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Abstract 
This thesis reports a mixed method case study of Turkish teachers’ and trainee 
teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding aspects of moral education and moral psychology, 
and the development of these beliefs and attitudes through teacher training and experience. 
Both internationally and in Turkey it is generally agreed that teachers are not well enough 
equipped to carry out moral education. This thesis explores a philosophical argument for why 
understanding the psychology of moral development could be valuable for teachers in 
informing their engagement with explicit and implicit moral education. A cross-sectional 
sample of participants was investigated using a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches 
to analyse beliefs and attitudes relevant to moral education. The results indicate that Turkish 
teachers and trainee teachers are not equipped with the relevant set of knowledge and skills to 
consciously foster students’ moral development; neither teacher training nor teaching 
experience appear to influence the teachers’ belief development. However, teachers and 
trainee teachers are willing and interested both to engage with moral education, and to 
receive training relevant to conducting moral education. Key findings regarding teachers’ 
beliefs and attitudes concerning conducting moral education include an inclination towards 
providing pupils with a scaffold to foster moral development, rather than dogmatic 
imposition of a certain set of values and virtues; and an inclination towards creating a 
pluralistic moral environment in the school that fosters compassion and cooperation. Based 
on the understandings gained from the reviewed literature and analysed data, 
recommendations are made regarding how to improve ITE programmes with respect to 
preparing teachers to engage with moral education. 
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Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations 
ITE:  Initial teacher education 
ME:  Moral education 
RE:  Religious education 
RCE: Religious Culture and Ethics 
MEB: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education – Turkey) 
FCM:  Four Components Model 
CDT:  Cognitive Development Theory 
SIM: Social Intuitionist Model 
NKA:  Neo-Kohlbergian Approach 
MFT:  Moral Foundations Theory 
TET:  Triune Ethics Theory 
PCG: Psychological Counselling and Guidance 
Student: Within the context of the empirical component of this study, “student” refers 
to participants who are first-year students of a teacher training programme. 
This applies in Chapters III, IV, V, VI and VII, and Appendix B; not in 
Chapters I and II. 
Intern:  Within the context of the empirical component of this study, “intern” refers to 
participants who are fourth-year students of a teacher training programme, and 
who also are doing their internships organised by the teacher training 
programme they are enrolled in, or who have recently completed their 
internships. This applies in Chapters III, IV, V, VI and VII, and Appendix B; 
not in Chapters I and II. 
Teacher: Within the context of the empirical component of this study, “teacher” refers 
to participants who are practising teachers. This applies in Chapters III, IV, V, 
VI and VII, and Appendix B; not in Chapters I and II. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION and PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 
This thesis is a study of Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes 
that are relevant to their engagement with moral education, and how initial teacher education 
(ITE) programmes in Turkey influence the development of these beliefs. My interest in 
Turkey stems from my dual nationality (Turkish/British) and my upbringing in Turkey. I 
have also observed the developments in my country in the last one and a half decades, 
sometimes with terror and outrage, and sometimes with hope and exhilaration. 
Turkey faces many problems, and has been experiencing political turbulence in the 
past decade. These include the abuse of law through large-scale court cases based on false 
evidence (Durmuş, 2016) and corruption scandals (Arango, 2013; Steinvorth, 2014), rising 
authoritarianism (Ant & Harvey, 2016; Vick, 2014) and the initial rise and later purge of an 
organization that had infiltrated key government offices which led to a failed coup attempt in 
2016 (Tüysüz & McLaughlin, 2016). Turkey also hosts the largest number of refugees from 
Syria (Stone, 2016), and the violence of the civil war in neighbouring Syria episodically spills 
into Turkey as the interests of the Turkish government, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
and the Kurdish rebels conflict (BBC, 2016).  
Furthermore, the reactions of the Turkish people regarding such issues have differed. 
In response to the corruption scandals, many of the government’s supporters said that those in 
government “steal, but at least work hard” (Akyol, 2014) and have re-elected the government 
several times since then, appearing to legitimise their corruption. When a man kicked a 
woman in her face for wearing shorts in 2016, no one intervened (Embury-Dennis, 2016). 
Syrian refugees have been assaulted by several angry mobs across Turkey (İdiz, 2015). 
On the other hand, the Turkish people also show courage and compassion, and follow 
through their convictions to the end. A proposed law that could have been interpreted as 
legitimising rape by allowing the offender to marry with the rape victim, including children 
(Pells, 2016) was withdrawn due to people’s outrage (Agerholm, 2016). Humanitarian aid to 
Syrians (The Guardian, 2016), and the generally more welcoming approach of the Turkish 
people compared to Western governments (Stone, 2016) also point to admirable charity.  
Moral education itself may not be able to remedy these problems themselves, but it 
can address the discrepancy in people’s reactions to such events by equipping the next 
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generation with the necessary moral skills and dispositions to face challenges better. 
However, in order to conduct moral education that can meet this aim, Turkish teachers who 
will carry out this education also need to be adequately equipped. Conversely, there is wide 
consensus that teachers are not properly prepared to engage in moral education, both in 
Turkey and abroad (Frey, 2010; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 
Sockett & LePage, 2002; Temli et al., 2011; Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2005; 
2008). As a result, this study focuses on how teacher training programmes in Turkey equip 
pre-service teachers in relation to conducting moral education. 
The remainder of this chapter sets out the context and field of the research, followed 
by a statement of the problem. Next, how the stated problem is addressed in this thesis is laid 
out. This is followed by a ‘road map’ of the thesis, which is followed by a discussion of the 
Turkish context and it’s relevance to the field. And finally, the philosophical approach 
employed in this study is explicated in the last section of the chapter. 
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1. Statement of the Problem 
The concept of moral education initially brings to mind the official course of moral 
education in state schools in Turkey, where moral education is taught alongside religious 
education (MEB1, 2010a; 2010b). The current system of moral education in Turkey takes 
place in the Religious Culture and Ethics (RCE) course, which is a mandatory course in 
grades 5 through 12 (10-year-old to 17-year-old students). Either one or two hours per week 
is allocated to this course depending on the grade level. Although the content of these lessons 
changes from grade to grade, the course books generally consist of six chapters, four of 
which are devoted to Sunni Muslim religious culture, one chapter to religion and morality, 
and one chapter focuses on the relationship between religion and either civilization, society, 
government/secularism, or Atatürk’s (founding father of the Republic of Turkey) principles, 
depending on the grade. 
However, pupils do not learn morality only in an official moral education course. 
Moral interactions pervade almost all aspects of school life, and these have an influence on 
students’ moral development beyond the formal curriculum that is followed in the classroom 
(Freire, 1983; Giroux & Purpel, 1983; Purpel & Ryan, 1983). While the content of education 
is detailed in the curriculum, pupils also learn morality through what might be called the 
context of education. The context of education referred to here is relevant to the concept of 
the hidden curriculum. This concept is more deeply explored in Chapter II, but for the 
purposes of this introduction, the hidden curriculum is defined not as existing in the form of a 
written document, but consisting of “the order and regulations of the school, its physical and 
psychological environment, and the non-official or implied messages that the administrators, 
or teachers, convey to students” (Yüksel, 2005, p. 330). Because morality is such a 
ubiquitous part of school social life, moral education inevitably takes place in the hidden 
curriculum (Purpel & Ryan, 1983). Pupils learn moral values by interacting with their peers, 
teachers, administrators, and other school staff as a natural part of the school experience. This 
points to the fact that moral education is confined neither to the elements detailed in the 
official curriculum nor to the classroom. 
One of the most fundamental elements that influences the hidden curriculum, and by 
extension the implicit moral education pupils receive in schools, is teachers’ beliefs (Sanger 
& Osguthorpe, 2005; 2013). Rokeach (1968) indicates that beliefs inform individuals’ 
                                                          
1 Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education – Turkey) 
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behaviour, and the theory of learning by observation (Bandura, 1986; 1997) indicates that 
teachers’ behaviour influences pupils’ behaviour (Renkl, 2014). Furthermore, addressing 
teachers’ beliefs is important because educators are not always fully aware of the beliefs they 
hold, and because psychologically fundamental beliefs (Richardson 1996, 2003) “can be 
highly resistant to modification, particularly if they are not confronted in an explicit, 
meaningful way,” for example, during their pre-service training (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011, 
p. 572). Ausubel, Novak, and Hanesian (1978; p. iv) argue that “the most important single 
factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows. Ascertain this and teach 
him/her accordingly.” 
The need to address teachers’ beliefs regarding moral education, and the problematic 
lack of it in teacher training programmes, is a point agreed on by many educators (Frey, 
2010; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; Sockett & LePage, 2002; 
Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2005; 2008). In response to this issue, Sanger and 
Osguthorpe (2005; 2011; 2013) have identified four sets of beliefs that are thought to 
profoundly influence teachers’ behaviour in the context of implicit moral education. These 
include moral beliefs, psychological beliefs, educational beliefs, and contingent factors (see 
Chapter II for more detail). Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005; 2011; 2013) indicate that attending 
to these four sets of beliefs that trainee teachers hold during their pre-service training is of 
paramount importance with regards to their ability to engage in moral education. 
However, there is a significant lack of research regarding what trainee teachers’ 
beliefs are when they enter teacher training programmes. Furthermore, there is also a lack of 
research in Turkey regarding how current teacher training programmes influence the 
development of these beliefs. This gap in understanding could potentially hinder efforts in 
teacher training programmes that attempt to address trainee teachers’ beliefs. Taking this gap 
in knowledge as the point of departure for this thesis, this study aims to shed light on what 
Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education are, and how these 
beliefs develop through teacher training and teaching experience. In light of this aim, five 
core research questions were identified: 
1. How does moral education take place? 
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of 
moral behaviour? 
16 
 
3. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding the occurrence and 
development of moral behaviour? 
4. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral 
education in Turkey? 
5. How do Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral 
psychology and moral education develop through teacher training and teaching 
experience? 
It was envisioned that by answering these research questions, recommendations for 
practitioners and policymakers could be made concerning how to approach teacher training 
regarding moral education. The answers to the first and second research questions were 
sought through an extensive review of literature. To this end, Chapter II focuses on the 
relevant educational and psychological literature. 
The answers to the third, fourth and fifth research questions were sought through the 
empirical component of this study. This entailed collecting and analysing data from a cross-
sectional sample of participants from the same teacher training programme of a university in 
Turkey, including first-year students who have little teacher training and no teaching 
experience, fourth-year students who have full training but little experience, and practising 
alumni teachers of the same programme who have full training and several years of 
experience. Collected data was analysed to shed light on what Turkish teachers’ and trainee 
teachers’ beliefs regarding the psychological and educational aspects of moral education are, 
and a comparison between the beliefs of the three groups of participants investigated has 
yielded an understanding of how teacher training and experience influence belief 
development. 
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2. Road Map 
How the thesis proceeds is explained in this section. So far, the first chapter of the 
thesis has outlined my motivation as the researcher to engage in this research and has briefly 
explained the context and the problem this thesis tackles. In the remainder of this chapter, the 
Turkish context and the philosophical approach regarding morality and moral education, and 
the role training on moral psychology in initial teacher education (ITE) programmes can play 
in better equipping teachers to engage in moral education, is explicated. The next section 
details the education system in Turkey in order to provide more background knowledge of 
Turkey, as well as briefly mentioning the social and political aspects that have been 
impacting on education in Turkey, and why Turkey is a worthwhile location to conduct this 
study. 
The last section of this chapter aims to make the philosophical argument that it is 
worthwhile to focus on fostering moral psychological skills in moral education. A mixed 
approach of virtue ethics, naturalism, and pragmatism is employed. What these skills are is 
not explained in depth here, because a deeper review of what constitutes these skills is 
presented in Chapter II. The central theme is that moral education should focus not only on 
what constitutes morality (focusing on specific values and virtues) but also on how to behave 
morally (focusing on morally relevant psychological skills), no matter how morality is 
defined – and in section 4.3 of this chapter it is argued that definitions of morality are likely 
to be plural; there may be multiple ways of phrasing and defining what constitutes morality. 
Chapter II, Literature Review, is composed of two main sections. The first section 
presents the educational literature regarding moral education and development, seeking an 
answer to the first research question. Initially, the concept of a theory of moral education is 
discussed, mainly based on Hand (2014). The historical development of conceptions of moral 
education in the West and in Turkey are discussed after this, which is followed by a more in-
depth explanation of how formal moral education takes place in Turkey, and several lines of 
criticism to this education. Following this, how moral education takes place implicitly in 
schools is discussed. This involves a deeper investigation of the concepts of hidden 
curriculum, moral ecology, and implicit education. Next, literature regarding teachers’ 
relevant educational beliefs and attitudes are presented. Finally, two methods of moral 
instruction, fostering moral expertise and role modelling, are discussed. 
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The second section of Chapter II focuses on moral psychology literature, seeking an 
answer to the second research question. Theories and models of moral psychology reviewed 
include the Four Components Model, Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Cognitive 
Developmental Theory, the Social Intuitionist Model, Moral Foundations Theory, and Triune 
Ethics Theory. Psychological constructs regarding moral judgement and its development, and 
moral motivation and its development are presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
discussion of how an understanding of reviewed literature of moral psychology is relevant to 
teachers’ beliefs regarding their engagement with moral education. 
Chapter III, Methodology, explicates the methodological approach employed in data 
gathering and analysis. The philosophical approach taken to conducting an empirical study in 
this thesis – pragmatic mixed methods research – is laid out. Following this, the research 
design is discussed. Next, the research tools and the data analysis procedure are explained. 
This is followed by the section addressing ethical concerns before the chapter is concluded 
with a description of participant recruitment. 
Chapter IV, Quantitative Data Analysis, is devoted to the reporting of the analysis of 
quantitative data, which was obtained through questionnaires. This mainly involves analysis 
of descriptive frequencies and results of regression tests run on the data. Following this in 
Chapter V, Qualitative Data Analysis, analysis of qualitative data obtained through 
interviews and observations is presented. 
In Chapter VI, Discussion, the findings obtained from data analysis are synthesised 
with the understanding of moral education and moral psychology gained from the literature 
reviewed in Chapter II. This entails a discussion of a) the influence of teacher training and 
experience on participants’ psychological and educational beliefs relevant to moral education, 
b) participants’ general dispositions relevant to their practice of moral education, given the 
understanding of their beliefs, c) how they may interact with pupils in terms of fostering 
students’ moral development and d) how they may attempt to influence the school moral 
ecology, and finally e) how current ITE programmes seem to equip teachers with beliefs 
relevant to their practice of moral education and several suggestions regarding how ITE 
programmes may attempt to further foster teachers’ beliefs, attitudes, and knowledge 
regarding their ability to engage effectively in moral education. 
Finally, in Chapter VII, Conclusion, the significant findings of the study are 
summarised, and the limitations of the study and the generalizability of findings are 
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discussed. Suggestions for future research are made before the thesis is concluded with some 
final thoughts.  
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3. The Turkish Context 
This section details the education system in Turkey and why Turkey has been chosen 
as the focus of this thesis. While there is a significant gap in knowledge internationally 
regarding how teachers are equipped to carry out moral education, making such a study 
desirable in any national context, the Turkish context has certain unique features that makes it 
particularly interesting. Most importantly, the shifting social and political context in the last 
two decades, and their impact on the education system is of interest. 
The education system in Turkey is highly centralized, and the decisions made at the 
level of the Ministry of Education have clearly felt reverberations throughout the education 
system. The curriculum is designed by the ministry and all schools except minority schools 
(e.g. Armenian schools, Jewish schools) and Embassy schools (e.g. British Embassy School 
in Ankara) are required to follow the curriculum with very limited autonomy. In this regard, 
public schools and private schools do not differ from each other much – the difference 
between the two kinds of schools is largely in private schools’ ability to be more selective in 
which teachers to employ and providing extracurricular activities, such as clubs, due to the 
greater amount of economic resources individual private schools can devote to these areas. 
Also of note is that, compared to the UK, where private schools are less common and more 
expensive, private schools in Turkey are much more common and not very expensive, 
although it should also be noted that the quality and quantity of private schools in Turkey has 
changed considerably over the past two decades. 
A detailed account of the curriculum is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
generally, the majority of the mandatory primary curriculum is made of Turkish, 
mathematics, foreign language (most commonly English), Knowledge of Life (until 3rd 
grade), and science and social studies (after 4th grade). These courses take 21 of a total of 30 
hours of lessons2 per week up to 4th grade3, and 21 of a total of 35 hours of lessons per week 
after 5th grade (MEB, 2017). The remaining hours are divided between various mandatory 
courses focusing on artistic or physical development, technology related courses, and 
religion. These courses take one or two hours per week. In addition to this, schools are 
required to provide 6 hours of elective courses to their students from 5th grade on, including 
three courses related to religious studies, four courses related to language and 
                                                          
2 Each hour of lessons takes 40 minutes 
3 Only 19 hours in 1st grade. 
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communication, extra foreign language courses, four science and mathematics related 
courses, five arts and sports related courses, and five courses related to social studies. Which 
elective courses will be provided are selected by the school administration; the students 
choose from the courses offered by their school. 
The curriculum for secondary schools depends on the type of secondary school. These 
types include Anatolian high schools (the most common type, usually just called ‘high 
school’ in daily language), and high schools with specific focuses, including science, social 
sciences, fine arts, sports, and vocational high schools such as religious vocational high 
schools, teacher high schools or accountancy high schools. The curriculum of secondary 
schools with a specific focus is dominated by the focus subject matter, while Anatolian high 
schools have a more balanced curriculum. Further to this, in the last two years in Anatolian 
high schools, students elect a branch to specialize. These include a focus on the sciences, 
social sciences, Turkish and mathematics (usually termed ‘equal weight’), or foreign 
languages. These branches are essentially sets of elective courses that begin students’ 
specialization in certain subject areas, and influence which tertiary programmes they may 
enter. This being said, Turkish, foreign language and religion are mandatory courses in all 
schools in all years.  
The education system in Turkey has changed five times in the past two decades, 
increasing the minimum mandatory education from 5 years of primary education in 1996, to 
8 years of primary education in the first instance, then to 11 years of primary and secondary 
education (8+3 years), and finally to the current 12 years of primary, middle and high school 
education (4+4+4 years) in 2012. During this period attendance to primary education has 
risen from 84.7% in the 1997-98 academic year to 94.8% in the 2015-16 academic year 
(topping at 99.57% in the 2013-14 academic year) (TÜİK4, 2017). Attendance to secondary 
education in the same period has increased from 37.8% in 1997-98 (not mandatory at this 
date) to 79.7% in 2015-16, which is the highest so far (TÜİK, 2017). The total number of 
students attending primary and secondary education has risen from 11.2 million in 1997-98 to 
16.3 million in 2015-16 (TÜİK, 2017). 
From the above two factors – the state’s heavy involvement in the education system 
and the percentage of school attendance – it is apparent that the state interacts with the vast 
majority of young people through the education system. Further to this, education in Turkey 
                                                          
4 TÜİK: Turkish Statistical Institute 
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is highly politicized, and this has been most clearly felt curriculum changes, especially since 
2012. An example of this is that the theory of evolution has been removed from the science 
and biology curriculum as a political move to appeal to certain segments of the society 
(Evrensel, 2017; Milliyet, 2017). On the other hand, religion has also received increased 
focus in the curriculum with the three new religious courses introduced as electives. Further 
to this, graduates of religious vocational high schools can now enter any tertiary programme, 
whereas their choices were limited only to theology before 2011. This has raised concerns 
especially with regards to these graduates entering law schools and influencing the judiciary 
system in less secular ways (Milliyet, 2011; Vatan, 2006). Also of relevance is the removal of 
the ban on wearing headscarves in schools. While on the one hand the ban was criticised as 
an oppression on freedom (Hürriyet, 2013; Yeni Şafak, 2013), its removal was also criticised 
on the grounds that girls who did not want to wear headscarves but were under pressure from 
their families to do so no longer had a reason acceptable to their families to take off their 
headscarves without damaging their relationships with them (Hürriyet, 2014). 
Moreover, in recent years, a large proportion of different kinds of schools have been 
converted to religious vocational schools. Due to this, there has been a surge in the number of 
religious schools, with religious middle school numbers increasing from 1099 in 2013 to 
1961 in 2015, and religious high school numbers increasing from 537 in 2012 to 1149 in 
2015 (Eğitimsen, 2016). 
The issues mentioned here have impacted the core identity of the Turkish Republic, 
and the values related to this identity. A breakdown of what these core values are is beyond 
the scope of this thesis – although it should be noted that the examples given above are 
mainly related to the secular characteristic of the Turkish Republic and Turkish people – but 
it should be born in mind that such values are ever-present as the undercurrent for both the 
values informing this thesis through me, the researcher (I grew up in Turkey), and the data 
gathered, as all data were gathered from Turkish participants and in Turkey. 
The recent conflict surrounding such core values has had reflections in the education 
system in what might be informally called a bureaucratic war in the game of thrones in 
Turkey. For example, schools’ selection of elective courses, particularly whether schools 
elected the new religious courses offered or not has been said to have been used as a means 
for tagging and profiling the political ideology of specific schools and/or the administrators 
of such schools (Cumhuriyet, 2013). Moreover, the tagging was not limited to the secular vs 
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religious divide, but extended to political loyalties: teachers and administrators were tagged 
as secular, government (AKP – the ruling party in Turkey since 2002) supporter, or supporter 
of the Gülen Organization5 (Cumhuriyet, 2013). 
The Gülen Organization is relevant to this thesis for several reasons – most 
importantly for their prominence in the fields of politics and education, and the conflict they 
have been having with AKP. The Organization is responsible for the Ergenekon and 
Sledgehammer trials among others (Aydınlık, 2017; Erdin, 2016), in which a large proportion 
of high ranking military officers were either jailed or forced to retire. The significance of 
these trails is that they were conducted very unfairly and this unfairness was public 
knowledge. Strong evidence supporting the innocence of indicted officers were ignored in 
favour of guilt-supporting evidence that was either weak or demonstrated to be fake were 
taken into account (Gül & Yılmaz, 2017). As a result, these trials diminished people’s faith in 
the judicial system. The Organization is also responsible for instigating the government 
corruption scandal widely covered in the media in 2013, which brought into public 
consciousness of how far corruption had penetrated the heads of state. The Organization also 
attempted to overtake the state by infiltrating state offices (Sözcü, 2015), rather than 
following more legitimate political routes. Finally, the Organization is also behind the failed 
coup in July 2016, which resulted in nearly 250 deaths and 2200 wounded (Akşam, 2016). 
The tagging mentioned above later found its use in the sweeping purges in education 
as the dershane6 system in Turkey, where the Gülen Organization’s presence was 
overwhelming, was disbanded7. Furthermore, it has been found that in order to gain exclusive 
control over academia and the armed forces in Turkey, the Organization stole questions of 
national and military exams in successive years, in effect committing cheating on a mass 
level in a period spanning fifteen years (A Haber, 2017; Ataman, 2017). 
                                                          
5 The Gülen Organization is headed by the Islamic cleric Fetullah Gülen, and was an ally of the ruling party AKP 
until 2011-2013, when the alliance fell apart following the leaking of tapes documenting government 
corruption by his organization to the media on 17-25 December 2013, and an overarching bureaucratic war 
began, which also took place in the field of education. The failed coup attempt in 2016 and the sweeping 
purges since 2014 are connected to this conflict. The organization is now deemed a terrorist organization in 
Turkey. 
6 Dershane’s in Turkey were a kind of after-school school, where students could get extra tuitions, most often 
in preparation for national exams such as the University Entrance Exam. All dershane’s were privately owned, 
and their curriculum was not monitored by the government, although given that the main purpose of the 
dershane’s was to prepare students to national exams, their curriculum usually consisted only of the academic 
courses that were assessed in such exams. 
7 The dershane’s that were not affected by the purge became private schools. This was the greatest factor 
impacting the quantity and quality of private schools in Turkey, as mentioned above. 
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The Organization’s presence, and the sweeping purges intended to eliminate the 
Organization from the state structure were not limited to the education system. A similar 
purge has taken place in the media, police force, judiciary, and the armed forces. Indeed, the 
failed coup attempt in July 2016 seems to have been precipitated by the removal of key 
officials in the judiciary system who, up until that time, protected the Organization’s 
members in the armed forces from legal actions against them (Ataman, 2017). The following 
coup attempt seems to have been made in desperation to retain power (Ataman, 2017). 
All these events form a backdrop to the moral ecology in Turkey, and moral education 
in Turkey in particular, during the time of this study and the period leading up to it. It would 
be unreasonable to assume that they have not had any impact on the collective moral 
psychology of the country. However, tracking how these social and political earthquakes 
impact on moral psychology and education in Turkey is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, the situation described here points to a clear need to foster cooperative attitudes 
in Turkey, which is one of the underlying motivations of engaging in this study. Taking the 
political situation in Turkey into account, understanding Turkish teachers’ and trainee 
teachers’ comprehension of moral psychology and their ability foster moral development is a 
worthwhile task. Furthermore, the results and findings of this study maybe applicable to other 
national contexts that share similar conflicts regarding their identity and core values, and in 
their respective political fields. 
This section has detailed the education system in Turkey, and the social and political 
environment that makes Turkey a worthwhile location to conduct this study. Information 
regarding how moral education is conducted in Turkey has been left out here, as this can be 
found in Chapter 2, alongside an international comparison. The next section explores the 
philosophical foundations underpinning this thesis. 
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4. Philosophical Approach 
In this section, the underlying philosophy of the thesis is explored. The main 
argument of this thesis is that including moral psychology in teacher training could equip 
teachers with better intellectual tools to foster pupils’ moral development. This statement 
contains several assumptions which need to be made explicit before proceeding to the main 
body of the study, namely to the practice of moral education and the use of moral psychology 
in it. While I do not narrowly align myself with the advocacy of any single school of 
philosophical thought, there is considerable influence from virtue ethics, naturalism, and 
pragmatism in the underlying philosophy of this study. 
The assumptions and foci in the above-stated argument of the study include, first of 
all, the focus on moral skills and behaviour rather than specific moral values and virtues; 
secondly, a philosophically naturalist concern regarding the universality of moral values and 
virtues intended to be fostered in moral education; and thirdly, a concern for what can be 
normatively prescribed as goals of moral education. Finally, a philosophical discussion will 
be made considering the use of moral psychology in teacher training. 
4.1. Why Virtue Ethics? 
The approach that virtue ethics takes, as a moral theory, in understanding human 
nature, and the nature of moral behaviour, has several advantages over its two main 
alternatives: deontology and consequentialism, at least for the purposes of the argument of 
this thesis. Before expanding on the philosophical approach informing this thesis, several 
problems of deontology and consequentialism need to be highlighted in order to dispel doubts 
regarding why virtue ethics is a better philosophical fit regarding the use of moral psychology 
in teacher training. 
There are many different strands of deontology and consequentialism (Schafer-
Landau, 2013). But what unites them in general, and what I take issue with in both, is that 
these two moral theories rely on the use of reasoning as a guide to daily behaviour, and their 
implicit claims to an absolute universal. Kant bases his philosophy on the primacy of 
reasoning, saying that the human faculty of reasoning is not geared towards happiness and 
well-being since, essentially, smarter people are unhappier (Kant, 2013, p. 486). Thus, he 
concludes, the purpose of reasoning is not well-being or happiness but something else. And 
given that humans possess such pronounced reasoning capacities, the purpose of the life of 
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the possessors of such reasoning is to be found not in happiness, but in morality, which is in 
turn defined by behaviour maxims that can be generalized into universal laws.  
Consequentialist theories on the other hand do not take reasoning as the basis for 
morality, but some external ‘good’ (Schafer-Landau, 2013) – defined in different ways 
depending on the strand of consequentialism. Essentially, consequentialist theories are 
concerned with calculating which actions or rules would result in the greatest good, following 
an identification of what the ultimate good is. However, such calculations would involve very 
complex reasoning processes which are obviously not employed in daily behaviour, such as 
pocketing an office pen. From this perspective, consequentialism as a moral theory may be 
more suited to macro level concerns such as legislature, ethics in technology, or politics, but 
has less to say about developing individuals’ moral propensities through education. 
With regards to the claims of universality, Kant famously proclaims that “I ought 
never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a 
universal law” (Kant, 2013, p. 488, italics original). While the clarity of this statement has 
intuitive attractiveness, the lack of disclaimer caveats points to absolute universalism, which 
is either not possible, or redundant. Social and environmental contexts differ too much across 
time and space. This becomes apparent when one considers the extremely different social and 
environmental necessities of daily life living in a stone age tribe and in a modern metropolis 
of the globalized world. For any maxim to be applicable in both cases it would need to be 
vague to the point that it offers no guidance regarding our moral behaviour in daily life. Such 
universal rules would need to be interpreted differently in different situations, defeating its 
absolutist and universalist implications. 
In consequentialism universality is an implicit assumption when one identifies an 
ultimate good which should be pursued (Foot, 1988, pp. 224-5). I am not against this idea per 
se, as I think that one such ultimate good exists – life in its broadest sense8, diversity, quality, 
and quantity – but the identification of this ultimate value would need to be from a supra-
species (for lack of a better word) perspective. The ultimate value would apply to fungi as 
much as it applies to humans, and perhaps artificial intelligence once it reaches human level 
intelligence. Consequentialist theories in general tend to take their point of departure as some 
ultimate human good, and this falls short of true universality. Some, like Foot (1988), 
                                                          
8 But even this is contentious: What if artificial intelligence and technology can perfectly mimic the animation 
of life? Is blood flow through flesh inherently more valuable than electric flow through plastic? Perhaps it is 
not life but the complexity brought about by life itself that is the ultimate value/good. 
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contend that an ultimate human good may not even exist (p. 241). Furthermore, the 
vagueness problem of universal rules afflicting deontology also applies to consequentialist 
goods. 
In other words, absolute universalism is not entirely possible whether it is some law 
or good; interpretations would be necessary to adapt the universal for differing situations. The 
central value of virtue ethics in this regard is that instead of rationally discerning how to 
apply moral universals in different contexts, virtue ethicist approaches focus on the 
development of skills, tendencies, habits, and characteristics that equip a person with the 
ability to adapt whatever moral universal to specific situations and circumstances. Stated this 
way, even moral universals discovered through deontological or consequentialist reasoning 
would require a character formed through the lens of virtue ethics to apply the universal to 
specific circumstances. Furthermore, the focus on psychological mechanisms that work 
unconsciously (faster and less effortful than reasoning) alleviates the necessity for relying on 
reasoning processes that turn out to be not as reliable as they may seem (see Chapter II, for 
psychological literature supporting this statement). This is the main reason for using a virtue 
ethical approach in this thesis to understanding morality, and by extension, the approach 
taken in thinking about how to conduct moral education. Although it should also be noted 
that this approach is considered to be universal insofar as humans’ morally relevant 
psychological capacities are concerned, and is not limited to the Turkish context. 
However, one also needs to bear in mind the problems of virtue ethics. The ambiguity 
of what exactly constitutes virtues does not readily lend itself to clear behavioural guidelines, 
and this further leads to problems of prioritising virtues, and following this, conflicts between 
virtues. The same issue also raises relativistic and situationist criticisms (Kristjansson, 2013). 
Yet, this ambiguity is not something that can be pulled this way and that through a 
combination of relativism and situationism. There is a general understanding of what virtues 
are (Kristjansson, 2013), and the remaining ambiguity serves as a platform for continuous 
negotiation and improvement both of our understanding of virtues, and how to apply them in 
daily life. While virtue ethics does not provide crystal clear guidelines, it recognizes the 
complexity of life that denies such clear guidelines, and engages with this complexity.  
4.2. Practical Wisdom and Habits 
The focus of the study is about fostering moral skills, rather than on teaching what 
certain values or virtues are. The aim of this study is to explore what kind of skills and 
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knowledge teachers can benefit from regarding how to teach pupils how to be moral, but not 
on identifying which values and virtues should be taught to pupils. Many virtue ethicists 
share this concern (Anscombe, 1958; Foot, 1978; 2001; Hursthouse, 1999; 2006; 2007; 2012; 
Nussbaum, 1993; 2006), and studies indicate that mere knowledge of morality rarely leads to 
moral conduct (Blasi, 1980; Hardy, 2006). Certain technical skills and deeper moral 
motivation are necessary for moral behaviour (Blasi, 1980; 1999; Narvaez, 2010a). The focus 
on moral skills can also be seen explicitly in Aristotle’s comparison of morality to other 
skills, like archery (Gorski, 2013). Being a good archer includes not only the knowledge of 
how to aim accurately, but also the ability to calculate distance and the effect of wind, and 
proper tensioning of the body. Similarly, moral conduct includes the capacity to recognise 
whether there is a moral issue at hand, being able to make accurate judgements about right 
and wrong, and the appropriate extent to which a particular virtue should be applied 
(Hursthouse, 2006; Rest, 1983; 1984). 
In virtue ethics literature, the capacity of the correct and appropriate application of a 
virtue in a particular situation is called practical wisdom. Hursthouse (2006) suggests that 
practical wisdom is not simply theoretical knowledge of the virtues and their application, but 
a set of intellectual capacities that allows the possessor of practical wisdom to perceive when 
and how to apply virtues, and avoid moral “mistakes” (p. 285). However, practical wisdom is 
gained through experience (Hursthouse, 2006). According to Hursthouse (2006), Aristotle 
draws a distinction between “natural virtue” which is usually possessed by adolescents, who 
mean to do well but make mistakes in the meanwhile, and “full virtue” which is generally 
possessed by adults who have had experience and cultivated their application of virtues in an 
appropriate way. Hursthouse (2006) indicates that “the claim that practical wisdom requires 
experience might just be an alternative description of the parallel between practical wisdom 
and techne (technical expertise) as regards habituation” (p. 286). Just as technical expertise 
requires experience and habituation in any practice of skill, “so practical wisdom requires 
experience of habitually doing what is virtuous” (p. 286). 
On the other hand, pragmatists like Dewey are also concerned with habituation. 
Dewey (1922) indicates that there are three broad levels of moral conduct: impulses, habits, 
and reflective action. Impulses are in essence what we are born with, and they later get 
refined by interaction with the environment (such as parents, society) or experience, into 
habits. Anderson (2014) indicates that habits can be considered as dispositions that have been 
shaped socially for certain kinds of behaviour or responses to the environment. For example, 
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a child’s hunger, through experience and interaction with the (cultural) environment develops 
into a taste for certain foods on certain occasions (e.g. birthday cake), or avoidance of certain 
foods (e.g. prohibition of pork in Islam). While habits may have had rationales when the 
behaviour first originated, over time the rationale can be forgotten, and habits start to operate 
unconsciously. This can pose a problem: as the environment changes, habitual behaviour 
might also need to change. However, since people form emotional attachments to their habits 
and customs, change may not come easily (Anderson, 2014). Once a way of living is 
established, people may resist change. Anderson (2014) indicates that in order to learn how to 
change habits psychological and sociological inquiry is necessary, beyond conscientiousness 
and willpower. 
In Dewey’s (1922) moral philosophy, intelligent conduct (self-reflection, deliberation, 
reasoning) is offered as a way of maintaining and reforming habits when they prove to be 
inadequate in a given situation or a change in environment. This can be considered as part of 
practical wisdom, for it too is concerned with the correct and appropriate application of a 
moral value or virtue in changing circumstances. Dewey (1922) further suggests that 
education is the key to instil habits more amenable to change through reasoning skills. 
Studies of moral intuitions and moral reasoning have yielded results that move in 
parallel with both the pragmatist and the virtue ethicist arguments. Recent research on moral 
psychology (Haidt, 2001; Graham et al. 2013; Narvaez, 2010a) indicates that moral habits 
(moral intuitions) are formed based on our morally relevant innate capacities such as disgust 
and compassion, and later get refined by experience (Graham et al. 2013) in line with the 
naturalist claim of the innateness of virtues cited by Hursthouse (2012): “[V]irtues arise in us 
neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but nature gives us the capacity to acquire them and 
completion comes through habituation” (p. 169). Moral intuitions drive our moral conduct. 
However, they are not immune to moral reasoning, and through self-reflection and moral 
deliberation, moral intuitions can be altered and lead to refined moral behaviour (Fine, 2006; 
Narvaez, 2010a).  
Research on moral psychology also points to certain capacities that are potentially 
part of the set of skills Hursthouse (2006) alludes to as practical wisdom, such as those 
explored in the Four Components Model (Rest, 1983; 1984) (see Section 2.1., Chapter II). 
Some researchers, such as Darcia Narvaez (2010a), also point to how expertise in these skills 
can be developed through education and experience, in line with the virtue ethicist focus on 
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techne. Considering our deepening understanding of moral psychology, and how to foster and 
develop morally relevant psychological skills, this points to the possibility that the 
development of moral skills could be fostered in education more adequately by focusing on 
psychological constructs and capacities relevant to moral conduct. The moral psychological 
literature is explored in greater depth in Chapter II, Section 2. 
There is a particular take on human nature and morality explored here and the 
following sections. In a nutshell, I think the moral nature of humans is the collection of their 
characteristics – habits and emotional dispositions that give shape to behaviour – that foster 
the quantity, quality and diversity of life in the broadest sense. The claim that ‘life’ is at the 
core of morality begs far more questions than can be engaged with in this thesis, and is thus 
beyond its scope. However, this definition of human moral nature – habits and emotional 
dispositions – has more of a psychological character, and accordingly, while not exhaustive, 
the literature reviewed in Section 2 of Chapter II explores certain aspects of this 
psychological nature in-depth. 
4.3. Nature, Universals, and Pluralism 
Concerns about the universality of moral values and virtues are also relevant 
considering the focus on moral skills in this thesis, as opposed to moral values. Morality is 
not an end in itself; it serves the greater purpose of living a good life. The definitions of 
‘good life’ may change, but the fact that morality contributes to it is an idea shared by many, 
especially virtue ethicists (Hursthouse, 2012; 2013; Nussbaum, 2006; Peterson, 2011). 
Naturalistically conceived, morality contributes to the survival, reproduction, and thriving 
(SRT) of many species such as chimpanzees and bonobos as well as humans (Clay & de 
Waal, 2015; Currey, 2008; de Waal, 2014; de Waal, et al. 2014; Miller, 2008; Narvaez, 
2010a; Sinnot-Armstrong, 2008). Humans are defined as an ultra-social species, and survive 
and thrive much better in interdependent social groups than in complete isolation (Hogh-
Olesen, 2010; Robinson, Kurzban & Jones, 2007; Simpson & Beckes, 2008). The evolution 
of morality is thought to be an adaptation to environmental challenges (Sinnot-Armstrong, 
2008). Evolutionary approaches to morality take into account our psychological mechanisms, 
and how they have interacted with our environment which has led to our present moral 
psychology. According to Darcia Narvaez: 
“For our ancestors, virtue corresponded with actions that promoted survival, 
reproduction, and thriving (SRT), such as various forms of cooperation. As humans 
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moved into more complex societies, notions of virtue changed and became culturally 
transmitted rather than grounded in everyday causal learning; the clear links among 
virtuous action and SRT were less apparent.” (Narvaez, 2010a; p. 172) 
While in our evolutionary past the challenges faced by our ancestors were largely 
natural and confined to relatively smaller social circles than the present; today such problems 
can come in the form of political and economic concerns as well as social and/or natural 
concerns (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Iyer et al. 2012; Koleva et al. 
2012). Given that political, economic, social/cultural and environmental challenges to human 
well-being are not uniform across the globe, the moral solutions or adaptations people create 
in different societies are naturally different from others’ solutions or adaptations. As a result, 
morality constitutes different things in different cultures. 
Variation in morality across the globe does not result only from differing challenges 
to human well-being. There can be more than one way to solve the same problem. Just as 
people create different solutions to the problem of finding or creating shelter, they also find 
different solutions to the problem of maintaining in-group harmony (Currey, 2008; Miller, 
2008). Studies with the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (Graham et al. 2013; Haidt & 
Graham, 2007; Iyer et al. 2012; Koleva et al. 2012) have shown that conservatives and 
liberals have different conceptions of what is morally relevant. This suggests that people who 
face similar or even the same challenges in the same environments find different solutions to 
their (moral) environmental challenges. 
This points to a kind of ethical pluralism that results from the plurality of morally 
relevant challenges to life and the plural solutions to them. Gorski (2013) indicates that 
ethical pluralism is related to within-species variation: 
“While human beings do share a number of distinctive capacities, these capacities are 
variably distributed across human individuals. If the art of living well consists in 
identifying and realizing these capacities, then there will not be any one-size-fits-all 
model of the good life. The good is itself plural.” (Gorski, 2013; p. 550) 
The plurality of “good” that Gorski relates to within-species variation can also be 
explored through the variation in environments. This can be studied through the concept of 
moral ecology (Brinkmann, 2004; Hertzke, 1998). Moral ecology gets its name from the 
biological concept which emphasises the interconnectedness among living beings in a given 
environment. Frey (2010) offers the definition that “the various social and organisational 
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environments that form the backdrop to conduct constitute a moral ecology” (p. 617). As a 
framework, moral ecology is sensitive to the variability of situations where moral skills are 
applied and moral virtues upheld. It acknowledges that moral conduct takes place within a 
given universe (the moral ecology), and recognises the pluralistic nature of social 
environments and their “moral properties” (Brinkmann, 2004, p. 57).  
Just as biological ecologies are unique (albeit sharing some fundamental 
characteristics), so are moral ecologies (Brinkmann, 2004; Hertzke, 1998). The more 
localised the focus is (for example, from global moral ecology to the moral ecology of a 
single family living in the slums of Mumbai), the greater the degree of the relativity of moral 
values would be (Frey, 2010). This creates a problem for moral education that focuses on 
fostering specific values and virtues, as a clear definition of the universe one is focusing on 
needs to be considered. How certain can one be in prescribing specific moral values and 
virtues to be fostered in education, given the variability of their use in daily life in moral 
ecologies at differing levels? In order to create a moral education that is pluralistic enough, a 
focus on the shared fundamental characteristics that apply to the variety of universes one is 
addressing in education is necessary, and this requires a clear definition of these universes. 
Conversely, the existence of shared psychological constructs and capacities relevant 
to morality are somewhat more uniform across our species than values (Banerjee, Huebner, & 
Hauser, 2010). Given the relativity of moral values, and the universality of morally relevant 
psychological constructs and capacities, it can be concluded that it is a worthwhile endeavour 
to focus on moral psychology in moral education. This does not necessarily imply that this 
needs to be at the expense of a focus on specific moral values and virtues. Focusing on both 
specific values and virtues on the one hand, and psychological constructs, capacities and 
skills on the other would arguably be more likely to result in better moral education. 
Nevertheless, fostering moral psychological skills and capacities can be done at a larger scale 
compared to specific values and virtues. 
A cautionary note is also necessary. Naturalistic pluralism should not be confused 
with the moral relativism of ‘anything goes.’ Gorski (2013) indicates that: 
“Ethical naturalism can … evade the trap of cultural relativism by focusing on the 
social preconditions of human flourishing. Specifically, it will adjudge some social 
orders to be better than others insofar as they allow individuals enough freedom to 
discover their capacities and enough resources to realize them.” (p. 550) 
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Naturalistic pluralism acknowledges that while there are many means of achieving 
“good,” the good as an end can be described in terms of things that enhance SRT, especially 
when it comes to “thriving” (Hursthouse, 2012; Miller, 2008), or from a pragmatist 
perspective, in terms of how well the means meet the ends (Anderson, 2014) - which in the 
naturalistic case would be a naturalistically defined “good life.” Both naturalistically and 
pragmatically, any claim to what is “good” should be open to empirical investigation 
(Anderson, 2014; Besser-Jones, 2015; Hursthouse, 2012). This makes morality a social 
science more than anything else (Besser-Jones, 2015). On the other hand, normative claims 
(that can perhaps be set as moral educational goals) made from a naturalistic perspective do 
not always hold philosophically (Mackie, 1977). This issue will be addressed in the next 
section. 
4.4. Goals of Moral Education 
Moral naturalism has been hailed as a robust descriptive philosophy, but is usually 
considered to be an inadequate normative philosophy (Mackie, 1977; Moore, 1903). The 
reason for this is the well-established distinction between facts and values, that descriptions 
do not serve as prescriptions, and what “is” has no bearing on what “ought” to be (Gorski, 
2013; Moore, 1903). Given the naturalist foundation of this thesis, how can any normative 
claims be made concerning the goals of moral education, such as the potential benefits of 
including moral psychology in teacher education? 
One of the aims education in Turkey is responsible for pursuing is to equip pupils 
with the skills necessary to thrive individually in their future lives and to contribute to their 
community (MEB, 1973). In virtue ethicist terms this can be described as eudaimonia 
(Besser-Jones, 2015; Hursthouse, 2006; 2013; Nussbaum, 2006). Eudaimonia is loosely 
translated as happiness, well-being, flourishing, or thriving by different authors (Hursthouse, 
2013). In this thesis, eudaimonia is taken to be flourishing or thriving (interchangeably) as 
this term is shared with the natural sciences (survival, reproduction, and thriving). 
A caveat in the approach of the thesis needs to be highlighted at this point: goals and 
aims for moral education can be sought through different avenues. For example, an 
alternative avenue is through civic concerns and citizenship education, as Peterson (2011) 
suggests, and for which a nuanced argument can be found in Beck (1998). However, 
citizenship is much more bound by time and location compared to the more universalizable 
aspects of the nature of morality of interest to this thesis. Beck (1998) focuses on morality 
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only in the context of citizenship education in the UK. This has little bearing on the moral 
education context in Turkey, and civic education in Turkey is completely separate from any 
notions of moral education – that is the domain of RE. Moreover, civic education is very 
closely related with its temporal and geographic environment (e.g. UK between 2000-2010). 
When investigating the nature of morality, the psychological nature of human morality is the 
primary interest here. 
There is no consensus among philosophers regarding a detailed description of what 
eudaimonia consists of. While Peterson (2011) describes it as “living in accordance with 
human nature” (p.23) of which participation in politics is an essential element, most virtue 
ethicists continue to debate the term. Taking a pluralistic stance, there may not even be a 
single universal description of eudaimonia that applies to all people beyond its translation as 
‘thriving.’ Instead, eudaimonia can be different for each individual, considering the within-
species variation of talents, tendencies and capacities among humans that Gorski (2013) 
mentions, and the variety of environments in which people live. The application of one’s 
capacities and skills to the environment as best as one can to the benefit of oneself and others 
could be thought of as thriving in one’s environment. Concerning moral education, this could 
be translated into an aim as fostering moral skills and capacities, and directing pupils in how 
to apply these within their given moral ecology. In other words, fostering flexible moral 
habits and practical wisdom in order to enhance and foster thriving in pupils’ future lives. 
There are several ways of approaching the issue of applying oneself to the 
environment as best as one can. The kind of thriving characteristic of a species is posited to 
be eudaimonia for that species by naturalist virtue ethics. Lenman (2014) suggests that: 
“In the case of plants, to say an individual is a good member of whatever its species 
may be is to evaluate how well its parts and operations contribute in ways 
characteristic of that species to the two ends of survival and reproduction. With at 
least some animals a third end becomes salient—freedom from pain and pleasure and 
enjoyment of sorts characteristic to the species in question. And with social animals a 
fourth dimension comes into play: the good functioning of the group.” 
In the case of humans, the latter two (pleasure, enjoyment and freedom from pain; and 
the good functioning of the group) can be conceived as thriving. This suggests that the 
concept of ‘good’ can be defined by natural and social sciences and that the descriptions 
would also serve as prescriptions of how people ought to behave. This leads to the question 
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Besser-Jones (2015, p. 4) poses: “Can we, on naturalistic grounds, pick out the best form of 
human life?”  
Two criticisms can be directed at this idea. The first one is the fact that not all 
characteristics of a species might enhance thriving or eudaimonia. That some behaviour is 
characteristic of an animal does not necessarily mean that it is the best possible behaviour to 
enhance SRT. The fact that certain characteristics have contributed to SRT does not mean 
that they are the best means of enhancing SRT. Certain characteristics can turn out to be not 
so good, or even defective, upon investigation. When compared to humans, other animals that 
have less cognitive control over their instinctual habits are at a disadvantage when they need 
to change a defective behaviour. However, we have much more developed reasoning skills, 
which give us the capacity to identify our defective characteristics better, and consciously 
address them. This points to our ability to keep revising moral education, goals, prescriptions, 
and even descriptions. But this does not mean that naturalism should be abandoned, since our 
reasoning skills are one of our natural characteristics that enhance thriving in our 
environments as well (Sinnot-Armstrong, 2008). 
The second criticism, which is related to the first, is the well-established fact/value 
distinction in philosophy (Gorski, 2013; Mackie, 1977; Moore, 1903). According to this 
distinction, which is partly based on Hume’s philosophy and partly on Kant’s (Gorski, 2013), 
we cannot make logically valid deductions about what ought to be based on our empirical 
knowledge. But this distinction does not always hold. Gorski (2013) indicates that facts 
influence values and values influence facts. Pragmatists like Dewey (Pappas, 2009) and 
Anderson (2004) have drawn attention to how researchers’ values affect not only the research 
questions they set out to answer but also their interpretations of their findings. Thus, the 
values of researchers not only influence which facts are sought but also the meaning ascribed 
to them; our interpretation and expression of facts are value-laden. 
Conversely, our values are also fact-laden. Gorski (2013) indicates that evaluative 
judgements about someone’s character such as ‘brave’ or ‘cruel’ are both factual and 
evaluative. Such judgements ascribe a positive, neutral or negative evaluation to a person’s 
character in relation to a normative ideal on the one hand, and on the other, they are 
descriptions of facts: of that person’s behaviour. For example, someone who inflicts 
unwarranted damage on others is called cruel. Whether an action is warranted or not may be 
dependent on a normative ideal state; however, ideal normative states are not based on purely 
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philosophical values independent from natural states. Nature can offer some normative ends. 
In his research on chimpanzee societies, Frans de Waal (2014) defines their moral behaviour. 
He indicates that there is an ideal normative state in chimpanzee communities – social 
harmony – which individual chimpanzees try to preserve through various kinds of conduct, to 
achieve this ideal normative state (de Waal, 2014). This suggests that investigating human 
behaviour could also allow researchers to define the normative ideal people strive for in their 
daily lives. While this normative ideal may be interpreted by purely philosophical methods, 
everyday life itself would not be based on pure philosophical conceptions, but on the natural 
demands of daily living. 
Besser-Jones offers a potential naturalistic normative framework, which she names 
the health model (Besser-Jones, 2014; 2015), in answer to the question she poses, cited 
above. According to the health model, eudaimonia, the ideal normative state of thriving (for 
humans), is characterised by the realisation of one’s talents and capacities to the fullest 
extent, and their application to the benefit of one’s own life and the lives of others. The social 
sciences can identify what these capacities are, and define the limits of the extent to which 
they can be realised. Furthermore, the sciences can also describe how the application of such 
capacities can bring about the greatest benefit for their possessor and others. 
Making use of social sciences (such as moral psychology) in moral education can 
philosophically hold from naturalist and pragmatist perspectives. However, informing moral 
pedagogy does not need to be entirely based on ontological and epistemological philosophy. 
Morally relevant psychological capacities and constructs do not always depend on 
establishing certain normative prescriptions independent from natural states for them to be 
discussed. As an example, moral sensitivity is necessary to recognise that there is a moral 
issue at hand, no matter whether we are talking about generosity, courage, or temperance. 
This does not mean that we should consciously recognise the moral issue, for when it 
becomes habitual, conscious recognition becomes intuitive moral sensitivity (Myyry, 2003; 
Rest, 1983; 1984. See Chapter II).  
4.5. Moral Psychology in Teacher Training 
Given that natural and social sciences can factually describe what can be prescribed as 
normative ends, moral psychology can help us define psychologically sound aims for moral 
education with a flexible amount of universality. The flexibility suggested here is grounded in 
the naturalist and pragmatist philosophies that our current knowledge is not infallible, and 
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what we know today as true and right might turn out or become false and wrong in the future. 
Following such shifts, the normative goals we set for moral education would also need 
revision. The universality suggested here refers to the morally relevant psychological 
constructs shared by all people (except, perhaps, ‘morally disabled’ people like psychopaths), 
but not to categorical principles9. 
Moral psychology has so far defined some psychological capacities relevant to 
morality (Graham et al. 2013; Haidt, 2001; Kohlberg, 1981; 1984; Narvaez, 2008; 2010a; 
2010b; Rest, 1983; 1984) and how they can be further developed through education (Bebeau, 
1994; 2008; Morton et al. 2006; Narvaez, 2008; 2010b; Narvaez, Gleason, & Mitchell, 2010). 
(This is discussed in detail in Chapter II.) Furthermore, studies indicate that without paying 
due attention to psychological constructs, moral behaviour and character do not develop 
solely based on fostering moral reasoning (Hardy, 2006). Could teaching moral psychology 
to trainee teachers equip them with the necessary academic knowledge to foster the 
development of these psychological capacities in pupils (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013), 
and work towards helping pupils achieve their personal eudaimonia? 
As Lexmond (2012) puts it, “policies to build character should … be about building 
the foundational skills necessary to pursue a good life; not about setting out exactly what that 
life will look like” (p. 3). This would include what Krebs and Denton (2005) call enlightened 
self-interest, which is related to the conception of eudaimonia. They argue that the “key to 
moralization” resides in both “inducing people to understand the nature of morality,” and 
“why it is ultimately in everyone’s best interest to uphold systems of cooperation” – how it is 
in their interest to behave morally and encourage others to do so as well (Krebs & Denton, 
2005; p. 646). While they take a pragmatist approach, Krebs and Denton’s (2005) argument 
is deeply related to naturalistic virtue ethics in that they argue that peoples’ conception of 
eudaimonia (their best interests) is dependent on cooperative/moral behaviour. Furthermore, 
                                                          
9 For example, one might say that a (categorical) principle is ‘killing is wrong,’ but this obviously changes, or is 
systematically disregarded, in times of war. I would amend that principle as ‘inflicting unwarranted harm on 
others is wrong;’ however, what constitutes ‘warrant’ can change from one social/cultural environment to the 
next, or even from one event to the next, considering all the situational and psychological elements (including, 
for example, religious beliefs and political situations) influencing convictions and practical necessities. In order 
to understand universal moral principles one needs to decipher the structure of how (in this example) the 
things that constitute warrant change. But this structure has eluded philosophers and scientists so far. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that such a structure does not exist. My belief, as of this writing, is that the 
most fundamental, perhaps the only universal principle is ‘ensuring the continuation of life,’ applying even to 
non-human animals, with all other principles being in service of this ultimate principle. But the discussion of 
this assertion is beyond the scope of this thesis, as it has no direct practical relevance to teacher training 
regarding moral education or to moral education itself. 
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this would also entail pupils to realise their morally relevant psychological capacities and 
understand how to apply these capacities to their daily lives in order to achieve eudaimonia, 
as Besser-Jones (2015) suggests. 
This points to the fundamental importance of moral education in schools, and to the 
equal importance of teachers’ role in this education. This is based on a consideration of moral 
ecologies. Being in the classroom, teachers are better situated than philosophers or policy 
makers to understand the moral ecologies in which pupils live and are likely to live. Thus, 
having direct access to pupils themselves and their moral ecologies situates teachers in a 
place where they can judge with better nuance how and which values, virtues, and morally 
relevant psychological capacities to foster in pupils. 
Furthermore, teaching something as ubiquitous as morality would require a broader 
approach than addressing moral development and moral issues in a few lessons per week 
following a pre-defined curriculum (Osguthorpe, 2009; Sanger, 2008). Kohlberg (1983) 
argued that the vast majority of moral education takes place in what is called the hidden 
curriculum, and Purpel and Ryan (1983) indicate that moral education takes place outside the 
pre-defined curriculum inevitably. How moral education takes place beyond the curriculum is 
discussed in Chapter II. 
In summary, the central philosophical approach to moral education in teacher training 
programmes undergirding this thesis considers both specific values and virtues, and 
psychological skills and capacities relevant to morality. While the prioritisation of specific 
values and virtues can change from one community to the next, morally relevant 
psychological capacities are thought to be universal. Considering this, this study focuses on 
how Turkish teachers are equipped, particularly during their university training, and through 
experience of teaching, to foster students’ morally relevant psychological capacities. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, the answers to the first two research questions are sought: 
1. How does moral education take place? 
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of 
moral behaviour? 
Initially, educational literature is explored in the first section, in order to shed light on 
the first research question. The review of educational literature initially explores the idea of a 
theory of moral education. The section following that provides greater context regarding the 
history of moral education in the West and Turkey, and the current Turkish moral education 
system and reviews some of the criticisms of the system. This is followed by an exploration 
of the concepts “hidden curriculum” and “moral ecology” in relation to implicit moral 
education. Next, a cross-cultural review of teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral 
education is presented. The first section is concluded with a review of two pedagogical 
methods. 
This is followed by the review of the moral psychology literature in order to address 
the second research question. The section broadly reviews several theories and models of 
moral psychology and moral development, and focuses on moral judgement and moral 
motivation. The chapter is concluded with a discussion of how an understanding of moral 
psychology can benefit teachers in their endeavour to engage in moral education. 
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1. Moral Education 
This section focuses on moral education in schools. The previous chapter laid the 
philosophical foundations for why including moral psychology in teacher training could work 
towards fostering students’ moral development. This section explores the educational 
literature in relation to the same topic. In summary, moral interactions pervade almost all 
aspects of school life, and these have an influence on students’ moral development beyond 
the official curriculum that is followed in the classroom. For teachers to understand the 
school’s subtler effect on students’ moral development, it would appear to be beneficial for 
them to understand the moral atmosphere of the school (Kohlberg, 1983), and the psychology 
of moral development. 
This section thus concentrates on a) how the theory of moral education is conceived in 
this thesis, b) trends of moral education in the West and Turkey and the problems of focusing 
on the official moral education curriculum in the Turkish context; c) how moral education 
takes place implicitly in schools with regards to the moral ecology of the school and 
psychological constructs; d) the importance of addressing the beliefs of teachers relevant to 
moral education and moral development; and e) how moral education can be conducted 
taking into account the psychological capacities and the moral ecology of the school. Morally 
relevant psychological capacities are explored in more depth in the next section but are 
briefly explained here where necessary. 
1.1. Theory of Moral Education 
This section is mainly based on Michael Hand’s (2014) views on what a theory of 
moral education might be, and positioning myself in reference to Hand’s arguments. Hand 
initially makes a distinction between two kinds of theories. The first kind is called ‘scientific 
theories’ that are solely explanatory, but make no normative claims. Most theories in the 
natural sciences fall into this category, as, for example, there are no normative claims made 
by the theory of gravity. The second kind is called ‘practical theories’ and these theories 
involve normative claims of some sort, and often suggest methods of meeting these 
normative aims. Hand also adds that conceiving practical theories and their methodological 
suggestions as set in stone would be misled; that no theory is, nor should be, “teacher-proof” 
(p. 520), indicating that the implementation of any theory of moral education is and should be 
dependent on individual teachers’ practice of moral education. 
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Hand (2014) then moves on to distinguish between practical theories that are 
thematically related to practice, where the theory is relevant to some aspect of practice but 
not entirely prescriptive, and theories that are pragmatically related to practice, which 
prescribe specific methods for meeting normative aims set out. Hand implies that such 
theories have a much narrower focus on some current issue. 
The underpinning philosophy of morality explored in the previous chapter draws 
heavily from scientific theories explored in this chapter alongside various schools of 
philosophical thought, but insofar as a theory of moral education is endorsed in this thesis, it 
is normative. The main normative claim here is that moral education ought to foster students’ 
moral development, and in terms of its relation to practice, it is argued that theoretical 
knowledge of moral philosophy, psychology and education should be employed in this 
endeavour. 
This raises a question of the content of moral education. While it might initially seem 
as the arguments of this thesis suggest that intricacies of moral philosophy and psychology 
should be taught to pupils, this is not the case. The argument here is that teachers would 
benefit from the theoretical understanding this literature would provide to them in their 
endeavour to engage with moral education. 
Hand’s (2014) suggestion regarding the content of moral education is that it should 
include moral standards. While acknowledging that not all moral standards fall into the 
following category, Hand maintains that the following are criteria for moral standards on 
which it can be assumed that everyone would agree. He argues that those standards that are 
deemed to be universally-enlisting (applying to everyone) and penalty-endorsing (failing to 
comply with the standards is worthy of punishment) are moral standards. However, it should 
be noted that this argument seems to intend to identify the minimal necessary content for 
moral education, rather being the centrally defining aspect of all content for moral education. 
Hand (2014) continues his discussion of moral standards on which everyone can agree 
by borrowing a term from Copp (2009, cited from Hand 2014): 
“…moral standards are justified when their currency in society serves to ameliorate what 
Copp calls the ‘problem of sociality’, the ever-present risk in human social groups of 
breakdowns in cooperation and outbreaks of conflict. This risk is ever-present because of 
certain contingent but permanent features of the human condition: namely, our 
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vulnerability to one another, our limited capacity for sympathy, and a limited supply of 
needed or wanted resources.” (Hand, 2014, p. 528). 
The argument is maintained that were we not susceptible to the dangers quoted above, 
no moral standard may have been necessary. However, this is not the case in our current 
lives, and certain standards of behaviour are required in order to curb such dangers and avoid 
social breakdowns. This is posited to be the main justification for defining the criteria for 
moral standards as universally-enlisting and penalty-endorsing, for the demand of compliance 
to such standards incurs a cost to the individual in favour of group cohesion: if everyone does 
not act in accordance with these standards free-riders will be better off than those who 
comply, and if there is no threat of penalty, there is no incentive for individuals to refrain 
from free riding constantly and on a mass scale. 
This view of morality overlaps with the understanding of morality underpinning this 
thesis. Human morality evolved into its current state over the past hundred millennia in 
hunter-gatherer societies (Sinnot-Armstrong, 2008). This environment is very different from 
the current environment in which much of humanity lives (nation-states in which the vast 
majority of people live in villages, towns or cities much larger than what would have been 
common or even feasible in the stone age). While in stone age conditions our evolved, innate 
(organized in advance of experience, Graham et al, 2013; see section 2.2.2 below) morality 
may have been sufficient and alleviated the necessity for moral standards, these mechanisms 
are no longer as applicable in daily life as they used to be, and as a result, proper functioning 
of groups rely more on our flexible cooperation, on which mass subscription to moral 
standards put reasonable limits with a view to protect group stability. 
Having set out the minimal necessary content for moral education – moral standards 
crucial for ameliorating the problem of sociality – Hand (2014) proceeds to exploring 
pedagogical methods which may be employed in the teaching of moral standards. Two main 
methods are identified: moral formation and moral inquiry. Moral formation refers to 
teaching students how to act in accordance with moral standards. Although this involves 
cognitive elements (how to do something, recognizing something has to be done), it does not 
involve in-depth thinking about the justifications for the moral standard. This is mainly the 
area of the second method: Moral inquiry is mainly focused on discussion and understanding 
the justifications for moral standards, and by extension, subscribing or rejecting the standard. 
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Hand (2014) further distinguishes between two kinds of moral inquiry: directive and 
nondirective. Directive inquiry involves the teacher to direct the students into subscribing to 
or rejecting certain moral standards by emphasising how un/sound the justification for that 
norm is. For example, rejecting racism would necessitate a directive method of moral inquiry 
in Hand’s view, involving a very clear emphasis on the unsoundness of the justifications of 
racism, and the soundness of the arguments against it. In nondirective inquiry the teacher 
does not endorse any justification, and everything is open for discussion, with the teacher 
mostly refereeing the discussion. Hand suggests that this method is more appropriate to 
controversial issues. 
While the philosophy of this thesis might be in agreement with the minimal definition 
of the criteria for identifying moral standards, as discussed above, there is an argument to be 
made for a broader conception. One of the reasons Hand (2014) focuses on a minimal 
definition of moral standards is that these standards are liable to be broken, and that moral 
education should focus on equipping students against this temptation, at least as far as the 
problem of sociality is concerned. However, I think the concern of temptation is misguided. 
Properly articulated standards will be consistent, and it will turn out that people do not break 
their standards. The issue in understanding subscribed standards is one of priority. The 
questions of interest here are ‘do I have the character of a person who prioritizes self-interest, 
or morality?’ ‘Is there truly a difference between self-interest and morality, or is it simply 
short sighted character traits and moral standards versus far sighted ones?’ The justifications 
for standards are the standards, what is otherwise referred as the ‘standard’ is a summary of 
the justification. As a result, the articulation of a justification requires precision and a clear-
eyed and impartial view of oneself and others. In this reasoning, the matter becomes one of 
Aristotelian character education. As Kristjánsson (2010a) puts it, the point of moral education 
should be to “infuse pupils’ selves with moral concerns” and to equip them with the 
necessary elements of practical wisdom (pp. 235-236). 
This thesis mainly explores the psychological mechanisms relevant to moral 
formation, although mechanisms relevant to moral inquiry are also discussed (e.g. moral 
reasoning). However, such an approach to moral education would constitute a radical 
departure from how moral education is and has been understood and conducted in the Turkish 
context currently and historically. Due to this reason, an exploration of how moral education 
has been understood historically, and is understood currently in Turkey is necessary. 
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1.2. Moral Education in the West and Turkey 
This section briefly reviews the historical development of approaches to moral 
education in the West and Turkey, and sets moral education in the broader political and social 
contexts with regards to how it has related to the goals of education more broadly conceived. 
Approaches to moral education in East Asia and other parts of the world are not discussed 
here for concerns of space, as Turkey has positioned itself with reference to the West rather 
than the East, making East Asian moral education beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Moral education has evolved and changed over the ages since Aristotle. The clearest 
analysis of this evolution in the West has been conducted by Walker et al (2015) who use 
Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology to build a genealogy of moral education starting from the 18th 
century. The authors indicate that in the 18th century the central theme of moral education 
was based on the religious doctrine of original sin, and moral education revolved around 
disciplining students to behave according to Christian morals. The central theme in the 19th 
century then shifted to class differences, and was based on the notion of ‘the polite pupil’ (p. 
83), in imitation of the manners of high society gentlemen and ladies. Walker et al argue that 
in the early 20th century moral education experienced a revival when schools were considered 
as ‘moral communities’ (p. 83) where students were morally adjusted into prosocial habits. 
Later on in the second half of the 20th century, with the introduction of Kohlberg’s Cognitive 
Development Theory, the central theme of moral education became one of fostering students’ 
cognitive development regarding moral judgement. Around the turn of the 21st century the 
central theme of moral education shifted once more, this time being based on strengthening 
students’ ‘fragile emotional selves and self-esteem’ (p. 84). Finally, the authors argue that the 
currently emerging trend centres around the theme of ‘the flourishing pupil’ (p. 84), which is 
based on the recent revival of virtue ethics and Aristotle, as well as the gain in momentum the 
positive psychology movement has experienced. The philosophical approach taken in this 
thesis, as explained earlier, falls in the general vicinity of this final trend. 
A similarly detailed account of the evolution of moral education in the Turkish 
context does not exist; the few studies that are relevant have been conducted recently (e.g. 
Çoban, 2014; Kaya, 2013; Yazıbaşı, 2014). But it should be borne in mind that most of these 
studies are authored by theologians rather than historians, philosophers, or educationists, and 
are biased towards exalting religion and religious values in opposition to more secular 
approaches, in accordance with the current political trends in Turkey outlined in Chapter I. 
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During the Classical Ottoman Period (15th century to 18th century) morality did not 
exist as a field of study separate from religion (Yazıbaşı, 2014), and education was not wide 
spread – it was mainly confined to state elites, and was geared towards creating and 
maintaining the state system and state officials. During the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) the 
Ottoman Empire embarked on a period of modernization, in which a more developed and 
Western influenced education system was introduced, and moral education was given space 
in the curriculum as a separate course, yet still heavily influenced by religion. A greater focus 
on ‘duty’ was also incorporated into the curriculum; Yazıbaşı (2014) claims that this was 
influenced by the rise of Kantian ethics in the West, from which the model for the new 
education system was taken. At the turn of the 20th century there was a clearer change in the 
discourse regarding morality and moral education. As European style institutions and 
intellectual advances in the West made their way into the Ottoman state and intellectual life, 
notions of nationalism (both in the narrower ethnic sense, and the wider imperial, i.e. 
Ottomanism, sense) and rationalism were incorporated as legitimating references for morality 
alongside religion (Gurbetoğlu, 2007; Yazıbaşı, 2014), pointing to the early phases of 
secularisation Turkey was undergoing.  
Starting with the Tanzimat Period, there have been explicit and implicit expectations 
regarding moral education on the part of the Ottoman state in order to achieve certain goals 
through education. In the Tanzimat Period the main expectation was the unification of the 
diverse peoples that made up the population of the Empire, in an attempt to resist the wave of 
separatist nationalistic sentiments (Kaya, 2013; Yazıbaşı, 2014). From the turn of the 20th 
century to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the surge in interest in moral education has 
been connected to a perception that the losses the Empire was suffering on the political front 
were due to a collapse in the morals of society (Gurbetoğlu, 2007; Yazıbaşı, 2014). This 
period is followed by the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, and the founding of the 
Turkish Republic. 
In the early years of the republic, Turkish society underwent seismic revolutions; the 
multicultural empire of six centuries that had become more theocratic towards its end, had 
collapsed, and was replaced by a secular and somewhat more homogeneous republic. The 
country underwent rapid industrialisation, the old Arabic script was replaced with a modified 
Latin alphabet, the Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished, and a centralized education 
system was instituted, among numerous other reforms in the legal, economic, political, and 
social arenas. 
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This was accompanied by a change in the discourse of moral education as well. With 
secularisation in full swing, there was a major shift in legitimation of morality from religion 
to humanism and nationalism in the formative years of the Republic (Çoban, 2014; Kesgin, 
2011). This lasted until the 1950s when religious education was re-introduced to the 
education system; however, this return to religion was not at the expense of humanistic and 
nationalist references. In 1982 moral education and religious education were combined into a 
single mandatory course, and this revived religious legitimation of morality to a greater 
extent. Finally, since the ascension of the AKP government into power in 2002, humanistic 
and positivistic elements of legitimating morality have been systematically removed from 
education (e.g. Evrensel, 2017 and Milliyet, 2017 mentioned in Chapter I). Government 
officials have explicitly stated that they are encouraging a more religious youth (Hürriyet, 
2012). However, the main motivation regarding changes in moral education seem to be tied 
more closely to pragmatic politics, and any change made to education in general and moral 
education in particular may be reversed depending on political necessities. 
The history of moral education is closely tied with the social and political contexts in 
both the West and in Turkey. Accordingly, the content of moral education has been 
influenced deeply by these contexts. However, while the above accounts of the history of 
legitimating principles of morality are concerned with their influence on the content of moral 
education, one aspect is not considered: the schooling structure itself. 
It has been argued that the current system of schooling is based on the model of 
factory lines, and creates an environment conducive to the development of values relevant to 
industrial age factory workers (Godin, 2012; Robinson, 2015). While the relevance of this is 
not exclusive to moral education, it is deeply related to the implicit moral education students 
receive through the hidden curriculum (see below for more on the hidden curriculum). When 
this structure was imported into the Ottoman Empire and adapted in the new Republic, 
creating an environment relevant to factory line values may not have been an explicit 
intention. But this may have had its use in the period of rapid industrialisation Turkey went 
through between the 1920s and 1950s. 
In contrast to this, John Dewey himself has had a major influence on the Turkish 
education system, as he was invited in 1924 to survey the newly founded Republic and make 
suggestions regarding how to create a new education system. Dewey produced two reports, 
and based on these reports schools with a highly progressive structure were introduced, called 
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Village Institutions (Şahin, 2017). I will refrain from going into greater depth regarding 
Village Institutions here for concerns of space, as these schools had a very different structure 
from the current school structure, and they were closed in 1948 for both domestic and 
international political reasons (İnce, 2009), and remain a controversial topic. However, they 
are worth this brief mention as both the philosophy and the controversy surrounding the 
institutions during the formative years of the Republic have been influential. The remainder 
of this section focuses on the current state of moral education in Turkey. 
Explicit moral education in the Turkish Education System consists of a single course 
devoted to religion and morality. The course is titled Religious Culture and Ethics (RCE), and 
it is mandatory in grades 4 to 12 (ages 9 to 17). It was introduced to the curriculum as a 
compulsory course after the 1980 coup d’état, on the grounds that the lack of compulsory 
moral education had led to the social instability and violent clashes between the youth of 
opposing political convictions of the 1970s (LePage et al., 2011). The course today is 
allocated one lesson per week in middle school, and two lessons per week in high school. The 
textbooks for this course are comprised of 4 chapters on (Sunni) Islamic religious culture 
(e.g. how to pray), one chapter on morality, and one chapter on the relationship between 
religion and secularism, civilisation, or another topic, which changes from textbook to 
textbook depending on the grade level. Apart from this course, there is no explicit attention 
devoted to fostering moral development in the Turkish Education System. 
There are several problems associated with the current practice of moral education in 
Turkey, as well space for improvement in some respects. These include normative and 
practical problems as well social and political concerns. Teaching morality alongside religion 
has been criticised outside of Turkey (Tillson, 2011), and secular circles in Turkey have 
raised concerns over the recent increase in the focus on religion (Yıldız, 2009; Yılmaz, 2009). 
Moreover, the specific focus on Sunni Islamic culture at the expense of the Jewish, Christian, 
and Alevi Muslim minorities in Turkey (Yıldız, 2009; Yılmaz, 2009) has received criticism 
that the current mandatory moral education curriculum is not sufficiently pluralistic (Okçu, 
2009; Şaşmaz et al., 2011; Yıldız, 2009; Yılmaz, 2009). These criticisms point to a need to 
revise the current official curriculum for social and political reasons. 
Furthermore, the course does not address moral skills as much as it addresses 
religious culture. Apart from the lack of pluralism to reflect the values and virtues of differing 
traditions within Turkey, the course does not explicitly focus on the development of morally 
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relevant psychological capacities. While the current curriculum may foster valuable skills in 
students (such as acquainting them with the moral norms of the dominant culture), a review 
of the course’s curriculum reveals that it does not overlap with the moral psychological skills 
and capacities that this study focuses on. 
A philosophical argument for why psychology should inform moral education has 
been made in the previous chapter. However, the current lack of psychological focus is also 
contrary to the aims of moral education of the Turkish Education System. When the 
foundations of the goals of the Turkish Education System were being laid in the 1930s, a 
policy-maker of the time, İsmail Hakkı, argued that the “ethics of a democratic republic 
should be completely positivistic and worldly which eliminates religion from the sphere of 
morality” (cited from LePage et al, 2011; p. 367). The emphasis on ‘positivistic and worldly’ 
refers to a greater focus on scientific perspectives as opposed to religious perspectives in 
ethics, which were far more prominent in the public sphere during the Ottoman era, from 
which the new republic was distancing itself at the time. This implies that including training 
on moral psychology in teacher training programmes would align with the original aims of 
the Turkish Education System. While the exclusion of religion is no doubt contrary to 
pluralism, the lack of a psychological focus in moral education also risks failing to achieve 
the original “positivistic and worldly” aims of moral education in Turkey. 
All these issues might point to a need to revise the official curriculum. However, such 
an intervention might still be short of achieving the desired goals of moral development. 
According to some authors (Higgins, 1991; Kohlberg, 1983; Ryan & Purpel, 1983; Sanger & 
Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013), something as ubiquitous as morality and moral development cannot 
be adequately addressed in only a few lessons per week. Thus, a broader approach to moral 
education, beyond the curriculum of a single course, is necessary. Hence relying on revising 
the existing curriculum to foster moral development may not be an adequate approach to 
moral education. This broader approach would consider several aspects of school life and 
education. Two of these aspects are the implicit education students receive from the moral 
ecology of the school, and teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education. 
1.3. Implicit Moral Education and the Moral Ecology of the School 
Many authors have noted that education is a morally laden endeavour (Giroux & 
Purpel, 1983; Jackson, Boomstrom, & Hansen, 1998; LePage et al., 2011; Narvaez & Lapsley 
2008) and that moral interactions pervade nearly all aspects of school life (Ryan & Purpel, 
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1983, Jackson, Boomstrom, & Hansen, 1998). It is thus important for educators to understand 
the moral ecology of a school. A term that has striking parallels with moral ecology in the 
education literature is the hidden curriculum. While the official curriculum can be described 
as the content of education, the hidden curriculum can be defined as the context of education. 
Yüksel (2005) indicates that the hidden curriculum does not exist in the form of a written 
document, but “consists of the order and regulations of the school, its physical and 
psychological environment, and the non-official or implied messages that the administrators, 
or teachers, convey to students” (p. 330). Following Frey’s definition of moral ecology that 
“the various social and organisational environments that form the backdrop to conduct 
constitute a moral ecology” (2010, p. 617), the moral ecology of the school can be said to 
consist of both the official and hidden curriculum. However, according to Kohlberg (1983), 
the majority of education takes place in the hidden curriculum; which implies that the hidden 
curriculum forms the greater part of the moral ecology of the school.  
Frey (2010) maintains that there is a feedback loop between moral ecology, and the 
character traits and the resulting behaviour of individuals and organisations. Moral conduct of 
individual elements (individuals, institutions, organisations, etc.) comprise their moral 
ecology, and their moral ecology, in turn, influences their behaviour, and their character 
(development) by extension (Frey, 2010). In the educational context, this idea finds support 
from the multitude of studies that indicate that moral education takes place beyond the 
classroom activities following the official curriculum (Çubukçu, 2012; Giroux & Purpel, 
1983; Jackson, Boomstrom, & Hansen, 1998). In the Turkish context, Çubukçu (2012) found 
that activities which are part of the hidden curriculum in Turkish elementary schools have a 
significant effect on students’ internalisation of values. 
Purpel and Ryan (1983) indicate that moral education in the hidden curriculum is 
inevitable. The authors make a list of sayings and activities that carry various moral messages 
to students, such as the story of Robin Hood which “shot holes through the notion that 
stealing is categorically wrong” (p. 270). Furthermore, Narvaez (2001; 2002) indicates that 
what the students learn from stories is not always the intended moral, pointing to the 
possibility that even explicit activities with well-defined goals might result in implicitly 
teaching different moral lessons. The moral that students might take from Robin Hood’s story 
might not be to stand up for the disadvantaged and oppressed, but that stealing can be 
acceptable. 
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Hierarchical relationships in the school (student – teacher – administrator), rules, and 
the way rules are practised also teach students about authority (Freire 1983; Giroux 1983), 
right and wrong, fairness, and justice (Freire 1983; Giroux 1983), and by extension 
‘democratic’ lifestyle (Giroux, 1983; Higgins, 1991; Kohlberg 1983). The emphasis on 
managerial and technical skills in teacher training programmes (Carr, 1994; Giroux, 1983) at 
the expense of a “wider concern of values education,” (Carr & Landon, 1998, p. 28) shape 
teachers’ conception of education. Furthermore, the similar emphasis on technical skills in 
the curriculum (Freire, 1983) at the expense of values education shapes students’ conceptions 
of society and influence students’ moral development in relation to these conceptions. This 
emphasis and the resulting understandings can sometimes be contrary to democracy, 
alongside the teacher’s and/or administrators’ absolute authority in making final decisions 
that influence students’ school lives (Freire 1983; Giroux 1983; Higgins, 1991; Kohlberg 
1983). This indicates that training students to live in a democratic society in an institution 
with an undemocratic culture may not foster the values associated with democracy in 
students. 
Just as democratic practices in the school, or lack thereof, influence the development 
of democratic values in students, the school’s moral atmosphere affects students’ moral 
behaviour. Power, Higgins and Kohlberg (1989) define the school's moral atmosphere as the 
values and norms that regulate informal interactions between students, teachers, staff, and 
administrators to the degree that these norms and values are shared between the people of the 
school. Brugman et al. (2003) conducted a comparative study between the Netherlands and 
Russia, involving 752 students from 40 Grade 8 and Grade 10 classes. Their research 
assessed whether adolescents’ perceptions of school moral atmosphere exerted an effect on 
their moral behaviour by conducting pre-intervention and post-intervention tests on students’ 
perception of school moral atmosphere and comparing the results with students’ norm-
transgressive and pro-social behaviour before and after the intervention. The intervention was 
designed to “increase the accuracy of students’ perception of the moral atmosphere in their 
school, i.e., to reflect better the majority perspective among the students” (Brugman et al., 
2003; p. 290). Their findings indicate that students’ perceptions of the school’s moral 
atmosphere increase their moral behaviour even more than the degree of their moral skills 
and capacities do. They note that one of the reasons for this is the greater concern for social 
desirability in adolescents. 
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The moral atmosphere of schools may change from culture to culture, or even school 
to school. However, students’ perception of their school’s moral atmosphere, and the 
reflection of this perception in students’ behaviour can be generalised beyond the Russian 
and Dutch contexts to the Turkish context. 
This points to the importance of understanding the moral ecology of the school, how 
teachers’ and administrators’ behaviour is a part of the school’s moral ecology, and the 
considerable effect it has on students’ moral development. Thus, attending to teachers’ 
perceptions and beliefs regarding the implicit elements of moral education in schools and 
moral development in students is of central importance concerning the broader approach to 
moral education mentioned above. On the other hand, the fact that students’ perception of the 
moral atmosphere of the school influences their moral behaviour more than their moral skills 
and capacities should not mean that fostering students’ moral skills is not of importance. As 
Frey (2010) indicates, the feedback loop between moral ecology (moral atmosphere of the 
school) and its elements (students’ and teachers’ behaviour) make the cultivation of moral 
skills even more crucial. 
1.4. Teachers’ Beliefs and Attitudes 
There is general agreement that teaching is a moral endeavour, and what teachers do, 
think, and believe have moral repercussions (Bullough, 2011; Buzelli & Johnston, 2001; 
Colnerud, 1997; Giroux & Purpel, 1983). This position appears to be shared by many pre-
service and in-service teachers. Research studies from the West, Turkey and East Asia 
indicate that most teachers enter into the profession at least partly for moral reasons and 
believe that they have a moral responsibility as educators (Brookhart & Freeman, 1992; 
Farkas, Johnson, & Foleno, 2000; Goodlad et al., 1990; Joseph & Efron, 1993; LePage, et al, 
2011; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013; Temli, Şen, & Akar, 2011; Wang & Fwu, 2002). 
This suggests that the problems of moral education do not stem from teachers’ lack of moral 
character or unwillingness to address moral issues in education, but from a lack of 
educational skills, accurate beliefs (see below), and a moral language over which moral 
issues can be discussed (Sockett & LePage, 2002; Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2005; 
2008; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013). Recently, Revell and Arthur (2007) demonstrated 
this issue in the UK by analysing over 1000 teachers’ attitudes and experinces regarding 
character education. The authors found that while teachers are willing to develop their skills 
regarding moral education, their training does not adequately equip them, and whatever 
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equipment their training provides is contingent on their course and teaching placement 
school. 
Addressing teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education is crucial for equipping them 
with better intellectual tools for fostering the moral development of students. The need to 
address teachers’ beliefs regarding moral education and the problematic lack of it in teacher 
training programmes is a point agreed on by many educators (Frey, 2010; Narvaez & 
Lapsley, 2008; Revell & Arthur, 2007; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; Sockett & LePage, 2002; 
Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2005; 2008).  
Rokeach (1968), Donovan and Bransford (2005), and Pajares (1992) indicate that 
teachers’ beliefs are at the core of their teaching practice and behaviour, and Bandura’s 
(1986; 1997) Theory of Learning by Observation shows that teachers’ behaviour influences 
students’ behaviour. Furthermore, addressing teachers’ beliefs is important because educators 
are not always fully aware of the beliefs they hold, and because psychologically central 
beliefs which are based on experience “can be highly resistant to modification, particularly if 
they are not confronted in an explicit, meaningful way” (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011, p. 572). 
In this thesis, the notion of ‘belief’ is described relatively broadly. Beliefs are taken to 
be, following Rokeach (1968), “any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred 
from what a person says or does, capable of being preceded by the phrase, ‘I believe that’” (p. 
113). Beliefs also involve preconceptions and understanding (Donovan & Bransford, 2005); 
someone’s belief is what a person takes to be true in the world, and thus, is related to that 
person’s knowledge – either arising from knowledge, or giving rise to knowledge. The 
central argument here is that, stated superficially, inaccurate knowledge relevant to moral 
education arising from uninformed beliefs, insofar as they exist, should be replaced with 
informed beliefs based on accurate knowledge (within the limits of what the academic 
literature has to offer) through teacher training. 
What has more direct relevance to this thesis is the psychological function of beliefs, 
and requires a more nuanced description. Beliefs cause people to behave in certain ways – 
organize their time and energy towards certain goals. For example, the belief that it will rain 
today could lead a person to take an umbrella in order to keep dry and thus avoid ill health. 
Taking a functionalist approach, the aspect of beliefs of most interest to this thesis can be 
described thus: 
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“Believing that performing action A would lead to event or state of affairs E, conjoined 
with a desire for E and no overriding contrary desire, will typically cause an intention to 
do A” (Schwitzgebel, 2015) 
Translated into the aims of this study, the above statement would read as “believing 
that engaging in a pedagogical activity informed by moral psychology would lead to the 
fostering of students’ characters, and given that teachers enter the profession partly for this 
moral reason, a contrary desire is not expected, and will typically cause a teacher to intend to 
conduct moral education informed by moral psychology.” 
The neurology of how exactly beliefs translate into behaviour is beyond the scope of 
this study. The concept of ‘belief’ is most deeply explored in this section of the thesis, as the 
discussion is particularly relevant here, but it is also relevant in the moral psychology section 
of this chapter, and the qualitative data analysis and discussion chapters. However, the term 
‘belief’ throughout the thesis is used in the manner described here. 
Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005; 2011) have developed a framework for teacher training 
programmes which addresses teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education and prepares them 
for the moral work of teaching. They delineate four areas of beliefs to address “which [are] 
treated as sources of explanation that should be considered in analysing, comparing, 
evaluating, enacting, and designing studies of moral education” (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005, 
p. 573). These four categories are psychological beliefs, moral beliefs, educational beliefs, 
and contingent factors. Psychological beliefs regarding morality include beliefs about what 
features moral psychology encompasses, how these features develop, and how they interact 
with variables in the environment. Moral beliefs refer to meta-ethical assumptions (the nature 
and scope of morality) and normative assumptions (about right and wrong, good and bad). 
Educational beliefs include assumptions about the aims of education and the nature and scope 
of teaching and education in society. Finally, contingent factors refer to more 
autobiographical information: personal, historical, social, political, and institutional beliefs 
(Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005). 
Several studies have been conducted regarding some of the areas of beliefs Sanger 
and Osguthorpe identify. In relation to educational beliefs relevant to this study, Carr and 
Landon’s (1998; 1999) investigations focused on Scottish teachers’ perceptions of the hidden 
curriculum and the teacher’s role in moral education. Carr and Landon (1998; 1999) 
conducted discussions with teachers of six different Scottish schools whose students and 
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ethos varied considerably on socio-economic, racial, religious, and ethnic lines. Their study 
was published in two parts. The first part of their study focuses on teachers’ perception of the 
teacher’s role in moral education (Carr & Landon, 1998), and the second part of the study 
focuses on teachers’ perception of the hidden curriculum (Carr & Landon, 1999). Both 
studies were conducted by recording and analysing teachers’ responses to the discussion tasks 
entailed in the study. 
Carr and Landon’s study (1998) on teachers’ beliefs regarding the role of the teacher 
in moral education reveals that Scottish teachers think that moral education should be a 
separate area of study that is not the domain of a specialist such as the religious education 
teacher and that teachers should be role models. The Scottish teachers also inclined towards a 
philosophical middle ground between moral authoritarianism and moral permisivism, and 
supported fostering critical thinking regarding moral matters; however, they also admitted 
that they did not know how to determine this middle ground, and sought some philosophical 
certainty to take an approach confidently. Carr and Landon (1998) also indicate that the 
teachers tended to take a pragmatic approach to morality; “the prevailing view seemed to be a 
kind of social-contractual ethics of agreement, whereby a given attitude or action counts as 
unacceptable if it transgresses or offends against what the reasonable majority would be 
inclined to agree upon in a given context” (p. 172). 
The authors’ study regarding teachers’ beliefs about the hidden curriculum (Carr & 
Landon, 1999) reveals that Scottish teachers’ conception of the hidden curriculum is 
ambiguous. Teachers could agree neither on whether hidden meant unofficial or unintended, 
or deliberately concealed, nor on what was actually conveyed implicitly. Upon further 
discussion with the teachers regarding whether the implicit elements of moral education 
should be made explicit, Carr and Landon (1999) found that two views prevailed: Firstly, 
some teachers believed that any implicit education concerning values must be made explicit, 
no matter whether both the value and the intention of teaching that value is benign or malign, 
in order to secure a “general climate of rational openness” (p. 25) about values. Secondly, 
other teachers believed that making explicit the inexplicit teaching of positive values could 
have adverse effects such as demoting the practice of such values from moral aspiration to 
duty to the school or hubris or narrow tribalism. Carr and Landon (1999) also add that 
“despite the evident interest in, readiness to address and ability to discuss such questions—
clearly apparent on the part of all with whom we worked—it emerged that teachers had not 
been well equipped for this task during their professional training” (p. 28). 
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These two reports indicate that there is considerable variety among teachers’ beliefs, 
and more interestingly, that there tends to be more variation in such beliefs among the 
teachers of the same school, rather than between different schools. This points to the richness 
of the diversity of ideas that are part of school moral ecologies, adding further importance to 
the need to pay attention to teachers’ perception of school moral ecology. 
Furthermore, similar characteristics can also be seen in more recent studies in other 
courses related to moral education: Peterson et al (2015) found that teachers in England 
similarly held diverse beliefs in the context of citizenship education. Considering that both 
moral and citizenship education in the UK are not clearly structured in the National 
Curriculum (Peterson, 2011; Peterson et al 2015), the issue of diverse beliefs and practices in 
both kinds of education may be related to ambiguous aims and definitions set by respective 
governments. 
Temli and colleagues (LePage et al., 2011; Temli, Şen, Akar, 2011) have also 
conducted similar studies in Turkey, which show some correlations among Turkish and 
Scottish teachers’ beliefs. Their study involved a questionnaire survey of 824 primary 
teachers from 15 different provinces in Turkey. According to Temli, Şen, and Akar (2011), 
Turkish teachers believe that the role of the school is to give students not only academic 
skills, but moral education as well so that students can acquire the values of the society, in 
line with the Scottish teachers’ belief that moral education should not be the responsibility of 
a specialist. Scottish and Turkish teachers also shared the belief that teachers are expected to 
be role models “especially, in the way they acted in society” (Temli, Şen, and Akar, 2011; p. 
2064). Furthermore, Turkish teachers also took a pragmatic approach to moral education, in 
that they believed it should be about solving social problems. Turkish teachers also added 
that moral education should help students acquire global values (such as honesty, respect, and 
tolerance, in the teachers’ words) and not be driven by a political or religious agenda, despite 
the fact that most stated that their values were deeply influenced by their families and 
religion. Turkish teachers were also concerned about the potential negative effect of the 
media, but this difference might be related to the increase in media channels in the decade 
separating the two studies. Another similarity between the Scottish and Turkish studies is that 
in both studies, the authors conclude that, despite their willingness to deal with moral 
education, teachers were not equipped with the necessary skills to engage with moral 
education in their teacher training, and the teachers from both countries would have liked to 
receive such training. Temli, Şen and Akar (2011, p. 2065) state that Turkish teachers 
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“thought that the amount of moral education they undertook was rather insufficient to 
understand how to deal with moral education and how to cope with moral dilemmas in the 
school context.” 
Temli, Şen, and Akar’s study was also used in a cross-cultural comparative study with 
American teachers (LePage et al. 2011). The most significant difference to emerge between 
Turkish and American teachers’ beliefs turned out to be their conception of a moral person. 
The authors indicate that “for Turkish teachers, if a person is to be considered moral, they 
need to hold global values: honesty, reliability, and respect for others and the environment” 
(LePage et al., 2011, pp. 369). On the other hand, American teachers emphasised that a moral 
person was someone who acted in moral ways. Another important difference that emerged 
from the cross-cultural study was not in the statements to the responses to the surveys, but in 
the number of surveys returned. In the Turkish study, the researchers received nearly 800 
responses for the 1200 (73%) surveys sent out, while the American researchers received 203 
responses of the 2300 surveys (8%) sent out over two years. While most studies report that 
nearly all teachers are willing and interested in engaging with moral education, this disparity 
in responses between the American and Turkish teachers may point to a greater willingness 
among Turkish teachers to engage with matters regarding moral education compared to 
American teachers. However, it must be noted that the authors of this study thought that other 
factors, such as American teachers receiving educational surveys too frequently, might have 
contributed to the low response rate. 
The findings from the above-reviewed six studies shed some light on Turkish, British, 
and American teachers’ educational beliefs, considering the framework developed by Sanger 
and Osguthorpe (2005; 2011). Most importantly, these studies indicate that teachers from all 
three countries share the belief that moral education is the responsibility of the school, rather 
than a specialist teacher. Secondly, teachers from each country believe that the teacher should 
be a role model and should help students acquire moral values. However, teachers’ beliefs 
regarding the method of teaching values, and to what extent the teacher can explicitly 
influence students’ values shows difference among the teachers from the three countries.  
Some suggest that teachers’ willingness but inability to engage with moral education 
is caused by a lack of moral language (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013; Sockett & LePage, 
2002; Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2008). Borrowing from Vygotsky and Bakhtin, 
Tappan (1991) indicates that language is a psychological tool that helps people make sense of 
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their experiences, and maintains that a moral language mediates moral experience and moral 
functioning, helping people understand their moral experiences, discuss moral issues, and 
make moral decisions. Sockett and LePage (2002) argue that despite how morally rich school 
life is, teachers lack the moral language to make sense of these experiences from a moral 
perspective, and instead use the technical language they have been equipped with in their pre-
service training. As a result, they deal with moral matters with students using a technical 
language as opposed to a moral one, further transmitting a technical perspective to their 
students. Sockett and LePage (2002) further add that moral language is missing not only in 
the classroom but in teacher training programmes as well, resulting in the current state of 
teachers who are under-equipped to conduct moral education. This is further supported by the 
study of Willemse, Lunenberg, and Korthagen (2008) which involved discussions with 54 
teacher educators. Their study concludes that the preparation of trainee teachers to the moral 
work of teaching is left to individual teacher educators who conduct this education in an 
unplanned and implicit manner. Furthermore, the authors add that teacher educators 
themselves lacked the necessary moral language to discuss moral issues and moral education 
with their students – even those teacher educators who were more interested and invested in 
moral education (Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2008). Although the relatively small 
number of participants requires some wariness in generalising these findings, they could also 
apply in the Turkish context, as there is no specific attention given to morality in education 
faculties in Turkey.   
The use of moral language is closely related to teachers’ beliefs regarding morality 
and moral education. Carr and Landon (1998) state that an aversion of imposing values, 
characteristic of teachers with liberal views, caused “something close to intellectual paralysis 
regarding the open discussion of values issues” (p. 167). Sanger and Osguthorpe (2011) 
caution teacher educators against similarly paralysing beliefs and suggest that these beliefs 
should be addressed in teacher education. Conversely, Carr and Landon (1998) also report 
that the explicit attention paid to moral matters in Catholic and independent schools had not 
led to a dogmatic acceptance of any kind of moral position, but to “heightened awareness of 
the need for appropriate rational justification of actual practice” (p. 167). This suggests that 
the moral language used in these schools, presumably borrowed from religion at least in 
Catholic schools, had provided an adequate platform for discussing moral issues with 
confidence. 
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The framework mentioned above for preparing trainee teachers for the moral work of 
teaching suggested by Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005) could also provide both teacher 
educators and trainee teachers with a moral language which can be used to address their 
beliefs and foster student teachers’ skills of moral education. Just as a religious perspective 
provides Catholic schools with moral language to address moral issues and teach morality, as 
implied by Carr and Landon’s (1998) findings, Sanger and Osguthorpe’s framework could 
bring psychological, philosophical, and educational perspectives that contribute to trainee 
teachers’ moral vocabulary, and thus help them make sense of their moral experiences and 
beliefs in a more structured way, equipping them with better intellectual tools to engage with 
moral education. These perspectives would also align with and foster the original ‘positivistic 
and worldly’ aims of the Turkish Education System as stated by İsmail Hakkı. 
1.5. Role Modelling and Expertise 
Such intellectual tools can be utilised by teachers for moral education in many ways. 
Here I focus on two methods, one implicit and one explicit, that can aid teachers in helping 
students achieve their personal eudaimonia. The two methods that I focus on, role modelling 
and fostering moral expertise, can be applied complementarily in moral education, as 
fostering moral expertise would be likely to involve demonstrating specific values in action – 
i.e. modelling them. 
The first method to be considered is role modelling. Several recent studies (Sanderse, 
2014; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013) have shown role modelling to be the most widely 
used method of teaching moral values. The same studies also imply that teachers most 
commonly believe that students learn moral values by observing role models. Conversely, 
Sanderse (2014) argues that role modelling as a concept is under-researched and not well 
enough developed in teacher education programs. In his review, Sanderse (2014) reports that 
teachers and pre-service teachers in the Netherlands and the U.S. most firmly believe that 
students acquire moral values from their teachers when the teachers embody these values and 
make an example of them, i.e. become a role model for the value. Furthermore, Sanderse 
(2014) maintains that most teachers in interviews and questionnaires fail to make a reference 
to any alternative method of teaching morality. While teachers may be highly confident about 
the impact of role modelling, they are not always aware of its limitations, nor how this 
learning takes place, e.g. learning through observation. This implies that teachers hope that 
students will simply pick up values following their example. This is further complicated 
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when teachers take a liberal point of view (Klaassen, 2002) which Carr and Landon (1998) 
also mention, and consider values as a matter of personal choice which makes them avoid 
trying to influence students’ choices and remain as neutral as possible. Furthermore, teacher 
educators’ lack of skill, knowledge, and language to prepare student teachers to the moral 
work of teaching discussed above may also add to this problem. 
Sanger and Osguthorpe (2013) indicate that Albert Bandura’s (1986; 1997) 
Observational Learning Theory could “help to extend, refine, and/or ground beliefs about 
how modelling works” (p. 172). Bandura (2003) states that: 
“Modelled activities… convey principles for generative and innovative behaviour. In 
abstract observational learning, observers extract principles or standards embodied in 
the thinking and actions exhibited by others. Once they acquire principles, they can 
use them to generate new instances of the behaviour that go beyond what they have 
seen, read, or heard.” (p. 169) 
Four types of processes are emphasised in observational learning: attention, retention, 
reproduction, and motivation (Bandura, 1986). Renkl (2014) indicates that for learning by 
observation to take place, attention must be paid to relevant behaviour, the demonstrated 
activity must be encoded and remembered (retention), the learner has to be capable of 
reproducing the activity, and also the learner has to be motivated to produce the behaviour to 
be learned.  
Demonstrating the value or behaviour that is desired for the student to learn is much 
more effective, as enacted models attract and sustain attention more than when they are 
conveyed verbally or in written form (Renkl, 2014). Retention processes are necessary to 
embed brief observations into more permanent memory traces. While it is very hard, if not 
impossible, to recall an observation in full detail, the retention process allows the learner to 
remember the core idea and the gist of the model behaviour to be transferred to future 
instances where it may apply. The reproduction process converts the extracted abstract 
principles of the model behaviour into appropriate action. However, reproduction can be 
hampered if the observed behaviour is not retained well enough or if the action requires some 
other sub-skill which the learner lacks. Motivation to reproduce a modelled behaviour can 
become problematic under certain circumstances (see Section 2.3.). In terms of moral 
behaviour, a well-known “gappiness problem” was identified by Blasi in 1980, which refers 
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to the lack of motivation for people to act morally even when moral reasoning and moral 
intuition processes work well – even when they know the right thing to do. 
However, Bandura (2003) argues that models can also convey motivational aspects of 
their character and behaviour. Teachers as competent models convey skills, strategies and 
knowledge, while also through their example of pursuing challenges they can inspire 
resilience and aspiration in their students (Bandura, 2003; Osguthorpe, 2009). Identifying 
with a model also increases motivation to learn from the model and reproduce behaviour 
(Bandura, 1986). Renkl (2014) indicates that multiple examples or models are much better 
than a single one, as the student would then have a greater range of models to identify with 
and learn from effectively. Not only this, but multiple models also provide a larger and more 
diverse pool of activities that can be modelled for the student. 
Role modelling (and learning by observation) is an implicit method of teaching 
morality. The kinds of behaviour that teachers model in the classroom, and what students 
learn from those modelled behaviours cannot be accurately stated in the official curriculum, 
due to its spontaneous nature. While the nature of role modelling does not prescribe a certain 
structure to teaching, it does allow flexibility for the teacher. Being a value-neutral method of 
conveying values – any value can be modelled – this method can be adapted to the moral 
ecology in which moral education takes place. 
The second method discussed here is fostering expertise of moral skills (Narvaez, 
2010a; 2010b). Developing expertise, similar to role modelling, is a value-neutral method of 
teaching morality since it focuses on morally relevant psychological skills rather than specific 
values themselves. This allows some flexibility for the teacher in choosing which values to 
emphasise, given their background understanding of the moral ecology in which they teach. 
Unlike role modelling, however, fostering expertise can be implemented in a more structured 
and explicit way. 
In this thesis, a skill is considered to be a unifying structure for sets of behaviours and 
abilities relevant to achieving a given end. The end of interest here is moral behaviour, 
making psychological skills relevant to moral behaviour the focus of this thesis. These skills 
do not necessarily exist only in observable behaviour; moral skills can involve what might be 
tentatively called ‘mental behaviour’, including abilities and capacities such as sensitivity to 
emerging and subtle moral issues, recognition of the moral salience of a situation, and 
making decisions and passing a moral judgement on which to act. This is in opposition to 
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more directly observable behaviour such as things said, movements made, approval or 
disapproval expressed, etc. 
A skill is generally taken to be the ability to do something well, or expertise (Oxford 
Dicitionaries, 2017). However, the meaning as in ability, rather than expertise, reflects the 
use of ‘skill’ in this thesis better. A skill does not necessarily have to be an intricate and 
complex ability. The complexity and intricacy of a skill will be greater at greater levels of 
expertise, and lower at more novice levels. The literature reviewed below gives an indication 
as to how morally relevant skills can be developed from more novice levels to greater levels 
of expertise through education. 
The issue of whether skills require conscious effort to execute should also be 
addressed. While at first sight it might seem intuitively correct that complex and intricate 
skills require high levels of conscious effort, it makes sense that this conscious effort is 
necessary only when the skill in question is in the process of being developed (see below and 
section 2). Once high levels of expertise have actually been attained in any given skill, 
especially relevant to moral behaviour, one telling sign of expertise (in any given skill) is that 
the execution of the relevant behaviour does not require conscious effort, as the behaviour 
has now become ‘second nature,’ so to say, and all mechanisms relevant to carrying out the 
skill have become habitualised and automatized. 
Skills relevant to moral behaviour can be discussed in terms of general skills and 
further sets of sub-skills. For example, skills of empathy and role taking contribute to the 
overall moral sensitivity skill of a person (see section 2 below for why moral sensitivity is 
considered a skill). But for concerns of space, this thesis focuses on the general skills without 
listing and exploring in detail the relevant sub-sets of skill for any of these general skills. One 
notable exception to this is the exploration of moral reasoning and moral intuitions in relation 
to moral judgement in section 2 of this chapter. There are brief mentions of specific skills 
here, when they become relevant, however; the main exploration of specific morally relevant 
psychological skills is in section 2 below. This section is concerned with how such skills can 
be fostered in education. 
Narvaez advocates novice-to-expert training in order to foster students’ moral 
development (2010a; 2010b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). She indicates that education is 
viewed as the development of expertise in various domains (2010b) and that moral behaviour 
can be conceived as a set of abilities which can be developed to greater degrees of expertise. 
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Narvaez and Lapsley (2008) state that “experts are more efficient at solving problems in the 
domain, monitoring their progress, and deriving workable solutions” (p. 164). Expertise is a 
deep and refined understanding that can be found in practice and action. 
Experts and novices differ from each other in a number of ways. First of all, experts 
enjoy larger, richer, and better organised “networks of concepts (schemas)” than novices do 
(Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008; p. 164), which contain greater amounts of declarative, procedural, 
and conditional knowledge about the domain. Declarative knowledge refers to knowing what 
to do; procedural knowledge refers to knowing how to do it; and conditional knowledge 
refers to knowing when to act and how much action is required. Furthermore, experts also 
have negative knowledge which refers to knowing what not to do and when to refrain from 
action altogether and wait. Secondly, experts and novices perceive the world differently and 
act accordingly in different ways. Experts see greater detail than novices and notice 
opportunities that novices miss. And lastly, experts and novices behave differently. While 
developing their expertise, novices use conscious and effortful methods to reach the desired 
goal, whereas experts tend to have automated skills, which demand less cognitive effort. 
Expertise is also domain specific. Narvaez and Lapsley (2008) indicate that 
“individuals build their knowledge over time during the course of experiences related to a 
particular knowledge domain, thereby increasing in expertise.” (p. 164). It is acquired by 
deliberate cultivation over years and thousands of hours of practice (Ericsson & Charness, 
1994) and it involves “reflexively activated, context specific schemata” (Ritchhart & Perkins, 
2005, p. 789). Well-educated expert intuitions require complex, automatized, unconscious 
deep knowledge which is very different from the naïve intuition of novices (Narvaez, 2010a). 
Narvaez (2010b) maintains that social and moral expertise start to develop from birth. 
Intuition and reasoning development regarding social cognitive and moral domains are 
established in early experiences. Earlier, she noted that frequent and repeated experiences 
develop conceptual schemata that can be later accessed in relevant situations (Narvaez et al., 
2006). According to Narvaez (2010a), “experts in training have extensive, focused practice in 
particular contexts” (p. 85). A person with greater expertise than theirs about the domain 
keeps “whispering in the ear” about how and what to notice, practice, do and why. This kind 
of “caregiving” (Narvaez, 2010b; p. 85) provides the necessary guidance for developing 
expertise in various domains. According to Narvaez (2010b), the criteria and limit of such 
guidance should not be the age of the developing novice but the level of expertise. 
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In order to cultivate ethical expertise, education would need to follow a series of steps 
and stages of instruction through a novice-to-expert approach involving “mimicking 
naturalistic learning within a climate of support: immersion in examples and opportunities, 
attention to facts and skills, practicing procedures, and integrating across contexts” (Narvaez, 
2010a, p. 171). Narvaez explains this process in greater detail: 
“In level one, immersion, the teacher provides multiple examples of capable skill 
performance at developmentally appropriate levels… In level two, the educator draws 
attention to particular sub-skills that the students can practice in class… In level three, 
practice procedures, the teacher models skill sets … and students practice in role play 
and in actual everyday situations… In level four, integrating learning across contexts, 
the educator sets up ways for students to practice problem solving in multiple settings, 
to learn how to adjust skill application to different situations.” (Narvaez, 2010b; p. 
87) 
This four-stage structure of fostering skills presents a method of providing 
experiences where students can practise the moral skills in the controlled environment of a 
classroom. For students to apply their moral skills in environments less controlled, attention 
also needs to be paid to different kinds of decision making. 
Goldberg (2002) demonstrates that there are two types of decision making: veridical 
decision making where the conditions are preselected (e.g. psychological experiments), and 
adaptive decision making where the person making the decision has to make sense of a wide 
range of incoming information simultaneously. This involves prioritising certain input while 
checking what feels right (intuitions) and what seems logical (reasoning) and considering 
possible courses of action among other things. Overall, adaptive decision making requires 
more effort and reflects real life situations better. 
To foster adaptive ethical expertise in students, Narvaez (2010b, p. 86) makes 
suggestions regarding the environment in which this education may take place. First of all, 
establishing a secure and caring relationship between the student and the teacher in which the 
teacher has an unconditional positive regard for the child, recognising his/her needs and 
individuality allows the child to thrive as a person and a student. A supportive climate, in 
which the students perceive that the teacher emphasises understanding, leads the students to 
adopt a mastery orientation to learning, as opposed to a performance orientation. Vaydich, 
Khmelkov, and Narvaez (2007) indicate that a mastery orientation to learning fosters 
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prosocial attitudes and behaviour. Viewing the students with a growth mindset instead of a 
fixed mindset allows the teachers to realise that students need structure and guidance in order 
to develop various skills required for a good life (Narvaez, 2010b). Using the above-
mentioned novice-to-expert pedagogy teachers would be able to foster the moral development 
of students. Fostering autonomy and self-authorship cultivates self-monitoring skills and self-
reflection which help students, for example, to change strategies to solve problems when 
there is a need to, “whether working a math problem or a moral problem” (p. 88). Pointing 
out that each community has its own approach and understanding of moral character (the 
moral ecology of the community), Narvaez recommends that restoring the ecological system 
of support in the community would foster the flourishing of the child since it is the 
community where students as persons practise and apply their ethical skills. 
Narvaez’s approach to developing expertise in moral skills could be seen as the 
psychological counterpart of Aristotelian naturalistic virtue ethics discussed in the previous 
chapter. Narvaez identifies certain psychological skills that can be developed into moral 
expertise. These psychological skills form part or the whole of techne (Hursthouse, 2006) in 
the philosophical literature. In this kind of education students are taken to possess natural 
virtue (or less), and the development of these virtues (from scratch or their natural form) to 
greater degrees of expertise can be seen as part of the accumulation of experience required to 
gain full virtue. Furthermore, the concept of practical wisdom overlaps with adaptive ethical 
expertise; Narvaez seems to prefer a psychological term with some welcome naturalistic 
philosophical baggage. Practical wisdom seen as a set of skills and capacities, as Hursthouse 
(2006) suggests, would refer to greater degrees of moral expertise, including negative 
expertise (Minsky, 1997). 
1.6. Summary 
The primary aim of this section has been to answer the first research question: How 
does moral education take place? In the Turkish context, moral education is given alongside 
religious education in the RCE course; however, the course has received criticism on the 
grounds that it is insufficiently pluralistic. The lack of pluralism is problematic not just on 
social and political grounds, but also on philosophical grounds, given the plurality of moral 
issues and their appropriate solutions in daily life. The course also lacks a clear psychological 
focus on fostering moral skills, which further contributes to the problematic lack of pluralism 
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while also failing to achieve the original ‘positivistic and worldly’ aims of moral education in 
Turkey. 
 Furthermore, moral education does not take place solely in the official curriculum. 
The majority of moral education happens implicitly in the hidden curriculum and through the 
moral ecology and atmosphere of the school. It is inevitable that moral education takes place 
implicitly, beyond the official curriculum: students learn from their experiences and 
observations, and the interactions that constitute school life provide a far richer source of 
experiences and observations than the official moral education course. 
Yet the implicit nature of moral education does not necessarily imply that it must take 
place unconsciously and that it has to lack structure or a deliberate approach. Given that 
teachers’ interactions with students form one of the most central aspects of implicit moral 
education, teachers can consciously engage in implicit education and approach it in a 
deliberate and systematic manner, provided that they understand how implicit moral 
education takes place. 
This draws attention to teachers’ dispositions that are relevant to how they engage in 
moral education. Teachers’ beliefs and assumptions regarding moral education, moral 
psychology, and moral philosophy are critical in this respect. These central beliefs and 
assumptions direct teachers’ behaviour, and in return, their behaviour influences students’ 
moral development. 
Several studies that shed light on some of the beliefs pertinent to teachers’ 
understanding of implicit moral education have been reviewed. Most importantly, while 
teachers may be willing and interested in engaging in moral education – they appear to think 
that it is their responsibility as teachers to engage in moral education, and that it is the 
school’s responsibility to foster students’ moral development – it seems that their initial 
training has not equipped them to engage effectively with moral education. This finding 
appears to hold cross-culturally; similar findings have been reported in Turkey, Scotland, and 
the USA. 
This is especially exemplified in teachers’ faith in role modelling moral values: while 
they seem confident that role modelling has an impact, they are not always aware of its 
limitations. Furthermore, teachers cannot always think of alternative methods of teaching 
morality and tend to rely solely on role modelling. 
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It is likely that the root cause of this result is that initial teacher training programmes 
do not focus sufficiently on addressing the central beliefs that teachers hold, which determine 
how they engage with moral education. One further potential cause is also identified as the 
lack of “moral language.” While teachers are well-equipped with the technical aspects of 
teaching and education, this is done at the expense of a focus on morality. The heavy 
emphasis on the technical aspects of education and the lack of a focus on the moral aspects of 
teaching is thought to preclude teachers from making sense of their experiences in school 
through a moral lens. Instead, they revert to the technical lens with which they have been 
equipped. This is thought to hinder teachers’ ability to engage in moral education. 
This issue could be addressed by attending to the moral aspects of the school in initial 
teacher training. Training regarding moral philosophy, moral psychology, and moral 
education could potentially help teachers understand the nature of morality, how moral 
development occurs, and how implicit moral education takes place. Furthermore, including 
training on these topics in ITE may also provide teachers with a moral language through 
which they can better understand and engage in moral education. 
In the case of role modelling, Albert Bandura’s Theory of Learning by Observation 
(1986; 1997) could help teachers better understand how role modelling may foster students’ 
moral skills. Furthermore, teachers need not rely solely on the spontaneous nature of role 
modelling to foster students’ moral skills. A more deliberate and systematic approach can be 
taken with the structure Narvaez (2010a; 2010b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008) proposes for 
fostering moral expertise. 
In summary, moral education happens largely unconsciously. While this applies in the 
Turkish context, it also seems to hold cross-culturally. However, this does not need to be the 
case. By attending to teachers’ beliefs relevant to their engagement with moral education, and 
by equipping them with a moral language in their initial training, it is possible to conduct 
implicit moral education in a much more conscious, structured, and effective manner. 
The next section explores several morally relevant skills and capacities in greater 
depth. These skills and capacities form part or the whole of what teachers can foster in 
students towards greater moral development and moral expertise. 
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2. Moral Psychology 
In this section, an answer to the second research question is sought: What are the 
psychological processes involved in the production and development of moral behaviour? In 
order to answer this question literature regarding some core aspects of moral psychology is 
presented and reviewed. This review of moral psychology literature, while not exhaustive, 
represents a comprehensive picture of moral development. I should note, however, that the 
main aim in attempting to understand and describe moral psychological processes is not to 
identify content matter for moral educators, but to consider whether an understanding of 
moral psychology constitutes part of the knowledge teachers could benefit from concerning 
their engagement in moral education. The following review selectively presents the literature 
on moral psychology; discussion regarding how an understanding of the literature reviewed 
here can help teachers better engage in moral education can be found in sections 2.6 and 3. 
Given that the purpose of this chapter is to identify psychological processes relevant 
to moral behaviour, a definition of behaviour is in order. Throughout history there have been 
three broad philosophical approaches to understanding what behaviour is (Cziko, 2000). 
These include psychic approaches which indicate that behaviour is rooted in the soul; 
materialist approaches that reject immaterial entities such as the soul and employ only 
physical explanations based on matter, energy, and their interactions; and dualist approaches 
which assume that behaviour has roots both in physical material and the soul (Cziko, 2000). 
In line with the naturalist underpinnings of this thesis, the conception of behaviour is purely 
materialistic. 
The Oxford Dictionary has two definitions of behaviour: “The way in which an 
animal or person behaves in response to a particular situation or stimulus” and “the way in 
which a machine or natural phenomenon works or functions” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2017). 
References to behaviour in this thesis are almost exclusively in the former meaning. This 
indicates two things: a) that a behaviour is an action, and b) that it is in context – ‘in response 
to a particular situation or stimulus.’ 
Here, behaviour is taken to be an action, but it also involves an intention, in 
opposition to actions without intentions such as reflexes. Intentionality also implies agency, 
but this is dealt with in section 2.3 with reference to the concept of identity. This being said, I 
do not take it that intentions have to be conscious – moral behaviour, especially moral 
judgements (see section 2.2 below), can be driven by subconscious mechanisms, and it is 
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argued that most moral judgement happen subconsciously. Indeed, given that conscious 
mechanisms require more effort, and thus are not employed as often we may think they are 
(see section 2.2.2 below), it is desirable that moral behaviour is rooted in subconscious 
psychological mechanisms, and by extension, intentions. 
Furthermore, I do not take it to be that a behaviour is just what meets the eye – that a 
behaviour is a behaviour only if it affects a person (or something else). Moral behaviour is a 
much more unified whole, where moral judgements passed inside a person’s mind are as 
much a part of the same behaviour as the reflection the judgement has in words uttered, 
movements made, or affects others in any other way. 
It is also worth pointing out this thesis is specifically interested in moral behaviour, as 
opposed to behaviour in general, as evidenced by the fact that 58% of all occurrences of the 
word ‘behaviour’ in the main body of the thesis are immediately preceded by the word 
‘moral’. Moral relevance constitutes the context (situation or stimulus in the above definition) 
that conceptually turns an ‘action’ into a ‘behaviour’. What kinds of behaviour qualify as 
moral behaviour is dependent on how one defines morality, the definition of which has been 
argued to be plural in Chapter I. However, the psychological mechanisms that are concerned 
with moral behaviour do not rely on defining morality; certain mechanisms, such as 
reasoning, intuitions, and motivation, have been identified as relevant to moral behaviour. 
This is the reason that literature on the psychology of moral behaviour has been deemed to be 
the most relevant field to understand moral behaviour. 
Certain aspects of moral psychology have been researched in greater detail than others 
in this review. James Rest’s Four Components Model (Rest, 1983) has been included because 
it provides an overview of the occurrence of moral behaviour. Rationalist and intuitionist 
approaches to moral judgement, including the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach (Rest et al. 1999; 
2000) to Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory (1981; 1984) and Haidt’s Social 
Intuitionist Model (2001), have been reviewed because of their descriptive power regarding 
the occurrence and development of moral judgement. Concepts related to moral emotions and 
moral identity have been included for the understanding they provide regarding moral 
motivation. Graham and colleagues’ Moral Foundations Theory (2013) offers support and 
greater depth for the intuitionist position and an understanding regarding innate moral 
structures. Finally, Narvaez’s Triune Ethics Theory (2008), once again alongside the Moral 
Foundations Theory, is included for depth of understanding regarding moral ecologies. 
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Conversely, some aspects of moral psychology have not been discussed in depth. First 
of all, the most conspicuous is the absence of discussions related to culture and religion given 
their relevance to morality (e.g. Shweder et al., 1997), even though concerns regarding the 
influence of cultural practices and religious sentiments on moral development and 
understandings of morality become more prominent in Chapters V and VI (Qualitative Data 
Analysis and Discussion chapters, respectively). However, this thesis focuses on teachers’ 
understanding of moral developmental psychology, and thus theological and cultural aspects 
of morality are beyond the scope of this thesis, due to concerns of space. Similarly, due to a 
lack of space, more in-depth discussions of aspects of moral sensitivity and moral 
implementation were not possible in this thesis. These discussions were omitted from the 
final draft of the thesis not because they are not important and do not deserve space here, but 
discussions regarding moral judgement and moral motivation have greater priority. Moral 
judgement is prioritised because moral reasoning is a major element of moral judgement, and 
an in-depth understanding of moral reasoning is thought to be educationally the most relevant 
aspect of moral psychology (see Sections 2.2, 2.6, and 3 below). Moral motivation is 
prioritised because one of its major elements is the moral self, which is also educationally 
very relevant (see sections 2.3, 2.6, and 3 below). Discussions regarding the moral self can 
also lend themselves to discussions regarding moral implementation, but this was also 
omitted due to concerns of space. The other models and theories that have been explored in 
this thesis were given greater priority due to the reasons explained in the above paragraph. 
Each of the models and topics of moral psychology reviewed below could contribute 
to teachers’ psychological beliefs, based on the suggestions of the Moral Work of Teaching 
framework developed by Sanger and Osguthorpe (2011; 2013). While philosophical 
arguments are more prominent in some sections below, as opposed to empirical 
psychological studies (e.g. discussions regarding the moral self), all reviewed literature has 
direct relevance to how one might understand the psychological aspects of morality, 
especially developmental aspects. 
2.1. Four Components Model 
This section provides an overview of James Rest’s (1983) Four Components Model 
(FCM), briefly describing the components and citing some of the research conducted in 
relation to the model. Individual components are explored in depth in the following sections, 
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and the model is later discussed in terms of how teachers could use it to foster their students’ 
moral development at the end of the chapter. 
The FCM is a theory which gives an overview of moral psychology. According to the 
model, for moral behaviour to be elicited a person would need to (a) recognize the moral 
significance of a given situation, (b) decide on a course of action s/he deems to be morally 
right, (c) prefer to act on moral values than other non-moral values or not to act, and finally 
(d) show the determination to follow through the chosen course of action even under pressure 
(Bebeau, Rest, Narvaez, 1999; Rest, 1983; 1984). These four processes are named moral 
sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation, and moral implementation, respectively. 
While these four processes can be conceived as moral skills (Narvaez, 2008; 2010a), it should 
be noted that they also interact with our emotions and identity (Garcia & Ostrosky-Solis, 
2006; Hardy, 2006). Rest and his colleagues suggested that the combination of knowledge 
from all four components would allow people to make more reliable predictions of moral 
behaviour (Rest et al. 1999) and that all four processes are required for moral development 
(Rest, 1983). 
Although these components can be studied in relative isolation, and are to some 
degree independent of each other, the components are interconnected (Morton et al. 2006). 
Rest et al. (1999) state that “logically, Component 1 (sensitivity) precedes Component 2 
(judgment), but the components do not follow each other in a set temporal order—as there 
are complex feed-forward and feed-backward loops, and complex interactions” (p. 102, 
emphasis added). For example, a person’s judgement (Component 2) of which values deserve 
more priority may lead them to be motivated (Component 3) to be more sensitive 
(Component 1) to certain kinds of moral issues (e.g. justice-related issues). In turn, with a 
new experience where the person carries out a moral action (for example, one they did not 
think they were capable of) (Component 4) may lead them to realize (Component 1) 
something new, and alter their moral judgement (Component 2) and/or the kinds of 
motivation (Component 3) they find to act morally. These rather crude examples are intended 
to show the possibilities of how each component could affect another. 
2.1.1. Moral Sensitivity 
Moral sensitivity is defined as the awareness of the moral salience of a given situation 
and how our actions affect other people (Hoffman, 1984; Myyry, 2003; Rest, 1986; Rest & 
Narvaez, 1994). This involves understanding that there is a moral issue in a particular 
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situation, the people who are the participants of the situation and are affected by it, being able 
to identify the variety of possible courses of action that can be taken in reaction to the 
situation, and imagining the consequences of each course of action for all affected parties. An 
understanding of the rights and welfare of others is central to moral sensitivity, particularly 
when these conflict with one’s own interests (Hoffman, 1984). Rest (1986; 1994) assumed 
that moral sensitivity involves being able to imagine different possible scenarios of the 
situation and how different lines of action could affect others. 
The majority of studies concerning moral sensitivity have been conducted in relation 
to professional ethics, especially dental care and nursing (Bebeau, 1994, Bebeau, Rest, & 
Yamoor, 1985; Clarkeburn, 2002; Johnson, 2011; Karcher, 1996; Latané, Nida, & Wilson, 
1981; Lind & Rarick, 1999; McNeel, 1994; Robichaux, 2012; Staub, 1978; You, Maeda, & 
Bebeau, 2011). Results indicate that for most people it is not a case of whether the person is 
morally sensitive or not. Myyry (2003) argues that “there are substantial differences in 
persons’ emotional sensitivity to the needs of others” (p. 10) and that “sensitivity is not 
usually viewed as a general personality trait but rather a process which may vary from 
situation to situation” (p. 11). There can be a variety of degrees of moral sensitivity among 
people and even within persons themselves. Some people can be more sensitive to moral 
issues in certain contexts than others. For example, a parent may be highly sensitive to moral 
issues within the family while not as sensitive to moral problems in the workplace. On the 
other hand, another person could be equally sensitive to moral issues in all contexts but may 
be more sensitive to justice-related issues than to care-related issues. It is generally agreed 
that moral sensitivity develops with age along with social cognitive abilities involving 
perceiving events and behaviour, and inferring intentions, emotions, and motivations (Myyry, 
2003, Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010; You, Maeda, & Bebeau, 2011). Uhlinger and Shantz 
(1983) also suggest that recognising and recalling information relevant to the event increases 
with age.  
Studies indicate that social intelligence (Curzer, 2014), moral imagination (Narvaez, 
2008; Werhane, 1999; Yurtsever, 2006), empathy (Hoffman, 2000; Jordan, 2007; Myyry, 
2003) and role-taking (Flavel, 1968; Hoffman, 2000) are especially important for moral 
sensitivity. Robin, Reidenbach, and Forrest (1996) point out that in many difficult decisions, 
moral concerns are not in plain sight and are fused with other, competing interests. People 
who do not recognise moral problems, in other words, are morally insensitive, because they 
fail to apply their moral beliefs and theories into everyday situations (Curzer, 2014). Curzer 
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(2014) maintains that the application of social intelligence – the set of cognitive and affective 
skills that allow a person to imagine his/herself in the other’s shoes – in moral dilemmas, is 
rather uncommon due to “the bare fact of otherness,” because people come from different 
backgrounds and “perhaps…simple self-centeredness” (p. 108). 
Moral cognition cannot be separated from affect (Rest, 1986). Research suggests that 
empathy and role taking foster motivation for moral sensitivity (Flavel, 1968; Hoffman, 
2000; Jordan, 2007; Myyry, 2003). Social intelligence also has common concepts with 
empathy and role-taking in that it requires people to imagine themselves in the others’ shoes 
(Curzer, 2014). The central aspect of moral imagination with respect to moral sensitivity is 
the ability to take the others’ perspective, either cognitively through role taking, or 
emotionally through empathy. However, moral imagination is a much wider concept that can 
sometimes lead to negative consequences (see Triune Ethics Theory below). 
2.1.2. Moral Judgement 
The second component of the FCM is moral judgement. It is described as the ability 
to choose the most appropriate course of action from among the recognised possibilities 
(Myyry, 2003; Rest, 1986; 1994). Logically, this process follows moral sensitivity as here the 
needs of affected parties have been recognized, possible courses of action identified, and the 
potential consequences of actions and their effects on other individuals have also been 
considered (Bebeau, Rest, & Narvaez, 1999; Rest, 1983, Rest et al. 1999; 2000). However, it 
should be highlighted again that the order suggested here in only logical, not temporal. 
Moral judgement has received the largest amount of scholarly attention, starting from 
Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory (1981; 1984) in the 1960s to the present. 
Arguably, Kohlberg’s theory has made the greatest contribution to moral psychology 
research, as studies on cognitive development of moral judgement (Barriaga et al., 2001; 
Haidt, 2001; Kohlberg, 1981; 1984; Myyry, 2003; Narvaez, 2010a; 2010b; Nisan & 
Kohlberg, 1982), criticisms from various lines of thought (Baril & Wright, 2012; Gilligan, 
1982; Krettenauer & Edelstein, 1999; Locke, 1986; Sandberg & Juth, 2011; Schweder, 1982; 
Turiel, 1983; 1997), and reactions to criticisms (Feinberg et al., 2012; Rest 1983; Rest et al., 
1999; 2000; Thoma et al., 1999) have so far dominated the field. Moral judgement and its 
development are investigated in greater depth in section 2.2. below. 
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2.1.3. Moral Motivation 
Rest (1986) defines moral motivation as an individual’s value priorities. It is 
concerned with how (and whether) an individual prefers moral values over non-moral values. 
Once the moral salience of a situation and how a possible course of action may affect others 
has been recognised, and a course of action has been judged to be the best to follow in the 
given situation, moral motivation is required for the individual to feel driven to act on the 
judgement. Moral motivation thus refers to a commitment to act in accordance with one’s 
moral values, “whether or not to try to fulfil one’s moral ideal” (Rest, 1984, p. 27) and taking 
responsibility for any moral outcomes (Myyry, 2003). 
Ever since Blasi (1980) identified a gap between moral judgement and action, arguing 
in his meta-analysis that moral action does not seem to correspond with the high scores of 
moral judgement on Kohlbergian tests, moral motivation has received a large amount of 
academic attention from both psychological (Hardy, 2006; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011; 
Lotze, Ravindran, & Myers, 2010; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013; Power, Roney, & Power, 
2008) and philosophical perspectives (Blasi, 1980; Kretz, 2012; Kristjánsson, 2006; 2009; 
2010a; 2010b). Philosophers and psychologists have argued that moral emotions (Blasi, 
1999; Best, 1988; Coplan, 2010; Garcia & Ostrosky-Solis, 2006; Hernandez, 2009; 
Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011) on the one hand, and moral identity (Bergman, 2005a; 
Krettenauer, 2011; Kristjánsson, 2009; 2013; Monin & Jordan, 2009) on the other can best 
bridge this gap. The motivating quality of moral emotions and moral identity, their relation to 
each other, and the development of moral motivation in terms of moral emotions and moral 
identity are explored in greater depth below. 
2.1.4. Moral Implementation 
Moral implementation is sometimes interchangeably referred to as moral character or 
moral action, but in order to avoid confusion with the other two terms that are frequently used 
in this thesis in different contexts, in this study this component is referred to only as moral 
implementation. Moral implementation has been studied less than the other components. 
Bebeau, Rest, and Narvaez (1999) describe moral character in the following words: 
“A person may have the first three components (be sensitive to moral issues, have 
good judgment, prioritize moral values), but if he or she is lacking in Component 4, 
the person will wilt under pressure or fatigue, won't follow through, will be distracted 
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or discouraged, and moral behaviour will fail. Component 4 presupposes that one has 
set goals, has self-discipline and controls impulse, and has the strength and skill to act 
in accord with one's goals.” (p. 22) 
The development of moral character in this sense entails fostering moral 
determination and bravery to some extent for resisting distractions and pressure respectively, 
and the emotional drive and energy to follow through despite fatigue. As Narvaez (2010a) 
puts it, “experts in ethical action know how to keep their eye on the prize” (p. 171). 
Although a search of “Four Components Model” and “moral character” or 
“component 4 development” yields relatively few results, literature related to the 
development of moral character can be found in moral identity development (Krettenauer, 
2011; Moshman, 2009; Power, Power, & Clark, 2008) and in moral agency development 
(Lapsley, 2010; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010; Tappan, 2010) which relate to this through 
personality trait development (such as bravery) and development of moral autonomy.  
2.2. Moral Judgement 
Moral judgement was introduced in section 2.1.2 above; in this section, it is explored 
in greater depth. Two main processes lead to moral judgement: moral reasoning and moral 
intuitions. While the two processes were thought to be incompatible and studied in isolation, 
recent research indicates that the two processes are complementary. Initially, moral reasoning 
literature is presented below, followed by moral intuitions. Finally, how the two processes 
work together is presented. 
The field of moral psychology grew mostly in response to Kohlberg’s Cognitive 
Development Theory, which proposed a developmental structure to moral reasoning. 
However, its underlying assumptions have been heavily criticised; as a result, Kohlberg’s 
original theory has lost most of its credibility. Currently, the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach 
(hereafter NKA) to the Cognitive Developmental Theory, advanced by Rest and colleagues, 
is more widely accepted as it addresses most of the criticisms directed at Kohlberg’s theory, 
albeit focusing solely on moral reasoning. On the other hand, Kohlberg’s original theory is 
more widely known. 
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2.2.1. Development of Moral Reasoning 
The NKA proposes that moral development can be described through three schemas 
of reasoning. Rest et al. (1999; 2000) revised the stages of CDT (Kohlberg, 1981; 1984) to 
construct the schemas of the NKA. These three schemas are the Personal Interest Schema, the 
Maintaining Norms Schema, and the Post-Conventional schema (see Table 1). 
In the Personal Interest Schema, the individual has an egocentric orientation to 
morality (as opposed to a socio-centric orientation), judging the rightness and wrongness of 
an action based only on its immediate consequences. Questions of morality remain at person 
to person/face-to-face basis, and individuals using this schema justify a moral decision by 
analysing what each stakeholder in a moral dilemma has to gain or lose in the consequences 
of an action, driven mainly by the notion of ‘if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours’. It 
is hypothesised that moral behaviour in this schema is motivated by external forces, and is 
heavily based on the approval of adults, mainly parents and teachers. Individuals operating at 
this level of reasoning are primarily concerned with themselves and people with whom they 
have an affectionate relationship (Rest et al. 2000, p. 387). It is regarded as a somewhat 
simpler and morally uncritical form of reasoning. It is also suggested that this style of 
reasoning develops early in childhood. In the latter stage of the personal interest schema, 
societal roles are more important. Moral evaluation of actions is in terms of relationships, and 
the concept of ‘treat others as you would like them to treat you’ becomes important. External 
approval is still an important factor in motivation, and moral behaviour is still based more on 
personal interests than societal interests. 
Cognitive Development Theory Neo-Kohlbergian Approach 
Pre-conventional Level Stage 1: Avoidance of 
Punishment 
--- 
Stage 2: Self-interest  
Personal Interest Schema  
 
Conventional Level 
Stage 3: Interpersonal 
Accord and 
Conformity 
Stage 4: Maintaining 
Authority and Social 
Order 
 
Maintaining Norms Schema 
 
Post-conventional 
Level 
Stage 5: Social Contact  
Post-conventional Schema Stage 6: Universal 
Ethical Principles 
Table 2: CDT Stages vs. NKA Schemas 
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The main characteristic of the second schema of the NKA (Maintaining Norms 
Schema, see Table 1) is conformity with society’s rules, and obeying them without much 
questioning or critical thinking, even if obedience or disobedience will not have a significant 
consequence. Rest et al. (1999; 2000) regard it as more complex than the Personal Interest 
Schema since it includes a socio-centric perspective. Individuals using this schema see no 
need to question authority and rules, almost having complete faith in them. Law is connected 
to order in a moral sense; thus, the law is morality. Also, this schema provides a sense of 
moral certainty; the individual is likely to think that s/he knows that s/he is right for the sake 
of the entire society. 
This schema is typical of adolescents and adults. Rest and colleagues argue that the 
main reason for the advance to this level during adolescence is the “discovery of society” 
(Rest et al., 2000, p. 386). This refers to the understanding that people are connected to each 
other through institutions and ‘the system,’ (Rest et al., 2000), and not only on a face-to-face 
basis. This awareness raises questions about the morality of society and issues of moral 
authority. This is due to greater abstract thinking capacities of adolescents compared to 
younger children, developing around age 10 (Rest et al., 2000), and the related advent of 
moral imagination. As children are more and more capable of understanding distant 
institutions functioning on abstract principles – aided by their newly developing imaginative 
capabilities – their (understanding of the) world expands. This leads to the “discovery of 
society.” 
However, the matter may not be about the entire society, but about the peer-group. 
Adolescence is also the time when alliances and friendships are forged (Haidt, 2001), so this 
schema may be related more to solidifying such alliances by uncritically subscribing to the 
dominant norms of the peer group and maintaining those values, rather than the entire 
society. It may also have a connection with our evolved tribal nature; perhaps the issue is 
related more to the development of a sense of belonging to a tribe or group during 
adolescence, rather than our cognitive capacities affording moral reasoning at only this level 
of complexity. 
The Post-Conventional schema (see Table 1) is characterised by a more independent 
moral orientation. At this level, rules are regarded more as guidelines rather than definite 
moral dictations. As a result, an individual may disobey certain rules which do not reflect his 
or her principles. The most fundamental tenet of the Post-Conventional schema is that moral 
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obligations are to be based on shared ideals, are fully reciprocal, and are open to scrutiny 
(Rest et al., 2000; p.388). This kind of moral reasoning is typical of adults; however, 
relatively fewer active members of society reach this level according to Rest et al. (1999; 
2000). Kohlberg (1984) had also found that fewer members of society reach the stages of the 
Post-Conventional level. (See Table 1 for how the Post-Conventional level in the CDT and 
the Post-Conventional schema in the NKA are related.) 
Eckersberger & Zimba (1997) propose that the advance from one stage/schema to the 
next can be understood in terms of a heteronomous vs. autonomous orientation to the style of 
reasoning defined by the schemas. The authors indicate that each Kohlbergian stage (see 
Table 1 for CDT and NKA stage comparison) has a further set of sub-stages, A and B 
(heteronomous and autonomous orientations, respectively). It is envisioned that when an 
individual advances from, for example, stage 3 to stage 4, they advance from an autonomous 
orientation of stage 3 reasoning (Stage 3B) to a heteronomous orientation of stage 4 
reasoning (Stage 4A). According to Kohlberg (1984), this could be partly due to how 
progress takes place. Progress from one stage to the next is usually prompted by a more 
complex observation of the moral domain of life; in other words, it is partly motivated 
externally (e.g. observing peers functioning/making decisions at a higher stage of moral 
reasoning). It would logically follow that in most cases an externally motivated advance to 
the next stage would lead to a heteronomous orientation until the reasoning style of the stage 
is properly internalised, and an autonomous orientation can be taken. Once this autonomous 
orientation is established, it is possible that the moral horizon of the individual is broadened, 
and the individual becomes ready to engage with the observation required for the advance to 
the next stage.  
2.2.2. Moral Intuitions 
The core assumption of the above-presented rationalist approach to moral judgement 
is that moral reasoning is responsible for moral judgements. This assumption was challenged 
by Haidt in 2001 with the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM). Haidt argued that reasoning does 
not reflect the whole picture of moral judgement, and instead asserted that moral judgements 
are not the result of conscious reasoning, but of unconscious, intuitive judgements. The SIM 
relies less on decision-making mechanisms available to our conscious observation, and more 
on unconscious mechanisms that operate outside the awareness of our consciousness and 
demand less cognitive effort. The core assumption of the SIM is that moral judgements are 
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caused by automatic moral intuitions. Moral reasoning is activated only when it is called 
upon for purposes of justifying a moral judgement. Haidt (2001) defines moral judgement as 
“evaluations (good versus bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with 
respect to a set of virtues held by a culture or subculture to be obligatory” (p. 817). Moral 
reasoning is defined as conscious (intentional, effortful, within the individual’s awareness) 
mental activity of analysing information about people and the situation in order to reach a 
moral judgement. And finally, moral intuition is defined as “the sudden appearance in 
consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), 
without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of research, weighing 
evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). 
Haidt (2001) offers four main lines of criticism of the rationalist approach. First of all, 
that there are not just one, but two cognitive processes involved in decision-making, namely 
reasoning and intuitions. Reasoning, a slow and effortful process, is largely accessible to our 
consciousness, but intuitions, effortless and automatic, are unconscious operations, and cause 
the larger part of moral judgements. Secondly, although the reasoning process may seem to 
be objective, it is most often driven by relatedness motives (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Chen, 
Shechter & Chaiken, 1996) and coherence motives (Kesebir & Pyszczynski, 2011; 
Moskowitz, Skurnik, & Galinsky, 1999). Thirdly, such motivated reasoning does not 
objectively reflect the decision-making process but merely produces posthoc justifications. 
And finally, moral action is based more on emotions than on reasoning. 
In return, Haidt (2001) proposes four main “links” in SIM concerning the occurrence 
of moral judgements (see Figure 1). Initially, a situation elicits a moral intuition. This leads to 
the sudden appearance of a judgement in the individual’s consciousness (link 1: intuitive 
judgement link). This judgement occurs automatically and effortlessly. Next, a justification 
for the already made judgement is created (link 2: posthoc reasoning link). This is done in 
order to convey the judgement to another person. Haidt (2001) argues that reasoned 
discussions and arguments do not usually cause another person to change their position 
unless the argument taps into the other person’s moral intuitions (link 3: reasoned persuasion 
link). On the other hand, the simple fact that one believes in a moral position is likely to 
affect another person’s moral intuitions if the two individuals have a positive relationship 
(e.g. friends, allies; link 4: social persuasion link). According to Haidt, this comes as a result 
of our sensitivity to the emergence of group norms. 
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Figure 1: The social intuitionist model of moral judgment (Figure taken from Haidt, 2001, p. 815) 
Besides the four main links SIM proposes, there are two more links: reasoned 
judgement link (link 5), and private reflection link (link 6). Link 5 suggests that in rare cases 
where the initial intuition is weak, and processing capacity is high, people could reason their 
way to a judgement by “sheer force of logic” (Haidt, 2001; p. 819), overriding the intuition. 
Haidt argues that link 6 can spontaneously activate an intuition that contradicts the initial 
intuitive judgement. Role taking is the most common way of doing this as when one imagines 
oneself in the shoes of another, empathy is activated, and one can understand the pain, 
affection, or other vicarious emotional responses. Haidt (2001) also adds that while rationalist 
models focus on the last two links, the SIM concentrates on the first four links. However, 
Haidt maintains that there are no links between one person’s reasoning and another’s 
judgement. 
Concerning the development of moral intuitions in the SIM, it is proposed that they 
are partly innate, but they are also shaped by culture. In Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt 
and colleagues define innate as “organised in advance of experience” (Graham et al. 2013, p. 
7). These innate moral intuitions are then either built upon or discarded through experiences 
largely influenced by the culture in which an individual grows up. Haidt argues that just as 
children are born with the capability to learn all the sounds of any language, but lose this 
ability after passing a certain sensitive period and fail to properly pronounce new sounds of a 
language they learn after the sensitive period, children are born with the capacity to 
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internalize any moral value, but after a certain age, they are less able to do so, and do not 
internalize the values of foreign cultures. Haidt (2001) calls this the selective loss of 
intuitions. On the other hand, through being immersed in a culture, other moral intuitions that 
are valued by the culture become more pronounced as children grow. This is called 
immersion in custom complexes. Haidt proposes that the sensitive period when children 
internalise values seems to be between the ages of 9 and 15. If children younger than 9 years 
old migrate to another culture, the values of the previous culture do not seem to have a lasting 
effect. On the other hand, people older than 15 years of age experience culture shock when 
they travel to a foreign culture. Haidt posits that the rules and norms of the host culture may 
be learnt, but they will not be internalised. This sensitive period overlaps with adolescence; a 
period when children learn how to make alliances. Haidt (2001) hypothesises that children 
acquire moral norms from their peers. He names this process as peer socialisation, and 
explains it in the following terms:  
“children’s task in late childhood and adolescence is not to become like their parents 
but to fit into their peer group, for it is among peers that alliances must be formed and 
prestige garnered... Children acquire their culture – including moral values – from 
their peers, just as they acquire their phonology (i.e. children of immigrants copy the 
accent of their peers, not their parents)” (p. 828) 
The question of universality which has been posed to rationalist approaches to moral 
judgement also applies to intuitionist approaches. The development of moral reasoning is 
highly likely to be heavily based on culture since it is through our culture that we get our 
habits and styles of rationalising the world (Haidt, 2001). However, the development of 
intuitions may be more universal, as this is based on human psychology – a rather more 
consistent structure across cultures than habits of reasoning. This is not to deny that social 
intuitions could differ so much from culture to culture that foreign people may sometimes 
feel like complete aliens to a particular culture, however, the development of social/moral 
intuitions could follow a similar process across cultures. In Moral Foundations Theory, 
Graham, Haidt and colleagues (2013) argue that moral capacities are innate and universal. 
They point out, however, innate and universal does not mean unmalleable. Instead, moral 
intuitions are revised through cultural experiences. 
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2.2.3. Rational Control over Intuitions 
Research on moral intuitions explains how moral judgements occur, and research on 
moral reasoning explains how moral judgement develops. However, unlike Haidt (2001) 
claims, moral reasoning does not simply create confabulatory justifications for past actions 
and does lead to moral judgement. Several mechanisms of cognitive control over initial 
intuitive judgements exist, and these have a direct influence on judgement. Indirectly, styles 
of moral reasoning can become habituated, and eventually act like moral intuitions. 
Cognitive control over moral intuitions has been demonstrated through cognitive 
override (Fine, 2006) and emotion reappraisal (Feinberg et al., 2012). Cognitive override 
depends on being motivated to withhold an initial judgement. Motivation to pass an accurate 
judgement has been shown to withhold the original intuition (Thompson et al. 1994). 
Dependency on the person being judged was also shown to lead to rational judgements over 
intuitive ones (Pendry & Macrae, 1994). Also, concerns about stereotyping were shown to 
cause people to withhold their initial judgement in order to arrive at a more accurate or 
socially desirable judgement through reasoning (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998; 
Devine, 1989). While these motivations cannot be considered to be the entire list of possible 
motivations for a cognitive override of initial intuitive judgement, they nonetheless provide 
evidence that, given the motivation, reasoning can override intuitive moral judgements. 
Emotional reappraisal is a kind of emotion regulation strategy, though not the only 
one (Hu et al., 2014). It allows a person to step out of a situation emotionally in order to 
evaluate the situation rationally, including his or her own emotional situation (Feinberg et al. 
2012). Feinberg et al. (2012) indicate that this “involves construing an emotion-eliciting 
situation or event in a way that diminishes the intensity of the emotional experience… When 
exposed to a potentially immoral act that elicits emotionally driven moral intuitions, some 
people … reappraise their emotion by focusing on why they are experiencing it and whether 
there is good reason to experience it, and… this reappraisal … limit[s] the emotional impact” 
(p.789). Feinberg and colleagues (2012) found that individuals who had the habit of 
reappraising their emotions arrived at fewer moral judgements based on their initial intuitions 
overall, supporting the position that our initial moral intuitions, based on our emotions, are 
malleable control and manipulation by conscious effort. This suggests that a disposition to 
rein in impulsive/intuitive judgements by thinking twice can help one keep one’s moral 
intuitions in check. 
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Rational intuitions refer to paths of reasoning that have become habitualised and cause 
judgements to appear as if intuitions. After having gone through steps of learning and 
practising, our conscious and reasoned efforts become internalised and habitual. Narvaez 
(2010a) calls this process the development of expertise while Sauer (2012) calls it the 
education of intuitions. When next time this internalised, habitual rational process is invoked, 
it behaves like an intuition; a judgement suddenly appears in our consciousness, and we do 
not go through the steps of weighing evidence, careful thinking, etc., once again. This is not 
the same intuition as the one we had before learning and internalising the reasoning process. 
Sauer (2012) argues that rational judgements could be passed automatically if they 
have been habitualised. He argues that if we repeat the same action frequently enough over a 
long enough period of time, the action becomes habitual. What we once devoted conscious 
effort to (keep your foot on the brake when you start the car) becomes habitual and does not 
require conscious effort after a period. This is habitualisation. Sauer further maintains that 
acts which are habitualised are not random. Habitual actions serve a purpose (e.g. getting 
back home), and such habitualising practices and purposes can be provided by education. 
“In the course of an agent’s education, her practical reasons become embodied in her 
automatic judgemental and behavioural responses. These reasons are thus both 
internal to a subject’s psychology and external to her conscious awareness and 
initiation control at a given point in time. Making explicit the reasons that brought me 
to adopt my after work routine – namely that I want to go home – is an enterprise that 
comes entirely post hoc. But it need not be confabulatory; indeed, it would be 
ludicrous to suppose so.” (Sauer, 2012; p. 264) 
Narvaez also supports the position that some automatic judgements are not merely 
intuitive, but are based on (previous) reasoning. She names this the development of 
“expertise” (Narvaez & Lapsley; 2008; Narvaez, 2010a; 2010b; 2010c) instead of habits. 
Narvaez makes a distinction between the expert intuitions experts have regarding a domain 
and the naïve intuitions that novices have. Narvaez (2010a) makes use of three concepts, 
arguing for the integration of moral reasoning and moral intuitions. She argues that 
deliberation allows “one to assess the signals of intuition and the construction of reasons and 
to scrutinise their validity” (Narvaez, 2010a; p. 169). This makes it possible for perceptions 
to shift, altering one's intuitions in the course of deliberation. Next, she argues for moral 
deliberation in terms of moral imagination. In essence, moral imagination is a sophisticated 
kind of moral deliberation. Moral imagination allows the individual to consider things 
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beyond the immediate in terms of time, alternative, and place. This helps the individual to 
move beyond the immediate, allowing one to have different intuitions, monitored by reason. 
Finally, Narvaez supports expert-to-novice teaching and thus developing moral expertise in 
which a dialogue between intuitions and reasoning deepen understanding of a given moral 
situation (see section 1.5 above). Intuitions and reasoning constantly feed each other, and 
with the guidance of an expert, moral expertise develops. Intuitive reactions are subjected to 
scrutiny through reasoning, and the reasoning process then becomes intuitive. As a result, 
expert intuitions develop. 
In summary, while moral reasoning is a conscious and effortful process, moral 
intuitions are unconscious and automatic processes. Moral judgement is primarily rooted in 
moral intuitions. However, moral intuitions are not formed randomly; they are based on 
cultural experiences and habitualised reasoning styles. Moreover, effortful cognitive 
processes can control the unconscious intuitive processes. This indicates that fostering certain 
styles of moral reasoning during education may equip students with the right moral intuitions, 
and the cognitive abilities to maintain and control moral intuitions. 
2.3. Moral Motivation 
Moral motivation is defined as an individual’s value priorities (Rest, 1986). It is 
concerned with how (and whether) an individual prefers moral values over non-moral values 
(Myyry, 2003; Rest, 1986). While moral judgement allows a person to understand what is the 
best thing to do in a given situation, moral motivation is necessary to drive the person to act 
on the judgement. 
In his meta-analysis, Blasi (1980) concludes that moral reasoning does not correlate 
with moral action; this situation has since been termed the ‘gappiness problem’ and finds 
support from recent studies as well (Hardy, 2006). Hardy (2006) compares the motivational 
force that moral identity, moral reasoning and moral emotions provide. His research shows 
that moral identity and moral emotions play a significant role in motivating the individual to 
moral action, but not moral reasoning. He suggests that a larger, personality oriented 
perspective is necessary to understand morality, as pure reasoning is shown to contribute 
rarely to moral action. Educators and philosophers have called for the resolution of this gap 
(Kretz 2012; Kristjánsson, 2010a). In order to bridge this gap, philosophers and psychologists 
have focused on the motivational power of moral emotions and the moral self (Blasi, 1980; 
Hardy, 2006; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011; Kretz, 2012; Kristjánsson, 2006; 2009; 2010a; 
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2010b; Lotze, Ravindran, & Myers, 2010; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013; Power, Roney, & 
Power, 2008).  
Haidt (2003) indicates that moral emotions can be defined as the emotions that are 
concerned with the well-being and interests of others. This definition does not categorise 
specific emotions as moral or not, rather the context in which an emotion is felt makes it 
moral. Huebner, Dwyer, and Hauser (2008) suggest that “the source of moral judgments lies 
in our causal-intentional psychology; emotion often follows from these judgments, serving a 
primary role in motivating morally relevant action” (p. 1). 
An exhaustive list of morally relevant emotions and their effect on behaviour is 
beyond the scope of this thesis; however, many studies have focused on specific emotions 
and their influence on moral behaviour. Empathy has been shown to cause people to act more 
compassionately to those with whom one shares a close positive bond (Hoffman, 2000; 
Myyry; 2003); anger at perpetrators has been demonstrated to motivate attacking behaviour 
(Graham et al., 2013; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998; Hutchinson & Gross, 2011; Roseman, 
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994); guilt has been shown to motivate pro-social behaviour in order to 
make reparations and right the wrongdoing one has committed (Krettenauer & Johnston, 
2011; Sanders, Pattison, & Hurwitz, 2011); the expectancy of being proud of good action was 
shown to motivate action (Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011); shame has been demonstrated to 
be negatively linked with morality by “freez[ing] the global self” (Sanders, Pattison, & 
Hurwitz, 2011, p. 86) from taking action (Hoffman, 2000; Myyry, 2003; Sanders, Pattison, & 
Hurwitz, 2011; Tangney & Dearing 2002); and disgust has been shown to cause avoidance of 
perceived immorality (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, and Imada 1997; 
Hutchinson & Gross, 2011). 
On the other hand, many psychologists and philosophers think that moral emotions 
alone do not present the entire picture of moral motivation. Blasi (1999) indicates that 
emotions cannot be the motivational force for “moral” actions. He considers intentionality to 
be a fundamental element of moral action and argues that the automatic and unintentional 
nature of behaviour that is driven by emotions do not meet this criterion. He instead suggests 
that moral identity provides a better picture. This position finds support from many 
philosophers (Dewey, 1932; Kristjánsson, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010). 
According to Pasupathi and Wainryb (2010), moral identity is usually measured as 
how much value people place on moral values as opposed to other values. While moral 
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emotions and motivations can sometimes account for morally right behaviour or the lack of 
it, over time certain people tend to make “right” decisions more often. This is because of a 
developed moral identity (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010). 
However, this begs the question of what is a moral value, and further to this, what is 
value. In very broad terms, what makes anything worthy of value is the efficiency any given 
thing provides in achieving a certain aim. Based on this, one could discuss different types of 
values, e.g. the economic value of an object or a behaviour based on how well it achieves its 
economic aims; the intellectual value of, say, an academic paper or a critical disposition 
based on how well the paper or the critical disposition achieves the intellectual aim, etc. This 
definition makes an exhaustive list of values and aims beyond the scope of this thesis, as it 
would indeed be very long. 
In line with the naturalistic underpinnings of this thesis, I would say that moral value 
is defined by how well an act achieves the aims of survival, reproduction and thriving (SRT) 
(Narvaez, 2010a; de Waal, 2014) of an immediate entity (such as an individual, or a 
community), or the quantity, quality and diversity of life in the broadest sense. Acts that 
achieve these ends would thus be morally valuable, and the abstraction of the common 
elements of these acts would be called a ‘moral value.’ For example, if the act of imparting 
accurate information with the intent of telling the truth, as opposed to imparting inaccurate 
information with the intent of deceiving, contributes to the aims of SRT of a community, the 
abstraction of the common element of such acts – honesty – would be deemed a moral value 
(and associated with a positive normative evaluation, such as ‘honesty’ has – assuming that 
community values its aims of SRT). 
Once a value has been identified, and specifically identified as a moral value, the 
definition of this value can be employed as a general guideline and/or aim for behaviour. The 
definition of moral identity as the prioritization of moral values over other kinds and types of 
values is in reference to this: which types of values are considered before other kinds of 
values in terms of acting as a guideline for behaviour? However, this also requires addressing 
the concept of identity. 
Identity can be discussed at length as it acquires different qualities in different 
contexts; one might talk about one’s tribal identity, as in their nationality, ethnicity, or any 
other similar kind of group, religious identity, or gender identity. This thesis is not concerned 
with such accounts of identity, but with the aspects of individuals’ identity relevant to moral 
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psychology – morality is not the preserve of any group, no matter how the group is defined, 
and whether it is or not is not relevant to the focus of this thesis. 
Instead, what is of interest here is how the morally relevant aspects of one’s identity 
leads or does not lead to moral behaviour. The concept of identity has a narrative quality to it 
(Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2010), as it is informed by one’s past, and future aspirations – i.e. 
temporally connected backwards and forwards thematically: “narratives both reflect existing 
conceptions of self, and may also exert prospective influences on future self-views” (Wainryb 
& Pasupathi, 2010; p. 64). 
Furthermore, the construct of identity is of interest for what might be called its 
function. One’s identity tends to be a thread of intertwined themes and narratives that 
influence one’s interaction with the world. Based on one’s (moral) identity a person is likely 
to be more (morally) sensitive to certain things than others, and likely to pass judgements in a 
certain fashion as opposed to possible alternatives. By extension, identities also influence 
how one reacts to the happenings around them – essentially influencing both our experiences 
(how we process things happening inside ourselves psychologically and outside ourselves – 
how we are affected by the world) and our choices (how we affect the world). 
One final element of identities is that they are what one takes one’s self to be. This 
leads to a circular argument about identity being the self and the self being the identity. 
However, the difference between a self and an identity is that selves are what they are 
concretely (in the sense that “I am what I am” – insofar as such an abstract thing as a ‘self’ 
can be thought of as concrete), but identities are perceptions of this self. 
The term ‘value’ appears throughout this thesis, although it is slightly more relevant 
in the philosophy section (Section 4) of Chapter I, and throughout Chapter II. The term is 
used in the sense defined here. The term ‘identity’ is most relevant in this section, and it used 
in other parts of the thesis specifically in terms of ‘moral identity’, as discussed in more depth 
below. 
Different scholars have discussed the concept of moral identity in different times. 
However, sometimes the discussions of moral identity overlap with conceptions of the moral 
self. Concerning the philosophy of moral identity, or the moral self as Dewey (in Hickman & 
Alexander, 1998) and Kristjánsson (2010a) refer to it, an important distinction needs to be 
made regarding cognition and affect. While it may appear as if cognition and affect are two 
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different things, they are a single whole (Best 1988; Kristjánsson, 2010a). We do not feel 
emotions unless we cognate something – this can be other-related like feeling anger at the 
perception of the moral law being broken, or self-related like feeling shame for having acted 
too selfishly. Conversely, our cognition has its roots in our emotions. When emotions are 
dispositional (as opposed to episodic emotions, Kristjánsson, 2009) they direct what we will 
be sensitive to, the decisions we are likely to make, the values we are likely to prioritise... As 
Dewey (1909) puts it, an individual “is an organic whole, intellectually, socially, morally, as 
well as physically” (p. 5). 
Kristjánsson (2009) indicates that there is a difference between emotions that are felt 
episodically and settled emotional dispositions. Episodic emotions are felt in response to a 
situation, but emotional dispositions are settled states of emotions. While feeling excited 
about a certain event is an episodic feeling, a general trait of being frequently excited – or 
excitableness – is a settled emotional disposition. These emotional dispositions form our 
character traits, and our interactions with the world are guided by these emotions. 
Kristjánsson indicates that the educationally relevant aspect of this is that the right kind of 
emotional dispositions should be fostered during education. 
Comparable lines of arguments can be found in John Dewey’s writings as well. 
According to Dewey, the self is the interaction of habits and interests (in Hickman & 
Alexander, 1998). While Dewey does not explore the relationship of emotions and character 
traits in depth, he indicates that affect guides our interests, and frequent practice or pursuit of 
interests becomes habitual. He maintains that “the self is constituted, on the one hand, by its 
acts and habits, and on the other, by its social membership” (cited from Bergman, 2005b, p. 
51). Dewey (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998) explains that the most characteristic activity of 
the self is deliberate choice, and that “as Aristotle said, the goodness of a good man shines 
through his deeds” (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998, p. 342). Dewey (in Hickman & 
Alexander, 1998) emphasises that once the self has made a certain choice, it is disposed to 
make similar ones in similar situations in the future, ultimately becoming habits. 
Furthermore, Bergman (2005b) states that for Dewey “character is the interaction of habits” 
(p. 48). Since, for Dewey, habits are such a fundamental part of a person’s character, and 
habits are formed by deliberate choice, choice is the means by which selves are created and 
maintained. 
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The focus on habits is also shared by Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. According to 
Kristjánsson (2010a) who indicates that morally relevant habits are based on emotional 
dispositions, the ultimate aim of the Aristotelian focus on habits is to “help the young 
gradually actualise their own [practical wisdom], in order to re-evaluate and possibly revise 
the emotional dispositions with which they were originally inculcated, and to infuse those 
dispositions with moral value” (pp. 235-236). A parallel to this kind of practical wisdom can 
be found in The Moral Self (Dewey, 1932, from Hickman & Alexander, 1998), where Dewey 
states that the “union of benevolent impulse [emotions] and intelligent reflection is ... most 
likely to result in conduct that is good. But in this union the role of thoughtful inquiry is quite 
as important as that of sympathetic affection” (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998, p. 348). 
Dewey (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998) agrees with Aristotle (and Spinoza) that 
“happiness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself” (p. 351), and states that “it is in the 
quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set up this and that end to be reached, but the end 
is growth itself” (emphasis original, p. 353). Bergman (2005b) states that according to Dewey 
“the only moral “end” or “law” is growth of the self; the essential moral criterion is what sort 
of self is being furthered and formed” (p. 51). 
What kind of self is being advanced and formed is guided by what Frankfurt (1971) 
calls second order volitions/desires. If a person desires, for example, to be honest, this is a 
first-order volition. If a person “wants to want to” (p. 9) be honest, this is a second-order 
volition. Second order volitions form the base of what Dewey (1932) calls interests. 
Kristjánsson argues that the “real integration between moral cognition and moral action is 
achieved only when one’s moral understandings and concerns have become part of one’s 
sense of selfhood: a selfhood thereby constructed under the influence of moral reasons. 
Acting against such a self-identity would represent unacceptable self-betrayal or even self-
loss” (Kristjánsson, 2010a; p. 90). Blasi (1999) further indicates that without second order 
volitions one cannot be a person in the fullest sense of the word. He maintains that people can 
have different reasons for wanting to want something and that “[f]rom this perspective (and 
from the perspective of moral personhood), it matters less to know what kind of emotions 
people spontaneously experience than to know the reflexive desires they have about these 
emotions and the core concerns from which both the reflexive desires and the attempts to 
regulate the emotions derive” (p. 11). He argues that a truly moral identity is constructed 
when the second order volitions a person holds are also based on moral concerns, rather than 
pragmatic or simply identity-consistency or other concerns. 
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With regards to the development of moral motivation, Malti and Buchmann (2010) 
found that close friendships are a moral motivator for young adults, but interestingly not for 
mid-adolescents. Malti and Buchmann (2010) compared the sources of moral motivation of 
1258 15-year-olds and 584 21-year-olds by evaluating their responses to hypothetical 
dilemmas. The authors indicate that for mid-adolescents, the relationship with the caregiver is 
more important for moral motivation than friendship. For young adults, the relation with 
caregivers is not as important for moral motivation as it is for adolescents. Malti and 
Buchmann (2010) suggest that this may be the result of having solved autonomy and 
interdependence problems by young adulthood, and thus a lesser dependence on parents. The 
researchers found no relation between education level and moral motivation. They suggest 
that education may be more important for cognitive moral tasks/skills (e.g. moral judgement). 
They found that valuing social justice predicts moral motivation, and state that several studies 
“provide empirical support for the argument that the strength of motivation to act upon rules 
is associated with the extent to which one values justice, incorporates this value into one’s 
identity, and draws on it as a basis for moral behaviour” (p. 146). 
2.4. Moral Foundations Theory 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) is based on evolutionary thinking on morality and 
cross-cultural research on virtues (Graham et al., 2013). The authors state they developed the 
theory in order to shed light on “why morality varies so much across cultures yet still shows 
so many similarities and recurrent themes” (MoralFoundations.org, 2012, n.p.). Their 
argument is that several innate and universally available psychological systems are the 
foundations of “intuitive ethics;” and then cultures around the world build their own virtues, 
narratives, and institutions on top of these foundations, leading to the immense cultural 
variety in morality. However, it should be noted that the variation is not limited to cultural 
differences as it is posited that there are even greater differences within cultures than between 
cultures. 
MFT is based on four assumptions: nativism, cultural learning, intuitionism, and 
pluralism. Nativism posits that there are psychological systems that develop in the brain even 
before birth. However, the authors point out that these innate structures are far from being 
unmalleable. Rather, they are “organised in advance of experience” (p. 7). During childhood, 
and stretching into adulthood, cultural learning (i.e. experience) revises the innate structures 
and reconfigures the individual’s morality into its cultural norms. Graham et al. (2013) 
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indicate that “MFT is a theory about the universal first draft of the moral mind, and about 
how that draft gets revised in variable ways across cultures” (p. 10). Intuitionism completes 
the circle of nativism and cultural learning by adding that moral behaviour and evaluations 
are not the results of conscious reasoning, but rather that they occur rapidly and 
automatically, “relatively effortless, associative, heuristic processing” (Graham et al., 2013, 
p. 11). The authors also argue that “evolutionary thinking encourages pluralism” (p. 12) on 
the grounds that solutions to evolutionary adaptive problems are fashioned by whatever 
material is available. This suggests that our ancestors used whatever cognitive materials were 
available to them to solve recurring adaptive problems they faced, rather than inventing novel 
psychological resources. 
Based on the above claims, MFT identifies five foundations: care/harm, 
fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Kesebir 
and Pyszczynski (2011) explain that “these foundations, notwithstanding individual and 
cultural differences, are posited to be recurrent themes of intuitive ethics across time and 
space” (p. 880). 
Care/harm Foundation: This foundation relates to our evolutionary history as 
mammals, considering social/emotional attachments and empathy – our ability to feel and 
dislike the pain of others. It underlies virtues (and vices) of kindness and nurturance such as 
compassion or cruelty. 
Fairness/cheating Foundation: This foundation relates to our evolutionary history as 
social animals, who face opportunities of “non-zero-sum exchanges and relationships” (p. 
13). It is based on the evolutionary process of reciprocal altruism. It is related to ideas such as 
justice, proportionality, rights, and autonomy.  
Loyalty/betrayal Foundation: This foundation is related to our tribal nature and ability 
to form shifting coalitions. This foundation strengthens the bonds within a group. It underlies 
virtues and vices such as patriotism, self-sacrifice for the group, loyalty and betrayal to the 
group as the name suggests. 
Authority/subversion Foundation: This foundation relates to our social nature forming 
hierarchies. It underlies virtues of leadership and followership, including obedience and 
deference to legitimate authorities and traditions. 
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Sanctity/degradation Foundation: This foundation relates to physical and spiritual 
cleanliness. It is based on the feeling of disgust, an evolutionary adaptation to avoid sickness 
and other forms of contamination. Treating the body as a temple, and virtues and vices 
related to this notion, result from this foundation. 
Although MFT was not developed to shed light on different political moralities, Haidt 
and Graham (2007) found that the theory mapped on differences in political ideology easily 
and closely. The theory is also best known for the empirical results it yielded on this topic. 
Graham et al. (2013) point out that western liberal political culture, which focuses on 
protecting individuals from harm and exploitation, is relatively narrow compared to other 
parts of the world. They maintain that “in most traditional societies the moral domain is 
broader, including concerns about protecting groups, institutions, traditions, and the moral 
order in general” (p. 16). The authors also show that there is a difference between social 
classes: richer people tend to have a narrower moral domain, and that they value this 
narrower moral domain slightly more intensely (Graham & Haidt, 2007; Graham et al., 
2013). 
According to Haidt and Graham (2007), the fundamental difference between liberals 
and conservatives lies in how much individuals embrace different moral foundations, and 
which ones they do. The authors report that “liberal morality rests primarily on … two 
foundations (… fairness/[cheating] and harm/care), whereas conservative morality rests on 
five foundations, including [loyalty/betrayal], authority/[/subversion], and 
[sanctity/degradation] concerns as well” (pp. 112-113). 
Concerned with the care and fairness foundations more than loyalty, authority, and 
sanctity foundations, it could be argued that liberals are much more concerned with matters 
of autonomy and liberty. Graham et al. (2013) explain that liberal morality is characterised by 
greater openness to experience, lower need for structure, and “a dampened disgust 
sensitivity,” (p. 18) which would in turn make liberals less anxious in challenging traditional 
authority structures. 
Conservative morality, on the other hand, while valuing all foundations, does not 
place as much value on care and fairness foundations as liberals do, but emphasizes loyalty, 
authority, and sanctity foundations much more than liberals, placing higher respect on values 
such as “family and country” (McAdams et al, 2008). The authors report that conservatives 
have a higher need for order, structure and closure, and lower openness to new experiences 
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compared to liberals. Conservatives have a higher disgust sensibility as well, leading to a 
higher emphasis on the sanctity foundation. These findings, the authors argue, provide the 
psychological framework for politically conservative morality. 
The MFT also sheds light on cultural differences in morality to a certain extent. The 
authors also argue that, while there are significant differences between eastern and western 
cultures, MTF provides a relatively good explanation concerning the differences in morality. 
Graham et al. (2013) found that even after controlling for various demographic variables, 
individuals from Eastern cultures (South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia) valued loyalty 
and sanctity related virtues slightly more than their Western counterparts. Furthermore, this is 
“consistent with established cultural differences in collectivism ... and the role of purity 
concerns in daily life and religious practices” (Graham et al., 2013; p. 26). Moreover, the 
authors found that “compared to the liberal vs. conservative differences in the U.S., these 
cross-cultural differences were small – consistent with the theory that variation within 
cultures exceeds variation between cultures ...” (Graham et al., 2013, p. 26). 
The fact that variation within cultures exceeds the variation between cultures indicates 
that the findings of Graham and colleagues are also applicable in the Turkish context. 
However, given the unique position of the Turkish culture nestled in between individualistic 
Western cultures and collectivist Eastern cultures, morality in Turkey may be much more 
diverse, and the moral concerns of the smaller communities that make up the Turkish people, 
including all ethnic and religious minorities, maybe even more diverse. This further adds to 
the importance of fostering a pluralistic understanding and approach to morality in moral 
education in Turkey. 
In a different line, the fact that variation within cultures exceeds the variation between 
cultures could suggest that typical clashes between progressive and conservative groups 
around the world is bound not by geographical similarities (or differences), but by a much 
deeper (possibly evolutionary) psychological split within our species. However, this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2.5. Triune Ethics Theory 
Triune Ethics Theory (TET) was developed by Narvaez (2008; 2010b; 2011; Narvaez 
and Vaydich, 2008) in response to the complexities of moral psychology, for which both the 
rationalist and the intuitionist models have failed to account on their own. TET takes into 
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perspective evolutionary psychology and neurobiology, as well as developmental 
psychology. Narvaez (2010b) explains the TET in her own words: 
“Triune ethics theory ... integrates neuro-scientific, evolutionary, and developmental 
findings to explain differences in moral functioning (capacities that involve noticing, 
feeling for, imagining, solving, and acting on the needs of others). TET proposes that 
three basic types of affectively rooted moral orientations emerged from human 
evolution and are influenced by early care and social environments: the ethics of 
security, engagement, and imagination. Each orientation has neurobiological roots 
that are suggested by the structures and circuitry of human brain evolution ... and each 
prioritizes a different set of emotions. When the propensities for action in a particular 
orientation trump other values, they become an ethic. That is, as a type of motivated 
cognition, an activated ethic influences what affordances (action possibilities) are 
salient, and what goals and actions are preferred. Thus, moral action emerges from the 
affective stance underlying the ethic that imbues ongoing experience with a particular 
moral value ... Each ethic makes normative claims, making particular actions seem 
“right” based on the interaction between the particular context and the habits of mind 
brought to the situation by the person (character).” (p. 81) 
TET has been developed to meet three goals: (a) It aims to integrate findings in 
neurobiology, affective neuroscience, and cognitive science into moral psychology in order to 
shed light on moral research that focuses on the moral life of people. It is a bottom-up theory 
that takes into account the “motivational orientations that are rooted in evolved unconscious 
emotional systems shaped by experience that predispose one to react to and act on events in 
particular ways” (Narvaez, 2008, p. 96). (b) TET aims to understand human morality from 
the perspective of person’s interactions with the context. Narvaez argues that people differ in 
their early emotional experiences which prime them to behave in certain ways in a given 
context, while situations evoke particular reactions. (c) TET also suggests the initial 
conditions for optimal moral development. It takes into account the “environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness,” (the psychological environment in which we have evolved; p. 96) 
which supports optimal brain development for moral maturity. 
The theory outlines three different ethics that are grounded in various parts of the 
brain. The Security Ethic is rooted in parts of the brain that evolved the earliest. Narvaez 
implies that this ethic is built on the most basic survival needs, and correspondingly in the 
same areas of the brain that regulates these drives. The Engagement Ethic is grounded on 
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relatively more recently evolved parts of the brain, and that it is characteristically 
mammalian. Social bonding and affection are rooted in similar regions of the brain; hence 
values of cooperation receive higher emphasis in the Ethic of Engagement. Imagination Ethic 
is grounded in the most recently evolved parts of the brain, and it is characteristically human. 
It makes use of all the capacities of the human brain and can move beyond the immediate. 
Imagination Ethic can bind both with the Security Ethic (in which the individual takes a more 
anti-social position against imagined strangers) and with the Engagement Ethic (in which the 
individual takes a more cooperative position with imagined strangers) (Narvaez, 2008). 
Security Ethics (Bunker Morality): Evolutionarily older brain structures related to 
morality are activated when the individual feels threatened, such as the anger-rage emotion 
system, and the fear-distress emotion circuit in the brain. These networks are useful for self-
preservation. The author notes that the security ethics are associated with threats like death, 
leading the individual to feel less compassion towards companions. The “fight or flight” 
mode as well as seeking one's basic needs is embedded in this system. Narvaez also adds that 
priming an individual with a market orientation also makes the security ethic more accessible, 
making the individual less compassionate. 
 Engagement Ethic (Harmony Morality): Harmony morality relies more on 
compassion as opposed to self-preservation. It involves the use of emotion systems that allow 
intimacy and “limbic resonance,” implying the use of empathy. The ethic of engagement is 
oriented to face-to-face emotional affiliation with others, especially with those whom the 
individual shares an affectionate, caring relationship, as well as social bonds. It underlies self-
sacrifice and compassionate response. Narvaez notes that when moral exemplars engage in 
committed or risky actions for others, they are typically driven by affiliation and compassion. 
Imagination Ethic (Mindful or Heartless Morality): The imagination ethic makes use 
of more complex brain structures which have evolved relatively recently, taking full 
advantage of humans’ cognitive reasoning capacities, fundamental for social and moral 
functioning in complex societies. The key trait of the ethics of imagination that distinguishes 
it from the ethic of security and engagement is that it allows for the individual to address 
concerns beyond the immediate and envision alternatives to what exists, and plan and guide 
action for change. However, the ethic of imagination can be harnessed by both the security 
ethic and the engagement ethic. When it is harnessed by the security ethic, the ethics of 
imagination allows the individual to become more protective of the group against (imagined) 
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outsiders, making the individual less compassionate for out-group people, creating a 
“heartless morality.” On the other hand, when it is harnessed by the ethic of engagement, the 
individual becomes more interested in cooperation with (imagined) others, or possibly future 
generations, thus creating a “mindful morality.” Narvaez adds that the Imagination Ethic is 
the one that has been studied most extensively, namely by Piaget, Kohlberg, and the 
rationalist tradition in general. 
2.6. Summary 
The main aim of this section has been to find an answer to the second research 
question and shed light on how moral behaviour occurs and develops. The reviewed literature 
is posited to contribute to teachers’ psychological beliefs regarding morality, and the 
understanding gained from it is expected to help teachers better foster students’ moral 
development. In this summary, a concise picture of how moral behaviour occurs and 
develops is presented based on the literature reviewed above; the chapter summary in the next 
section discusses the educational implications of the psychological literature in conjunction 
with the educational literature reviewed in the first section of this chapter. 
How does moral behaviour occur? The FCM indicates that moral behaviour comes as 
a result of the complex interactions of four different morally relevant broad skill sets. These 
are moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation, and moral implementation. While 
each component may be comprised of independent skill sets, the complex feed-forward and 
feed-backward interactions between the components draws attention to the fact that moral 
development happens globally, as opposed to each set of skills developing independently 
from each other. Skills related to moral sensitivity, including empathy and role taking, allow 
a person to understand the moral salience of a situation and react appropriately. Skills related 
to moral judgement direct which course of action a person is likely to follow, and skills 
related to moral motivation provide the drive to act on the moral judgement. Finally, skills 
related to moral implementation allow a person to follow through the course of action to its 
end, making sure the action is fully executed. 
The moral judgement literature reveals that while one may feel like s/he is in control 
of his/her moral judgements, this is not entirely the case. Judgements are more often intuitive, 
and out of one's conscious control to a certain extent. Moreover, given the motivated 
reasoning and posthoc justification problems, one may not even be able to recognise that s/he 
is indeed likely to arrive at morally biased judgements. However, it is possible to take 
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conscious control over moral intuitions. Several methods of withholding initial intuitions to 
arrive at more accurate moral judgements exist. These include, but are not limited to, 
emotional reappraisal (Feinberg et al., 2012) and cognitive override (Fine, 2006). 
Furthermore, it is possible to consciously design one’s moral intuitions, by practising certain 
styles of moral reasoning to the point where they become habitualised and intuitive. 
Developing expertise in morally relevant skills also helps conscious maintenance of moral 
intuitions. This is not to imply anything negative regarding initial moral intuitions; however, 
it is certainly possible to improve or change moral intuitions in a more conscious manner. 
On the other hand, moral reasoning and judgement mechanisms alone do not lead to 
moral behaviour, moral motivational mechanisms do. The main drive to act morally is 
provided by moral emotions. However, one’s moral self determines which moral emotions 
one is likely to feel. Two kinds of moral emotions exist: episodic emotions which are felt in 
specific situations, and emotional dispositions which determine one’s tendency to feel certain 
emotions in general. Emotional dispositions lie at the heart of character traits, and alongside 
one’s habits, constitute the moral self. Furthermore, the choices we make deliberately affect 
the development of our moral selves. Each choice made, and each action carried out fosters 
the disposition to act similarly in similar situations in the future. These decisions are further 
influenced by what Dewey (1932) calls “interests”, and Frankfurt (1971) calls “second-order 
volitions.” Both second-order volitions and interests can be selected rationally and pursued 
consciously, granting an individual conscious control over the development of his/her moral 
self, at least to a certain extent. 
How does moral development take place? This review does not exhaustively detail 
each stage of moral development in depth, as this is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
the reviewed literature does lend some understanding regarding the age-related development 
of morality. Moral reasoning development progresses from an ego-centric and uncritical 
schema during childhood to a socio-centric and uncritical schema during adolescence, to a 
socio-centric and critical schema during adulthood. This has major educational implications, 
which are explored in the next section. Furthermore, progress from one stage to the next 
follows the heteronomous/autonomous orientation cycle, where an individual initially takes a 
heteronomous orientation to a higher level of moral reasoning, before fully internalising the 
reasoning style and achieving an autonomous orientation to that level of moral reasoning. 
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The early phases of moral intuition development are not clear as of yet. It is suggested 
that true internalisation of moral intuitions happens between the ages 9 to 15. It is also 
suggested that the values internalised are not necessarily or primarily those of the child’s 
parents or the school, but his/her peer group. However, concerning moral motivation, it 
appears that caregivers are more important for adolescents, whereas peers are more important 
only for young adults. 
Taken together, the age-related development of morally relevant skills seems to be 
influenced most by socialisation. During childhood and earlier phases, socialisation happens 
most prominently within the family. Thus it is expected that families influence children’s 
moral development the most during this phase. However, understanding of morality remains 
ego-centric essentially. Once a child reaches late childhood and early adolescence, 
socialisation expands considerably. Children’s expanding cognitive capacities lead to the 
discovery of society – that people are connected to each other through institutions. 
Furthermore, establishing and solidifying alliances with peers becomes more important 
during adolescence. It appears that this leads to the internalisation of values held by peers. 
This is also in parallel with a growing concern for social desirability during adolescence, and 
uncritically maintaining the norms of the social group of which the child is a part, whether 
this group is the peer group, the family, school, or any other relation (e.g. nationality, 
religion, ethnicity, football team…). Finally, once issues related to autonomy and 
interdependence are resolved in adulthood, parents seem to lose their importance related to 
moral development, and peers and the general society appear to take precedence. While this 
is not true in all cases, individuals may advance to the Post-Conventional schema in 
adulthood, finally achieving a critical and socio-centric approach to moral judgements. 
The MFT and the TET are psychological theories that contribute to one’s 
philosophical beliefs regarding morality, as well as psychological beliefs. The MFT indicates 
that while different cultures may have different morals, they are rooted in the same features 
of human evolutionary psychology. Furthermore, it also points out that that liberals and 
conservatives have different moral concerns, and that it may be hard for people on one side of 
the spectrum to understand the moral concerns of the people at the other end of the spectrum, 
as what is thought to be morally relevant differs between the two sides. Such an 
understanding can have wide-ranging consequences regarding tolerance and democracy; the 
educational implications of this are explored in more depth in the next section. 
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The TET draws attention to two main dispositions one may have with regards to 
moral behaviour: one based on fear and self-preservation (Security Ethics), the other based on 
compassion and cooperation (Engagement Ethics). Furthermore, it also sheds light on how 
human cognitive capacities can amplify the effects of either disposition (Imagination Ethics). 
This points to the importance of understanding the consequences of each disposition, and 
perhaps attempting to foster them in accordance, as well as creating the school environment 
in which these dispositions can be fostered or controlled.  
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3. Chapter Summary 
The main aim of this chapter has been to answer the first two research questions: 
1. How does moral education take place? 
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of 
moral behaviour? 
The answers to these two questions create the theoretical foundations on which the 
empirical component of this study stands. These two questions were answered individually in 
the summaries provided in sections 1.6 and 2.6 above. The chapter summary in this section 
brings together the conclusions from the previous summaries to discuss some of the possible 
educational implications of how an understanding of implicit moral education and an 
understanding of moral psychology can help teachers better foster students’ moral 
development. 
Given that the focus of this thesis is on implicit moral education, the purpose of this 
literature review is not to detail aspects of moral psychology as content matter for moral 
educators, but rather to identify the areas of moral behaviour and its development which are 
most pertinent to teachers; and knowledge of which could direct their conduct and teaching in 
a way that fosters students’ moral development. In other words, so that teachers can take 
conscious control over the implicit moral education they conduct in an unplanned and 
unconscious manner. Prescription of specific pedagogical methods is not the aim of this 
study, as specific pedagogical practices can change from culture to culture, depending on the 
moral intuitions, identified by the MFT, on which a culture has built its morality. The 
argument here is that understanding and knowing the issues explored in this review could 
help teachers behave and engage in implicit moral education accordingly, which could have a 
positive influence on students’ overall moral development. It should also be noted that 
teachers themselves can benefit from such an understanding of morality beyond the potential 
contribution to their students’ moral development; as one of the interview participants of the 
empirical component of this study stated. 
In the first section of this literature review it was concluded that while teachers are 
interested and willing to engage in moral education, their initial training does not equip them 
optimally to do so. Furthermore, the training they receive does not seem to equip them with a 
moral perspective, or “moral language” (Sockett & LePage, 2002), for them to make sense of 
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their experiences in school through a moral lens. The Moral Work of Teaching (MWT) 
framework developed by Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005; 2011) offers an approach that may 
be taken in ITE programmes to remedy this issue. By focusing on teachers’ beliefs relevant to 
moral education in their initial training, including their moral, psychological, and educational 
beliefs, teachers can be intellectually better equipped to carry out moral education. In this 
review, greater attention was paid to aspects, theories, and models of moral education and 
moral psychology that may inform teachers’ psychological and educational beliefs. Although 
some reviewed theories may also be relevant to teachers’ moral beliefs, this discussion is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In the review of educational literature of the first section of this chapter, it was 
identified that the majority of moral education takes place implicitly. Two key concepts to 
understand in this respect are the hidden curriculum and moral ecology. The hidden 
curriculum refers to the secondary and implicit messages educational activities, structures, 
and systems (e.g. school rules) may convey to students. Moral ecology is a broader term that 
refers to all morally relevant aspects of the school life, including the explicit moral education 
provided in schools, aspects of moral education that would be categorised as part of the 
hidden curriculum, as well as the interaction between the people in the school. 
In the psychological review of the second section of this chapter, two theories of 
moral psychology were identified that may lend a deeper understanding in terms of positively 
manipulating the school moral ecology and hidden curriculum to foster moral development: 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2013) and Triune Ethics Theory (TET; 
Narvaez, 2008). An understanding of the MFT, especially the liberal/conservative divide with 
respect to how people of different political orientations find different sets of concerns morally 
relevant, may help teachers create a pluralistic and tolerant moral ecology in their schools. 
TET, on the other hand, sheds light on how people may prioritise values of self-preservation 
or cooperation. Such an understanding could further help teachers create a moral ecology that 
fosters a disposition towards self-preservation or cooperation. While these suggestions are 
somewhat vague, they cannot be made any more specific here, as how teachers’ employ their 
understanding of TET and MFT in the context of their own schools’ moral ecology is down 
to each teachers’ creativity, for the moral ecology of each school would be unique, and the 
more specific a suggestion is, the less generalizable it’s application would be. 
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An understanding of the other models and theories reviewed in this chapter could help 
teachers direct their attention and behaviour in more specific ways. Sanderse (2014) 
concludes that teachers’ understanding of how role modelling works and the training they 
receive in ITE regarding role modelling as a method is lacking. Including Albert Bandura’s 
Theory of Learning by Observation (1986; 1997) in ITE can address this issue. A clear 
understanding of how role modelling and learning by observation work could be an 
invaluable tool for teachers in terms of teaching moral values through demonstration. 
The most basic value in understanding the Four Components Model (Rest, 1986) is 
that the model provides an overview of the skills and some processes involved in the 
production of moral behaviour. Such an understanding could help teachers diagnose how and 
why a student fails to act morally, whether this is due to moral insensitivity, a lack of good 
judgement, prioritising non-moral values, or simply because their students do not bother to 
act morally or are deterred for various reasons. Such recognition could allow teachers to 
individually help students develop their moral skills. In educational interventions of ethical 
development, role-playing morally charged situations has been shown to increase moral 
sensitivity and motivation (Bebeau, 1994), while discussing moral dilemmas has been shown 
to foster moral judgement (Morton et al. 2006). Furthermore, and more crucially, the feed-
forward and feed-backward loops between the four components suggest that attending to 
students’ moral development globally, rather than focusing on individual skills, is more likely 
to be more effective. 
In conjunction with an understanding of the FCM, an understanding of how expertise 
of morally relevant skills develops could greatly increase teachers’ effectiveness in terms of 
providing moral education. Understanding how each skill develops, what kind of activities 
foster expertise in which skills, and which activities would be more appropriate for which age 
groups can help teachers design their classroom activities and select content material for their 
lessons with greater precision to foster these skills at appropriate levels. 
Understanding the developmental progress of moral reasoning from the Personal 
Interest Schema to the Maintaining Norms Schema to the Post-Conventional Schema is 
especially important in this respect. These schemas broadly define the perspective students 
are likely to take with regards to moral behaviour at specific ages. Furthermore, 
understanding the heteronomous/autonomous cycle involved in the progress from one schema 
to the next can further help teachers select content material for their lessons, design their 
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classroom activities, and inform their interactions with students with greater precision to 
foster moral reasoning development. 
Understanding and fostering moral reasoning development is particularly important, 
for it is the door through which teachers may influence students’ moral intuitions and moral 
selves – constructs that are less accessible to teachers’ direct influence. Understanding how 
moral intuitions function could help teachers identify how and why students act morally or 
not. It sheds light on the complications and limitations of moral reasoning. Furthermore, 
Haidt’s (2001) suggestion that teachers’ reasoned arguments are unlikely to influence 
students’ moral intuitions as much as the positive bond between the teacher and the student 
draws attention to the importance of the quality of teachers’ relationship with their students, 
which Narvaez (2010b) also highlights. When this understanding is coupled with an 
understanding of how one may rationally control one’s ‘naïve’ moral intuitions through 
cognitive override, emotional reappraisal, or other methods, teachers’ attempts to foster 
desirable moral intuitions in students can be much more robust and effective. In addition to 
this, understanding how habitualisation of certain styles of moral reasoning can lead to expert 
moral intuitions can help teachers define goals for the moral education they intend to provide. 
A deep understanding of moral reasoning development could further help teachers 
influence the development of students’ moral motivational constructs. While motivation for 
moral behaviour is mainly driven by moral emotions, which are most likely beyond the direct 
influence of teachers, the tendency to feel certain moral emotions is defined by students’ 
moral selves. Moral selves are primarily formed by emotional dispositions (which also form 
the base for character traits) and habits. In return, habits and emotional dispositions are 
largely influenced by an individual’s deliberate choices, interests, and second-order volitions. 
And given that deliberate choice, interests, and second order volitions can be consciously and 
rationally selected by an individual (at least to a certain extent), fostering and influencing 
students’ moral reasoning development is critical. 
However, this should not be taken to mean that reasoning is the primary skill that 
teachers should aim to develop. Following from the above analogy, such a claim would be 
similar to saying that the door of a house is the most important part. What takes primacy in 
moral education should be students’ global moral development, including their moral 
reasoning, moral identity and self, and all other morally relevant skills. 
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In order to achieve this, an environment conducive to moral development needs to be 
created, for which an understanding of moral ecology, MFT and TET is argued to be useful 
here. Furthermore, as Narvaez (2010a) and Haidt (2001) indicate, in the lack of a positive 
emotional bond between a teacher and a student, the teacher is unlikely to be able to 
influence the development of a student’s moral self, which is one of the most fundamental 
elements of moral psychology. Once the necessary minimum environmental and social 
conditions required (which have not been identified in this thesis for concerns of space) are 
present, the teacher may then equip the students with the reasoning tools necessary for 
students to lead their own moral development in a desirable trajectory. In order to achieve 
this, it is argued here that an understanding of moral reasoning development is crucial for 
teachers. 
In section 2 of this chapter, and in this section, a cyclical relationship between moral 
reasoning, morally relevant habits, moral self and identity, moral emotions, moral intuitions, 
and ultimately moral behaviour has been described. The main reason for emphasising moral 
reasoning in this complex system of feed-forward and feed-backward relationships is not 
because moral reasoning has greater importance in terms of moral development, but because 
it is the most practical skill teachers may target in terms of moral education, in order to help 
the students direct the development of aspects of their moral psychology that teachers do not 
have direct access to – such as students’ emotional dispositions. 
This may raise a question of what to do in cases where students’ reasoning capacities 
are harder to empathise with, as might be the situation in cases of special educational needs 
and disabilities (SEND), where students’ psychological and mental SEND’s are different 
from non-SEND students. The fact that some students have psychological and mental 
SEND’s does not mean that they wholly lack the capacity for any of the psychological skills 
discussed in this thesis. However, depending on the kind of special need, a more specialized 
approach may be necessary for teachers to foster such students’ moral development. For 
example, teachers may need to follow different educational approaches with students afflicted 
by psychopathy, due to psychopaths’ emotional disabilities (Fallon, 2006). However, moral 
education in the SEND context is far beyond the scope of this thesis. 
This concludes the literature review of this thesis. There may be many other potential 
contributions an understanding of how implicit moral education takes place and how moral 
psychology works may have with regards to teachers’ engagement in moral education, 
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however, mentioning the entire range of possibilities is beyond the scope of this thesis. This 
summary gives an indication of the possibilities understanding these issues offers with 
respect to conducting moral education. The next chapter explains the methodology employed 
in the empirical component of this study. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, the overarching methodology of the research is presented. This study 
is designed as a mixed methods case study that investigates a cross-sectional sample of 
participants. Initially, the purpose of the empirical component of the study is explained. This 
is followed by the philosophical approach employed in conducting the research. Next, the 
research design is presented, alongside the rationale for the design of the data gathering tools 
and experience gained from the pilot study. Finally, ethical considerations pertinent to this 
study are addressed before the chapter is concluded with an account of how participant 
recruitment and data gathering was conducted. 
1. Purpose and Setting 
The purpose of this empirical investigation was to examine, in the light of 
understandings developed from the literature review, how Turkish teachers’ and trainee 
teachers’ beliefs regarding moral psychology, moral development, and moral education 
develop through teacher training and teaching experience. In order to achieve this, qualitative 
and quantitative methods were employed in the research. A case study approach focusing on 
one Turkish university and a cross-sectional sample of trainee teachers and alumni teachers 
of the same university was chosen for this purpose. In order to establish triangulation, the 
research methods included a questionnaire survey, semi-structured interviews, and 
observation of intern teachers and teachers with several years of teaching experience. 
The setting of this study was chosen to be Turkey. There is very little attention paid to 
moral education by academics in Turkey apart from religious education. Education is a 
morally loaded enterprise, and moral education takes place in schools inevitably (Purpel & 
Ryan, 1983) and implicitly (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). However, in Turkey, neither moral 
development and psychology nor an understanding of implicit learning and teaching are 
taught to trainee teachers. As a result, Turkish teachers may engage in implicit moral 
education without being fully aware, or in control, of the education they provide. While this 
does not automatically warrant the assumption that teachers’ knowledge and beliefs about 
moral education, development and psychology are wrong, and that they “miseducate” 
students; an empirical investigation will help to understand the nature of teachers’ beliefs and 
attitudes, and how these beliefs and attitudes are reflected in classroom practice.   
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2. Research Questions and Aims 
The main aim of the research was to understand Turkish teachers’ beliefs and attitudes 
regarding moral psychology and moral education that may influence students’ moral 
development through implicit moral education. Five research questions were identified in 
order to meet this aim: 
1. How does moral education take place? 
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of 
moral behaviour? 
3. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding the occurrence and 
development of moral behaviour? 
4. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral 
education in Turkey? 
5. How do Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral 
psychology and moral education develop through teacher training and teaching 
experience? 
The first two questions were addressed in Chapter II by an investigation of the 
literature on moral psychology and moral education. The empirical component of the study is 
designed to answer the third, fourth and fifth questions. In order to investigate the third and 
fourth questions, the empirical component of the research attempts to shed light on the beliefs 
of teachers and trainee teachers regarding moral psychology and moral development and how 
these develop through teacher training and teaching experience. Addressing the 5th question 
entails a comparison of the beliefs of the three different groups of participants recruited to 
take part in this study. 
The answers to the remaining three questions were sought through a questionnaire 
survey designed to probe participants’ beliefs regarding the above-stated topics. However, 
while a questionnaire survey would allow a broad understanding regarding the beliefs and 
attitudes of the population under study (teachers and trainee teachers), it would only afford a 
surface appreciation of the beliefs under investigation, allowing only a superficial 
understanding of them. Thus interviews, which provide a deeper understanding, were also 
necessary to complement the broad, but superficial understanding provided by a survey. 
Furthermore, in order to establish triangulation and cover the weaknesses of the survey and 
interview methods, an observation of interns’ and teachers’ classroom practice was also 
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conducted. This entailed cross-checking their practice with their stated beliefs in the 
interviews.   
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3. Research Design 
This research can be considered to be social research. Johnson (1994) indicates that 
educational research is usually social research as it is based on people: “…where people and 
their behaviour, their forms of organisation and their associations are the subject of enquiry, 
we are into the field of social research” (p. 4). While the content of the research involves 
strong psychological elements, the context of the research revolves around beliefs about 
psychological constructs and how these beliefs are reflected in the context of education, 
rather than the psychological constructs themselves.  
The empirical component of this study has been designed as a case study, with a 
cross-sectional sample of participants, employing mixed methods. In the following section, 
an argument is made for employing mixed methods in a case study and studying a cross-
sectional sample of participants in order to yield the most reliable and valid results, compared 
with other possible methodologies. 
3.1.The Pragmatic Paradigm and Mixed Methods  
This study can be conceived as a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The 
main reason for this lies in the philosophical paradigm underpinning this research, which is 
influenced mainly by methodological pragmatism. 
Morgan (2007) argues that social research has been undergoing a paradigm shift since 
the turn of the century. Previously most research was guided by either a positivist paradigm, 
which predominantly employs quantitative methods, or an interpretivist paradigm, which 
focuses on qualitative methods (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011; Mertens, 2010). The 
results produced by research with different paradigms were thought to be “incommensurable” 
(Morgan, 2007, p. 58). However, this view has started to lose its popularity, as can be seen in 
Morrison’s (2002) argument that in educational research it is common that the two paradigms 
often overlap and that methods based on these two different approaches may be similar to 
each other. 
The use of a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods have increased in 
frequency recently (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011; Mertens, 2010; Morgan, 2007; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003), and this mixed method approach “is driven by pragmatism” as 
an epistemological paradigm (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 26). Morgan (2007) 
indicates that other philosophical paradigms dictate a priori a certain pattern of investigation 
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to the research. While this makes methodological justifications somewhat easier, by referring 
to a fixed set of assumptions, such a priori assumptions also limit the research. Pragmatism, 
on the other hand, pays “equal attention to both the epistemological and technical “warrants” 
that influence how we conduct our research” (Morgan, 2007, p. 68). As a result, pragmatic 
studies tend to justify the use of a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods with 
reference to both epistemological arguments and the comparative reliability and validity of 
specific research tools/methods used in research. 
Furthermore, methodological pragmatism also draws from multiple philosophical 
approaches in order to complement the strengths and weaknesses of each approach: 
 “Pragmatism adopts a methodologically eclectic, pluralist approach to research, 
drawing on positivism and interpretive epistemologies based on the criteria of fitness 
for purpose and applicability, and regarding ‘reality’ as both objective and socially 
constructed.” (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 23) 
Given the nature of the purpose of the research and the kind of data necessary to be 
analysed in order to investigate the issue, it was felt that strict adherence to either an 
interpretivist or positivist paradigm would not have been sufficient. With a view to achieving 
a well-established understanding, considering both the breadth and depth of the current state 
of relevant beliefs of the participants of this study, a mixed methods approach was necessary. 
A quantitative method (questionnaires) could provide the necessary broad understanding of 
what is generally believed among the participants with regards to the research questions, but 
this would fall short of providing the necessary depth. In order to achieve greater depth, a 
qualitative method (semi-structured interviews) was also needed. The interview schedule 
required to be informed by the (early/tentative) results of the questionnaires in order to ask 
accurate questions which would yield a more nuanced picture of what participants’ beliefs 
were, and to give a better indication of the development of participants’ beliefs with regards 
to progress through teacher training and experience. 
While these methods would provide the necessary understanding of how these beliefs 
came into being and how they develop, they cannot yield any data on how these beliefs 
actually influence practice. Statements can be biased for a variety of reasons (see below), and 
they may not reflect the reality of the classroom behaviour of teachers. Therefore, 
observations are also necessary for achieving an accurate and triangulated understanding of 
the nature of teachers’ beliefs, and how they reflect in classroom practice (see below). 
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Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2003, p. 353) indicate that triangulation is only one of the 
five purposes served by using mixed methods, the others being complementarity, 
development, initiation, and expansion. The use of mixed methods in this study mainly serves 
the purposes of triangulation, complementarity, and development. Employing mixed methods 
allows the researcher to elaborate, clarify, and ultimately complement the results obtained by 
one method with results gained from another. In this study, interviews allowed me to clarify 
some results obtained from the questionnaires and elaborate on several interesting points 
raised in the survey results. Identifying these points in the survey results allowed me to 
“develop” the interview schedule in more depth. More specific justifications and descriptions 
of the methods used are made in the next section.  
When using the pragmatic mixed methods paradigm, the researcher also needs to 
make a decision about how much particular quantitative or qualitative methods will dominate 
the research (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003). This is a 
matter of prioritisation, and it is also dependent on the purpose of the research. Given that the 
overarching aim of this study is to understand Turkish teachers’ beliefs regarding moral 
psychology and moral development, and how these beliefs may influence implicit moral 
education in Turkey, the subjectivity and objectivity of the psychology of moral development 
and beliefs pertaining to this topic must be considered. While the psychology of moral 
development is regarded as an objective phenomenon (albeit variable from individual to 
individual) (see Graham et al. 2013; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al. 2000), beliefs 
about these topics are subjective, and since this study does not assess the moral psychological 
constructs of teachers, but teachers’ beliefs regarding the psychology of moral development, 
and how their beliefs impact their practice, qualitative methods (interviews and observations) 
are more dominant in this study. 
3.2.Case Study Approach and the Case 
The design of the empirical component of this study can be categorised as a case 
study which focuses on a cross-sectional sample of participants. Bassey (1999, 2002) defines 
case studies as conducted within a localised boundary of space and time, into aspects of an 
educational activity, or programme, or institution, or system. Case studies are carried out 
mainly in the natural context of the investigated phenomena and within an ethic of respect for 
persons, in order to inform the judgements and decisions of practitioners or policy-makers or 
of theoreticians who are working towards these ends. Johnson (1994) indicates that case 
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studies are concerned with “the interaction of factors and events over a period of time. 
Usually, the study is of a phenomenon still in evidence at the present day, though not 
necessarily new or recent” (p. 20). Furthermore, “case studies can penetrate situations in 
ways that are not always susceptible to numerical analysis” (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 
2000; p. 181); facilitating greater depth in understanding complex social phenomena. This is 
the main reason case study design has been chosen as the research approach for this study. 
Bassey (1999) lists what the data provided by a case study should allow the researcher 
to do: 
a. “to explore significant features of the case, 
b. to create plausible interpretations of what is found, 
c. to construct a worthwhile argument or story, 
d. to relate the argument or story to any relevant research in the literature, 
e. to convey convincingly to an audience this argument or story, 
f. and to provide an audit trail by which other researchers may validate or challenge 
the findings, or construct alternative arguments” (p. 58) 
The data collected in this research was expected to meet the above-listed items and to 
shed light on teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes relevant to fostering 
students’ moral development (identified in Chapter II). It was also expected that data analysis 
would allow the creation of a taxonomy detailing these beliefs and attitudes, which can be 
validated or challenged by other researchers by providing a detailed explanation of the 
methodology employed in arriving at the interpretations of the data. The interpretation of the 
data, or the created narrative or taxonomy of beliefs, was expected to shed light on the 
strengths and weaknesses of teacher training in Turkey with regards to its capacity for 
equipping teachers with the beliefs and attitudes conducive to better fostering students’ moral 
development. 
The case study approach has several strengths compared to other approaches. While 
coping with complex phenomena, results of case studies are easier to understand as they tend 
to rely on intelligible and non-technical findings, they capture a unique feature and are 
“strong on reality” (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000, p. 184), providing insights into 
similar cases. Furthermore, they can be undertaken by a single researcher, which makes the 
study relatively easier to conduct (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000; Coolican, 2004). 
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But this approach also has some weaknesses. It is possible for such studies to be 
subjective or biased as they are not open to cross-checking. As a result, this approach may 
lack a degree of scientific rigour. This is further problematized as access to all aspects of the 
studied phenomenon could possibly be uneven. The findings may be unique to the case, and 
may not be generalizable (Coolican, 2004). This approach also relies on time, ready access to 
settings and familiarity with a range of research skills. Furthermore, case studies “are prone 
to problems of observer bias, despite attempts made to address reflexivity” (Cohen, Manion 
and Morrison, 2000, p. 184; Johnson, 1994). 
When conducting a case study, it is important to carefully define the case, considering 
the scope and features of the case (Yin, 2014). Yin presents a twofold definition of a case 
study. The first part is concerned with the scope of the study: 
“A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
(the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident.” (Yin, 2014; p. 16) 
The second part of the definition involves the features of the case: 
“A case study enquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, 
and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical proposition to 
guide data collection and analysis.” (Yin, 2014, p. 17) 
The definition that Yin offers highlights the reason why the boundaries of cases under 
investigation can be fuzzy; in certain cases, as with this study, the phenomena of interest to 
the study can be deeply connected to things beyond the scope of the study. Moreover, results 
obtained can be based on multiple sources of evidence, and each piece of evidence can point 
to multiple results. One of the greatest challenges related to conducting and obtaining results 
from case studies in the context of social science is that these studies attempt to investigate 
certain phenomena that have what might be described as an organic interconnectivity with 
their context. Thus, a clear understanding of the boundaries of the case, concerning the scope, 
features and limits is necessary. 
Yin’s (2014) emphasis on having a clear understanding concerning the fuzzy 
boundaries of a case is especially pertinent to the case under study here; the case might 
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appear simply to include data collected from a multitude of schools, a sample of students and 
alumni from a teacher training programme, and an enquiry into the training programme itself. 
However, the focus is specifically on a Turkish teacher training programme and the attitudes 
and beliefs of the programme’s students and alumni related to the aspects of moral 
psychology and education regarding fostering students’ moral development. 
This definition of the case implies several characteristics regarding the scope, features 
and limits of the case under study. The scope of the case can be defined in two ways. Firstly, 
it covers the population of interest, which are Turkish teachers and trainee teachers. 
Secondly, the study also includes a certain set of beliefs and attitudes related to aspects of 
moral psychology and moral education. These aspects of moral psychology and moral 
education have been identified through the literature review (see Chapter II). The study 
features a sample of the population of interest (see below for more information on the 
participants) and, more importantly, how these beliefs and attitudes develop through teacher 
training and experience. The study was limited to the students and alumni of a teacher 
training programme conducted at the education faculty of a university in Turkey. The limits 
of the study regarding the beliefs and attitudes under investigation can also be found in the 
literature review chapter; the study is not related to aspects of psychology and education 
beyond those that have been identified in the literature review. The scope, features and limits 
of the study have been defined generally here, but given the interconnectivity of the case with 
its context, they cannot be exhaustively specified.  
Case studies can vary, either to include single case studies or multiple case studies. 
Single case studies focus on a single location, event, or phenomenon, while multiple case 
studies focus on more than one (Yin, 2014). Considering these characteristics, this study 
qualifies as a single case study: the beliefs of teachers and trainee teachers who are studying 
or have studied, at one institution’s teacher training programme. While this study gathers data 
from a number of schools, the unifying theme is that all participants are from the same 
teacher training institution; practising alumni teachers work in different schools; however, 
they have all received the teacher training provided by the same university. 
3.3.Cross-Sectional Sampling of Participants 
A cross-sectional sampling of participants was selected for this study. Cross-sectional 
studies focus on different samples of subjects who are related to each other in some way, 
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depending on the study. Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) state that cross-sectional 
studies provide: 
“a snapshot of a population at a particular point in time… in education, cross-
sectional studies involve indirect measures of the nature and the rate of changes in the 
physical and intellectual development of samples of [people] drawn from 
representative age levels” (p. 175).  
Cross-sectional studies usually feature large-scale and representative sampling and 
macro-level analysis which enables different groups to be compared. In this study, trainee 
teachers, intern teachers, and experienced teachers who are receiving, or have received, 
training from the same university were selected to track the development of beliefs over time 
spent receiving training and gaining teaching experience. 
The alternative to a cross-sectional study is a longitudinal study, which examines the 
same group of participants over a longer period of time. Longitudinal studies feature micro-
levels of analysis and enable the same individuals to be compared over time. The strengths of 
longitudinal studies are that they show more reliable causal relationships for interpretation, 
document how change and development occur over time, provide in-depth and accurate 
coverage of individuals, are less prone to sampling errors as the same population is studied 
over time, and enable clear recommendations for interventions to be made. However, 
longitudinal studies take a long time to conduct, taking years in some cases. A longitudinal 
design for this study would have required at least 9 years for data gathering – including 4 
years of university training and 5 years of teaching experience (assuming participants 
graduate without delay and work as teachers for 5 years immediately following their 
graduation). Longitudinal studies are also vulnerable to control effects. Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison, (2000) indicate that “repeated interviewing of the same sample influences their 
behaviour” (p. 178). Furthermore, longitudinal studies create the problem of securing 
participants who will make a long-term investment in participating (Mertens, 2010). 
In comparison, cross-sectional studies are relatively quick and cheap to conduct, do 
not suffer from control effects (as participation is necessary only once, which also increases 
the likelihood of participation), and are more generalizable as a variety of participants are 
involved (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000; Mertens, 2010; Yin 2014). However, it is 
harder to infer causality in cross-sectional studies, and they are not as effective in tracking 
developmental patterns as longitudinal studies. Considering these practical problems related 
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to longitudinal studies, a cross-sectional approach was preferred, as cross-sectional studies 
are relatively easier to conduct in terms of time commitments and finding voluntary 
participants. 
The cross-sectional selection of participants entailed three sections: first-year students 
who have little training and no teaching experience, fourth-year students who have full 
training but little teaching experience, and practising alumni teachers who have both full 
training and several years’ experience. This selection of participants was expected to reveal 
how trainee teachers’ beliefs investigated in this study may have developed through teacher 
training and experience. It should be noted that university training in Turkey takes four years, 
and in the final year, the university arranges students’ placements where they can undertake 
their internships. For the sake of brevity and ease of reference, hereafter 1st-year students who 
took part in the study are referred to as ‘students,’ fourth-year students are referred to as 
‘interns,’ and practising teachers are referred to as ‘teachers.’ 
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4. Research Tools 
The primary research tools employed in this study were questionnaires, semi-
structured interviews, and semi-structured observations. These tools were used in order to 
establish triangulation, complementarity and development (Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003). 
The implication of triangulation is that through the application of different methods to 
examine a question, the accuracy of the answer is improved. Triangulation, therefore, helps to 
reduce potential subjectivity and increase consistency. According to Bush (2002) 
“triangulation means comparing many sources of evidence in order to determine the accuracy 
of information or phenomena. It is essentially a means of cross-checking data to establish its 
validity” (p. 68). The use of a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches also allows the 
research tools to complement each other in terms of breadth and depth, considering the 
strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative research methods (see above). The 
order of data collection also allows for development, in that questionnaire results inform the 
development of the interview schedule, and results obtained from interview data analysis 
inform the observation schedule development. 
4.1.Questionnaire Survey 
The questionnaire survey, as a research tool, has several benefits. First of all, it is less 
time consuming and relatively cheaper than other methods, and it can be administered to a 
larger sample of participants to obtain quick results (Denscombe, 2003). It is empowering to 
the respondents in that they can complete the questionnaire when it suits them (Gillham, 
2007). Greater respondent accuracy is possible, as respondents are anonymous and free of 
interviewer bias (Johnson, 1994). They are also relatively easy to analyse since the questions 
are standard, and answers to closed questions make analysis straightforward (Gillham, 2007). 
Questionnaire surveys, therefore, provide large scale and general data regarding the topic 
under investigation (Denscombe, 2003; Gillham, 2007; Johnson, 1994). 
However, questionnaires by themselves are not sufficient to provide reliable data. The 
number of responses to questionnaires is usually low, unless the sample is ‘captive’ (e.g. 
students in a lecture hall), as it is often hard to motivate participants to respond (Gillham, 
2007). Gillham (2007) indicates that a 30% response to questionnaires is usual, and above 
50% returns “has to be accounted quite a good response” (p. 9). Questionnaires are also 
vulnerable to errors in wording and design, as these can drastically affect the responses 
gathered. This is further complicated by the need to write brief and relatively simple 
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questions, as well as an inability to correct misunderstandings (Johnson, 1994). Finally, the 
genuineness of responses to questions cannot be ascertained (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 
2011; Gillham, 2007); it is hard to identify cases in which a participant’s responses are 
random rather than accurate or truthful. Indeed, two questionnaires were discarded in this 
study as the participants had explicitly noted at the end of the questionnaire that they had 
answered the questions randomly. In anticipation of these potential problems, semi-structured 
interviews and observations were also employed in this study to increase reliability and 
validity. 
4.1.1. Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was designed to assess participants’ beliefs regarding moral 
psychology and moral education. The questionnaire is divided into four parts. The first part, 
which focuses on participants’ beliefs regarding moral psychology, is formed of twenty-four 
questions assessed against a Likert scale. Likert scales ask participants to give a rating to an 
item on a questionnaire, indicating their agreement or disagreement to the statements on the 
questionnaires in this study. The second part focuses on beliefs regarding moral education, 
and it is formed of seventeen questions also assessed against a Likert scale. The third part 
also focuses on beliefs regarding moral education and is formed of four ranking questions 
with a total of nineteen items between the four questions. Ranking questions ask participants 
to rank several items in a question on the questionnaire. It uncovers participants’ views 
regarding the priority they ascribe to each item, compared to each other item.  Part 4 sought 
background information to cross check whether any unexpected patterns were emerging from 
participants’ responses, and to classify which questionnaire was answered by a member of 
which group under investigation (student, intern, or teacher). Questionnaires were 
administered in Turkish; responses were later translated into English for presentation in the 
thesis (see Appendices A3 and A4).  
The first part of the questionnaire consisted of 24 statements focusing on participants’ 
beliefs regarding moral psychology. The questions were designed as statements to which 
participants could agree on a scale of 1 to 5. These statements were written as one-sentence 
summaries of relevant literature reviewed in section 2, Chapter II. Participants’ responses to 
the statements revealed what they believe regarding the topics under investigation. The topics 
include a) the Four Components Model – moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral 
motivation, and moral implementation, b) moral intuitions and moral reasoning; c) Moral 
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Foundations Theory; and d) Triune Ethics Theory (see Chapter II, Section 2). Participants’ 
responses were analysed both as responses to individual questions, and as their sum total 
scores for the part, sum total scores being the sum of response scores participants gave on the 
Likert scales (1 to 5) to each question of each part of the questionnaire. 
The second part of the questionnaire consists of 17 statements focusing on participants’ 
beliefs regarding moral education in the hidden curriculum. The questions were designed as 
statements to which participants could agree or disagree on a scale of 1 to 4. It was 
anticipated that participants might not be able to decide whether they agree or disagree with 
statements regarding moral psychology in the first part of the questionnaire due to not being 
familiar with certain topics under investigation. For this reason, a neutral response was 
provided in the first part. This was not the case in the second part of the questionnaire in 
order to understand whether participants had negative or positive attitudes to the topics under 
investigation. It was anticipated that participants would be familiar with these topics 
depending on how much teacher training and experience they had. 
Statements were designed to reflect participants’ perception of a) their role in moral 
education, b) how moral education takes place in the hidden curriculum, c) broadly how 
moral education should be carried out in the official curriculum, d) the current state of moral 
education in Turkey, and e) their experience of engaging with moral education. The 
statements were drawn from the literature reviewed in Chapter II, Section 1. Six statements 
which focus on participants’ experience of engaging in moral education were omitted from 
the questionnaire distributed to first-year students, as these students were assumed to have no 
experience of teaching (questions 36 to 41). Participants’ responses were analysed both as 
responses to individual questions and as their sum total scores for the part. 
The third part of the questionnaire also focuses on participants’ beliefs regarding moral 
education in the hidden curriculum. However, these questions were designed as ranking 
questions. Participants were prompted to rank the items on the 4 questions in this part from 
the most effective to the least effective. The first question in this part asks participants to rank 
5 definitions of hidden curriculum drawn from Carr and Landon (1999) from the most 
accurate definition to the least accurate. The other three questions ask participants to rank 
which elements they think influence students’ moral development, and how they think moral 
learning takes place. The questions were drawn from the literature reviewed in Chapter II. 
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Participants’ responses were analysed both as responses to individual questions and as their 
sum total scores for the part. 
Alternatively, a more qualitative approach could have been followed in the design of 
the questionnaires, including a fewer number of open ended questions instead of the current 
number of Likert scale and ranking questions. Such a qualitative approach was not employed 
for several practical reasons. 
The first reason is related to the expected familiarity of participants with the explored 
moral psychology topics. Given that elements of moral psychology do not feature in teacher 
training programmes; it was expected that participants would be unfamiliar with the explored 
topics. It was thought that, this being the case, greater structure in question design would 
provide more information regarding participants’ relevant beliefs than loosely structured/ 
unstructured, open-ended questions. Furthermore, a high number of beliefs related to narrow 
and specific aspects of moral psychology were of interest for this phase of the study. Due to 
these reasons more structured questions were preferred in the exploration of beliefs relevant 
to moral psychology. 
Questions designed to tease out participants’ beliefs relevant to moral education were 
relatively more straightforward. This is mainly due to this phase of the study being designed 
to achieve a broad and somewhat more surface understanding of participants’ beliefs relevant 
to moral education. It was expected that with the relatively higher number of participants and 
questions at this point, analysis would have required more time and energy than the depth of 
obtained data would warrant. 
Furthermore, more qualitative and unstructured questions could have been more 
appropriate if the main area of interest was participants’ experience of moral education. This 
was not the priority interest – beliefs regarding moral psychology and education took priority 
over participants’ experience, given the fundamental value of how beliefs influence 
experiences, as established in Chapter II. Also, considering that over 40% of participants – 
first year students – were expected to lack any experience of teaching, focusing 
predominantly on participants’ experiences risked making the data obtained from the 
quantitatively most significant portion of participants qualitatively insignificant, creating a 
bias in obtained data. 
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These points also raise the question of why the research focused on narrow and specific 
beliefs rather than aiming to achieve a broader and more holistic understanding of 
participants’ beliefs through more qualitative questions. The main reason for this is that the 
purpose of this phase of the study was to achieve a broad and surface understanding of a 
higher number of teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs on specific aspects of moral 
psychology, which could later be explored in greater depth in the interviews and 
observations, and yield more generalizable results through triangulation.  
Apart from exploring how beliefs regarding moral psychology and moral development 
are influenced by ITE programmes in Turkey, the empirical component of this study is also 
partly characterised by the attempt to analyse Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ relevant 
beliefs. This entails gaining an understanding of these beliefs in some depth, leading to the 
qualitative element, but it requires breadth in understanding as well, to see how generalizable 
findings are, which is better obtained through quantitative methods. Due to this reason, a 
solely quantitative or ethnographic line of enquiry was not chosen, considering their 
respective weaknesses discussed above. 
Other research approaches that were not chosen include experimental designs and 
grounded theory. The diagnostic aim of the empirical component is better met through 
analysis of more naturalistic data, as opposed to data obtained through experimental designs 
or pre-test/post-test designs characteristic of intervention studies, in avoidance of deliberate 
control of obtained data. Contrarily, theory generation through grounded theory was not 
chosen as beliefs of interest to this study were drawn from and analysed with reference to the 
relevant literature reviewed in Chapter II, alleviating the need for an emergent theory. 
4.2.Interview Schedule 
In addition to a questionnaire survey, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
voluntary participants. With the exception of very large scale studies, questionnaires are 
rarely the sole research tool used in most studies (Denscombe, 2003). The interview method 
has several strengths that help ameliorate some of the weaknesses of using questionnaires. 
Most importantly, interviews allow the researcher to probe matters in more depth than 
questionnaires. Motivation to respond to an interviewer is much greater than to a 
questionnaire, and it is generally easier to answer questions verbally than in written form. In 
addition, any misunderstandings can be corrected on the spot and points of interest pursued 
further (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011). 
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While strictly structured interviews resemble verbal questionnaires, semi-structured 
interviews have strengths that neither formal interviews nor questionnaires can offer. Semi-
structured interviews give the researcher opportunities to investigate the beliefs of teachers 
and trainee teachers in more detail and to find out how their experiences and education 
affects their beliefs and understanding. Semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to 
pursue certain ideas and follow these to a suitable conclusion, while also allowing some 
degree of direction by the participant:  
“The prime aim of a structured interview is to get equivalent information from a 
number of interviewees, information which is uncontaminated by subtle differences in 
the way in which it is asked for. The semi-structured interview has a similar aim of 
collecting equivalent information from a number of people, but places less emphasis 
on a standardised approach. A more flexible style is used, adapted to the personality 
and circumstances of the person being interviewed” (Johnson, 1994, p.45). 
The limitation of using semi-structured interviews is that the analysis may become too 
dominated by the opinions of the person being interviewed, depending on his/her natural 
inclination towards subjectivity or objectivity. 
“Research interviews, although apparently a perfect natural means of communication 
and enquiry, are in practice riddled with numerous pitfalls for the unwary. For 
example, the questions asked may turn out to be loaded ones, if the interviewer 
merely seeks to confirm a prejudice. Respondents may not tell the truth, particularly if 
they believe their answers may show them in a bad light or reach the ears of their 
superiors.” (Coleman and Briggs, 2002, p. 143) 
With this consideration in mind, every effort was made during the interviews to 
maintain the required objectivity. On the other hand, unstructured interviews are completely 
led by the participant; thus, they are prone for the interview to digress too far from the main 
topic of investigation. 
For this study, semi-structured interviews were preferred. Adopting a non-
judgemental approach and an openly neutral stance are of key importance, both for ethical 
reasons and for clarity and reliability of obtained data from the interviewees. Semi-structured 
interviews allow more space for this kind of an approach compared to structured interviews 
as they are less standardised and open to re-articulation for clearer communication of 
questions spontaneously during the interview. Semi-structured interviews are also preferred 
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as a means of following up on certain ideas that the interviewees may introduce during the 
interview. An unstructured interviewing style was not chosen, for there were specific 
concepts that needed to be addressed during the interview, and it could not be guaranteed that 
the interviewees would introduce these concepts without the researcher’s guidance. In fact, it 
was expected that it would be unlikely that the participants would introduce these topics. 
4.2.1. Interview Schedule Design 
Questions included in the interview schedule were also based on the literature review 
and driven by the research questions. The main aim of the interview was to gain a deeper 
understanding of the topics investigated by the questionnaire. To this end, the interview 
schedule was semi-structured, allowing the interviewer both to ask pre-determined questions 
and follow up points of interest as the interview developed. The interview questions were 
similar to those of the questionnaire and were also broadly divided into four parts excluding 
the initial background questions. 
Initially, some background questions were asked, in order to begin the interview 
conversation. These early background questions cover participants’ demographic information 
(see Chapter V). This was followed by the first section of the interview questions that 
introduced the main topic and probed participants’ beliefs regarding morality including three 
questions related to participants’ background knowledge on moral psychology and their 
understanding of morality. The second part included eight questions related to moral 
psychology. These were drawn from the literature review and were designed to elicit 
interviewees’ beliefs regarding moral psychology, rather than to evaluate their knowledge of 
the issues since no formal education related to moral psychology is provided in teacher 
training programmes in Turkey. The third part of the interview included 5 questions related to 
moral education and implicit moral education, with which participants are more or less 
familiar depending on their group. Finally, with the fourth part, the interview was concluded 
by asking participants three questions about their own experiences relevant to learning and 
teaching morality, explicitly or implicitly (see Appendices A7 and A8). 
As the interview schedule was long, it was not expected that all questions would be 
explored in great depth, given that each question on the schedule could lead to a detailed 
conversation on a relatively narrow field. However, following the pilot study, it was noticed 
that participants tended to answer several questions at once while explicitly focusing on one, 
as separate questions in the schedule focus on related topics. The questions were 
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asked/presented to the interviewee in a fashion that followed the flow of the interview. The 
questions were also visible to both the interviewer and the interviewee on the computer 
screen and handed out in hard copies to the interviewees. This was partly done in order to 
keep the interview from digressing and allowing the interviewee to look at the questions 
themselves if they felt this to be necessary. The interviewer also kept a separate sheet of 
questions at hand to take notes on. It was expected that the interviews would last at least 20 
minutes and no longer than 40 minutes; the shortest interview was 15 minutes long, and the 
longest was 36 minutes long – averaging around 26 minutes per interview. The interviews 
were also audio-recorded. Audio recordings were later transcribed and shared with the 
interviewee to check accuracy before analysis, and participants were once again asked 
verbally whether they could be quoted in addition to the request stated in the Participant 
Information sheets. The interviews were conducted in Turkish and later translated into 
English to be presented in the thesis. 
4.2.2. Analysis Procedure 
Verbatim transcriptions of the interviews and translations were made by the 
researcher. Interviews were not translated wholly into English, as this would have been 
extremely time-consuming. Only the parts of the interviews relevant to analysis and 
presentation have been translated into English. Being a native speaker of both English and 
Turkish, having conducted the interviews in person, and having an in-depth understanding of 
the topics investigated in the interviews, I judged that I would be the most suitable translator 
of the interview data into English and translated the relevant parts of the interviews myself. It 
should be noted that while I aimed to make the most accurate translations possible, 
differences in nuance between English and Turkish make it almost impossible for translated 
material to reflect the original material with perfect accuracy, and word-for-word translations 
do not always make sense in the translated language. Thus cultural and social knowledge and 
intuitions concerning the use of language both in English and in Turkish was necessary to 
employ at times in order to achieve greater accuracy in translation. As a result, while all 
translated quotes have been marked with quotation marks and reflect the original material to a 
very high degree, each quote should be considered a paraphrase of the original material. 
Problems arising from translations have been noted where they are relevant. 
The main aim of this part of the study was to understand and describe Turkish 
teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding certain aspects of moral psychology and 
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moral education, so that a deeper analysis could be conducted in the discussion of the results 
concerning how these beliefs reflect in classroom practice in conjunction with the 
questionnaire and observation data. To meet the descriptive aim of this part of the study, the 
main method of analysis employed was thematic categorization. The analysis procedure was 
conducted independently for data obtained from each question of the interview schedule. 
Each question focused on different aspects of moral psychology or moral education, and so 
the nature of participants’ responses changed from question to question. In order to address 
the variety of obtained data, they were not analysed using a single methodology strictly 
corresponding to a certain well-defined method of analysis. Instead, a variety of analytical 
methods were employed depending on the nature of the data. Methods of thematic content 
analysis and framework analysis were used most often, as the data could be analysed and 
presented best through the practices of these methods. Most importantly, what these two 
methodologies have in common is that they are both focused on the thematic categorization 
of data in order to make sense of it, although this is not the sole concern of either method. 
The first method of analysis used in this part of the study, involving thematic 
categorization, is thematic content analysis. Neuendorf (2002) indicates that “content analysis 
may be briefly defined as the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message 
characteristics” (p. 1, italics original). Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2007) define content 
analysis: 
“[Content analysis] simply defines the process of summarizing and reporting written 
data – the main contents of data and their messages. More strictly speaking, it defines 
a strict and systematic set of procedures for the rigorous analysis, examination and 
verification of the contents of written data” (Cohen, Mannion & Morrison, 2007; p. 
475). 
Cohen, Mannion and Morrison (2007) further explain that while content analysis is 
sometimes thought of as the quantitative analysis of qualitative data, it is not strictly so. 
Anderson and Arsenault (1998) indicate that content analysis can shed light on how 
frequently certain topics appear in a data set. Moreover, Weber (1990) maintains that the 
aims of content analysis include uncovering the focus of individual, group, institutional and 
societal matters, description of trends and patterns in the content of communication, and the 
coding of responses to open-ended questions in questionnaires. 
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The steps used in content analysis involved defining the units of analysis, identifying 
and selecting codes to be analysed, identification of categories based on the definition of 
units of analysis and identified codes, categorising codes, and interpretation of categories 
(Cohen, Mannion & Morrison, 2007; pp. 477-483). Krippendorf (2004) indicates that there 
are five ways of defining units based on their physical, syntactical, categorical, propositional, 
and thematic distinctions. Physical distinctions refer to the physical aspects of data such as 
the space a building occupies, or the length of a speech. Syntactical distinctions are 
concerned with linguistic units of data, such as words or sentences. Categorical distinctions 
“define units by their membership in a class or category – by their having something in 
common” (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 105). For example, references to “the first African-
American president of the United States” and “Barrack Obama” and any other reference to 
the same person would be the unit of analysis concerned with Obama. Propositional 
distinctions are also concerned with the linguistic aspects of data and they “delineate units 
according to particular constructions, such as those that have a particular propositional form 
or exhibit certain semantic relations between conceptual components” (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 
106). Thematic distinctions of units can be described much more freely; they are defined 
based on “story like verbal material, and the use of relatively comprehensive units of analysis 
such as themas, themes,... combinations of categories, motifs, imagery, and thoughts” 
(Krippendorf, 2004; p. 108, italics original). The description of units most appropriate to the 
aims of this study is based on thematic distinctions, and units of analysis – codes – have been 
thematically defined and analysed in this part of the study. The description of themes has 
changed from question to question based on a priori concerns and considering novel recurrent 
concepts emerging from the data. 
The second method of analysis involving thematic categorization is framework 
analysis, which was developed by Jane Ritchie and Liz Spencer in the 1990s for the field of 
applied policy research at the Social and Community Planning Research Institute (SCPRI) in 
London (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). While this study is not related to the field of applied 
policy research where it is employed most often, it can be, and has been, used in research in 
educational settings as well (e.g. Archer et al., 2005). 
Framework analysis consists of five steps. The first is the familiarisation process 
where the analyst immerses him/herself in the data and starts writing down possible themes 
and key issues emerging from the data. The second step involves identifying a thematic 
framework, where the analyst starts to conceptualise the thematic framework through which 
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the data can be categorised, analysed and presented based on predetermined and/or emergent 
issues recurring in the data set. This step is more concerned with identifying the emerging 
themes, based on novel or a priori concerns, rather than categorising. Ritchie and Spencer 
(1994) indicate that: 
“Devising and refining a thematic framework is not an automatic or mechanical 
process, but involves both logical and intuitive thinking. It involves making 
judgements about meaning, about the relevance and importance of issues, and about 
implicit connections between ideas.” (p. 180) 
The third step is indexing, where the analyst categorises the bits of data according to 
the theme they fit. These bits of data can be called ‘codes’ in comparison with content 
analysis literature. Codes can be applicable to more than one theme/category, and in such 
cases, they are thus categorised. The fourth step is charting, where the analyst removes the 
codes out of their context and rearranges the whole data set based on themes or cases. In this 
study, charting is based on themes. While a cut and paste method can be applied, charting in 
framework analysis also includes paraphrasing and summarising the relevant data: 
“Whereas some methods of qualitative analysis rely on a ‘cut and paste’ approach, 
whereby ‘chunks’ of verbatim text are regrouped according to their index reference, 
charting involves abstraction and synthesis.” (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994; p. 184) 
The final step in framework analysis is the mapping and interpretation step, where 
“the analyst begins to pull together the key characteristics of the data, and to map and 
interpret the data set as a whole” (p. 186). At this stage, the analyst analyses the data taking 
the research aims into consideration. Ritchie and Spencer (1994) indicate that the purposes of 
framework analysis in the context of applied policy research involve “defining concepts, 
mapping range and nature of phenomena, creating typologies, finding associations, providing 
explanations, developing strategies etc.” (p. 176). The aim of this part of the study was to 
describe participants’ beliefs regarding moral education and moral psychology. Among the 
main goals of the research was to understand how participants’ beliefs were reflected in 
classroom practice. However, this objective was met in the final discussion of the whole data 
set, following the description and analysis of observation data, and taking into account data 
obtained from the questionnaires and interviews as well as the observations.  
Drawing from the above-reviewed literature on thematic content analysis and 
framework analysis, analysis of data was conducted in six or seven steps depending on the 
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nature of the data. The first step of analysis involved immersion in the collected data through 
reading, rereading, transcribing and (where necessary) translating the data. This allowed me 
to get ‘a feel’ for the data at hand. The second step involved reading the transcribed data once 
again and jotting down notes regarding possible themes based on a priori concerns, or novel 
themes, recurring in the data set. After this, all potential themes were turned into titles and/or 
subtitles on a separate sheet of paper into which codes could be categorised. The third step 
followed was to identify codes relevant to identified themes, as well as identifying other 
codes that merit analytical attention. Then each identified code was categorised under their 
relevant titles. In case certain identified codes were relevant to more than one title or subtitle, 
they were categorised multiple times. Following this, the titles and categories were refined 
either through changing the title of the category to better reflect its contents, consolidating 
categories if they turned out to be more closely related than originally thought, or by breaking 
apart certain categories into more categories if certain elements of their contents were not as 
closely related to each other as originally thought. 
While this categorization and thematization process was used with every question, in 
some questions categorization turned out to be either not possible or unnecessary. Thematic 
analysis was still employed in these cases without categorization. The sixth step was not used 
in the analysis of all questions, as in this step quantitative analysis of identified codes and 
categories was conducted. The need for methodological pluralism in the narrow area of 
thematic categorization arose at this point, due to the nature of obtained data. Data obtained 
through some questions were at times so varied (or so uniform) that a quantitative analysis of 
the qualitative data was not warranted; thus, the use of content analysis would not have been 
appropriate. However, in other questions the quantitative analysis of the qualitative data 
reflected much more depth regarding the aims of those questions; thus, the quantitative aspect 
of content analysis was employed. This step largely involved the comparison of frequencies 
of codes or categories. The final step in the analysis was the interpretation of identified codes, 
categories, themes, and where relevant, the quantitative aspects of data. 
This procedure was conducted independently in the analysis of each question in the 
interview schedule, a total of 19 times. It was necessary to code and categorise the data 
separately for each question as each one is focused on a different topic, and they have 
relatively little bearing on each other. Following the regrouping of interview questions after 
the pilot interviews, in order to avoid asking questions that yield the same data repeatedly, 
questions no longer tended to draw answers that were highly relevant to other questions in the 
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interview schedule. As a result, categories identified in the analysis of one question could not 
be applied uniformly in all other questions, although certain themes were recurring in some 
questions. Interpretation of findings was also conducted independently for each question due 
to different categories and themes emerging from question analyses. General interpretation of 
the whole set of findings from the qualitative data analysis (including both interview and 
observation data analysis) is made at the end of Chapter V. Still, larger interpretation of 
results with consideration for the broad aims of the research is made in Chapter VI in 
conjunction with the results obtained from questionnaire data analysis. A final note that needs 
to be made is that codes were analysed with respect to their corresponding themes unless the 
context in which the code occurs needed to be considered as well. 
One more alternative analysis method considered was discourse analysis. Rogers et al. 
(2005) define discourse analysis as focusing on “how language as a cultural tool mediates 
relationships of power and privilege in social interactions, institutions, and bodies of 
knowledge” (p. 367). Discourse analysis could have been warranted in this part of the study, 
especially in relation to participants’ beliefs regarding morality in Turkey, and how moral 
justifications are employed for ostracism and other forms of social pressure on people. 
However, participants’ beliefs regarding this aspect of morality are not part of the aims of the 
study; their beliefs regarding moral psychology and development, and how these beliefs 
reflect in classroom practice concerning the fostering of students’ moral development is the 
priority interest of this study. 
There are further practical problems regarding the use of discourse analysis in this 
study, which are related to language. The data set is in Turkish, yet the presentation needs to 
be made in English. And discourse analysis relies heavily on the use of language (Rogers, 
2011; Rogers et al., 2005), as opposed to the conceptual and thematic focus of the methods 
reviewed above. In order to conduct discourse analysis in Turkish and present the findings in 
English, a comparative review of the method in both languages would have been necessary so 
that the underlying justifications and analysis procedure could have been made explicit. 
Considering that there are relatively few points that discourse analysis could have shed light 
on (at least with regards to the priorities of this study), this path was not taken. It was judged 
that the time and energy spent on conducting discourse analysis in two languages that have 
nothing in common grammatically, and very little culturally, would not be justified by the 
relatively small amount of results the method would have yielded, which would be 
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tangentially related to the research aims in any case. The issues regarding translation become 
more apparent in Chapter V, Section 1; especially in section 1.8. 
4.3.Observations 
The interview and questionnaire methods are not always sufficient to provide reliable 
data. Bush (2002) indicates that the greatest vulnerability of the interview method is bias. 
Interviewees may give inaccurate answers because they may want to reflect themselves in a 
certain light, for social desirability bias (giving answers they think are more likely to be better 
accepted by society), or because they are led by the interviewer into giving certain answers. 
Similarly, the interviewer may ask loaded questions (e.g. confirming a prejudice). For this 
reason, observations were also planned in order to establish reliability through triangulation. 
The main aim of the observations was to understand whether participants’ beliefs, as 
stated in the interviews, were reflected in their teaching practice. Moyles (2002) explains that 
observations are independent of participants’ stated views and that they are sometimes 
necessary to establish triangulation: 
“Observation as a tool for the researcher can be powerful, flexible and real. It is not 
dependent, like questionnaires or interview methods, on respondents’ personal views, 
but seeks explicit evidence through the eyes of the observer either directly or through 
a camera lens.” (Moyles, 2002, p. 172) 
Observations are important research tools as they can give direct access and insight 
into complex social interactions and settings, provide permanent and systematic records of 
such interactions and settings and enrich and supplement data gathered by other techniques 
like questionnaires and interviews. They are also context sensitive and ecologically valid 
(Denscombe, 2003). Furthermore, observations use very varied techniques, yielding different 
types of data and with the potential to be widely applied in different contexts; and be used to 
address a variety of types of research questions (Denscombe, 2003; Moyles, 2002). Cohen, 
Manion, and Morrison (2000) indicate that observations can yield data on the physical, 
human, interactional, and programme setting of observed phenomena. However, observations 
alone cannot generate completely reliable data: 
“Observation methods are powerful tools for gaining insights into situations. As with 
other data collection techniques, they are beset by issues of validity and reliability. 
Even low inference observation, perhaps the safest form of observation, is itself 
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highly selective, just as perception is selective. In this respect it has been suggested 
that additional methods of gathering data might be employed, to provide 
corroboration and triangulation, in short, to ensure that reliable inferences are derived 
from reliable data.” (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2000, p. 315) 
For this reason, findings from observations were cross-checked with questionnaire 
results and interview findings. It was expected that in this way triangulation is established 
and reliability increased. 
The observations were semi-structured and conducted in a non-participant manner. 
The main reason for engaging in non-participant observation is that the researcher was not 
part of the group that he was researching (the school where observed teachers work). 
Observing in this manner has several benefits, as well as costs. The most important drawback 
of non-participant observation is the ‘observer effect’ (Gillham, 2008; Simpson & Tuson, 
1995). In the presence of a stranger (the non-participant observer in this case), people do not 
act the same as they would if this person were absent. This creates a problem as the non-
participant observer cannot have clear access to the natural behaviour of those that are being 
observed. On the other hand, when the researcher is an insider of the group – a participant 
observer – s/he is more likely to have clearer access to more natural behaviour, as the 
researcher is not a stranger to those being observed. However, becoming an insider to the 
observed group (conducting participant observation) either requires an investment of time, 
such that one becomes a part of the observed group, or that the researcher has already 
established themselves as a part of the group. Since the researcher was not part of any of the 
schools in which the observations were conducted, becoming an insider by investing time and 
assuming other roles in the schools was the only possible way of conducting participant 
observation. Since it would not be feasible to become an insider to 10 different schools, and 
considering the time limitations of a PhD programme, participant observation was not 
feasible for this study. 
Non-participant observation has several benefits, the most important of which is 
detachment. Yin (2014) indicates that participant observation is prone to biases such as 
“[having] to assume positions or advocacy roles contrary to the interests of good social 
science practice” (p. 117). Furthermore, being a part of the observed group, the researcher 
may have other roles and responsibilities to the group which may create practical problems 
such as insufficient time to take research-related notes in an event, or inability to position 
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oneself effectively in order to conduct the observations. The detachment of non-participant 
observations allows the researcher to circumvent problems of bias and practicality to a certain 
extent and given the potential sensitivity of the research topic (morality), detachment in terms 
of avoiding bias was crucial for this study. 
Observations are guided by the observation schedule which can range in its degree of 
structure from strictly defined item checklists to a complete lack of observation schedule – 
usually described as unstructured observations (Gillham, 2008; Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007; Simpson & Tuson, 1995). Unstructured observations are often used by ethnographers 
who immerse themselves with the group they are researching as participants of the group 
(Angrosino, 2007). While unstructured observations yield rich qualitative data, they are 
expensive in terms of time, analysis, and presentation, making it harder to manage for the 
researcher (Gillham, 2008). When researching implicit moral interactions and education, an 
unstructured ethnographic observation – immersing oneself in the context – could be 
preferable, as Woods (2013) has done. However, in this study, the heavily participatory 
nature of unstructured observations could have created practical problems such as devoting a 
lot of time to becoming a participant in one place of observation. Furthermore, explicit and 
implicit interactions regarding ‘good and bad’ can be so common and so subtle in the school 
context (Purpel & Ryan, 1983) that in the lack of at least semi-structured guidelines to narrow 
the perspective and focus the researcher’s attention, the researcher cannot accurately perceive 
and reflect interactions about morality in its entirety – especially in a single day of 
observation. Thus, in this study, structure was required for the observations. 
Structured observations are sometimes equated with non-participant observations 
(Gillham, 2008); the observer enters the classroom with a previously prepared checklist and 
proceeds to mark the items on the observation schedule. Heavily structured observations tend 
to yield quantitative data and are much more manageable in terms of time, preparation and 
analysis compared to unstructured observations; however, the results they yield can be 
superficial (Gillham, 2008; Simpson & Tuson, 1995). Interactions about morality in the 
school context take a variety of forms, from subtle gestures to lesson-long lectures about 
good and bad behaviour, to school rules (Purpel & Ryan, 1983). Constructing a strictly 
defined set of items to be marked on a checklist that covers this wide range of potential moral 
interactions is not only very difficult but also unnecessary. The present study does not focus 
on specific behaviour or events that convey moral messages to students (such as, for example, 
a disapproving frown of the teacher to a student speaking out of turn in class), but rather how 
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(and whether) these interactions occur in general. Since the specific behaviour or event that 
may convey a moral message can take such a wide variety of forms, highly structured items 
are unlikely to cover the whole range of possible interactions about morality and reflect an 
accurate picture of the events that take place in the classroom. 
It is possible to create a structured checklist for controlling whether certain activities 
which have been shown to foster moral development, such as role-playing activities or 
dilemma discussion (Bebeau, 1994), have been undertaken for specific pedagogical purposes 
at specific dates. However, not only would it be unrealistic to expect to be able to observe 
these activities on the specific day of the observation (unless the observation date was set 
specifically when these activities would be carried out), but even if such activities were 
observed, it would be unrealistic to assume that one day’s activities are representative of the 
general moral education practice of the school (including both implicit and explicit moral 
education). The activities teachers use to foster students’ moral development could be learnt 
from follow-up questions instead. For this reason, more subtle interactions concerning moral 
education were the topic of the observations. 
Given the above grounds for the unsuitableness of highly structured, or completely 
unstructured observation schedules, for this study, semi-structured observation schedules 
were prepared. Semi-structured observations are not as highly structured as a checklist but do 
provide some guidelines for observation. Gillham (2008) indicates that in semi-structured 
observations the researcher has some structured items or questions, but that these are “open” 
so that the researcher “cannot predict what [s/he] will find” (p. 19). Given the difficulty of 
predicting the wide range of possible behaviour that may have moral implications which the 
students can pick up on, semi-structured observations were the most suitable kind of 
observation to address the research questions of this study. 
Two different observations were conducted. The main observation was focused on 
teachers’ classroom interaction with students; while supporting observations of the school 
grounds were also conducted. 
4.3.1. Classroom Observations 
The main observation schedule was designed to be semi-structured. Cohen, Manion, 
and Morrison (2008) indicate that observations allow data to be gathered on the physical 
environment and its organization (the physical setting), the people present in the 
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environment, their characteristics and how they organize themselves (the human setting), the 
interactions taking place in the environment and the manner of these interactions (the 
interactional setting), and the programme setting which covers curricula, pedagogic styles, 
resources and their organization. While the observation schedule was designed predominantly 
as an aid to record the interactional setting in the classroom, it also includes tools to record 
the physical, human, and programme settings as well. The main focus of the observations was 
teachers’ behaviour relevant to implicit moral education based on their beliefs stated in the 
interviews. However, while engagement in implicit moral education can be observed mostly 
in the interactional setting, the human (e.g. population of the class), physical (e.g. classroom 
size and seating plan), and programme (e.g. use of posters) can also play a part in the 
interactions of interest (see Appendix A11).  
The observation schedule was further adapted for each observation based on 
participants’ statements in the interviews. This further structure was added following the 
interview data analysis, and the added structure was unique to each observation, being based 
on individual participants’ statements.  
4.3.2. Observation of School Grounds 
While volunteer teachers were observed in their classroom practice, a supporting 
structured non-participant observation of the school in which the teachers were teaching was 
also conducted. This observation was expected to yield some data on the school rules and 
how they were practised, and the general climate and implicit messages that may have been 
conveyed to students through the physical environment of the school. These qualify as an 
observation of the physical setting (physical environment) and programme setting (pedagogic 
styles, rules, etc.) of the school. The observation schedule for the school included specific 
items, although other instances of interest were also noted during observations. 
The observation of the school grounds was divided into two sections: description of 
physical objects and facilities, and any behaviour or event of interest that took place outside 
the classroom. The schedule was once again semi-structured, albeit including more structure 
in the noting of physical facilities. 
The second section of the school grounds observation schedule included event 
descriptions. It was expected that certain events/behaviour of interest could be observed in 
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the school grounds. These events were noted down the same way as in the main classroom 
observation, only with the addition of where the event took place (see Appendix A12). 
4.4.Pilot Study and the Revision of Research Tools 
A pilot study was conducted which included 18 questionnaire responses from 
participants, including 5 students, 7 interns, and 6 teachers. Pilot interviews were also 
conducted with two participants from each group.  
The questionnaire initially consisted of 5 parts, with background questions included in 
the first part. Following the pilot study, background questions were moved to the end of the 
questionnaire and one section which consisted of open-ended questions was omitted. The 
open-ended questions focused on the respondents’ own experiences in learning and, if 
applicable, teaching moral values. However, in the pilot study these questions were rarely 
answered, and when they were, they did not yield usable data – as it was evident that 
participants answered these questions just for the sake of answering them and without being 
concerned about accuracy. Some further problems regarding the wording of questions were 
identified and corrected in the final form. Also, the answers to questions in the second part 
included a five-point Likert scale range, including a neutral answer. In the pilot study, these 
neutral answers were regularly chosen by respondents. Later feedback from participants 
revealed that neutral options were not chosen for concerns of accuracy. For this reason, the 
neutral option was omitted to force the participant to give a more accurate answer. 
Only minor changes were made to the interview format after the pilot study. Most 
importantly it was found that in order to explore each question of the interview schedule in 
depth at least 60 to 90 minutes of interviewing was necessary. For this reason, the interview 
schedule was shortened. It was also noted that participants tended to give answers to several 
related questions on the interview schedule while they focused on one question. Clusters of 
questions that tended to elicit related answers were grouped in order to conduct the interview 
in manageable time scales while exploring the topics under investigation in depth. However, 
while most participants’ answers to a question would be relevant to other questions on the 
schedule, the other questions to which their responses were relevant changed from participant 
to participant. For this reason, the number of questions on the schedule could not be greatly 
reduced, for if the interviewees did not talk about a certain topic, the researcher could 
introduce it. Some problems based on the translations of questions from English to Turkish 
were encountered. These were corrected following the pilot study. Most importantly the 
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experience of interviewing was helpful for the researcher. This experience has allowed me to 
be more mindful of the ethical concerns of interviewing participants on a sensitive topic 
related to morality. And finally, background questions were moved to the beginning of the 
interview in order to serve as an easy start to the discussion. 
The observations were not piloted, for entering the classroom for a pilot observation 
would have been intrusive of pilot participants’ educational practice and privacy. However, 
having worked as a teacher and conducted observations during my university teacher training 
in Turkey as an undergraduate, I had some experience of conducting observations in 
educational settings prior to this research. Furthermore, I was also working at a school at the 
time of designing the observation schedule, where I practised conducting observations as part 
of my normal duties, which helped me design the observation schedule. This pilot resulted in 
the creation of the semi-structured observation schedule, whereas in the first place 
unstructured observations were planned to be conducted. During the practice observation, I 
noticed that without some guidelines to narrow my focus while observing, it would be too 
difficult to take unified notes that could lead to manageable amounts of data ordered in a way 
conducive to easier analysis. As a result, the semi-structured observation schedule was 
created.  
136 
 
5. Ethical Considerations 
Ethical considerations were central to this research as morality, and education 
regarding morality, are sensitive topics. The anonymity of participants, respect for their 
privacy, and confidentiality were of utmost importance. Due diligence was paid to the design 
of the questionnaire and interview schedule as “ethical problems in educational research can 
often result from thoughtlessness, oversight or taking matters for granted” (Cohen, Manion, 
& Morrison, 2000). Every effort was made to avoid articulating questions in a way that could 
be perceived as obtrusive, prejudiced, accusatory, or degrading. Participants’ informed 
consent was sought through a participant information sheet provided to the participants prior 
to the interviews, seeking permission to use quotations as relevant to the research analysis 
and presentation (see appendices A1 and A2, and A5 and A6). The practice of informed 
consent through participant information sheets and signed consent forms was also employed 
with the observations (see Appendices A9 and A10). The school names where participating 
teachers work and the names of the interviewees are not and will not be disclosed in this 
study or anywhere else. The individuals who took part in the questionnaire survey have also 
not been asked to disclose their names. 
A Participant Information Sheet was provided to reassure the participants that the 
study would not invade their privacy and that their identity would be kept confidential (see 
Appendices A1 and A2). The Participant Information Sheet included the details of the 
purpose of the study, why the person had been invited to participate in the study, ethical 
guarantees pertaining to confidentiality, anonymity, and the right to withdraw from the study 
giving reason, the benefits of taking part in the study, and communication details. Busher 
(2002) explicitly states the importance of informed consent: 
“Respect for the dignity and privacy of participants is often translated into the 
common practice, urged by various codes of conduct for researchers in Education and 
Social Sciences (e.g. British Educational Research Association, 1992; British 
Sociological Association, 1992) of researchers always trying to gain the informed 
consent of participants to be involved in any research they are proposing to undertake 
and always trying to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of their participants, 
whatever information they give.” (p. 74) 
Nonetheless, Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) indicate that “the questionnaire 
will always be an intrusion into the life of the respondent, be it in terms of time taken to 
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complete the questionnaire, the level of threat or sensitivity of the questions, or the possible 
invasion of privacy” (p. 245). With this consideration in mind, the questionnaire was 
designed to minimise the level of intrusion on the participants’ behalf. The wording of the 
questions was especially important in this case, as their content – morality – is a sensitive 
issue. Data provided by the participants were also handled with appropriate diligence. The 
data has been locked in a cabinet, and as I translated the material myself, the data has not 
been seen by anyone else. 
Ethical considerations are of even greater importance in observations. The privacy, 
anonymity, and confidentiality of all observed parties – be it the teacher that is the centre of 
focus, the school where the teacher works, or other parties present during the observations, 
such as the students or other staff – must be strictly protected. Video recording of 
observations was not chosen for this reason. Meticulous note taking was employed instead. 
Every measure was taken to protect the participants’ and other observed parties’ privacy, 
anonymity, and confidentiality. Participants and schools were given a guarantee of anonymity 
and confidentiality through the letter of informed consent and permission requests. 
With the above considerations in mind, an application to the Oxford Brookes 
University Research Ethics Committee was made in March 2014 to gain approval of the 
ethical soundness of the research approach and data gathering tools. Approval was granted in 
April 2014. 
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6. Recruitment and Data Gathering 
This section provides an explanation of how the cross-sectional sample of participants 
was recruited for this study, and how data were gathered. All participants were recruited from 
the teacher training programme of the same university in Izmir, Turkey. The university was 
chosen based on the reputation of its teacher training programme and practical concerns such 
as accessibility. Participants consisted of first-year students (students), fourth-year students 
(interns), and practising alumni teachers of the programme (teachers). This selection of 
participants was intended to reveal how teacher training and teaching practice influenced the 
development of the beliefs under investigation. Responses of students who had little training 
and no experience, interns who had complete training and little experience (fourth year 
education faculty students in Turkey have their internship in this year), and practising 
teachers who have both full training and several years of teaching experience were compared 
to reveal the influence of teacher training and experience on the beliefs under investigation. 
It must be reported at this point that, following data analysis, it was noticed that the 
sample of teachers and trainee teachers investigated in this study is biased. The bias resides in 
participants’ political orientations in general. Izmir is the most liberal city in Turkey 
considering social matters, which narrowed down the population under investigation. 
University students tend to be slightly more liberal as well, and the specific Faculty of 
Education where data was gathered is also reputed to have a liberal tradition, further 
liberalising the sample under investigation. As a result, the findings of this study, with 
regards to participants’ moral and educational beliefs, are more representative of beliefs 
influenced by liberal political orientations than of conservative orientations. 
6.1.Questionnaire Survey 
Two strategies were used to recruit participants. First and fourth-year students 
completed the survey on paper, and teachers completed the survey online. Permission was 
obtained from the faculty Dean to gather data from students and alumni of the programme 
and to conduct data gathering both on university grounds and online. After permission was 
granted, the recruitment of first and fourth-year students took place at the university. 
Questionnaires were distributed to students and interns in class, before or after a lecture they 
were attending in order to increase response rates. While data were gathered from this captive 
sample, the voluntary nature of participation was verbally emphasised in addition to the clear 
statement in the participant information sheets. A link to the online survey on the 
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SurveyMonkey website was communicated to the alumni of the programme through a variety 
of methods, including social media (such as Facebook) and emails sent to alumni of the 
programme by the university. Due to this indirect method of communicating, response rates 
were lower for teachers than they were for students or interns. 
6.2.Interviews 
The research was designed such that the number of interview participants was around 
one tenth of questionnaire participants, in order to collect manageable amounts of data. The 
contact details of the researcher were on the questionnaires and participants were invited to 
volunteer for interviews. Contact information of participants was taken once they volunteered 
to be interviewed, and a location for conducting the interviews was selected. Wragg (2002) 
indicates that the site where the interview is conducted is important as participants feel 
differently in different places, and this influences the answers they give. He suggests that 
conducting the interview in a location where the participant feels more relaxed is more likely 
to produce better results. For this reason, interviews were conducted in a place of the 
interviewee’s choice, as long as this was conducive to an uninterrupted interview.  
Twenty participants volunteered to be interviewed. First and fourth-year participants 
(students and interns) were asked whether they would volunteer to be interviewed on topics 
similar to those covered in the survey, immediately after the survey was conducted. 
Volunteers’ contact information was taken to facilitate possible arrangements to carry out 
further interviews. Five students and five interns volunteered to be interviewed. All 
interviews were audio recorded and took place at the university, in a place of participants’ 
choosing sufficiently convenient for conducting the interviews. The total time of recorded 
interviews was four hours and twenty-seven minutes, averaging 26.7 minutes per interview. 
The shortest interview was 15 minutes long, while the longest was 36 minutes. 
A survey of teachers was conducted online, and an invitation for interviews was 
communicated online as well. Contrary to expectations, more teachers volunteered to be 
interviewed than students or interns. Invitations for interviews were communicated to 
teachers through the online questionnaire. Ten teachers volunteered to be interviewed. Their 
contact information was taken, and a meeting was arranged for conducting the interviews at a 
place and time of the participants’ choosing. However, due to technical difficulties with the 
recorder, these interviews were conducted online in written form. More detailed information 
about the interviewees can be found in Chapter V. 
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6.3.Observations 
Intern and teacher participants were invited to volunteer for observations at the end of 
the interviews. The invitation was not extended to students since first-year students do not do 
teaching or teaching practice. The voluntary nature of participation was emphasised, and 
participants were briefed about how the observations would take place, and what the focus 
would be. (See Appendices A1 and A2 for PI sheets, and A9 and A10 for Observation 
Informed Consent forms.) It was planned that 5 interns and 5 teachers would be observed in 
class. While the aim of recruiting five teachers was initially met, only one intern volunteered 
to take part in the observations. More detailed information about the observation participants 
can be found in Chapter V. 
Information regarding the schools where teachers worked and where the intern had 
her placement was gathered. The schools were then contacted, and information regarding the 
research was given. Following this, permission to conduct observations on the school grounds 
and the classrooms was sought. Written assurance was provided that permissions could be 
withdrawn without giving cause and that schools’ and all observed parties’ anonymity and 
confidentiality would be protected. The heads of four schools gave permission, while two 
schools, one of which was where the intern had her placement, refused permission. Once 
permission was denied, the issue was not further pursued with either school. As there were no 
other volunteers, other opportunities for conducting observations could not be pursued either. 
With the schools that gave permission to conduct observations, a date for conducting the 
observations was set jointly with the school administration and the teachers who volunteered 
to be observed. Data were gathered on these selected days. 
Depending on the teachers’ availability on the day of the observations, non-participant 
observations for one or two lessons (40 minutes per lesson) were conducted with each 
participant, and observation of school grounds was allocated as much time as necessary. The 
time devoted to the observation of school grounds differed from school to school as each 
school was of a different size; for example, the observation of the urban school took the least 
amount of time as this was the smallest school. 
Field notes were taken on hard copies of the observation schedules, the hard copy of 
transcripts, and a notebook. Each observation was adapted based on the observed teachers’ 
statements in the interviews. Before the observations, I familiarised myself with the interview 
transcripts in order to be able to direct my attention to specific instances and interactions 
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when taking field notes and analysing observed data from the perspective of the stated 
beliefs, rather than trying to observe anything and everything at once. A hard copy of the 
transcripts was used during the observations in order to take a look at the statements again if 
necessary and to take field notes next to certain statements. Field notes were later digitalized 
by copying them to a word processor on computer. 
In order to minimise my impact on the lessons being observed, I chose the remotest 
place in the classrooms to conduct the observations. This was the back of the classroom in 
each case, and this further allowed me to observe the entire class as the lesson was taking 
place. Most importantly, this allowed me to see how and whether teachers responded to 
certain behaviours of students during class. Interactions (or lack thereof) between students 
and the teacher pertinent to the study were, later on, followed up by questions to the teacher 
after the observations. Follow-up questions were formed during the observations; they were 
based on how observed behaviour was related to teachers stated beliefs. 
However, it needs to be noted at this junction that the observations did not achieve 
their original aim. In retrospect, I believe that I have underestimated the depth and 
complexity of the issue. While achieving the initial objective of conducting observations in 
ten schools could have provided a wide variety, two to four hours of observations have not 
been enough to gather sufficient amounts of data. The gathered data have been analysed, and 
are discussed below to the extent that data analysis affords discussion. However, for this 
reason, references to the observations are somewhat scarce in the presentation of qualitative 
data analysis in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER IV 
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the results of the quantitative data analysis are presented. Two kinds of 
analysis have been conducted. Firstly, analysis of descriptive data focusing on the frequencies 
of responses to individual questions is presented. This is followed by the presentation of the 
analysis of results obtained from regression tests. Finally, in Section 5, the findings are 
summarised. 
The analysis of descriptive frequencies can be said to indicate that participants’ overall 
responses, to moral psychology issues investigated here, loosely reflect the moral psychology 
literature reviewed in chapter two of this thesis; however, some participants’ attitudes 
towards certain issues conflict with the attitudes of other participants. As a result, it cannot be 
clearly concluded that participants have a positive or negative attitude towards these matters. 
On issues related to implicit moral education, participants indicate that children learn 
morality firstly at home from their parents, and secondly at school from their peers and 
teachers. Participants seem to recognise their role in the moral development of students, and a 
large majority indicated that as teachers they are and should be responsible for students’ 
moral development. Furthermore, most indicated that they are not satisfied with the current 
system of moral education. 
Regression tests were conducted on four different topics: a) whether teacher training 
and experience influences attitudes, b) whether planning to continue in education or not 
influences attitudes, c) whether gender differences influence attitudes, and d) whether 
disciplinary focus influences attitudes. Overall, none of these tests has yielded significant 
results. Chi-square tests were conducted considering each of the four topics above, and these 
tests have yielded significant results on relatively few issues. 
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1. Reliability and Normality 
Cronbach’s alpha was chosen as the reliability indicator of the questionnaire. 
Cronbach’s alpha is the most commonly used reliability score for assessing the internal 
consistency of quantitative measures (Field, 2009; Hinton, 2004). As a general rule of thumb, 
a score of 0.7 or above is thought to reflect an acceptable amount of internal consistency 
(Field, 2009; Hinton, 2004). Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for the first three parts of the 
questionnaire as the fourth part contains only demographic and background questions. 
Cronbach’s alpha score for the first three parts was α = .72. (See Appendices A3 and A4, for 
the questionnaires given to participants.) 
Data were tested for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for each part 
of the questionnaire. Alternatively, the Shapiro-Wilk test can be used to assess normality. 
However, the Shapiro-Wilk test is more accurate with sample sizes smaller than 50 (Field, 
2009), while the sample size in this study is 171. The KS test showed that Part 1 responses 
were normally distributed, D(171) = 0.06, p < .05. However, the test revealed that part 2 
responses, D(171) = 0.07, p > .05, and part 3 responses, D(171) = 0.49, p > .001, were 
significantly non-normal. For this reason, non-parametric tests were run on the data. 
Skewness and Kurtosis are disregarded here as it is recommended that they are not 
considered in large samples (Field, 2009).  
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2. Participants 
2.1.Demographics 
71 first year students (41.5%), 63 interns (36.8%), and 37 teachers (21.6%) volunteered 
to take part in the study, totalling 171 participants in the survey. The sample included 17 
interns studying Teaching Computer and Information Technologies (9.9%), 30 mathematics 
teachers and students studying Teaching 
Mathematics, 27 English teachers 
(15.7%), 90 students and interns studying 
Psychological Counselling and Guidance 
(PCG) (52.6%), and 1 physics, 1 history, 
and 1 science teacher (0.5% each), while 
3 teachers (1.7%) did not report their 
subject (see Chart 1). The mean age of 
participants was 22.07 (SD = 4.16). 41 
participants were male (23.9%), and 126 
were female (73.6%). 4 participants 
(2.3%) did not report their gender. 
The high number of PCG students is due to the greater number of PCG students 
volunteering to take part in the study, and also to practical issues such as availability during 
the time when data gathering was permitted on university grounds. 
2.2. Experience and Education 
Twenty teachers indicated that their education level was graduate (11.6%) while 15 
teachers were post-graduates (8.7%). All other participants, with the exception of 5 who did 
not indicate their education level, were undergraduates (131 participants 76.6%): these are the 
first year or fourth year undergraduate students (students and interns). While 58 participants 
had not done their internship yet (33.9%), 50 were in the process of doing their internships 
(29.2%), and 59 participants indicated that they had completed their internship (34.5%). Four 
participants did not provide information on whether they had done their internship or not. In 
response to the question of how much teaching experience participants had, 57 participants 
(33.3%) stated that they had no teaching experience, 50 participants (29.2%) had the 
experience of an internship they had not yet completed, 27 participants (15.8%) had only 
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their internship experience (each of 
which was an intern), 16 teachers 
(9.4%) had from less than a year to 
two years of teaching experience, 
11 participants (6.4%) had three to 
five years of teaching experience, 
and finally 6 participants (3.5%) 
had more than six years of teaching 
experience. Once again, 4 
participants did not respond to this 
question (see Chart 2).  
In response to an open-ended question about whether participants had any training 
regarding moral psychology, development, or education, more than 80% of participants 
indicated that they had not, while some participants thought some education they previously 
received might be relevant to moral psychology. These included high school RE, citizenship 
and philosophy courses, and undergraduate professional ethics, philosophy, and 
developmental psychology courses. Only four participants mentioned Kohlberg’s theory in 
response to this question. No other author or moral psychology theory was mentioned. 
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3. Frequencies 
The presentation of results in this section focuses solely on their frequencies. Initially, 
how participants responded to the questions of the first part of the questionnaire is presented, 
focusing on what the results indicate regarding participants’ beliefs related to aspects of the 
Four Components Model, Moral Foundations Theory, Social Intuitionist Model, Triune 
Ethics Theory, Cognitive Development Theory and the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach. (Please 
see section 2.2 in the literature review for an overview of each of these theories.) The results 
of the second part of the questionnaire, which focuses on participants’ beliefs regarding moral 
education and their experience of engaging in implicit moral education with 17 statements, 
also assessed against a Likert scale, are presented in section 3.2 below. Finally, the results of 
the third part of the questionnaire, which involves 4 ranking questions regarding participants’ 
beliefs about moral development and implicit moral education, are presented in section 3.3, 
before the results of the regression tests based on participant groups are presented in section 4 
below. 
3.1.Moral Psychology Beliefs 
This section of the questionnaire was formed of 24 statements assessed against a 
Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). As Likert scale assessments 
provide categorical data rather than numerical data, the results and central tendencies for each 
question can be best presented through the mode, which is the statistic that describes the most 
frequent response to an item on the questionnaire (Field, 2009; Hinton, 2004). In this part, 
questions 1 to 11 are related to the Four Components Model, 12 to 15 are drawn from the 
Moral Foundations Theory and the Social Intuitionist Model, questions 16, 17, 22 and 24 are 
based on Triune Ethics Theory, 18 to 21 are from the Cognitive Development Theory and the 
Neo-Kohlbergian approach, and question 23 is unrelated to these topics. (See Section 2, 
Chapter II for these models and theories.) 
3.1.1. Four Components Model 
There are two questions specifically related to moral sensitivity – questions 1 and 6. 
Question 1 asked participants whether they thought people always understood the moral 
salience of a situation and question 6 asked participants whether they thought people always 
understood the moral salience of the decisions they made. The mode for question 1 was “not 
sure” with 66 (38.6%) responses. In addition to this, negative responses (disagree/strongly 
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disagree) to the item also add up to 66 
(38.6%), meaning that participants were 
either unsure whether people understood 
the moral salience of any given situation, 
or were inclined to believe that people 
did not recognize the moral salience of 
situations in general. This is supported by 
responses to question 6 where the mode 
is “disagree” with 68 (39.8%), followed 
by 54 “not sure” responses (31.6%) (see 
Chart 3). The results of the questions 
related to moral sensitivity indicate that 
there is a slight tendency among participants to believe that people, in general, do not 
recognise the moral significance of situations or their decisions.  
Four questions directly related to moral judgement were asked – questions 2 to 5. 
(Questions 7 and 18 are also indirectly related to moral judgement; however, they are more 
related to moral motivation and moral reasoning development respectively and have been 
analysed in the relevant section below.) Question 2 asked participants whether they thought 
people had good moral judgement, to which 70 participants (40.9%) disagreed. Following 
this, question 3 asked participants whether they thought people were influenced more by 
moral reasoning, or, in question 4, by moral intuitions when making moral judgements. These 
questions were followed by question 5 
which asked participants whether they 
thought rational and intuitive processes 
equally affected moral judgement. The 
mode for moral reasoning (question 3) was 
“disagree” with 63 (36.8%), and for moral 
intuitions (question 4) it was “agree” with 
87 (50.9%). Furthermore, responses were 
equally distributed between “disagree”, 
“not sure”, and “agree” regarding the 
balanced effect of rational and intuitive 
process on moral judgement (question 5), 
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with 49 (28.7%), 49 (28.7%), and 50 (29.2%) responses respectively (see Chart 4). This 
indicates that most participants believe that moral intuitions, in the form of emotions, 
influence moral judgement; however, they are divided on the matter of whether the two 
processes have a balanced influence on moral judgement. 
Six questions related to moral motivation were asked – questions 7 to 12. Question 7 
asked participants whether they thought people would still act immorally even if they knew 
what they were doing was bad. This question seeks to understand whether participants 
believe that moral reasoning provides moral motivation. 93 participants (54.4%) agreed with 
this statement, and 52 participants (30.4%) strongly agreed (total 145 participants, 84.8%), 
indicating that moral reasoning did not provide moral motivation, in line with the gappiness 
problem (see Section 2, Chapter II). 
Question 8 asked participants whether the 
moral self provided moral motivation. 
Participants agreed that people found the 
motivation to act morally within 
themselves with 81 (49.9%) participants 
agreeing (see Chart 5). Question 9 asked 
whether participants thought that moral 
emotions provided moral motivation, to 
which 77 participants (45.0%) agreed. 
Question 10 was also related to the moral 
self, however, this time focusing on 
second-order volitions (see Section 2, 
Chapter II). 65 participants (38.0%) agreed that people acted morally because they wanted to 
be good people.  
Questions 11 and 12 were designed to offer a contrasting point to the previous 
questions in suggesting that moral motivation was provided externally through laws and 
social pressure, with question 11 indicating that in the absence of laws and social pressure 
people would do what suits them best, while question 12 stated that laws and social pressure 
were more effective in ensuring moral behaviour than the moral self and character. Following 
the previous responses, especially to question 8, it might have been expected that participants 
would disagree with the notion that moral motivation was provided externally; however, 74 
participants (43.4%) agreed that without external motivation (such as punishments), people 
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would not act morally, and 41 (24.0%) participants strongly agreed to this as well, totalling 
115 (67.3%) participants stating a positive response. Furthermore, in response to question 12, 
81 participants (47.4%) agreed, and 30 participants (17.5%) strongly agreed, totalling 111 
(64.9%) positive responses. The total positive (agree and strongly agree) responses to the 
previous three questions are 101 (59.1%) for question 8, 94 (54.9%) for question 9, and 76 
(44.4%) for question 10, evidencing a stronger belief in external sources of moral motivation 
than internal sources. 
These results indicate that a majority of participants believe that while moral reasoning 
does not provide moral motivation, the moral self and moral emotions are more likely to 
provide moral motivation. However, without laws and social pressure to enforce moral 
behaviour, people would not act morally, indicating that while moral motivation is based on 
the moral self and moral emotions, these are not enough by themselves. 
3.1.2. Moral Foundations Theory and the Social Intuitionist Model 
Questions 13 to 15 were related to the Moral Foundations Theory and the Social 
Intuitionist Model (see Section 2, Chapter II). These questions were designed to elicit 
participants’ beliefs regarding the relationship between morality and culture. Questions 13 
and 14 were intended to contrast each other, with question 13 indicating that there are no 
universal moral foundations, only cultural moralities, while question 14 states that there are 
universal moral foundations across the world, however, their interpretation and application 
differ from culture to culture. Interestingly participants tended to agree to both questions. 70 
participants (40.9%) strongly agreed, and 63 participants (36.8%) agreed to question 13, 
totalling to 133 positive responses (77.7%) to a particularist perspective; and 75 participants 
(43.9%) agreed and 55 participants (32.2%) strongly agreed to question 14, totalling 130 
positive responses (76.1%) to a foundationalist perspective. About the same number of 
participants have indicated that they hold beliefs that were presented to be contrasting. 
Question 15 asked participants whether they thought culture influenced people’s emotions in 
morally salient situations, to which 101 participants (59.1%) agreed. 
These results indicate that while participants believe that culture has a very important 
role in people’s understanding of morality, their view on whether morality is entirely 
culturally relativistic or not is unclear. 
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3.1.3. Triune Ethics Theory 
Questions 16, 17, 22, and 24 were drawn from the literature regarding Triune Ethics 
Theory. Question 16 asked participants whether they believed that morality was innate, that 
people were born knowing at least some moral rules. Responses to this question were spread 
fairly equally, with 49 participants (28.7%) disagreeing, 38 participants (22.2%) indicating 
they were not sure, and 43 participants (25.1%) agreeing. This result points to a divide among 
participants’ beliefs, albeit there is a greater tendency to think that morality is not innate. 
Question 17 asked participants whether they believed that growing up in a loving and secure 
environment was more conducive for 
greater moral development for children. 
Participants overwhelmingly responded 
positively to this question with 142 
participants (89.3%) either agreeing or 
strongly agreeing with this statement. 
Question 24 asked participants whether 
they thought moral behaviour could be 
conceived as a skill that could be 
developed. 121 participants (72.1%) 
responses positively this statement, while 
only 16 participants (9.5%) responded 
negatively (see Chart 6). These results 
indicate that participants believe that 
children may or may not be born with any kind of moral knowledge, but if they are brought 
up in a conducive environment, their moral skills can be developed. 
Question 22 asked participants whether they thought research on neurology could shed 
light on the process of moral judgement, to which 76 participants (44.4%) agreed. This result 
indicates that teachers are more likely to believe that neurological research can be useful in 
understanding moral psychology than to think that neurology is not related to moral 
psychology. 
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3.1.4. Development of Moral Reasoning (CDT & NKA) 
Questions 18 to 21 were based on moral reasoning development, drawing from 
Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory, and the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach (see Section 
2, Chapter II). Question 18 asked participants whether they thought that people’s 
understanding of morality changed as they grow and mature. 93 participants (54.4%) agreed, 
and 53 participants (31.0%) strongly agreed with this statement, totalling 146 positive 
responses (85.4%). Question 19 asked participants whether they thought it was possible for 
children to think beyond their immediate surroundings on moral matters. While 55 
participants (32.2%) disagreed with this statement, 52 participants (30.4%) indicated that they 
were not sure. Question 20 asked participants whether they thought that the moral reasoning 
of most adolescents and some adults were driven by a desire to maintain the social order. 82 
participants (48.0%) agreed with this statement. Finally, question 21 asked participants 
whether they thought that it was possible for people to think of morality in terms of principles 
and ideals before adulthood, to which 61 participants (35.7%) disagreed and 57 participants 
(33.3%) were not sure.  
These results indicate that 
participants think that moral reasoning 
develops over time, and their 
understanding of this development seems 
to reflect the theories which these 
questions were drawn from. However, 
participants also have doubts as well, 
since nearly as many participants 
indicated that they were not sure as those 
that gave a non-neutral response in 
questions related to the pre- and post-
conventional levels of moral reasoning. 
One final question in Part 1 that does not fit under any of the above titles was question 
23, which asked whether participants thought that philosophical contemplation was the only 
way of understanding morality. 72 participants (42.1%) indicated that this was not the case. 
This suggests that some participants believe that philosophy is not the only method of 
understanding and possibly teaching morality (see Chart 7). 
Chart 9: Question 23 Frequencies – The only way of 
understanding moral rules is through philosophical 
contemplation. 
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3.2.Moral Education Beliefs – Responses to Likert Scale Questions 
Part 2 of the questionnaire is divided into two sections. The first eleven questions 
(questions 25 to 35) were answered by all participants and focus on participants’ views on 
moral education and the hidden curriculum, while the latter six questions (questions 36 to 41) 
were answered only by interns and teachers, since these questions focus on participants’ 
experience in teaching and it was assumed that first year students had not yet had any 
teaching experience. Once again, the questions are statements to which participants could 
agree or disagree on a Likert scale range of 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), and, 
once again, as these responses are not ranking or rating items, the discussion below of central 
tendencies are presented in terms of the mode. 
Question 25 asked participants whether they thought that it was important to teach 
morality in school, to which 158 participants (92.4%) responded positively (38.6% agree and 
53.8% strongly agree). Questions 26 to 28 were related to the place of the teacher in moral 
education. Question 26 asked participants whether they thought that it was their responsibility 
to teach moral values to their students. 165 participants (96.5%) responded to this question 
positively as well (42.7% agree, and 53.8% strongly agree). Questions 27 and 28 asked 
participants whether they thought that teachers are models of moral behaviour and whether 
they should be, respectively. 157 participants (91.8%) responded positively to question 27 
(39.2% agree and 52.6% strongly agree); this figure rises to 163 positive responses (95.3%) 
in question 28 (38.0% agree and 57.3% strongly agree). These results indicate that 
participants strongly believe that it is important to teach morality in school and that teachers 
have and should have a central role in fostering 
students’ moral development. 
Questions 29 to 33 are concerned with 
moral education. Question 29 asked participants 
whether they thought that there should be a 
specific subject focusing on moral education, to 
which 71 participants (41.5%) agreed, and 48 
participants (28.1%) strongly agreed. Question 
30 asked participants whether they thought that 
moral education should be taught across the 
curriculum, while question 31 asked participants 
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whether they thought that there should be more weekly lessons focusing on morality. 76 
participants (44.4%) agreed to question 30 (while 57 participants, 33.3% strongly agreed) and 
77 participants (45.0%) agreed to question 31 (see Chart 8). Question 32 asked participants 
whether they thought that teachers should be educated regarding how to foster students’ 
moral development. 84 participants (49.1%) agreed, and 72 participants (42.1%) strongly 
agreed with this question. Question 33 asked participants whether they thought that our 
current education system teaches morality effectively, to which 92 participants (53.8%) 
disagreed and 54 participants (31.6%) strongly disagreed. These results indicate that 
participants believe that neither moral education nor teacher training regarding moral 
education is sufficient and that moral education should be improved in terms of quality and 
time devoted to morality across the curriculum. 
 Questions 34 and 35 were related to the hidden curriculum. Question 34 asked 
participants whether they thought that the school’s physical and temporal (e.g. recess times) 
features influenced students’ moral development, to which 91 participants (53.2%) agreed 
and 33 participants (19.3%) strongly agreed. Question 35 asked participants whether they 
thought that school rules and culture had an influence on students’ moral development, to 
which 97 participants (56.7%) agreed, and 62 participants (36.3%) strongly agreed. These 
results indicate that participants think that the school rules and the physical environment of 
the school might have an implicit influence on students’ moral development. 
The second section of part 2 includes six questions (questions 36 to 41) that were 
answered only by fourth-year students (interns) and teachers as these questions are related to 
participants’ teaching experience. A total of 100 participants answered these questions. 
Question 36 asked participants whether they came across moral dilemmas frequently with 
students. 42 participants (42.0%) agreed, and 40 participants (40.0%) disagreed with this. 
Question 37 asked participants whether they frequently felt the need to teach morality to their 
students, to which 47 participants (47.0%) agreed, and 16 participants strongly agreed (63 
participants responded positively, 63.0%). Question 38 asked participants whether they 
taught morality whenever there was an opportunity. 50 participants (50.0%) agreed, and 27 
participants (27.0%) strongly agreed with this statement as well (77 participants responded 
positively, 77.0%). Question 39 asked participants whether they spent time teaching morality 
on a regular basis. 47 participants (47.0%) disagreed, and 38 participants (38.0%) agreed with 
this statement. Question 40 asked participants whether they thought it was not their place to 
teach morality, and 52 participants (52.0%) disagreed with this statement, and 29 participants 
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(29.0%) strongly disagreed (81 participants responded negatively, 81.0%), indicating that 
they thought it is their place to engage in moral education. And finally, question 41 asked 
participants whether they thought that moral values could not be taught. To this question, 41 
participants (41.0%) disagreed, and 37 participants (37.0%) strongly disagreed; 78 
participants (78.0%) thought that moral values could be taught. 
These results indicate that while only some participants come across moral dilemmas, 
nearly two-thirds felt the need to engage in moral education, and while more often than not, 
participants do not regularly spend time teaching morality, more than three quarters tend to 
take the opportunity to do so when it arises. On the other hand, nearly four out of five 
participants thought that moral values could be taught and that it was their place as the 
teacher to teach moral values. 
3.3.Moral Education Beliefs – Responses to Ranking Questions 
Part 3 of the questionnaire included 4 ranking questions. These questions were 
designed to elicit participants’ beliefs regarding the hidden curriculum, and how implicit 
moral education takes place. As these questions are ranking questions, central tendencies are 
better presented by the mean and the standard deviation (Field, 2009; Hinton, 2004). Each 
question asked participants to rank several items in order of accuracy depending on the 
questions and items, with 1 being most accurate and the highest number being the least 
accurate. Thus, the lower the mean value of the items in the tables shown below, the more 
accurate participants have ranked those items to be. 
Question 42: Hidden curriculum can be defined as, Mean Standard Deviation 
c) the implicit messages conveyed to students by 
teachers, staff and administration 
1.95 1.12 
e) school culture and psychological climate 2.86 1.37 
a) the unintended and/or accidental learning 
outcomes and side effects of schooling 
3.21 1.40 
b) the physical structure of the school, including 
announcement posters and the decoration of rooms 
and buildings, and time frames such as class and 
recess times and holidays 
3.43 1.27 
d) a system within education that benefits the ruling 
elite by maintaining present class structures in the 
society 
3.48 1.38 
Table 3: Question 42 – Definitions of hidden curriculum 
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Question 42 asked participants to rank 5 definitions of the hidden curriculum 
presented to them in order of accuracy with 1 being most accurate and 5 least accurate. The 
items are presented in the above table (Table 2). These results show that participants clearly 
believe that item (c) is the most accurate definition of the hidden curriculum, while item (e) 
was more often deemed to be the second most accurate definition of the hidden curriculum. 
Items (a), (b), and (d) were ranked to be less accurate. Item (c) is the textbook definition of 
hidden curriculum; as a result, it is not surprising that it was deemed to be the most accurate 
definition. The fact that item (e) was rated to be slightly more accurate than the other three 
items indicates that participants were more likely to be sensitive to the psychological aspects 
of implicit education, as opposed to the social, physical, or political aspects of it. 
Question 43: Children learn moral values: Mean Standard Deviation 
a) at home 1.18 0.62 
b) at school 2.48 0.76 
d) while playing with friends 2.84 0.80 
c) in the street 3.42 0.83 
Table 4: Question 43 – Where children learn moral values 
Question 43 asked participants to rank four items based on where participants thought 
children learnt moral values from 1 (most influential) to 4 (least influential). Responses 
clearly indicate that participants believe that home is the first and foremost place where 
children learn moral values (see Table 3). This is followed by school, and then while playing 
with their peers. Finally, participants think that other factors more peripherally influence 
children’s moral development. 
Question 44: Children learn moral values, Mean Standard Deviation 
a) from their parents 1.31 1.00 
c) by interacting with their peers 2.94 1.06 
b) from their teachers 3.01 1.21 
d) by observing their social environment 3.78 1.13 
e) from the media 4.54 1.25 
f) by thinking on their own 5.25 1.34 
Table 5: Question 44 – From whom children learn moral values 
Question 44 asked participants to rank 6 items based on how influential they thought 
certain people were in children’s moral development (See Table 4). Results clearly show that 
participants believe that the most influential people with regards to children’s moral 
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development are their parents. Teachers and peers were identified as the next most influential 
people. Observing the social environment, the media, and self-reflection were ranked as 4th, 
5th and 6th in the moral development of children, respectively. The fact that self-reflection has 
been selected as the least influential, and teachers’ and peers’ influence were second only to 
parents’ influence indicates that participants believe that children learn morality from other 
people rather than by themselves. The nearly equal ranking for teachers and peers could be 
due to different conceptions of ‘children’.  
Question 45: Children learn moral values, Mean Standard 
Deviation 
a) implicitly; values are caught, not taught 1.90 1.05 
c) by listening to lectures on morality/right and wrong 2.55 1.09 
d) through conflicts with their equals (peers) – with experience 2.61 1.00 
b) through punishments and rewards 2.93 1.07 
Table 6: Question 45 – How children learn moral values 
Finally, question 45 asked participants to rank 4 items based on how they thought 
children learnt morality, with 1 being the most influential, and 4 being the least influential 
(see Table 5). The results indicate that participants believe that children learn moral values 
mostly implicitly, and not through punishments and rewards. Being lectured on morality and 
through experience with equals were ranked to have medium influence on children’s moral 
development. The equal ranking of lecturing and experience with peers seem to mirror the 
equal ranking given to teachers and peers in question 44. A tentative conclusion that could 
follow from this finding is that participants give about the same amount of importance to both 
top-down teaching of morality from superiors (e.g. teachers and parents), and a bottom-up 
discovery of morality by children interacting with their equals. 
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4. Analysis According to Participants’ Groups: Results of Regression Tests 
In this section, the results obtained through regression tests run on the data are 
presented. After the analysis based on frequencies was conducted, regression tests were run 
on the data considering the various groupings that emerged from participants’ background 
information. Analysis was carried out to see, firstly, how teacher training and experience 
influenced belief development. The data obtained from the three different participant groups 
(students, interns, and teachers) were compared to this end. Secondly, whether participants’ 
investment in teaching as a career influenced their beliefs was analysed. This analysis was 
based on participants’ response to the question “Do you plan on staying as a teacher?” (See 
appendices A3 and A4). Thirdly, gender differences were also analysed. And fourthly, while 
it was not among the initial aims of the research to study students in the Psychological 
Counselling and Guidance (PCG) programme, the fact that over half of participants were on 
this course gave the opportunity to compare participants who were studying educational 
psychology and those studying other disciplines.  
4.1.Belief Development 
The cross-sectional selection of participants was intended to reveal how teacher training 
and teaching experience influenced belief development. As indicated above, the 
questionnaires given to each group were slightly different, considering participants’ level of 
education and experience of teaching. Analysis concerning belief development was 
conducted using two different strategies. Firstly, the ANOVA model was used to analyse the 
difference between each groups’ total score for all the questions of each part of the 
questionnaire. This analysis showed a significant relationship (p = >.001, df = 2) for part 2 
total scores between groups. However, this was likely due to a miscoding of results into 
SPSS. Six questions in this part were not answered by students as these questions were 
related to teaching experiences and students were assumed to have no experience. Thus these 
questions were omitted from their questionnaire in order not to make the questionnaire no 
longer than it was necessary. Participants could respond to these questions on a scale of 1 to 
4, and they were thus coded; however, for students, who did not respond to these six 
questions, responses were coded as 0 where they should have been left as missing data. One 
way ANOVA model was used again in Excel after this mistake was fixed. The test yielded a 
significant result between the three groups for questions that all participants responded to in 
part 2 (i.e. excluding the six questions not answered by students), p = .01, df = 2. The test was 
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repeated three times, taking into account only two groups at a time. The test yielded a 
significant difference between students and interns (p = .02, df = 1), and between students 
and teachers (p = .01, df = 1), but no significant relationship between interns and teachers (p 
= .43, df = 1). The test was also repeated including the six missing questions, but 
disregarding data from students as the missing data from students caused the results to be 
unreliable. No significant difference was found between interns and teachers concerning only 
the questions related to experience, nor when taking into account all questions of part two. 
These results seem to indicate that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education between students and the other two groups, 
but no difference between interns and teachers. This indicates that teacher training has a 
significant influence on participants’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education, but the 
same cannot be said of teaching experience as no significant difference was found between 
interns and teachers. This result, however, does not necessarily signify that the majority of 
participants gave the same or similar responses to questions. Indeed, the second strategy used 
to analyse the results, applying the chi-square test to each question (as opposed to part total 
scores) in order to understand whether there is any relationship between beliefs on specific 
topics and concepts and teacher training and experience, shows this. Applying the chi-square 
test to each individual question allows for more detailed exploration of responses, and 
whether there are differences between participant groups on specific issues (such as responses 
to question 24 which asks participants whether they believe morality is a skill that can be 
developed).  
There are only 4 questions that reveal 
any statistically significant relationship 
between training and experience and belief 
development: questions 8, 16, 42a10, and 
42b (see appendices A3 and A4). Question 
8 was designed to understand whether 
participants believe that the motivation to 
act morally was embedded in a person’s 
character, or was influenced by external 
factors (see Section 2, Chapter II for moral 
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motivation). The score for this question was p = >.001 (df = 8). The responses to this 
question seem to suggest that while interns are more likely to disagree, students are more 
likely to agree, and teachers are more likely to strongly agree with this statement (see Table 
6, and Chart 9 for a visual description). 
Question 8 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Not Sure Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Students 0 (0%) 5   (7%) 23 (32.4%) 40 (56.2%) 3   (4.2%) 
Interns 2 (3.3%) 11 (18%) 17 (27.9%) 26 (42.6%) 5   (8.7%) 
Teachers 1 (3.7%) 1   (2.7%) 8   (21.6%) 15 (40.5%) 12 (32.4%) 
Total 3 (1.8%) 17 (10.1%) 48 (28.4%) 81 (47.9%) 20 (11.8%) 
Table 7: Question 8 - People find the motivation to do the right thing within themselves. 
 Question 16 was designed to understand whether participants believe that people are 
born with at least some moral skills and 
capacities embedded in our psychology 
– whether morality is innate. The 
question was based on Triune Ethics 
Theory (see Section 2, Chapter II). The 
score for this question was p = .039 (df 
= 8). While there is a general tendency 
to disagree with this statement, more 
students tended to agree, and the most 
striking difference between groups is 
that students stated they were not sure 
much more than interns and teachers 
(see Table 7, Chart 10). This indicates that with greater education and experience in teaching, 
participants were more confident in stating a positive or negative disposition. 
Question 16 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Not Sure Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Students 7   (9.9%) 14 (19.7%) 22 (31.0%) 20 (28.2%) 8   (11.3%) 
Interns 13 (20.6%) 24 (38.1%) 9   (14.3%) 15 (23.8%) 2   (3.2%) 
Teachers 5   (13.5%) 11 (29.7%) 7   (18.9%) 8   (21.6%) 6   (16.2%) 
Total 25 (14.6%) 49 (28.7%) 38 (22.2%) 43 (25.1%) 16 (9.4%) 
Table 8: Question 16 - Morality is innate – we are born knowing at least some basic moral rules. 
Question 42 asked participants to rank five definitions of hidden curriculum drawn 
from Carr and Landon (1999), based on their accuracy (see Section 1, Chapter II). For item 
(a) the p-value was (.026), and for item (b) it was (.036). The implications of these results are 
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relatively clear. Not having studied what the hidden curriculum is, first-year students scored 
slightly differently for these two items. This is based on their lack of knowledge of hidden 
curriculum, as hidden curriculum is not discussed in the first year of the teacher training 
programme (see Tables 8 and 9, Charts 11 and 12). Once participants have had training 
regarding the hidden curriculum, their responses start to become more similar; indicating that 
teacher training has an impact on beliefs regarding the hidden curriculum. 
Question 42, item a Most 
accurate 
2nd most 
accurate 
3rd most 
accurate 
4th most 
accurate 
Least 
accurate 
Students 8   (11.6%) 9   (13.0%) 13 (18.8%) 17 (24.6%) 22 (31.9%) 
Interns 8   (12.9%) 10 (16.1%) 15 (24.2%) 19 (30.6%) 10 (16.1%) 
Teachers 12 (33.3%) 7   (19.4%) 7   (19.4%) 3   (8.3%) 7   (19.4%) 
Total 28 (16.8%) 26 (15.6%) 35 (21.0%) 39 (23.4%) 39 (23.4%) 
Table 9: Question 42a - Hidden curriculum can be defined as the unintended and/or accidental learning 
outcomes and side effects of schooling. 
 
Question 42, 
item b 
Most 
accurate 
2nd most 
accurate 
3rd most 
accurate 
4th most 
accurate 
Least 
accurate 
Students 9   (12.9%) 15 (21.4% ) 16 (22.9%) 13 (18.6%) 17 (24.3%) 
Interns 5   (8.1%) 5   (8.1%) 16 (25.8%) 21 (33.9%) 15 (24.2%) 
Teachers 0   (0%) 10 (27.8%) 4   (11.1%) 12 (33.3%) 10 (27.8%) 
Total 14 (8.3%) 30 (17.9%) 36 (21.4%) 46 (27.4%) 42 (25.0%) 
Table 10: Question 42b - Hidden curriculum can be defined as the physical structure of the school, including 
announcement posters and the decoration of rooms and buildings, and time frames such as class and recess 
times and holidays. 
4.2. Investment Differences 
Whether participants thought they would continue in teaching or not was also analysed 
to see if this kind of investment in the career had any impact on beliefs. Investment was 
measured from the responses given to the question “do you plan on continuing as a teacher?” 
Chart 14: Question 42a Frequencies 
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Chart 13: Question 42b Frequencies 
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Participants could choose from one of three items: (a) “Yes, I will continue as a teacher,” (b) 
“No, I will change my career,” and (c) “I am not sure yet.” 117 (68.4%) participants indicated 
that they intended to 
continue in teaching, 11 
(6.4%) planned on changing 
their career, and 39 (22.8%) 
were unsure. Four (2.3%) 
participants did not respond 
to the question. Chart 13 is 
provided as a visual 
description; participants 
who plan on continuing in 
education are coloured in 
shades of blue , participants who plan on changing their careers are coloured in shades of 
orange, and participants who have not yet decided are coloured the shades of green. The 
student population for each group is the darkest shade, while the lightest shades represent 
teachers and medium shades represent interns. 
Analysis concerning investment differences was conducted using two different 
strategies. Firstly, the ANOVA model was used to analyse the difference between each 
groups’ total score for all the questions of each part of the questionnaire. This analysis 
showed no significant relationships between any of the groups, indicating that, considering 
the overall measure, whether a participant planned to continue in education, change their 
career, or had not yet made a decision about continuing in education made no significant 
difference in their beliefs and attitudes investigated by this questionnaire. 
The second strategy used in analysis was applying the chi-square test to each question 
individually. There are only five questions that show any significant relationship between 
career plans and beliefs: questions 14, 22, 24, 27, and 42 (item a). Question 14 was designed 
to understand whether participants believed that there are common moral foundations across 
the world on which different cultural moralities are built (see Section 2, Chapter II for MFT). 
The score for this question was p = .008 (df = 8). 
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staying in education
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Chart 15: Participants' Plans 
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The two most striking results emerging from this test are the high percentage of neutral 
responses from participants who plan on changing their career, and the relatively low 
percentage of positive responses from the same group (see Table 10, Chart 14). 77% of 
participants who planned on continuing in education responded positively to this question 
(40.2% agreed, and 36.8% strongly agreed) while 82% of participants who were undecided 
about their future responded positively (56.4% agreed, and 25.6% strongly agreed). In 
contrast, only 54.6% of participants who planned on changing their career responded 
positively to this question. While nearly 4 out of every 5 participant who plans on continuing 
or is undecided responded positively to this question, only slightly more than half of the 
participants who will change their career have 
responded positively. Furthermore, participants 
who plan on changing their career responded 
neutrally to this question nearly twice as much 
as the other two groups combined (27.3% for 
‘no’s while 12% and 2.6% for ‘yes’s and 
‘unsure’s, respectively). Together these results 
seem to suggest that participants who have 
decided to change their careers are less likely 
to think that there are core foundations of 
moral behaviour that manifest differently in 
different cultures and more likely to refrain 
from taking either a positive or negative side with regard to this issue. 
Question 14 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Not Sure Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Yes, will stay 
in education 
2 (1.7%) 11 (9.4%) 14 (12.0%) 47 (40.2%) 43 (36.8%) 
No, will 
change career 
2 (18.2%) 0   (0%) 3   (27.3%) 5   (45.5%) 1   (9.1%) 
Unsure 1 (2.6%) 5   (12.8%) 1   (2.6%) 22 (56.4%) 10 (25.6%) 
Total 5 (3.0%) 16 (9.6%) 18 (10.8%) 74 (44.3%) 54 (32.3%) 
Table 11: Question 14 - I think that the core foundations of morality are the same throughout the world but rules 
and applications differ from country to country. 
Question 22 was designed to understand whether participants thought research on 
neurology could be used to understand moral judgement processes (see Section 2, Chapter II 
for TET). The score for this question was p = .009 (df = 8). The results suggest that 
participants who plan on changing their career tend to think less that neurology can be 
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Chart 16: Question 14 Frequencies - I think that the 
core foundations of morality are the same throughout 
the world but rules and applications differ from 
country to country. 
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effective in understanding moral 
judgement (see Table 11, Chart 15). 
This result seems to suggest that where a 
participant plans on continuing in 
teaching, they are more likely to think 
that morality can be studied in 
neurology. 
Question 22 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Not Sure Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Yes, will stay 
in education 
1 (0.9%) 15 (12.8%) 41 (35.0%) 52 (44.4%) 8   (6.8%) 
No, will 
change career 
2 (18.2%) 2   (18.2%) 2   (18.2%) 4   (36.4%) 1   (9.1%) 
Unsure 0 (0%) 3   (7.7%) 13 (33.3%) 19 (48.7%) 4   (10.3%) 
Total 3 (1.8%) 20 (12.0%) 56 (33.5%) 75 (44.9%) 13 (7.8%) 
Table 12: Question 22 - Research on brain functions and neurology can shed light on the moral decision making 
process. 
Question 24 was designed to understand 
whether participants thought moral behaviour 
could be conceived as a skill that could be 
improved. The score for this question was p = .014 
(df = 8). The results suggest that participants who 
were more invested in teaching were more likely 
to think of morality as a skill that could be 
developed while participants who plan on 
changing their career are less likely to think in the 
same way (see Table 12, Chart 16). Participants who were planning to continue as teachers 
were more likely to think of moral behaviour as something that could be improved through 
education.  
Question 24 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Not Sure Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Yes, will stay 
in education 
1 (0.9%) 5   (4.3%) 18 (15.7%) 64 (55.7%) 27 (23.5%) 
No, will 
change career 
0 (0%) 3   (27.3%) 4   (36.4%) 4   (36.4%) 0   (0%) 
Unsure 2 (5.1%) 4   (10.3%) 8   (20.5%) 21 (53.8%) 4   (10.3%) 
Total 3 (1.8%) 12 (7.3%) 30 (18.2%) 89 (53.9%) 31 (18.8%) 
Table 13: Question 24 - Moral behaviour can be conceived as a skill, and this skill can be further developed. 
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Chart 17: Question 22 Frequencies - Research on brain 
functions and neurology can shed light on the moral decision 
making process. 
Chart 18: Question 24 Frequencies - Moral 
behaviour can be conceived as a skill, and this 
skill can be further developed. 
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Question 27 was designed to 
understand whether participants thought 
teachers were moral role models for 
students. The score for this question was p 
= .001 (df = 8). While most participants 
indicated that they agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement, participants who 
planned on continuing as teachers notably 
strongly agreed more than other participants 
(see Table 13, Chart 17). This suggests that 
the more invested participants were in the teaching career, the more strongly they thought 
teachers were moral models for their students. 
Question 27 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Yes, will stay in 
education 
3 (2.6%) 3   (2.6%) 37 (31.6%) 74 (63.2%) 
No, will change 
career 
0 (0%) 2   (18.2%) 5   (45.5%) 4   (36.4%) 
Unsure 0 (0%) 5   (12.8%) 23 (59.0%) 11 (28.2%) 
Total 3 (1.8%) 10 (6.0%) 65 (38.9%) 89 (53.3%) 
Table 14: Question 27 - Teachers are models of moral behaviour for students. 
Question 42 was explained above. Once again responses to item (a) turned out to be 
statistically significant at p = .037 (df = 8). The main difference between groups in this 
question seems to be in their overall responses (see Table 14, Chart 18). Participants who 
plan on continuing in education were more 
likely to think that this item is not very 
accurate; however, a close number of 
participants have indicated other amounts 
of accuracy as well (between 17.5% and 
26.3%). Participants who plan on changing 
their careers thought this item was either 
more accurate or less accurate than other 
items as no participant from this group 
thought it was the 3rd most accurate 
description of the hidden curriculum while 
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Chart 19: Question 27 Frequencies - Teachers are 
models of moral behaviour for students. 
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36.4% and 27.3% of participants from this group indicated that it was either the most 
accurate or least accurate description, respectively. Participants undecided about continuing 
in education tended to give less accuracy to this item with 3rd and least accurate being the 
choice of more than 30% of participants from this group. 
Question 42, 
item a11 
Most 
accurate 
2nd most 
accurate 
3rd most 
accurate 
4th most 
accurate 
Least 
accurate 
Yes, will stay 
in education 
20 (17.5%) 20 (17.5%) 22 (19.3%) 30 (26.3%) 22 (19.3%) 
No, will 
change career 
4   (36.4%) 2   (18.2%) 0   (0%) 2   (18.2%) 3   (27.3%) 
Unsure 2   (5.3%) 4   (10.5%) 12 (31.6%) 6   (15.8%) 14 (36.8%) 
Total 26 (16.0%) 26 (16.0%) 34 (20.9%) 38 (23.3%) 39 (23.9%) 
Table 15: Question 42a - Hidden curriculum can be defined as the unintended and/or accidental learning 
outcomes and side effects of schooling. 
4.3. Gender Differences 
While differences in gender are not among the foremost priorities of this study, it was 
nonetheless controlled for. Previous studies have found that gender differences in moral 
psychology are either due to other 
variables like education or 
socialisation, or non-existent (see 
You, Maeda, & Bebeau, 2011 for a 
meta-analysis). However, some 
authors have pointed out that while 
women tend to be more care-
oriented, men are more justice 
oriented, agentic, and impersonal 
(Myyry, 2003; Walker et al., 1987). 
Gender differences were controlled for in this study to see whether any interesting patterns 
emerged.  
The sample included 41 male participants (23.9%), and 126 female participants 
(73.6%). Four participants (2.3%) did not report their gender. Chart 19 is provided as a visual 
description; females are coloured in shades of blue, and males are orange; students are the 
darker shade, while interns are the medium shade and teachers are the lighter shade of each 
                                                          
11 The discrepancy between Tables 8 and 14 are the result of participants’ not specifying their investment in 
teaching. 
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Chart 21: Participant Male/Female Ratio 
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colour. Once again, two strategies were used to analyse the data. Firstly, male and female 
participants’ part total scores were compared using independent t-test and Mann-Whitney U 
test, as responses were non-normally distributed. And secondly, the chi-square test was 
employed to analyse responses to each question. Levene’s test for equality of variances 
showed a weak correlation at p = .049 for part 3 responses (df = 165), while Mann-Whitney 
U test revealed no significant relationship between male and female participants’ scores, 
indicating that, considering the overall measure, gender makes no difference in beliefs and 
attitudes in this questionnaire. 
Chi-square analyses revealed statistically significant results for 5 questions: questions 
1, 25, 30, 31, and 43b. The first interesting finding to emerge from these results is that only 
one of the 5 questions is related to moral psychology; the other five questions with significant 
results are all on moral education. This result suggests that any difference between male and 
female participants’ beliefs and attitudes is 
more likely to be on educational issues 
rather than beliefs regarding certain 
concepts related to moral psychology. 
Question 1 was designed to 
understand whether participants believed 
that people, in general, could recognise the 
moral salience of a situation (see Section 2, 
Chapter II for moral sensitivity). The score 
for this question was p = .022 (df = 4). The 
results suggest that, while most 
participants indicated that they were not 
sure, males tended to disagree more often 
(48.7%) while females agreed and disagreed a similar amount (23.8% and 27.0% 
respectively) (see Table 15, Chart 20). This implies that males tend to think more that people 
may not understand the moral salience of a given situation. 
Question 1 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Not Sure Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Male 2   (5.1%) 19 (48.7%) 16 (41.0%) 2   (5.1%) 0 (0%) 
Female 8   (6.3%) 34 (27.0%) 49 (38.9%) 30 (23.8%) 5 (4.0%) 
Total 10 (6.1%) 53 (32.1%) 65 (39.4%) 32 (19.4%) 5 (3.0%) 
Table 16: Question 1 - People always understand the moral significance of a situation. 
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Chart 22: Question 1 Frequencies - People always 
understand the moral significance of a situation. 
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Question 25 was designed to understand 
whether participants thought moral education 
should be given in school. The score for this 
question was p = .035 (df = 3). The results 
show that, while the majority of participants 
think that it is important to teach morality in 
school, males tended to disagree slightly more 
than females (see Table 16, Chart 21).  
Question 25  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Male 3 (7.3%) 4 (9.8%) 12 (29.3%) 22 (53.7%) 
Female 2 (1.6%) 3 (2.4%) 52 (41.3%) 69 (54.8%) 
Total 5 (3.0%) 7 (4.2%) 64 (38.3%) 91 (54.5%) 
Table 17: Question 25 - It is important to teach morality in school. 
Question 30 was designed to understand 
whether participants thought moral education 
should be distributed across the curriculum in an 
implicit way or not. The score for this question 
was p = .021 (df = 3). The results suggest that 
males strongly disagree with this statement 
significantly more than females, while once 
again, most participants either agreed or 
strongly agreed (see Table 17, Chart 22). 
Question 30  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Male 5 (12.2%) 5   (12.2%) 16 (39.0%) 15 (36.6%) 
Female 2 (1.6%) 25 (19.8%) 57 (45.2%) 42 (33.3%) 
Total 7 (4.2%) 30 (18.0%) 73 (43.7%) 57 (34.1%) 
Table 18: Question 30 - Moral education should be taught across the curriculum. 
Question 31 was designed to understand 
whether participants thought it would be 
beneficial to have more weekly lessons 
focusing on morality or not. The score for this 
question was p = .030 (df = 3). The results 
once again show significant strong 
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Chart 23: Question 25 Frequencies - It is important to 
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disagreement among males to this statement. Otherwise, participants gave similar responses 
(see Table 18, Chart 23).  
Question 31  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Male 5 (12.5%) 13 (32.5%) 16 (40.0%) 6   (15.0%) 
Female 2 (1.6%) 44 (35.2%) 60 (48.0%) 19 (15.2%) 
Total 7 (4.2%) 57 (34.5%) 76 (46.1%) 25 (15.2%) 
Table 19: Question 31 - There should be more weekly lessons in school focusing on morality. 
Question 43 was designed to understand where participants thought children learned 
moral values. Participants were asked to rank four items in terms of the statements’ accuracy. 
The items were a) at home, b) at school, c) in the street, and d) while playing with friends. 
Results for this question showed a significant relationship between gender and responses to 
item (b). The score for this question was p = .017 (df = 3). Most participants agreed that 
children learnt values firstly at home, but 
while the majority of females (64.0%) 
thought the school was the second most 
important place where students learnt 
morality, males tended to think the school 
was the third or least important place where 
children learn morality (see Table 19, Chart 
24). This implies that female participants 
place a greater importance on school for 
moral education than males do. 
Question 43, 
item b 
Most accurate 2nd most 
accurate 
3rd most 
accurate 
Least accurate 
Male 2 (4.9%) 16 (39.0%) 13 (31.7%) 10 (24.4%) 
Female 4 (3.2%) 80 (64.0%) 30 (24.0%) 11 (8.8%) 
Total 6 (3.6%) 96 (57.8%) 43 (25.9%) 21 (12.7%) 
Table 20: Question 43b - Children learn moral values at school. 
4.4. Disciplinary Differences 
The last set of initial analyses focused on whether participants’ discipline made a 
difference in their beliefs. This was not among the initial intentions of participant selection 
and study design, but since more than half of all recruited participants (52.6%) were studying 
Psychological Counselling and Guidance (PCG), this gave an interesting opportunity to 
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compare participants studying educational psychology with other participants who taught 
different disciplines. One important point to note is that all PCG participants were either first 
or fourth-year students. The sample does not include PCG practitioners. 44 participants were 
first year PCG students (25.7% of total participants and 61.9% of the student group), and 46 
participants were fourth year PCG students (26.9% of total participants and 73.0% of interns). 
One way ANOVA was used to see whether there was any difference between PCG and 
other disciplines. No significant result emerged from the tests. This indicates that 
participants’ discipline, whether studying educational psychology or another discipline, made 
no difference concerning the beliefs and attitudes investigated by this questionnaire. 
Chi-square analysis revealed that PCG students and participants focusing on other 
disciplines differed statistically 
significantly in their beliefs in only one 
question: question 35. Question 35 was 
designed to understand whether 
participants thought that school rules and 
traditions (e.g. classroom seating 
arrangements, getting in line at the canteen, 
etc.) affected students’ moral development 
(see Section 1, Chapter II for implicit 
moral education). The score for this 
question was p = .036 (df = 4). The results 
suggest that the only difference between PCG students and interns and participants focusing 
on other disciplines is in their strength of disagreement to the question (see Table 20, Chart 
25). 94.6% of participants either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, while 5.4% 
disagreed. PCG students disagreed, participants of other branches strongly disagreed with the 
statement. However, the difference in the only statistically significant result is still very 
small. 
Question 35  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
Other Branch 2 (2.6%) 0 (0%) 47 (61.0%) 28 (36.4%) 
PCG 0 (0%) 7 (7.8%) 50 (55.6%) 33 (36.7%) 
Total 2 (1.2%) 7 (4.2%) 97 (58.1%) 61 (36.5%) 
Table 21: Question 35 - School rules such as classroom seating arrangements and getting in line at the canteen 
affect students’ moral development.  
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Chart 27: Question 35 Frequencies - School rules such as 
classroom seating arrangements and getting in line at the 
canteen affect students’ moral development. 
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5. Summary of Findings 
The analysis of descriptive frequencies can be said to indicate that participants’ overall 
responses to moral psychology issues investigated here, loosely reflect the moral psychology 
literature reviewed in chapter two of this thesis; however, some participants’ attitudes 
towards certain matters conflict with the attitudes of other participants. As a result, it cannot 
clearly be concluded that participants have a positive or negative attitude towards these 
issues. On matters related to implicit moral education, participants indicate that children learn 
morality firstly at home from their parents, and secondly at school from their peers and 
teachers. Participants seem to recognise their role as teachers in the moral development of 
students, and a large majority indicated that teachers are and should be responsible for 
students’ moral development. Furthermore, most stated that they are not satisfied with the 
current system of moral education in Turkey. 
Initial analyses have revealed that there is hardly any statistically significant 
relationship between beliefs and demographic factors considered in this study. The only 
statistically significant relationship found was that students’ beliefs and attitudes related to 
moral education, investigated in part two of the questionnaire, are different from the other 
two groups’ (interns’ and teachers’). This finding implies that teacher training has an 
influence on beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education. However, the lack of a 
statistically significant relationship between teachers and interns indicates that teaching 
experience does not influence beliefs regarding moral education. Furthermore, the lack of any 
significant relationship concerning part 1 indicates that neither teacher training nor 
experience influences beliefs regarding moral psychology. 
 In-depth investigation of each question with regards to group differences, employing 
chi-square tests, revealed some minor differences between groups on specific issues. Four 
questions showed a statistically significant relationship between teacher training and 
experience. The results indicate that, first of all, first-year students who have not studied the 
hidden curriculum gave different answers to the question related to how moral education took 
place in the hidden curriculum. This finding in itself is not surprising as hidden curriculum is 
part of the last year curriculum of teacher training programmes in Turkey; first year students 
are not yet acquainted with the concept, only interns and teachers know what “hidden 
curriculum” refers to. On the other hand, this finding implies that training on certain topics 
does have a significant influence on belief development. And secondly, the other two 
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questions that showed significant relationships are both on moral psychology – on moral 
motivation and on the innateness of morality. In both cases, the significant relationship points 
to a greater confidence for those with more training and experience when stating one’s 
disposition regarding the topics under investigation, rather than a substantial progress towards 
certain beliefs. It should be noted that out of the sixty questions in the questionnaire 
(disregarding background questions and treating each item in the ranking questions as 
individual questions), only four questions show any statistically significant relationship. 
Five questions showed significant relationships between beliefs and investment in the 
teaching career. Three of these questions were related to concepts in moral psychology, and 
two to moral education. The other questions analysed seem to suggest that participants who 
plan on staying in the teaching career are more likely to conceive morality in psychological 
terms – trusting more in neurology and believing that it is a skill that can be developed 
(through education) – and that teachers are in practice moral role models. This might point to 
some kind of investment in moral education beyond their own subject matter. Again, it 
should be noted that only five questions out of sixty show statistical significance. 
Gender differences also revealed five questions with significant results. Except for one, 
all questions that showed significant relationships were related to moral education. Overall, 
the results can be summarised as males giving less importance to moral education and 
learning morality in school compared to females. However, what the results do not show is 
that males do not give any importance to moral education. The results merely imply that a 
small but statistically significant population of males give slightly less importance to moral 
education. Again, it should be noted that only five questions out of sixty show statistical 
significance. 
Perhaps the most striking finding is that, compared to analyses based on other 
demographic qualities, there is even less difference in beliefs between participants who focus 
on educational psychology and those that focus on other disciplines. Only one question, on 
moral education rather than moral psychology, showed a statistically significant relationship. 
This lack of difference, coupled with other observations reported above, implies that not only 
does teacher training and experience not have an important effect on students’ and teachers’ 
beliefs regarding moral psychology but that even training in educational psychology makes 
no difference in investigated beliefs. This means that current teacher training and experience 
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equips teachers and psychological counsellors the same way. Furthermore, this equipping 
seems to be limited in teacher training programmes.  
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has reported the results of quantitative data analysis. Statistical frequencies 
and results of regression tests were described. In summary, quantitative data seem to indicate 
that teacher training and experience have very limited influence on belief and attitude 
development regarding the topics investigated with this questionnaire. This finding will be 
studied in more depth in the next chapter where it will be confirmed or disconfirmed through 
analysis of the data gathered from interviews. 
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CHAPTER V 
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the findings emerging from the qualitative data analysis.  
Initially, participants’ beliefs regarding certain aspects of moral psychology are presented. 
Next, their beliefs regarding moral education and implicit education are explored. This is 
followed by an analysis of how these beliefs differ based on participants’ groups. Finally, 
several other themes that recurred throughout the interviews are presented. 
The presentation of findings is predominantly based on interview data analysis; 
findings from the observations are presented where they are relevant. Each question in the 
interview schedule had a specific focus – participants’ beliefs regarding different aspects of 
moral psychology or moral education were sought. However, due to participants’ lack of 
knowledge on the topics of interest, discussion during the interviews tended to focus on the 
first thing that came to participants’ minds in response to the questions put to them. 
Responses to follow-up questions often yielded information concerning participants’ beliefs 
regarding issues that were initially planned to be explored in other questions of the interview 
schedule. Indeed, one rather eager participant had already answered nearly half my questions 
by the time I was able to steer the conversation to my first main moral psychology question 
that she had not already answered by herself. Sometimes participants focused on the same 
issue, but there was almost always a variety of foci. Furthermore, virtually no participant, as 
far as the questions on moral psychology are concerned, was able to focus on everything the 
question sought to elicit. Collectively participants covered almost all the aspects of 
investigated topics, but hardly any individual was able to recognise all aspects of any topic. 
The interview schedule was formed of four parts. The first part included three 
introductory questions which sought to understand participants’ background knowledge and 
understanding of the issues which were to be explored in later questions. The second part was 
formed of eight moral psychology questions. This was followed in the third part with five 
questions on moral and implicit education. Finally, four conclusion questions were asked, 
seeking to understand their personal experiences with moral education and teacher training. 
The analyses of participants’ responses have been presented in tables. These tables 
were later moved to Appendix B for concerns of space. Two tables were retained in the main 
text of this chapter as examples (see Tables 21 and 22).  
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1. Beliefs Regarding Moral Psychology 
In this section, participants’ beliefs and attitudes regarding aspects of moral 
psychology are presented. 
1.1. Participants’ Existing Knowledge 
Participants were asked whether they had received any training on moral psychology 
and whether they were familiar with any of the authors frequently referenced and quoted in 
this thesis. None of the participants had been given any education regarding moral 
psychology; one participant referenced the Religious Culture and Ethics course mandatory in 
primary and secondary schools, and one participant said she had done her own reading on 
moral psychology. In total, eleven participants stated that they had read Kohlberg. Of those 
who specified where they had read Kohlberg one participant indicated she had read his work 
studying for a national exam unrelated to her university studies, two participants had read his 
work for their university studies, and two teachers had read Kohlberg during their master’s 
degree studies. Although these participants did not specify which of Kohlberg’s works they 
had read, one participant indicated she had read Kohlberg’s stage theory, and one participant 
was familiar with Piaget’s cognitive development theory, though she initially thought it was 
Kohlberg’s. The rest of the participants could not remember any of Kohlberg’s work. The 
other authors that participants recognised or referenced included Gilligan (1 participant), 
Piaget (2 participants) and Wolfgang Klafki (1 participant). 
Throughout the interviews, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs was the most often and 
explicitly cited and referenced academic literature. This hierarchy was either expressly or 
implicitly referred to concerning when participants thought morality would apply. 
Interestingly most participants implied that moral concerns would become relevant when all 
baser needs are met, and the individual can start to realise his/her full potential. 
When asked to describe what morality is briefly, participants’ responses yielded a 
wide variety of perspectives regarding the nature of morality. Analysis revealed 12 distinct 
themes emerging from responses: 
a) Social harmony and consideration for others, collectivist 
b) Personal, individualist 
c) Both individualist and collectivist 
d) Rules 
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e) Virtues and character traits 
f) Values 
g) Developmental 
h) Universality 
i) Particularity 
j) Behaviour 
k) Intentions 
l) Sexuality 
Most participants emphasised different 
aspects of morality; some of these aspects are 
in opposition to each other, such as the 
emphasis on the universality or particularity 
of morality, or reflect incomparable aspects of 
morality, such as the focus on morality as a 
set of rules versus the emphasis on moral 
development. 
This richness of perspectives is also somewhat reflected in the academic fields 
participants thought were relevant to achieving a better understanding of morality. 
Participants were asked which academic fields should be studied to understand the nature of 
morality better. Nine areas of study were included in the question to provide a range of 
examples for the interviewees (see the interview schedules at Appendices A7 and A8, Part 1, 
Question 3). Most participants elected to choose from the listed examples, while several 
participants added disciplines not listed. Participants responded to this question most 
frequently with philosophy and psychology (11 participants – 55% each), closely followed by 
sociology (10 participants – 50%). Five participants (25%) indicated that religion was a 
relevant field, while three participants (15%) said that culture should also be studied. Two 
participants (10%) stated that understanding human evolution was pertinent to a better 
understanding of morality, and one participant (5%) added that neurology should be studied. 
Finally, five participants (25%), all of them teachers (i.e. 50% of teachers), indicated that all 
academic fields should be studied to gain an in-depth understanding of morality (see Chart 
26). Apart from these, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, anthropology, history, and language 
were also mentioned. 
Philosophy Psychology
Sociology Religion
Culture Human Evolution
Neurology All Fields
Chart 28: Participants' Perception of Academic Fields 
Relevant to Understanding Morality 
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Finally, two participants specifically stated that some fields should not be studied. 
One participant indicated that religion must be avoided for it is a private matter and that 
politics should be avoided because it does not shed light on human behaviour as much as 
philosophy and psychology. The other participant indicated that studying culture would limit 
one’s understanding of morality to that specific culture. 
These results imply that on the one hand, individuals’ perception of the nature of 
morality differs from person to person, and on the other, collectively the perceptions of 
morality that may influence implicit moral education in Turkey draw from a wide range of 
perspectives.  
1.2. Four Components Model 
In the questions that were based on the Four Components Model none of the 
participants was able to recognise all four components; in fact, no participant was able to 
identify moral sensitivity during the interviews. This is not surprising considering that 
participants had never received any training regarding the FCM.  
The first question of the second part of the interview sought to elicit participants’ 
beliefs regarding the Four Components Model (see Appendix B2). No participant was able to 
identify all of the components; only two participants were able to identify one of the 
components directly (moral judgement and moral motivation), and one participant was able 
to identify one of the major elements of a component (moral emotions in relation to moral 
motivation). All the other participants generally focused on how psychological components 
necessary for moral behaviour are learned during moral development. This is not a surprising 
finding considering that none of the participants had prior knowledge of the FCM.  
Over sixteen percent of all the participants’ statements relevant to the FCM in this 
question were categorised under the category of Components of the FCM, including 4.1% of 
statements categorised under the theme of Judgement, 8.3% under Motivation, and 4.1% 
under Emotions. 66.6% of all statements were categorised under the category of Moral 
Development, including 16.6% of statements categorised under the theme of Reactions, 4.1% 
under Learning, 25.0% under Developmental, and 20.8% under Environmental. And finally, 
16.6% of statements were not categorised under these themes (see Appendix B2). Chart 27 
shows the frequency of statements categorised under specific themes. Themes under 
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Components of the FCM have been coloured 
shades of green, themes under Moral 
Development have been coloured in shades of 
grey, and Other has been coloured blue. 
However, participants did refer to 
different elements of the components in various 
questions. Participants’ views regarding moral 
judgement were elicited in the second question 
of the moral psychology part of the interviews, 
participants focused on moral motivation in the 
third and fourth questions of the same part of 
the interview, and their views regarding moral 
implementation were also elicited in the third 
question. 
1.3. Moral Judgement 
In response to the question related to the FCM, only one participant recognised that 
moral judgement, or decision making, was necessary for moral behaviour to emerge. This 
finding implies that participants are not likely to recognise consciously that moral judgement 
is a necessary component of moral behaviour if they do not receive relevant training. 
However, when asked directly about their thoughts regarding intuitive and rational moral 
judgements, participants were able to discuss the issue in some depth. 
Participants’ views regarding moral judgement and their attitudes towards intuitive 
and rational judgements were elicited in the second moral psychology question, which asked 
participants whether people made moral judgements more often intuitively or rationally. 
Participants’ responses to this question can be presented at three different levels. Firstly, the 
majority of participants’ statements can be categorised into two main themes: a) 
Predominantly Emotional/Intuitive, and b) Balanced Influence. Only one female participant 
indicated that she believed that reasoning was more influential in moral judgement than 
moral intuitions and that this applied only to males. Secondly, some participants gave 
responses that do not neatly fall into these two categories. These include a focus on a) the role 
of experiences, b) gender differences, c) overriding intuitions, and d) an implied negative 
conception of emotional and intuitive moral judgement (see Appendix B3). 
Chart 29: Participants' Perception of the 
Psychological Components of Moral Behaviour 
Judgement Motivation
Emotions Reactions
Learning Developmental
Environmental Other
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Forty-five percent of all coded responses were categorised under Predominantly 
Emotional/Intuitive, and 22.5% of all coded responses were categorised under Balanced 
Influence. Considering only the statements categorised under these two categories, 66.6% 
were categorised under Predominantly Emotional/Intuitive, and 33.3% were categorised 
under Balanced Influence. Participants were twice as likely to indicate that they believed 
people made moral judgements based on their intuitions than they were to think that the 
effect of moral reasoning and moral intuitions were balanced. Except for one female 
participant, who stated that only males make moral judgements more often based on moral 
reasoning, no participant thought that the influence of moral reasoning was greater than the 
role of moral emotions and intuitions in moral judgement. 
However, more importantly, some participants gave more nuanced answers. The most 
important of these are the responses related to the role of experiences. One student, one 
intern, and two teachers focused on the role of experiences. One teacher stated that “by 
establishing a balance between our reasoning and emotions, and then deciding based on 
previous experiences.” One student indicated that initially moral judgements are more often 
based on moral intuitions, but that a balance developed over time by learning from 
experiences, and stated that the morally important thing is to take lessons out of it in 
retrospect and make an effort to be a better person in the future.  
Two participants also referred to whether one could override one’s intuitions and/or 
emotions with reasoning. Previous research indicates that this is possible (see Section 2, 
Chapter II). While one of the participants thought that she could not override her emotions or 
intuitive judgements, the other indicated that she did not act on her feelings: 
“If I’m worried [about something], how can I override it? I can’t.” 
“I don’t do bad things to people because of my emotions. If I’m angry, I hold myself 
in.”  
Two further answers implied that the participants had a negative conception of 
intuitive reactions. One participant indicated that moral judgements were mostly intuitive, but 
“through education, moral behaviour finds the correct direction” (emphasis added). Another 
participant initially stated that moral judgements were purely intuitive, but when she was 
asked whether there could be a balance between reasoning and intuitions, she stated “of 
course there is. I’ve looked at people badly,” indicating a negative attitude towards intuitive 
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judgements. While there is no consensus concerning whether moral judgements not based on 
reasoning is normatively good or bad, participants seemed to have greater respect for 
judgements based on reasoning. 
There are several interesting aspects of the participants’ thoughts regarding moral 
reasoning and intuitions. First of all, two participants, in relation to moral judgement, implied 
negative attitudes towards judgement based purely on moral intuitions. This is notable 
because, at least regarding moral judgement, no other positive or negative attitude can be 
gleaned concerning moral judgements based on moral reasoning or moral intuitions. It seems 
to be the case that participants value thought-out behaviour and judgements rather than 
uncritically going with their gut feeling. On the other hand, participants appeared to indicate a 
negative attitude towards technical/tactical moral reasoning (see Section 2, Chapter II for 
technical/tactical moral reasoning). However, this kind of reasoning did not occur to 
participants during the interviews unless they were directed by the researcher to think about 
it. This implies that while participants have positive attitudes towards moral motivation and 
judgement based on moral reasoning, technical/tactical moral reasoning does not occur to 
them as having moral relevance; they do not recognise its moral relevance unless they are 
directed to think about the issue. 
1.4. Moral Motivation 
The first, third and fourth questions of the moral psychology part of the interview 
yielded interesting findings regarding participants’ beliefs about moral motivation. The first 
question was based on the Four Components Model and was aimed at eliciting participants’ 
conceptions of psychological components necessary for moral behaviour to occur (see 
Appendix B2). The third question was related to participants’ views regarding the gappiness 
problem (see Appendix B4). The fourth question was related to moral motivation (see 
Appendix B5). In the question related to the FCM, less than 17% of identified statements 
were related to the FCM, but three-quarters of these were related to moral motivation and the 
motivational power of emotions. This finding implies that participants are most likely to 
identify moral motivation as a necessary component of moral action, if they identify any of 
the components, given that they have no prior knowledge of the FCM. 
The third question asked participants whether people always do the right thing in a 
situation when they know what it is, or whether people cannot or will not act on their 
knowledge for any given reason. Eliciting participants’ beliefs about a lack of moral 
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motivation as the cause of failing to act morally was one of the main goals of this question. 
Furthermore, the articulation of this question also allowed participants to reflect on other 
causes of failure as well, which yielded another substantial focus related to the fourth 
component of the FCM (see section 1.5 below). Moral motivation, on the other hand, is 
mainly the focus of the third component of the FCM. 
Analysis of participants’ statements relevant to moral motivation yielded three main 
themes: a) Religion, b) Personal Interest, and c) Indifference (see Appendix B4). Participants 
indicated that religion could both motivate people to act on their knowledge and that it could 
inhibit people from acting on their knowledge. This finding implies that participants’ 
understanding of morality, while having some connection to religion, does not entirely 
overlap with religious morality. Participants also indicated that other interests competing with 
moral interests – most often personal gain in this case – may cause people not to act on what 
they know to be the right course of action. Finally, one participant indicated that not acting 
morally in a situation where one knows what the right thing to do is might be caused by 
indifference, responding to this question with a proverb which roughly translates as “the 
snake that does not touch me can live for a thousand years for all I care.” This Turkish 
proverb is used in contexts where a person is indifferent to some wrongdoing as long as the 
person is not directly affected by the wrongdoing. 
The fourth moral psychology question asked participants whether they thought the 
motivational source for moral behaviour was internal (moral reasoning, emotions, character) 
or external (laws, social pressure). The question also sought to elicit participants’ views 
regarding technical/tactical reasons for moral behaviour (behaving morally to maintain a 
reputation or avoid punishments, rather than for moral reasons). 
Participants’ responses to this question were categorised into three categories: a) 
External Motivation, b) Internal Motivation, and c) Mixed Influence. Over 80% of identified 
statements were categorised under the first two categories, which include three themes each. 
Statements placed in the External Motivation category all refer to aspects of motivation for 
behaviour that are based on external factors such as other people’s reactions and 
punishments, while statements placed under Internal Motivation refer to moral motivation 
stemming from internal factors such as character or moral reasoning. Themes that constitute 
the External Motivation category include a) technical/tactical reasons, b) consequences 
(which has two further subthemes “legal consequences” and “social consequences,”) and c) 
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the necessity of external moral motivation. Themes that constitute Internal Motivation 
include a) development and character, b) reasoning vs. emotions, and c) the value of internal 
motivation. Mixed Influence includes statements that point to the variety and ambiguity 
related to moral motivation (see Appendix B5). 
Concerning the motivation for moral action provided by external factors, avoiding 
negative consequences such as ostracism and punishments and seeking positive consequences 
such as being accepted and achieving “the good in the afterlife” are considered to be the most 
important factors. Furthermore, external motivation is also deemed to be necessary, at least 
until a developmental stage is reached where character can start to provide internal 
motivation. Internal motivation is also more highly respected, compared to technical/tactical 
reasons or other external factors, albeit a few conflicting views to this emerged as well, which 
can be found in Appendix B5. 
1.5. Moral Implementation 
Participants’ views regarding the fourth component of the FCM (moral 
implementation) were elicited most clearly in the third moral psychology question – related 
to the gappiness problem. In the first question – directly related to participants understanding 
of the FCM – the ability to carry out a 
moral action was not mentioned at all, 
indicating that participants do not 
recognise that this ability is a necessary 
component of moral behaviour. 
In the question related to the 
gappiness problem, some participants’ 
statements referred to the barriers 
preventing people from carrying out the 
moral behaviour they are motivated to 
do. These statements were categorised 
into two themes: a) Social Pressure and 
b) Emotional Barriers (see Appendix 
B4). Chart 28 is provided for the 
visualisation of the frequencies of 
statements’ relevance to themes emerging from the question related to the gappiness problem. 
Religion Personal Interest
Indifference Social Pressure
Emotional Barriers Uncategorized
Unrelated to FCM No Gappiness Problem
Chart 30: Participants' Perception of Why People Fail to 
Act Morally 
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Themes under the Related to the FCM – Component 3 category have been coloured in shades 
of blue, themes of Related to the FCM – Component 4 have been coloured in shades of green, 
and other themes and subcategories have been coloured in shades of grey. 
Nearly a quarter of all statements given in response to the gappiness problem question 
attributed the cause of failing to act morally to social pressure, and 5% of statements were 
focused on other emotional barriers. Responses related to social pressure focus most often on 
the fear or anxiety of suffering negative social repercussions or ostracism. Participants 
indicated that people might not do what they know to be the right course of action to avoid 
exclusion or condemnation. Other responses were focused only on emotions such as fear and 
anxiety without an emphasis on the context of the emotions: 
“People do bad things because their emotions override their will to do good.” 
However, some of these responses are somewhat cryptic, making their analysis 
harder.12 Taking this into consideration, it seems to be the case that participants attribute the 
failures to act morally mostly to pressures from the social environment, and other unspecified 
psychological failings. 
1.6. Moral Behaviour as a Skill 
The final moral psychology question was related to moral behaviour as a skill and 
whether this skill could be fostered in education: 
“Do you think moral behaviour can be thought of as a skill? How can morality be 
fostered?” 
This question is based on the literature regarding morality as a skill, drawing mostly 
from the work of Darcia Narvaez (see Chapter II.). Where it was felt necessary to explain 
further what is meant by skill, an analogy to playing team sports was made with the FCM. It 
was summarized, with varying degrees of detail depending on participants’ indication of 
when they had sufficiently understood the analogy, that when a player receives the ball 
(senses the moral salience of a situation; component 1) s/he needs to make a judgement about 
whether to pass the ball, dribble, or take a shot (making a moral judgement; component 2). 
While rookie players might need to take a moment to think what to do and how to do it, 
                                                          
12 Some of these cryptic responses were not further pursued with follow up questions as I felt that these may 
be sensitive topics for the participant, and I judged it best not to pursue for ethical reasons and to avoid 
discouraging the participant from further engaging with the other interview questions. 
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professional players can make an intuitive judgement in a split second (moral reasoning vs. 
moral intuitions). Once a judgement has been made, for example, to pass the ball, the 
motivation to carry out the judgement is necessary (moral motivation; component 3), even if, 
for instance, the player with the ball does not like the person s/he is about to pass the ball to, 
and would rather not pass it. When the necessary motivation to carry out the judgement is 
mustered (e.g. for the greater good of the team, to win the match), the player should have the 
necessary motor skills to be able to pass the ball accurately to its destination (moral 
implementation; component 4); although it should be noted that component 4 of the FCM 
involves not motor skills but more often character traits and personal qualities such as 
endurance, determination and courage depending on the situation. More or less detail was 
given with this analogy as it was felt necessary or demanded by the participant. 
The first part of the question was framed as a simple yes or no question, but 
participants were invited to elaborate on their answers. Five participants indicated that moral 
behaviour is not a skill, eleven participants stated that it could be thought of as a skill, and 
four participants’ responses did not clarify whether they believed that morality is a skill or 
not. The unclear responses focused more on how morality can be fostered rather than whether 
it is a skill or not. Twelve responses in total had an explicit focus on development or moral 
education. Also, in eight responses, different perceptions of skill emerged. 
Two participants distinguished between morality as a skill and morality as a 
behaviour. Another participant said that moral behaviour “is a way of living, character;” 
implying that morality is not something that is done, but that someone is moral (or not). 
These three participants were teachers. One student made a distinction between moral 
behaviour based on emotions and based on reasoning, and stated that moral behaviour based 
on emotions could not be thought of as a skill, while behaviour based on reasoning could be a 
skill. The last participant to indicate that morality is not a skill was also a student, who 
seemed to conceive ‘skill’ as something that is socially learnt. She implied that even if 
someone grows up isolated from any community, a sense of morality would still develop 
based on what is experienced as good or bad: 
“No... I think [an understanding of morality] would form even if someone [...] isn’t in 
a community. [...] How you behave in relationships would be learnt in society. But I 
don’t think if there is [no] one [...] around with moral rules... People would create 
[morality] based on their experiences anyway. [...] In the end, [...] even if the child 
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grows up in a forest s/he’d [?13] the trees... S/he’ll like some things and dislike other 
things. These will somehow be related to emotions.” 
This participant seems to focus on skills as socially learnt, which seems not to align 
with her understanding of morality, as she states that morality is not entirely socially learnt. 
This implies instead that someone would inevitably develop an attraction to things associated 
with positive experiences and aversion to things associated with negative experiences, from 
which an understanding of morality would emerge. 
Eleven participants indicated that moral behaviour could be conceived as a skill. 
While some participants focused more on the development or teaching of this skill, in seven 
responses different understandings of ‘skill’ seem to be present. When one participants’ view, 
who said moral behaviour was not a skill, is included among the differing understandings of 
skill, a total of eight participants talked about their understanding of what skill is. Two 
participants, a student, and an intern, indicated that moral behaviour could be conceived as a 
skill when it includes a conscious effort; the intern stated that moral behaviour is a “cognitive 
skill,” while the student indicated that moral behaviour is a skill when it is based on 
reasoning as opposed to emotions. Three participants (two students and one intern) stated that 
moral behaviour could be conceived of as a skill because it is not always easy to act morally 
or on one’s moral beliefs. Following the explanation of the FCM, one student stated that “this 
is a skill because it is hard to do,” while the other two participants emphasised that being able 
to act morally consistently was something hard to do, and thus moral behaviour could be 
conceived of as a skill. One other participant, an intern, stated that moral behaviour could be 
conceived of as a skill because some people employ moral behaviour as a strategy to be loved 
by others.  
These responses, focusing either on moral behaviour as a skill because it is something 
hard to do (at least consistently), or that it involves conscious, cognitive effort, or it is used as 
a strategy, imply that participants’ conception of ‘skill’ is that it is an intricate and complex 
ability that requires conscious and continuous cognitive effort. This view seems not to align 
with the conception of skill as the capacity to carry out habituated and/or automated (“expert” 
in Narvaez’s terms) behaviour (see Chapter II). One intern’s response was somewhat related 
to this conception but does not align neatly with the other responses. This intern, to whom the 
                                                          
13 In Turkish the verb tends to be the last word of a sentence, and the participant did not complete this 
sentence, leaving the verb unsaid. 
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sports analogy was made, indicated that moral behaviour could not be compared to sports in 
terms of skills. She said that sporting skills are settled, repetitive and continuous while moral 
behaviour can change from situation to situation. However, she did not expressly indicate that 
moral behaviour cannot be thought of as a skill. Thus, her response was categorised among 
the responses that do not make it clear whether the participant believes that morality can be 
conceived of as a skill or not. While this intern’s understanding of skill seems to align with 
the other participants’ conception explained above, her understanding of morality as a skill is 
ambiguous, as she might think that moral behaviour might be conceived of as a skill in 
different terms (which was the case for another participant). However, this was not stated. 
Finally, one student, whose response has been analysed above in terms of developing 
morality as an attraction and aversion to certain things based on experiences, implied that 
skills are socially learnt, while morality would develop even in the absence of society. The 
interesting implication of this statement regarding the participant’s understanding of skill, as 
opposed to morality, is that she thinks that skills are “socially learnt.” This seems to imply 
that skills can be developed only when someone teaches the skill (thus the necessity of social 
interaction with other people) and appears to disregard abilities developed by oneself in 
isolation. 
The second focus participants addressed in their responses was the development of 
moral behaviour, whether as a skill or not. Twelve responses concentrate on this topic, three 
of which are ambiguous with regards to the conception of moral behaviour as a skill, two of 
which do not conceive of moral behaviour as a skill, and seven responses that indicate that 
moral behaviour is a skill. Seven participants (two students, one intern and four teachers) 
stated that moral behaviour could be fostered through education; one student elaborated on 
her view by indicating that this education should start at a young age, and the intern stated 
that this education could be either formal or implicit. Four participants (one student and three 
teachers) indicated that family has a major role to play in the development of moral 
behaviour. Two teachers also included the social environment alongside the family; one 
teacher elaborating on her view by including the “school environment [...] and relatives.” 
Two teachers further emphasised that life experiences play a role in the development of moral 
behaviour. One participant simply stated that “this skill can be fostered.” Two teachers 
emphasized that moral development took time; one teacher indicated that the development 
continues from infancy to seniority, the other teacher stated that each stage of development is 
a different area of skill, and by taking the correct steps during development these skills 
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should be applied in daily life and not just remain at the level of knowledge. One teacher and 
one student also indicated that a person could develop their own moral behaviour skills. The 
student who indicated this also stated that “moral behaviour is a skill for which everyone is 
born possessing the raw materials ... [and the] foundations for certain moral norms,” and that 
it was up to the individual to adapt their moral foundations to the conditions of the situation. 
This is perhaps one of the most interesting views as it is very much in line with Hursthouse’s 
(2012) description that “virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but nature 
gives us the capacity to acquire them” (p. 169). 
A cautionary note should also be made here. The translation for both ‘develop’ and 
‘foster’ are the same in Turkish (geliştirmek), as a result, the nuance between fostering and 
developing inevitably gets lost in translation in some instances. Participants’ statements have 
been translated into English as ‘foster’ or ‘develop’ based on what the context of where the 
word ‘geliştirmek’ is used implies. 
Two further interesting points emerge from participants’ responses to this question. 
Firstly, the conception of moral behaviour as a skill seems to have a negative connotation for 
three participants (one student, intern, and teacher each). The student and the teacher who 
have indicated this stated that “morality should not be a skill.” The intern who said that moral 
behaviour could be thought of as a skill when it is used as a strategy to be loved by others 
implied that this was a Machiavellian use of morality, and implied a negative attitude towards 
it. While no participant expressed a clear positive attitude towards the conception of moral 
behaviour as a skill, no other participant implied a negative attitude towards it either. 
1.7. Moral Emotions 
Participants’ views regarding moral emotions were elicited from their responses to the 
first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth questions of the moral psychology part of the interview. 
This is particularly the case in the fifth question which focuses on moral emotions 
exclusively, and the sixth question where the focus is the moral self in more general terms. In 
relation to FCM, only one participant indicated that emotions (empathy in particular) were 
relevant to moral behaviour (see Appendix B2). This suggests that moral emotions are not 
among the first thing that came to participants’ minds about psychological components 
necessary for moral behaviour to emerge. 
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In relation to the gappiness problem (see Appendix B4), participants did not name 
moral emotions as an important source of moral motivation but indicated that other emotions 
such as fear and anxiety, felt for various reasons, might inhibit people from acting morally. 
Regarding moral motivation, participants clearly recognised that moral emotions are an 
internal source of moral motivation. However, mention of moral emotions in this question 
was either in relation to moral character or opposition to moral reasoning. 
Participants’ understanding of moral emotions was elicited most clearly in the fifth 
question of the second part of the interview, which was related to moral emotions and their 
effect on moral behaviour: 
“What do you think might be moral emotions (e.g. guilt)? How do these moral 
emotions affect moral behaviour?” 
The main aim of the question was to understand what participants thought were moral 
emotions by eliciting example emotions, and how they thought these emotions influenced 
morally relevant behaviour. Some participants responded to this question by naming several 
other emotions, which was the core aim of this question, while others named character traits 
or habits alongside emotions. Some participants referred only to character traits as emotions, 
instead of emotions themselves. Many participants agreed that guilt was a moral emotion and 
four participants included guilt in their responses to this question, while several others 
seemed to indicate their agreement implicitly. Other moral emotions participants named 
included shame, anger (at cruelty), sadness and happiness (for others’ misfortune and good 
fortune respectively), and empathy. Other emotions respondents referred to, that are not as 
directly related to morality as shame, guilt, empathy or anger, but could have moral salience 
depending on the situation, included anxiety, fear, and peace of mind. 
Some participants also included character traits and other responses in their answers. 
Morally relevant character traits participants referred to include responsibility, virtue, a 
tendency to comply with social rules, industrious/working habits (çalışma alışkanlığı), 
humbleness/modesty (alçakgönüllülük), to be able to apologise, mercifulness, and helpfulness 
(yardımseverlik14). Other traits with varying degrees of moral relevance were also named. 
These include freedom (or a desire to be free), conscience, inner balance, and sympathy. 
                                                          
14 Yardımseverlik can be alternatively translated as benevolence, charity, or cooperativeness. 
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With regards to the effect of moral emotions on behaviour, participants indicated that 
moral emotions influence all behaviour in social situations, but the nature of this influence 
would depend on the situation and the character of the individual. While this summary 
reflects the views of all participants who responded to the second part of the question, one 
participant went into more detail and indicated that guilt limits what people think and want to 
do. 
Further investigation of data yields several more points worth mentioning. Firstly, one 
participant stated that morality is deeply related with emotions, that an emotion would reflect 
in morally relevant behaviour, and that morally relevant behaviour would have an emotional 
effect on the individual. The same participant also indicated that “[w]hat makes us contradict 
ourselves is sometimes our emotion of self-interest/selfishness” and that “[s]elfishness can 
sometimes be useful, but these are times when people should control themselves.” 
A note regarding participants’ use of the word ‘emotion’ in Turkish (duygu) also 
needs to be made here. While phrases such as ‘the/an emotion of guilt’ or ‘the/an emotion of 
freedom’ do not sound entirely grammatical in English, the same phrases in Turkish 
(‘suçluluk duygusu’ and ‘özgürlük duygusu’ respectively) are more commonly used linguistic 
elements and are not ungrammatical. ‘Duygu’ (emotion) is often treated as the noun, and 
‘hissetmek’ (to feel) is often treated as the verb for the same concept. However, the two are 
distinct concepts. While all emotions might be felt, not all feelings are emotions (this applies 
in Turkish as well). The word ‘feeling’ (‘his’ in Turkish) would be a more accurate 
description of the phenomena: ‘suçlu hissetmek’ (to feel guilty) or ‘suçluluk hissi’ (the 
feeling of guilt); ‘özgürlük hissi’ (the feeling of freedom) or ‘özgür hissetmek’ (to feel free). 
The fact that all participants used the word ‘emotion’ (duygu) instead of ‘feeling’ (his) when 
describing emotions or other felt phenomena indicates an ambiguity regarding the meanings 
of ‘emotion (duygu)’ and ‘feeling (his).’ However, since participants’ use of these words is 
also common in Turkish in general, it is difficult to conclude whether the ambiguity resides in 
participants’ understanding of these words or the use of these words in Turkish in general. 
Furthermore, all participants who referred to character traits in response to this 
question, either explicitly or implicitly, indicated that they considered them emotions. While 
character traits can elicit certain emotions, which provide the motivation to act in certain 
ways (e.g. moral action), character traits themselves, such as helpfulness (yardımseverlik), 
are not emotions. A tentative conclusion that should be taken with caution is that participants, 
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and even perhaps most Turkish speakers, conflate the instantaneous visceral element of 
emotions with the long-term effect of settled emotional dispositions which have a very close 
relationship with character traits. 
In addition to the ambiguity regarding participants’ conception of moral emotions, an 
ambiguity regarding the distinction between episodic emotions and settled emotional 
dispositions was also found in the analysis of the sixth moral psychology question (which 
was related to the moral self – see Appendices B6, B7, and B8). When discussing the 
influence of emotions on moral behaviour, participants focused either on episodic emotions, 
or emotional dispositions; no participant talked about both kinds of emotions, neither did any 
participant give an indication that they were aware of the distinction or the other kind of 
emotion. Participants’ understanding of moral emotions in this respect is more relevant to 
their understanding of the moral self, and thus is presented in the next section. 
1.8. Moral Self 
In the second introductory question (asking participants to describe briefly what they 
think morality is), only the responses of one participant who included virtues and character 
traits in her description of morality, and two participants who emphasised moral 
development, were related to the moral self. However, in other parts of the interview – 
especially in relation to moral behaviour as a skill – some participants implied or stated that 
they thought moral action was not something that was simply done, but that it was a way of 
life, a way of being. A more nuanced picture of participants’ views regarding the moral self 
was elicited mostly in the sixth moral psychology question, which focused on the relationship 
between emotions, character traits, and second order volitions: 
“What do you think might be the relationship between character traits and emotions? 
How much can one’s desire to be “this kind of a person” affect their moral 
behaviour?” 
Participants’ responses to this question can be categorised into five different foci: a) 
the relationship between emotions and character traits, b) second-order volitions, c) what 
influences moral behaviour, d) the role of the social environment, and e) the effect of life 
experiences. Participants’ responses regarding the relationship between emotions and 
character traits were more in line with the academic literature than was expected. Three 
themes have emerged in this category: firstly, that there is a cyclical or parallel relationship 
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between emotions and character traits, secondly the influence of reasoning and emotions on 
character traits, and thirdly the influence of episodic emotions and emotional dispositions on 
character traits (see Table 21). 
Table 22: The Relationship between Emotions and Character Traits 
Theme Description Example Statements 
There is a 
cyclical or 
parallel 
relationship 
between 
emotions and 
character traits 
Some participants 
emphasised or indicated that 
there is a deep two-way 
relationship between 
emotions and character traits. 
Most such statements 
indicated that the distinction 
between emotions and 
character traits are very hard 
to discern if not impossible. 
 
• “There must be a parallel relationship [between 
character traits and emotions].” 
• “...I can’t make a distinction between emotions 
and personality. Emotions must direct 
personality.” 
• “I think moral behaviour would have an 
emotional feedback. Or an emotional behaviour 
would have a moral feedback. I don’t think it is 
possible to make a distinction between the two.” 
The influence of 
emotions vs. the 
influence of 
reasoning on 
character traits 
The statements that have 
been categorised in this 
theme referred to the 
influence of reasoning on 
character traits, either in 
opposition to emotions or 
combined with them. 
• “Instinctively our emotions direct our thoughts. 
Through reasoning, emotions are managed.” 
• “Personality traits are the combination of 
emotional and cognitive traits; however it is life 
experiences that determine whether emotional or 
cognitive traits will be more dominant.” 
• “Morality is closer to reasoning [than emotions], 
and reasoning/logic must accept [moral 
principles].” 
• “Emotions must direct personality. Reasoning is 
a bit further away.” 
 
The influence of 
episodic 
emotions vs. the 
influence of 
emotional 
dispositions on 
character traits 
The statements from which 
this theme emerged were 
concerned with participants’ 
understanding of episodic 
emotions and emotional 
dispositions, and how these 
influence character traits. 
• “I think emotion[al reactions] would change 
when [an individual’s] character changes.” 
• “We are constantly experiencing emotions, 
aren’t we? We have a constant emotion, sadness, 
jealousy, happiness maybe... It might be that our 
emotions create our character traits.” 
• “I think character traits are socially learned. For 
example children of introverted parents are 
usually introverted as well. This is the child’s 
character... I think children learn these emotions 
from their parents.” 
 
Participants seemed not to have a clear understanding of the distinctions between 
emotional dispositions and episodic emotions. All participants focused on either the former or 
the latter when discussing issues where this distinction becomes relevant, but no participant 
referred to both kinds of emotions. More often, participants would respond to questions as if 
the other kind of emotions did not exist – emotions seemed to be conceived of as either 
episodic or dispositional. On the other hand, despite the ambiguity regarding their 
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understanding of emotions and feelings, and of situational emotions and emotional 
dispositions, participants’ understanding of the relationship between emotions and character 
traits was remarkably in line with the psychological and philosophical literature on the 
matter. Participants seem to think that, as far as a distinction between episodic emotions and 
emotional dispositions is perceived, emotional dispositions either have a profound and mutual 
influence on each other with character traits, or the two are the same and indiscernible, on the 
one hand. And, on the other hand, participants who focused on situational emotions indicated 
that these emotions are influenced by character traits. 
Participants’ responses that focus on the aspects of second order volitions (SOVs) 
have also yielded three themes, including a focus on the roots of second order volitions, a 
concern for second order volitions as goal orientation, and an emphasis regarding failures 
related to second order volitions (see Appendix B6). Participants’ responses that focus on 
second order volitions seem to indicate that they are rooted in an individual’s reasoning about 
what is desirable for a person and that they function as goals, which can take time to achieve. 
Finally, these aims are partly formed according to the social environment, and when they 
contradict the individual’s character or when they cannot be met problematic behaviour can 
arise. 
The third category revolves around the effect second order volitions and character 
traits have on moral behaviour. Participants’ responses tend to focus either on second order 
volitions or character traits (see Appendix B7). Participants who concentrated on the effects 
second order volitions and character traits have on moral behaviour, no matter which one 
they focused on, indicated that both have a direct and positive effect on moral behaviour. 
Participants seemed to have a positive attitude towards second-order volitions.  
The fourth focus to emerge from the responses to this question revolves around the 
influence the social environment has on the development of the moral self; this topic is 
explored in more depth in section 4.2 below. Similarly, the fifth focus emerging from this 
question revolved around the theme of life experiences, and this issue is explored in more 
depth in section 4.1 below. 
1.9. Moral Development 
Participants views regarding moral development and how it takes place were elicited 
mostly in the second introductory question (description of morality), and first and seventh 
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moral psychology questions (related to the FCM and moral development respectively). Some 
participants included concepts relevant to moral development in their description of morality:  
“A well-raised person is moral.” 
“[Morality is] something inside people but could be developed.” 
These two responses imply that some participants’ understanding of morality is at 
least partially dependent on the phenomenon of moral development. 
The heavy focus on moral development in the first moral psychology question was 
unexpected, as the question focuses on the FCM. Two-thirds of all responses to that question 
focused on moral development. These responses were further categorised into four themes 
including Reactions, Learning, Developmental, and Environmental. The first theme, 
Reactions, focused on caregivers’ and teachers’ reactions to children’s behaviour, fostering or 
discouraging certain behaviour. The second theme, Learning, emphasised that moral 
behaviour was something learnt. The third theme, Developmental, which, in terms of 
frequency, was the most common kind of response to the question, focused on aspects of 
moral development and related aspects of cognitive development. Finally, the fourth theme, 
Environmental, which was the second most common kind of response, focused on the social 
and cultural environment in which a child’s moral development takes place. 
The fact that developmental and educational aspects of morality were more frequently 
mentioned in response to this question than psychological components necessary for moral 
behaviour to emerge indicates that participants were more sensitive to the developmental and 
educational aspects of morality than its psychological aspects. 
A more detailed understanding of participants’ beliefs regarding moral development 
emerged in response to the seventh moral psychology question, which was more directly 
related to moral development and the role models that influence moral development: 
“How do you think moral development takes place from infancy to adulthood 
considering emotions, reasoning and behaviour? What do you think is the influence of 
the family, teacher (hierarchical relationships), peers (equals), and the general society 
(3rd persons and the media) on moral development?” 
Participants’ responses to this question were divided into two categories, based on 
which of the aspect included in the question they focused on: a) moral development, and b) 
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role models. Regarding the first focus, moral development, only three participants (one 
student, one intern, and one teacher) gave responses that clearly detail a progression of moral 
development. The teacher who focused on this part of the question gave a brief summary of 
whom she thought influenced morality over the course of development: 
“It initially starts with the family, followed by the influence of friends starting at pre-
school education and later on in school. The general society becomes more important 
in adulthood.” 
The responses of the student and the intern who also focused on this aspect overlap 
with the general direction of moral development indicated in the above quote. The student 
agreed that family and friends would be the only ones who influence moral development until 
the child is 12 years old, which, she indicated, is when character forms and relevant emotions 
are learnt and ‘sink in’ to one’s character. She further elaborated that during adulthood 
reasoning would become a more significant influence on moral development. The intern also 
indicated that the influence of peers becomes more important during adolescence, but she 
also focused on how rules of games influence a child’s understanding of normative morality. 
She emphasised that if a child does not play by the rules or does not conform to the norms of 
his/her peer group in adolescence, the child/adolescent could be ostracised.  
Three participants also indicated that other aspects of development are related to 
moral development. While one participant stated that “moral development influences 
emotions, thoughts and behaviour,” another indicated that emotional development was an 
important factor in moral development. Finally, one participant indicated that cognitive 
development and maturity are also important factors in moral development. 
All other participants focused more on who influences moral development than how 
moral development progresses over time, so did not identify whose influence is greater at 
specific stages. Half of all statements in this category name parents as the most influential 
models in moral development. Half of the participants who referred to the influence of 
society indicated that when compared with family, peers, and teachers, society was less 
influential, while the other half indicated that society was the most significant influence on 
moral development. The influence of society was the second most frequently cited answer. 
This is followed by the influence of peers regarding frequency and judged most commonly to 
be the second most influential actors, and finally, teachers were usually cited as the third 
most influential while being cited the least frequently. On the other hand, one participant 
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indicated that teachers would not have much influence; she stated that she never cared about 
her teachers herself and paid more attention to her peers, while another participant indicated 
that the teacher’s influence would lessen as the child grew older into adolescence. Also, one 
participant stated that, especially in early years, the teacher is closer to a parental figure than 
anything else, so would have an influence nearly as much as parents did. Some participants 
simply indicated that all of the above actors would have a direct impact on moral 
development, while two participants specifically stated that whoever one spent the most time 
with would have the greatest influence on one’s moral development. Finally, two participants 
focused on the influence of the media, and both indicated that it had a very negative influence 
on moral development. One of the participants focusing on the media elaborated that the 
influence of the media is very hard for parents to control, and she criticised parents who 
direct their children to spend time consuming media to either “get rid of the kid” or “so that 
the kid learns something.” 
1.10. Moral Foundations Theory & Triune Ethics Theory 
Discussions relating to the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) and the Triune Ethics 
Theory (TET) did not feature prominently in the interviews. Statements most relevant to the 
MFT occurred in response to the second introductory question (see Appendix B1). While 
some participants indicated that there could be moral universals, participants were more 
likely to imply a relativist position by stating that morality changes from person to person or 
from community to community. Furthermore, some participants indicated that particular 
moral rules are not derived from universals, but that moral universals could be extrapolated 
by investigating morality cross-culturally. These results suggest that participants were more 
likely to convey relativistic views than universalist views. 
Evidence for participants’ beliefs regarding the aspects of the MFT was found more 
often in observations of their practice. Instances of fostering values related to each moral 
foundation were observed, but these instances are not reported here due to concerns of space 
and their tangential relevance to the research aims. However, teachers were asked whether 
they were specifically aiming to foster any value, which values they were aiming to foster, 
and why, in the follow-up questions to the observations. Three of the four observed teachers 
indicated that their actions were not consciously based on the aim of fostering a specific 
value or virtue. They instead implied that, in summary, they observed the students doing 
something wrong (the observed wrongdoing is unique to each instance), and that they felt 
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compelled to direct students towards the correct course of action. The remaining one teacher 
stated that she was aiming to foster specific values (helpfulness and responsibility), but the 
values she indicated she was fostering do not seem to have a robust connection with her 
actions. In the instance regarding fostering helpfulness she had emphasised concepts related 
to equality which is related more strongly to the fairness/cheating foundation, and the 
instance related to responsibility seemed to have a more direct relationship with the 
loyalty/betrayal foundation as the responsibility the teacher was aiming to foster in the 
student was related to taking care of the poster with the lyrics of the national anthem. These 
results suggest that, from the perspective of the MFT, teachers are aware that their actions 
foster certain values, but they do not comprehensively understand how their actions foster 
which values.  
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2. Beliefs Regarding Education 
In this section participants’ beliefs regarding how moral education is conducted today 
in Turkey is presented initially. This is followed by how moral education should be 
implemented according to participants. Next, participants’ views regarding teachers are 
presented. And finally, participants’ thoughts regarding how teacher training should be 
carried out with regards to engaging in moral education is explored. The findings detailed 
below are predominantly based on interview data analysis, particularly on the data obtained 
in response to the five questions in the third part of the interview schedule, which focused on 
participants’ beliefs regarding aspects of moral education and implicit education. Some of the 
findings presented below draw also from the three concluding questions of the interview 
schedule (see Appendices A7 and A8). 
2.1. Current Moral Education in Turkey 
Currently, in Turkey, explicit moral education is conducted in conjunction with 
religious education (RE) in the Religious Culture and Ethics course (RCE), and there is 
greater emphasis on religious practices than on morality (see Chapter II). The course takes a 
predominantly Sunni Muslim approach to both religious education and morality. In addition 
to this, philosophy of morality is taught in the final year of secondary education as part of the 
philosophy course, and individual schools may have their own focus on ethics or character 
education. 
Participants’ thoughts regarding the current status of moral education were sought in 
the third question of the third part of the interview; however, some participants also touched 
upon this issue in the first question of the third part as well (see Appendices B10 and B12).  
No participant stated a positive attitude to the current moral education system. Three 
participants, one teacher and two students, did not indicate an attitude towards the system, 
and the remaining 17 participants all stated negative attitudes such as: 
“There is no moral education ... We used to take the religion course in middle school 
but the moral education given there is made up of whatever the individual teacher 
teaches and it changes from teacher to teacher and school to school.” 
Twenty-three statements given in response to this question have yielded six themes 
(see Appendix B10). Considering that the main context where explicit moral education is 
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practised is the religious education course, perhaps the most interesting finding is the lack of 
references to the course. Only five participants explicitly referred to RCE, while some 
participants referred to it implicitly (e.g. “It requires more support. A separate course and 
education programme should be planned.”). However, it seems to be the case that at least in 
seven interviews, participants did not recognise RCE as moral education. These seven 
participants either focused on the way implicit moral education is conducted in schools or 
described where moral education takes place without referring to RCE. Given that all 
participants have received RCE in their secondary education (the course has been mandatory 
since 1980), the fact that 35% of participants did not consider RCE as (at least partly) moral 
education is striking. The remaining 8 participants either make an implicit reference to RCE, 
or it is unclear whether they recognise RCE as moral education or not. 
One further point regarding participants’ attitudes towards RE in Turkey also needs to 
be made. When several participants’ responses to this question are taken in conjunction with 
their responses to some of the other questions on the interview schedule, it seems that while 
they are not entirely happy with RE and ME as they are currently conducted, they do not 
necessarily advocate the removal of RE from the official curriculum. These participants seem 
to think that religion holds great importance and that RE is necessary; but concerning ME, 
these participants either believe that RE and ME should be separated, or the moral education 
RE provides should be improved. Most frequently this improvement is indicated to be related 
to a more pluralistic understanding and teaching of morality and religion. 
2.2. Conducting Moral Education 
The first question of the education part of the interview (part 3) focused on 
participants’ thoughts regarding the value of moral education and how it should be 
conducted. 
“Do you think it is important to teach morality in school? How should the moral 
education program be conducted?” 
This question is focused more on participants’ thoughts about how moral education 
(ME) should be conducted. All participants indicated that moral education is important. 
However, while most participants focused on how they think moral education should be 
carried out in school, some participants stated that ME is not entirely possible or that school 
is not the most important factor in moral education. Statements were categorized into three 
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main themes within this larger category, including a) that the influence of the school is 
limited compared to that of the family, b) that morality is not something that can be taught (at 
least explicitly), and c) that moral education is not and cannot be confined to the school (see 
Appendix B8). 
Participants who focused on why the school is not the most important place for moral 
education tended to focus on how learning morality is broader than what can be taught in the 
school. Some participants indicated that the school’s influence can never be more than the 
family’s and that it could only have a supporting role to the teachings of the parents; while 
other participants indicated that school is not the only place moral education happens. Several 
participants also stated that they did not think morality can be taught in school or by teachers. 
However, these views represent only a minority of statements. 
Most participants focused on how moral education should be conducted. Participants 
who focused on how moral education should be conducted or how it can be improved 
focused on a variety of aspects related to ME. These include seven main foci that have been 
thematically categorised (see Appendix B9, several other statements of interest have been 
presented in the ‘Unspecified’ or ‘Other Statements’ categories as well): 
a. Moral education based on lessons, 
b. Moral education versus religious education, 
c. Moral education based on application and experience, 
d. Implicit moral education, 
e. Pedagogical methods relevant to moral education, 
f. The role of teachers, and 
g. Moral education as imposing values 
These results indicate several interesting points. While some participants support 
explicit moral education, others support implicit education. It seems to be the case that the 
more teacher training and experience participants have the more they favour explicit 
education. Secondly, only students explicitly focused on the role of teachers in moral 
education in response to this question; interns and teachers did not. Another interesting point 
is that, while there were six participants whose discipline is PCG, only one intern explicitly 
focused on the psychological aspects of moral education in this question by emphasising 
fostering students’ self-esteem. Taken in conjunction with what this participant had said in 
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response to other questions, she seems to imply that fostering students’ autonomy would 
result in achieving the aims of moral education. 
Finally, perhaps the most interesting finding is that three interns indicated that a 
certain kind of morality should not be imposed on students through moral education. They 
stated that moral education should be based more on what could be described as discovering 
morality for oneself; participants tended to emphasise classroom discussions to achieve this. 
When this is taken in conjunction with what several participants indicated during the 
interviews, there seems to be an underlying sense that some participants perceive morality in 
Turkey as an oppressive force impeding their self-expression. 
2.3. Implicit Moral Education 
The fourth question of the third part of the interview was related to the hidden 
curriculum and how moral education takes place in it: 
“What is the place of moral education in the hidden curriculum? How does moral 
education take place in the hidden curriculum?” 
The main aim of this question was to understand participants’ beliefs regarding how 
implicit moral education took place. The hidden curriculum is taught during the teacher 
training programme in Turkey. In most universities, it is covered in the last (4th) year of the 
programme. As a result, it was expected that interns and teachers would be familiar with the 
concept, while students would not be. None of the first-year students were familiar with the 
concept, so the hidden curriculum was briefly explained to them. 
Two themes emerged from participants’ responses including a) the importance of the 
implicit influence of teachers’ actions on students’ moral development, and b) the actors in 
the school environment whose actions have an influence on students’ moral development (see 
Appendix B11). These two themes cover a minority of statements (44.4%). The rest of the 
statements (55.5%) are not related to these two themes, or to each other, as they each have a 
different focus or description. 
The results point to the two most fundamental elements of the hidden curriculum: the 
actors involved in implicit moral education, and the salience of these actors’ behaviour. Not 
surprisingly, teachers are viewed as the most important actors with regards to ME in the 
hidden curriculum. Furthermore, participants are also aware that other people in the school 
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also have a significant influence. Participants also think that teachers’ behaviour is more 
important than what they say in class, and being a good role model is important. 
The majority of statements, however, do not fit into these two themes. These include 
the responses of 5 teachers, two interns, and three students. Each statement has a different 
focus except for two teachers who indicated that “morality should be at the foundation of 
education” using the exact same words. One primary teacher concentrated on the implicit 
moral education that takes place in the official curriculum:  
“The topics of the ‘Knowledge of Life’ course at primary level have been designed 
according to this. A situation is taken, and a connection to morality is made.” 
This is the only participant to emphasise moral education in the official curriculum. 
Two teachers focused on the applied and experiential nature of ME in the hidden curriculum. 
One teacher indicated that ME took place in the hidden curriculum “through living and social 
experiences” while the other teacher stated that moral education “is given some space in the 
hidden curriculum, but it is very weak in terms of application.” The interesting thing about 
the latter quote is that, while it is generally assumed that the hidden curriculum is not entirely 
intentionally, explicitly, or officially designed, the teacher states that ‘space [for moral 
education] is given in the hidden curriculum,’ (emphasis added) implying that the teacher 
thinks that the content of the hidden curriculum is intentionally or officially structured. 
While one of the interns stated that moral education takes place exclusively in implicit 
education, the other intern indicated that moral education does not take place in Turkey at all, 
because “moral values are [not] reflected or taught very well.” This participant’s view seems 
to indicate not that there is no implicit education, but that implicit education is not entirely 
moral. 
The three students each focused on different things. None of them had any knowledge 
regarding what hidden curriculum is, so a brief explanation of hidden curriculum was 
provided. The first student indicated that since RCE focuses more on RE, moral education 
would largely take place in the hidden curriculum. The second student focused on individual 
teachers’ understanding of morality and indicated that since each teacher’s understanding of 
morality would be unique, the values and virtues they emphasise would be different. As a 
result, a unified moral education could not be provided through the hidden curriculum. 
Finally, the last student focused on the physical environment: 
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“Of course it’s very important! For example, putting railings on little students’ 
classroom’s windows if the classroom is high. This is being concerned for the 
students, right? It’s for their benefit. You shouldn’t be pushed to do this, but do it 
yourself and be aware of it. It wouldn’t have any meaning if you put the railings after 
a student fell, right? But if you do it before anyone hurts themselves this is a truly 
moral thing to do.” 
This participant was the only one to focus on the implicit moral education the physical 
environment provides. Perhaps what is more interesting is that none of the other participants 
with greater training and experience referred to the physical environment in response to this 
question. While it changes from lecturer to lecturer, most commonly the physical 
environment is not part of the courses on the hidden curriculum. As a result, it is suspected 
that older participants who have received training regarding the hidden curriculum, but 
perhaps did not discuss the relevance of the physical environment in their lectures, do not 
associate the physical environment of the school with implicit moral education. 
Finally, one intern, who emphasised the development of autonomy in her interview, 
also elaborated on how some practices in the school environment might have a negative 
effect regarding moral education in response to the question regarding the current state of ME 
in Turkey:  
“Sometimes it is expected of the child to follow rules blindly ... Parents and teachers 
decide in the child’s stead – you will go to this school, we will learn this in class 
today – all without the child’s participation in decision making. As a result, the child 
ends up unable to advocate his/her own thoughts. So, the child just keeps on taking 
what is being provided rather than being creative or resourceful.” 
While this participant focuses explicitly on how certain practices have an implicit 
influence on moral development and education, other participants also refer to such issues, 
albeit more implicitly. Taken together, these results indicate that participants are aware of the 
influence certain practices might have in terms of implicit moral education. 
2.4. Learning Morality 
The second question of the education part of the interview focused on participants’ 
beliefs regarding learning morality, as opposed to the teaching morality focus in the above 
question: 
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“How do you think children learn moral values and good behaviour?”  
Two main categories emerged from participants’ responses: a) Observation, and b) 
Experience. Twenty-one of the 30 relevant statements, including statements placed in 
multiple themes, fall into the first category, which is further formed of 5 themes based on the 
emphasis on who is being observed. These include observation of a) family, b) teachers, c) 
social environment, d) peers, and e) other options such as the media. The remaining nine 
statements all focus on learning through experience (see Table 22). 
Participants seem to think that children learn morality first and foremost through 
observation. The most important factors here are the parents. Participants also focused on the 
role of the teacher; however, some participants do not think that the teacher can be very 
influential. Participants also place importance on peers as well, but more often they believe 
that the general society has a greater influence. Some participants also think that children 
learn morality from the media. On the other hand, many participants also believe that children 
learn moral values especially from practising moral behaviour, through experience. It should 
be noted that participants did not refer to any other alternatives such as learning morality 
through lessons or self-reflection. 
Table 23: Participants' Perception of How Children Learn Morality 
Category Theme Description Example Statements 
Observation Observing 
Family 
Statements placed in this 
theme indicated that 
children learn morality by 
observing their parents. 
Parents and family were the 
most frequently cited actors 
whom the children learn 
morality from by observing. 
 
• “Children learn the first models by 
observing and copying the parents. 
If good behaviour is observed and 
demonstrated to children, they will 
learn.”  
• “By taking examples and 
experiencing, and this starts in the 
family and continues with the 
social environment [the child] is 
in.” 
 
Observing 
Teachers 
Statements placed in this 
theme stated that children 
learn morality by observing 
their teachers. This theme 
holds the second highest 
frequency of codes. 
 
• “Teachers can be good models but 
I don’t think morality can be 
completely taught.” 
• “They learn from their parents, 
peers and teachers.” 
 
Observing 
the Social 
Environment 
Statements placed in this 
category emphasised that 
children learn morality by 
observing the social 
environment.  
• “Everyone in the school is part of 
moral education, the guy at the 
canteen, the cleaners, friends, 
administrators... They have more 
influence.” 
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 • “They learn by observing and by 
imitating good/moral adults.” 
Observing 
Peers 
Statements relevant to this 
theme all emphasised that 
children learn morality by 
observing their friends. 
Peers were cited less 
frequently than the above 
other themes. 
 
• “In school, the greatest influence 
is the friends, with whom kids 
spend the most time.” 
• “By observing role models. First 
from the parents, then teachers, 
then friends.” 
Observing 
Other 
Statements placed in this 
theme either did not specify 
who is being observed or 
specified people with whom 
children do not interact 
directly. 
 
• “[They learn morality] from 
societal norms and media.” 
• “As the child observes and 
experiences.” 
Experience Statements relevant to this 
theme all emphasised that 
children learn moral 
behaviour by practising it. 
• “By experiencing, and sometimes 
by making mistakes.” 
• “Through experience of both good 
and bad, and the child should be 
able to learn lessons from that. If 
that fails, I don’t know...” 
• “They learn through play.” 
• “If the teacher treats each student 
fairly, if all students have the 
chance to speak their mind, if 
everyone contributes, the child can 
see that collaboration yields better 
results. For example, deciding on 
classroom rules together with 
students: When students help 
decide on rules they can 
understand the reasons for rules 
and having contributed to their 
creation, they can develop 
autonomy.” 
 
 
2.5. Regarding Teachers 
While this was not among the main aims of the interviews, some participants also 
mentioned their views regarding teachers who engage in moral education. Surprisingly, all 
participants who touched upon this subject indicated negative attitudes towards teaching staff. 
This view was emphasised most in response to the first and third questions of the education 
part of the interview (see Appendices B10 and B12). 
In response to the first education question, only four participants, each of them 
students, focused on teachers. Three of the students indicated that the teacher plays a crucial 
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role in moral education, but one participant stated that “if the teachers had the necessary and 
relevant knowledge they could do better moral education.” 
In response to the question regarding the current state of moral education, some 
participants focused on teachers’ behaviour or quality regarding their ability to engage in 
moral education. Several participants have indicated negative attitudes towards teachers who 
conduct moral education, for example: 
“It is taught only in religious education, perhaps by the wrong people.”  
“As far as I can see unskilled teachers are being trained... I don’t think I’ll be a very 
good model so I don’t want morality to be taught... If the system was a bit better more 
skilled teachers could be trained. [...] If I were a parent I wouldn’t want teachers to 
teach anything about morality to my children.” 
This indicates that some participants believe that current teachers who are engaging 
with moral education either are not equipped with the necessary tools to engage in moral 
education or approach the issue from a perspective towards which participants do not have a 
positive attitude. Participants seem to think that teacher training does not equip teachers, 
including themselves, with the best tools for engaging in moral education.  
This is further complicated by another factor. In response to the third education 
question, some participants also emphasised that engaging in moral education is up to the 
initiative of individual teachers. 
“[The current state of moral education is] awful... It is up to individual teachers to 
conduct moral education, and idealist teachers who will do quality moral education 
are very rare.” 
The emerging picture is that, according to participants, the practice of moral education 
in Turkey is weak, and teachers who engage in moral education are not adequately equipped 
to do so. In response to this, participants have also talked about how teacher training should 
be conducted concerning moral education. 
2.6. Teacher Training 
Participants conveyed their views regarding how teacher education should be 
undertaken with regard to moral education in the last (fifth) education question, and the final 
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question of the interview schedule (the third question of the concluding section of the 
interview, see Appendices A7 and A8). 
The last question of the third part of the interview was related to the effect teacher 
training had on implicit moral education: 
“How do you think higher education teacher training affects primary and secondary 
education hidden curriculum? What do you think can be done in teacher training to 
improve moral education in primary and secondary education?” 
This question aimed to elicit participants’ beliefs based on their experience and 
expectations as much as their knowledge of implicit moral education. Participants’ responses 
yielded two themes including a) improving teacher training, and b) the benefit and influence 
of teacher training (see Appendix B12). The majority of statements were categorised in these 
two themes; only three statements were not categorised there. 
All participants, either implicitly or explicitly, indicated that they think that teacher 
training regarding moral education would be very beneficial and that the current system 
needs to be improved in one way or another. While most participants focused on how to 
improve pre-service teacher education, some of the teachers emphasised that in-service 
training would be beneficial. Some teachers also stressed that teacher educators should be 
well equipped to conduct this training, although they did not elaborate on this. The fields of 
moral psychology, student psychology, and developmental psychology were indicated to be 
important to learn in this training. One intern implied that trainee teachers should have the 
opportunity to practise the training they receive: 
“The development of a person must be thoroughly known. Developmental psychology 
must be learnt; student psychology must be learnt; teaching techniques and 
methodologies must also be learnt. The training we get supposedly teaches us this, but 
it is shallow, and we don’t have the means to practise any of this kind of training we 
get. I’m not sure if every graduate of an education faculty is moral either. I don’t 
think the assessment of this training can be tests; the idea is ludicrous.” 
 Another interesting point is that two participants stated doubts about the characters 
and abilities of teachers regarding providing moral education. And finally, all participants, 
except one, indicated that they would have liked to receive this kind of training and would 
have benefited from it. 
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The final question of the interview asked participants whether they would like to 
receive training regarding the topics explored in the interview – mainly moral psychology 
and implicit moral education. Participants’ responses were analysed from the perspective of 5 
main foci. All teachers except one indicated that they would have liked to receive training on 
moral psychology and development. Participants talked about a) the reasons for receiving 
training on moral education, b) how the format of this training should be, c) the content of the 
training, d) who should be given this training, or e) that they would have liked to receive this 
training (see Appendix B14). Twenty-three statements in total have been analysed; including 
some long monologues parts of which have been categorised in different themes. 
The first point to emerge was that all participants except one teacher stated positive 
attitudes towards such training. Some participants have explicitly said that they want to 
receive such training: 
“Of course I would like to have a course like this. I think the training I received is not 
enough. I would have liked to learn more.” 
None of the students, with one exception, could elaborate on the aspects of the 
training they would like to receive, and nearly half of teachers elected not to elaborate. The 
reasoning participants provided for taking this training varied, but the unifying theme of all 
the reasons given is the perception that the training received is not sufficient and should be 
deeper. One student emphasised that people should be given this training, to put it briefly, to 
understand the nature of morality and how the world works in relation to this. 
Concerning the format of this training, participants seem to have a negative attitude 
towards being told top-down what is right and wrong and would prefer a kind of training that 
would allow them to develop their own understanding of morality: 
“A course means directing people. I would like to discuss what people think morality 
is rather than how to be moral. Not like ‘universal morality is this or that.’” 
This has two implications. First of all, it seems that participants do not want to 
recreate the established understanding of morality uncritically, and prefer to receive training 
that would allow them to think about morality critically. And secondly, this implies that 
participants value autonomy in terms of reflecting on morality, and would prefer to foster the 
same kind of autonomy with their own students. However, it should be noted that only 
students and interns focused on this, not teachers. 
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Regarding content, moral philosophy was mentioned most frequently as potential 
content for the training. Moral psychology, moral development and a sociological 
understanding of morality were also considered to be relevant to this kind of training. 
“... we should first understand how morality progressed historically... [...] We should 
understand the human brain’s cognitive process [...] After this, philosophy and 
sociology should enter the scene. This time we should investigate the philosophical 
perspectives on morality. Like pragmatism. [...] It should be in the frame of historical 
development once again, so we can have a sense of the historical pattern, a 
foundation. And we should understand what shapes societies’ understanding of 
morality.” 
This student went into great depth about what the content of training should cover, 
and emphasised that gaining a historical understanding of how and why morality came to be 
considered what it is currently is crucial in terms of understanding the nature of morality. 
Regarding the length of the training considered, participants’ thoughts ranged from ‘a 
few seminars’ to being ‘distributed across secondary and tertiary education.’ Most 
participants implied that this training should be given during university training (although 
some teachers also considered the possibility of in-service training in other questions), and 
most, but not all participants, think that this training should take more than a few lectures or 
seminars. This implies that most participants would prefer in-depth training. 
And finally, although only a few participants focused on this, those who did all 
indicated that at least everyone involved in the education process, including non-teaching 
staff, should receive this training. This implies that at least some participants think that 
everyone who may have an influence on the student should receive training regarding moral 
development. 
2.7. Participants’ Experience of Teaching and Receiving Moral Education 
The first question of the conclusion section of the interview was related to 
participants’ experience of teaching moral values: 
“How much time do you devote to teaching moral values in the classroom? Do you 
use a specific system or method when you teach morality?” 
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The students who had no teaching experience did not respond to this question. The 
remaining participants, including one student who had the experience of a few private 
lessons, responded to this question. Participants either focused on how much time they spend 
on teaching values or the methods they use. Some of the responses, however, did not focus on 
either the time dedicated to teaching values nor on the methods employed. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, teachers gave clearer answers to this question than interns (see Appendix B13). 
The time teachers indicated that they devote to teaching values ranges from “only 
when the opportunity arises” to “all the time.” Two teachers stated that they teach morality as 
part of their lessons every day. These two teachers were primary teachers. In Turkey, primary 
teachers tend to teach a single primary level class most courses every day, having a more 
intimate relationship with the students of their class than other subject matter teachers. All 
other teachers have specific disciplines they teach, and specific discipline teachers, such as 
physics or history, tend to teach a range of grades, so they interact with more students, but 
with less frequency than primary teachers, who specialize on a single class until the class is 
5th grade, when the majority of their courses become taught by subject matter teachers. As a 
result, primary teachers tend to have more opportunities to engage in moral education. Other 
disciplinary teachers indicated that they either conduct moral education in general throughout 
the whole education process or that they spent time on it only when the opportunity arises. 
Concerning methods, teachers were able to give more general answers, whereas 
interns focused on the methods they employed in specific instances during their internships, 
particularly mentoring and guiding the students towards moral behaviour and conflict 
resolution. Teachers, on the other hand, gave more specific methods they employed in 
general. One teacher stated two specific methods (‘I Solve Problems15’ and drama) while 
other teachers focused on either providing experiences or making connections between 
concepts of morality discussed in class to current events in or out of the school. One teacher 
indicated that she tried to make use of Kohlberg’s theory while engaging in moral education. 
The remaining three interns stated that they either had not had the chance to engage in moral 
education, or if they did it they were unaware of it, or that they did not conduct moral 
education at all.  
  
                                                          
15 ‘I Solve Problems’ is a series of activities designed to foster primary students’ problem-solving skills. 
210 
 
3. Belief Differences Based on Participants’ Groups 
This section discusses the differences emerging between participants’ beliefs based on 
which group they are a part of (student, intern, teacher), and based on their disciplines. Belief 
differences based on gender are not discussed here, unlike the discussion of the questionnaire 
data results. Only one of the 20 interview participants was male, and all observation 
participants were female. Thus, a comparison of beliefs based on gender is not possible in the 
qualitative data analysis. 
Three groups of participants took part in the interviews: students, interns, and 
teachers. Results of the regression tests run on the data gathered from the questionnaires 
indicated that there is little statistically significant difference between these three groups’ 
beliefs, and these differences were on minor points. This was investigated in more depth in 
the interviews. Similar to the quantitative data analysis, the interview data also point to only a 
few differences between the beliefs and attitudes of participants from these three different 
groups. 
The first notable difference is in the third introductory question of the interview; while 
most participants indicated that they thought that several academic fields were relevant to 
understanding morality (most often philosophy, psychology, and sociology), half of the 
teachers stated that all areas were related to morality. Secondly, in questions related to moral 
psychology, teachers were more often focused on the developmental aspects of morality in 
terms of how it took place and who influenced moral development. Thirdly, with regard to 
participants’ thoughts about moral education, it seems like the more training and experience 
participants had, the more they appeared to have a positive attitude towards explicit moral 
education. Fourth, with regard to how teacher education could be improved in relation to 
moral education (in the fifth question on education), teachers were the only ones who 
emphasised that in-service training could also be considered, while students and interns 
focused exclusively on pre-service university training. The interesting point here is not that 
interns and students failed to mention in-service training – as the question directed 
participants to think about university training – but that teachers were interested in in-service 
training despite the question’s direction. The final point is that, in line with the quantitative 
analysis, and not surprisingly, the student group did not know what to talk about with regard 
to the hidden curriculum – as they had had no training regarding the hidden curriculum and 
implicit education while interns and teachers had undertaken this training. 
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Participants’ beliefs and attitudes according to their discipline were also analysed. 
However, once again in line with the quantitative analysis, only in a few instances did 
participants’ disciplines seem to influence their thoughts explicitly. One PCG intern focused 
on fostering students’ autonomy in order to foster their moral development, and one 
Computer and Technology Education intern indicated that technology should be a part of 
moral education: 
“Philosophy [should be part of teacher training for moral education], but also other 
relevant things too. These include religion, technological developments, 
psychological theories... Giving the largest share to philosophy, all these should be 
studied.” 
More interestingly, the two primary teachers indicated that moral education was part 
of their daily practice. While explicit moral education is not part of the curriculum in early 
and primary years, the format of the primary education programme seems to allow teachers to 
engage in moral education much more often than other subject matter courses. Apart from 
this, participants’ disciplinary influence did not appear to have an explicit influence regarding 
their beliefs and attitudes about moral psychology and moral education. 
These results imply that participants’ understanding of morality is not related to either 
the teacher training and experience they have or their disciplines. Where differences based on 
participants’ groups can be detected, these are related to issues about moral education rather 
than moral psychology. It might be the case that their understanding of morality is more 
closely related to their worldviews than with their views regarding education and teaching. 
This conclusion also seems to align with participants’ thoughts that moral education is up to 
the initiative of individual teachers who place more importance on what they conceive to be 
moral education and strive to engage with it. Some participants also indicated that while not 
all teachers conduct moral education, some teachers that do should perhaps not, implying that 
participants’ think that their understanding of morality does not overlap with some other 
teachers’ understanding of morality. Finally, this conclusion also seems to be supported by 
participants’ emphasis that moral education should not be conducted in a top-down way, but 
based more on discovery of values through discussions and critical thinking, and practising 
moral behaviour. 
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4. Other Recurring Themes 
In this section, other themes recurring throughout the interviews are presented. 
Participants indicated that these concepts and phenomena are highly relevant to the field of 
moral psychology and moral education. 
4.1. Role of Experiences 
While this was not among the main aims of the interview, participants’ beliefs 
regarding the role of experiences in moral development, and character development, in 
particular, are worth mentioning. Especially in two questions (the second and sixth moral 
psychology questions), some participants indicated that reflecting on past experiences allows 
people to make better moral judgements in the future, and also implied that taking certain 
decisions predisposes us to make similar decisions in the future by either fostering or 
weakening an orientation. This is somewhat in line with Dewey’s (1932) philosophy of the 
moral self, that past choices influence present choices, which in turn dispose us to make 
similar choices in the future. And this pattern of making choices and judgements is a crucial 
part of forming and maintaining our moral self. 
4.2. Social Pressure and the Social Environment 
The social environment and social pressure were recurring themes throughout the 
interviews. The role of the social environment in relation to moral development was 
referenced several times. Participants seem to think that the social environment in which a 
child grows has a critical influence on their moral development. However, participants stated 
negative attitudes towards this influence under certain circumstances. The effect of media on 
moral development was referenced few times, each time along with an indicated negative 
attitude. However, more importantly, the influence of social pressure was referenced in 
different ways. 
First of all, participants indicated that many people act morally, or at least in line with 
social expectations relevant to morality, out of a fear of experiencing ostracism and other 
kinds of social pressure. Contrary to this, participants also indicated that people might 
sometimes fail to act morally due to the same fear. This shows that participants think that 
social pressure can force people to act both morally or immorally. Furthermore, this seems to 
suggest that participants’ understanding of morality does not overlap with their perception of 
the expectations of society, or what the general society thinks morality to be. They seem to 
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think that people’s greater concern is to be approved by general society and by friends and 
family, whether this would require acting in line with morality or not. Participants seem to 
think that, when the influence of the social environment is considered in terms of moral 
development and behaviour, retaining the positive attitudes of others is more important than 
acting morally. The aim of retaining this positive attitude might entail moral behaviour, but it 
might also entail the opposite. 
4.3. Religion and Religious Education with Regard to Morality 
Religion was another theme that recurred several times during the interviews. 
Religion was thought to be relevant especially to a person’s motivation to act morally. It 
should be noted that none of the participants used religious terms when describing morality in 
the second introductory question. However, both positive and negative attitudes towards 
religion were stated during the interviews. 
Religious beliefs are indicated both to motivate and inhibit people from acting on their 
moral knowledge. This implies that participants’ understanding of religion does not entirely 
overlap with their understanding of morality. However, it was also said that religion “elevates 
morality to a higher level,” indicating a level of trust in the moral teachings of religion. Upon 
analysis, this struck me as contradictory, but it was not followed up in the interviews, as I had 
not recognised the contradictory nature of the statements until analysing them. It seems to be 
the case that participants observed a difference in the practice of religion in relation to 
morality. A contrast emerges between the perception of a deep and genuine belief in religion 
which leads to moral behaviour and a shallow technical/tactical belief in religion where moral 
behaviour is conceived of as a tool to secure God’s favour. Participants indicated positive 
attitudes to genuine religious beliefs and negative attitudes towards (what could be described 
as) tactical religious behaviour. 
While attitudes towards religion are either positive or negative depending on the 
context, attitudes towards religious education are negative, at least the way it is currently 
conducted in Turkey. There seem to be two main causes of this negative attitude: firstly, that 
religious education, as it is conducted currently, is perceived to be not pluralistic enough, 
failing to address students of different religious backgrounds and beliefs, thus not appealing 
to all students: 
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“There should be no religious education because the way it is practised now excludes 
people of different religious backgrounds.” 
In relation to this, a narrow understanding of morality is thought to be conveyed 
alongside RE, which fails to address the concerns of a portion of students. Furthermore, 
participants not only implied that their understanding of morality does not overlap with the 
morality taught in RE, but they also implied resentment at such a narrow perspective of 
morality being imposed upon them. One final point of interest is that about a third of the 
participants did not seem even to consider current RE as moral education. 
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5. Conclusion and Summary 
This chapter covered the findings obtained from qualitative data analysis. The results 
indicate that while no participant has a broad and comprehensive understanding of moral 
psychology, collectively their beliefs complement each other. While participants think that it 
is important to teach morality in school, they believe that the influence of moral education is 
limited compared to the influence of the family and the general society. Furthermore, they do 
not think that teachers are equipped well enough to conduct moral education, and most feel 
they are not adequately prepared to engage in moral education themselves. They have all 
indicated a positive attitude towards receiving more training concerning moral education. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter initially revisits the purpose, setting and aims of the study, the research 
questions, and the methodology employed in seeking answers to the research questions. 
Following this, how teacher training and experience influence the development of teachers’ 
and trainee teachers’ beliefs is discussed in the second section. This is followed by a 
discussion of participants’ general dispositions regarding moral education, including their 
thoughts about the current system of moral education and how it should be changed, and their 
attitudes towards their colleagues who engage in moral education in the third section. The 
fourth section goes into greater depth regarding the implications of teachers’ beliefs for their 
potential engagement in face-to-face interactions with students and classroom activities in 
terms of fostering students’ moral development. The fifth section follows this by focusing on 
the implications of the findings in terms of teachers’ beliefs and dispositions relevant to 
creating a school environment conducive to fostering moral development. Finally, the sixth 
section discusses the training ITE programmes seem to provide trainees and possible 
recommendations for revising ITE programmes to better prepare teachers for engaging with 
moral education. Limitations of the study, generalizability and transferability of findings, and 
avenues of potential future research can be found in Chapter VII. 
1. The Purpose of the Research 
This research was born out of my perception as a student and a trainee teacher in 
Turkey that teacher training programmes lacked a sufficient focus on moral education. In 
addition to this, the rising levels of political turbulence, hostility, indifference to others’ 
suffering, and corruption in the last decades in Turkey, made me feel that a greater focus on 
moral education was desirable. As a result, this study aimed to shed light on ways in which 
moral education could be improved in Turkey. 
Drawing from philosophical naturalism, pragmatism, and virtue ethics, it was 
identified that teachers’ beliefs regarding moral psychology, development, and education are 
crucial in terms of their efforts and ability to foster pupils’ moral development. This is mainly 
due to the implicit nature of most moral education taking place in schools, where teachers’ 
beliefs and attitudes – which inform their engagement with implicit moral education – have 
the most significant effect on pupils’ moral development in the school context. This 
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highlights the importance of understanding how ITE programmes in Turkey equip pre-service 
teachers with the beliefs, attitudes, and content matter knowledge relevant to their 
engagement with moral education. However, there is a significant lack of knowledge on this 
issue. Following this understanding, five core research questions were identified: 
1. How does moral education take place? 
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of 
moral behaviour? 
3. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding the occurrence and 
development of moral behaviour? 
4. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral 
education in Turkey? 
5. How do Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral 
psychology and moral education develop through teacher training and teaching 
experience? 
In order to answer these research questions, initially, a deep investigation of relevant 
literature was carried out. The educational literature reviewed to answer the first question 
indicates that, most importantly, while teachers are willing and interested in conducting moral 
education, they are not adequately equipped in their pre-service training to do so. This is most 
clearly exemplified in the lack of ‘moral language’ through which teachers can make sense of 
their moral experiences in school, and their faith in the impact of role modelling, despite 
lacking an understanding of how role modelling works and its limitations. Furthermore, due 
to the nature of morality and the nature of school life, moral education takes place largely 
implicitly through the hidden curriculum, and more broadly, pupils’ interaction with the 
moral ecology of the school. One of the most critical elements of this kind of moral education 
that students receive is their interaction with teachers. These indicate that teachers’ beliefs 
regarding the psychological and educational aspects of morality, which inform their 
behaviour relevant to implicit moral education, are one of the key elements that define the 
moral education pupils receive in school. 
The review of moral psychology literature aimed to provide a clear and 
comprehensive picture of how moral behaviour occurs and develops, to answer the second 
research question. The FCM sheds light on the overall psychological processes that moral 
behaviour entails. It also indicates that these processes can be conceived and fostered as 
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morally relevant skills in education. Moral reasoning was identified as a crucial skill to 
develop as it a) leads to moral judgement, b) is capable of refining and maintaining moral 
intuitions, which drive moral judgement to a larger extent than moral reasoning, c) helps to 
consciously and rationally create and maintain one’s moral self, and d) is more accessible to 
teachers’ influence than other aspects of pupils’ moral psychology. The implications of moral 
reasoning regarding the moral self is especially important, as the moral self is the prime 
motivator for moral behaviour. The motivation to act in moral ways itself resides in one’s 
episodic moral emotions; however, the tendency to feel these emotions are rooted in one’s 
emotional dispositions (which also deeply influence character traits). Furthermore, habits also 
define the moral self, and morally relevant emotional dispositions and habits can be 
consciously and rationally directed through the use of deliberate choice, interests, and 
second-order volitions, highlighting how fostering moral reasoning is central to moral self 
development. Moreover, an understanding of the MFT and TET can help teachers create a 
moral ecology within their schools that fosters pluralism, tolerance, and an orientation 
towards self-preservation or cooperation. The TET also highlights how humans’ cognitive 
capacities amplify the effects of an ethics of self-preservation or cooperation. 
The remaining three research questions were answered through the empirical 
component of this study. The empirical component entailed a pragmatic mixed method 
approach to identifying Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs relevant to the aspects 
of moral psychology and education described in the literature review through a cross-
sectional sampling of the population. The cross-sectional sampling was intended to reveal the 
influence of teacher training and experience on Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ 
beliefs, through a selection of participants that either had little training and no experience 
(first-year students), full training and little experience (interns), or full training and several 
years of experience (practising teachers). The mixed methods approach was intended to 
provide a deep and broad understanding of participants’ beliefs and belief development by a) 
achieving a broad (though possibly superficial) understanding of participants’ beliefs through 
a questionnaire, b) gaining a deeper understanding of identified beliefs through semi-
structured interviews, and c) understanding how these beliefs reflect in teachers’ conduct in 
and outside of the classroom through observations. However, the observations did not meet 
their aim due to an insufficient amount of data collected (see Chapter III for observations and 
Chapter VII for limitations and future directions). 
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The remaining body of this chapter synthesises the understandings gained from the 
literature reviewed in Chapter II with the results of the empirical component of the study 
described in Chapters IV and V.  
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2. Development of Beliefs 
No general patterns regarding belief differences, or development, can be found among 
the participants of this study. This is perhaps one of the most significant findings. Teacher 
training or experience does not have a statistically recognisable impact on the development of 
Turkish teachers’ beliefs. Neither does gender, commitment to the teaching career, nor, 
perhaps more surprisingly, disciplinary focus. Participants differ from each other based on the 
groups mentioned above, in only several minor matters that are largely unrelated. These 
minor differences are discussed in more detail where they become relevant in the following 
sections. 
The most significant of these differences is in educational beliefs; there is hardly any 
difference in moral psychology beliefs that fits any pattern regarding participants’ groups. 
The most that can be said about the development of psychological beliefs is that with greater 
training and experience participants are more likely to indicate a positive or negative attitude 
regarding aspects of moral psychology. In the questionnaires, the student group was more 
likely to respond to questions with ‘not sure’ than interns or teachers were. This suggests that 
students have relatively less confidence in their thoughts or beliefs. However, whether the 
development of confidence regarding this issue is related to teacher training and experience, 
or just age and general life experience, is not clear. The lack of a similar difference in 
educational beliefs suggests that age and experience are more likely to be the root cause of 
the development of confidence.  
One of the most surprising findings was that disciplinary differences are nearly non-
existent. This is surprising because the comparison between participant groups was based on 
whether the participants were students of Psychological Counselling and Guidance (PCG) or 
other disciplines. The PCG department is part of the education faculty; however, courses in 
this department predominantly focus on psychology. While moral psychology is not part of 
the PCG curriculum, it was expected that students who are better acquainted with human 
psychology would differ in their beliefs from students and teachers who are not as 
knowledgeable on psychology as PCG students are. The lack of difference between PCG 
students and students and teachers of other disciplines suggests that the PCG programme is 
no more or no less effective in preparing its students to foster pupils’ moral development. 
One of the main differences between participants lies in their approach to moral 
education. In the interviews, it emerged that younger participants – mainly students and 
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interns – are more interested in discussing the nature of morality and moral education, 
whereas teachers are more focused on the practical aspects. Teachers more often focused on 
how moral development takes place and who influences development in what way, implying 
that teachers are more interested in learning how to conduct moral education, as opposed to 
learning what morality is. In a similar vein, students also seem to talk and think about moral 
education the way they would like to receive it, while teachers think and talk about moral 
education the way they would teach it. This suggests that a course on moral development that 
focuses on the nature of morality and moral psychology would be of greater interest to 
younger trainees, while practical aspects of engaging in moral education would be of greater 
interest to older students and practising teachers (for example, through in-service training). It 
should be noted at this point that in the interviews, many teachers indicated that they would 
be willing to take in-service training concerning how to engage in moral education. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a correlation between greater training and experience 
with more positive attitudes towards explicit moral education. This could be due to several 
reasons, one of which is the ease of conducting explicit education. Explicit education requires 
a set of knowledge and skills; most often this can be obtained from training that equips 
teachers with a set of professional knowledge and expertise. Implicit education, however, 
requires a more subtle approach. I would argue that implicit moral education – constant role 
modelling, reacting appropriately to spontaneous events, etc. – requires the teacher to be a 
certain kind of person, as opposed to possessing a set of skills and knowledge. My view is 
that the teachers who were interviewed had a similar but tacit understanding of the issue – 
that implicit moral education is more demanding of the teacher. And whether episodic 
sessions of in-service training can adequately equip teachers to meet the demands of implicit 
moral education is yet to be seen. 
Finally, while participants’ moral philosophies were not extensively explored in this 
study, there seems to be a wide variety of philosophical understandings of morality that 
inform Turkish teachers’ thinking about morality, moral psychology, and moral education. 
Elements of philosophical naturalism, rationalism and pragmatism were detected; however, I 
should admit that I may be somewhat constrained in my observation, by virtue of being more 
familiar with these schools of thought than most others, and it is possible that I was unable to 
identify many other approaches. Nonetheless, this still implies that a course on moral 
philosophy is likely to be of interest and benefit to Turkish teachers. 
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Given the lack of belief differences among the groups investigated in this study, the 
next section focuses on participants’ general dispositions regarding moral education.  
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3. General Dispositions Regarding Moral Education 
 In the questionnaires participants overwhelmingly agreed that it is important to teach 
morality in school, and that teachers are and should be role models. This is an indication that 
participants of this study are willing to engage in moral education and believe they have a 
moral responsibility as teachers to do so, providing further support to many authors 
(Brookhart & Freeman, 1992; Farkas, Johnson, & Foleno, 2000; Goodlad et al, 1990; Joseph 
& Efron, 1993; LePage, et al, 2011; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013; Temli, Şen, & Akar, 
2011; Wang & Fwu, 2002). 
Furthermore, in the interviews, whenever participants lacked the knowledge to talk 
about an issue related to moral psychology in depth, they frequently referred to the 
developmental aspects of moral education. This is especially exemplified in the responses to 
the interview questions focusing on the components of the FCM, morality as a skill, and 
moral development. Having received no training regarding any of these issues, participants 
were largely unable to talk about the psychological components of moral behaviour, how and 
whether morality can be conceived as a skill, or what it is that actually develops in moral 
development, respectively. Instead, a large majority focused on how psychological 
components of moral behaviour may develop, who or what might influence moral 
development or the development of moral skills. Given that fostering growth is at the heart of 
the teaching profession (even if this growth is most usually of specific intellectual skills), this 
common focus on development further seems to indicate that participants may have the 
growth mindset of a teacher, bringing to the discussion what they can (the perspective of, and 
interest in, fostering development as a teacher) where their content knowledge is insufficient. 
This further provides support to the notion that teachers are interested and willing to engage 
in moral education. Because, otherwise, one would expect participants to disengage (or at 
least give such an indication), or talk in ways that are not so teacher-like during the 
interviews. They spoke of all issues with some enthusiasm, although since they had 
volunteered to participate in the study, this might indicate an existing interest in the subject. 
Contrary to this, during the interviews, some participants also indicated that the 
school’s influence on pupils’ moral development is limited. It was thought that, given the 
definitive impact of the family on students’ moral development, the influence of the school 
could go only so far, and while the school may provide pupils with the experiences and 
observations to foster their moral development, similar experiences and observations also 
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take place outside of the school, and the these would compete with the influence of the 
school. This points to two conclusions: a) that there is a tacit realistic understanding among 
the participants about the limitations of the moral influence of the school, and by extension, 
the teachers’, and b) that participants are aware of how ubiquitous moral interactions are – 
that they pervade all aspects of not only school life, but life in general.  
While attitudes towards moral education among participants are very positive, 
attitudes towards the current system of moral education are not. In the questionnaires, 
participants overwhelmingly indicated negative attitudes towards the current system, and this 
was repeated in the interviews as well – only a quarter of interview participants referred to 
the RCE course as moral education, and more than a third did not seem to consider it as 
moral education at all. The most often cited reason for this negative attitude was the lack of 
pluralism in the course, and that education related to morality did not feature in the course as 
much as it should. While these criticisms reflect some important gaps in the design of the 
course, and have been voiced by other authors (Okçu, 2009; Şaşmaz et al., 2011; Yıldız, 
2009; Yılmaz, 2009), there also seems to be another implicit, political, reason as well. 
As noted in Chapter III, the population sample included in this study was biased 
towards a liberal16 sample. In Turkey, the place of religion in the public sphere, and by 
extension in education, is a hotly debated political and social issue. In this regard, liberals 
tend to favour greater distance between religion and education, while conservatives tend to 
favour closer ties between the two. Furthermore, the MFT indicates that liberals tend to be 
slightly more individualistic than conservatives, valuing autonomy more highly (Graham et 
al., 2013), and this may also apply in Turkey as well. Several participants indicated that 
moral education should not impose certain values and virtues on pupils – or trainee teachers – 
instead favouring a kind of moral education that would foster critical thinking and moral 
autonomy. Moreover, some participants also indicated that religious motives could motivate 
both moral and immoral behaviour (or refraining from either behaviour). This implies that 
participants’ understanding of morality and religion does not overlap perfectly. And finally, 
several participants also indicated negative attitudes towards their colleagues who conduct 
moral education. Given the current state of the system in Turkey, the only teachers who can 
explicitly conduct moral education are the RE teachers, which in all likelihood participants of 
this study criticised based on the assumption that RE teachers emphasise non-secular values. 
                                                          
16 Here I am referring only to liberal or conservative views on social matters. 
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Taking these points together, it is possible that the greatest concern of the participants of this 
study regarding moral education is that, as it stands, moral education is provided in a non-
pluralist and dogmatic manner, undermining secular values, and that it is not entirely geared 
towards fostering morality. This implies that teachers with liberal tendencies may be more 
interested in engaging in moral education from a secular perspective for political reasons or 
prefer to avoid the issue entirely due to the sensitive political situation in Turkey. 
The above indicates what participants think moral education should not be. Given that 
their anxieties about current moral education are more related to the fact that it is bundled 
together with religious education, with less emphasis on its moral aspects, it might be 
expected that they could prefer RE and ME to be separate courses. This preference is 
reflected in the data. There is variety among participants’ beliefs regarding how implicit or 
explicit moral education should be taught, preference for and focus on explicit education 
increasing with age and experience, but in general greater focus on both implicit and explicit 
education was called for. In terms of how explicit education should be designed, most 
participants indicated that ME should not be susceptible to shallow learning based on passing 
tests through rote memorization, but an in-depth, experience and practice-based curriculum, 
fostering moral autonomy and avoiding imposing a set of values and virtues.  
However, there is also one point that seems to contradict participants’ emphasis on not 
imposing values. In the frequency analysis of the quantitative data, the responses to Question 
45 appear to indicate that participants, while believing that morality is learnt first and 
foremost implicitly, gave about the same amount of importance to both top-down teaching 
through lectures on right and wrong and bottom-up discoveries through interactions with their 
peers. At first sight, the value given to top-down teaching may seem to be inconsistent with 
the emphasis that moral values should not be imposed; however, it is more likely that 
participants value top-down teaching in terms of providing a scaffold for pupils’ moral 
development. This theme is explored in more depth in the next section.  
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4. Implications of Findings for Face-to-Face Practice 
Despite all the evident interest and willingness, and convictions about how moral 
education should take place, it is quite apparent that the participants of this study were not 
adequately equipped with the necessary understanding regarding moral psychology to 
optimally carry out ME, in line with the findings of Temli et al. (2011) and Carr and Landon 
(1998; 1999). Given the lack of evidence for belief development based on teacher training 
and experience, this conclusion applies to both experienced teachers as well as students who 
have recently enrolled in an ITE programme. However, the students and teachers who took 
part in this study seem to approach moral education with an interest in fostering development, 
as opposed to outright teaching what is moral and what is not. In fact, many participants have 
expressed resentment towards the latter approach. Based on this, the remainder of the section 
will explore the notion, given participants’ current beliefs, of how they may foster moral 
development by providing a scaffold for pupils’ development. 
Participants were more likely to think that moral behaviour can be conceived as a skill 
– more than 70% of questionnaire participants and 55% of interview participants indicated 
this. More interestingly, during the interviews, it was noticed that most participants seemed to 
have never thought whether morality is a skill or not. The fact that there is a tendency to 
agree with this could either be due to social desirability bias by a high number of participants, 
or that thinking of moral behaviour as a skill fits in with their worldview. 
Whether the following description of skill applies to morality or not in teachers’ view, 
skill is thought to be an intricate ability that requires constant cognitive effort. This belief 
does not entirely reflect the literature regarding moral skills (Narvaez, 2010a; 2010b; Narvaez 
& Lapsley, 2008). With regards to the purposes of this thesis, the degree of the intricacy of an 
ability may reflect the expertise one has regarding the skill. This implies that skills on which 
expertise has not been cultivated would not be as intricate as expert skills. Furthermore, the 
notion that skill requires constant cognitive effort is also problematic. Development of skills 
entails automation at higher levels (Narvaez, 2010a; 2010b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). 
While constant cognitive effort would be required when a new skill is being cultivated, as 
greater expertise is gained the need for cognitive effort would become less frequent; indeed, 
automation is a sign of developed expertise and cognitive effort is a sign of developing 
expertise. These imply that teachers’ perception of skill only reflects newly developing skills, 
and the unawareness regarding the subtle, automated nature of expert skills may cause 
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teachers to misjudge the level of pupils’ moral skills, and by extension, misjudge the best 
course of action regarding how to further foster the development of any given skill. 
Another potentially problematic aspect of teachers’ perception of moral behaviour as 
a skill is the negative attitudes indicated towards it. While only a minority conveyed their 
attitudes, all stated attitudes were negative. It seems to be the case that, given that skills are 
thought to require constant cognitive effort, conceiving of morality as a skill leads some to 
believe that moral behaviour is more likely to be employed in a calculating, Machiavellian 
manner, akin to technical/tactical moral reasoning. This puts moral skills in conflict with a 
truly moral self. It seems to be the case that participants believe that moral behaviour will 
naturally follow from a truly moral self, which in itself may not be an inaccurate conception. 
However, the development of the moral self need not be abandoned to nature, and nurturing 
its development entails the development of skills related to moral motivation. Given the case, 
it may seem that teachers would prefer to refrain from influencing (i.e. fostering) pupils’ 
moral motivation and moral self development, but this conclusion is not supported by other 
results from the data analysis. 
This is especially exemplified in participants’ attitudes towards external moral 
motivation. While they value internal motivation more highly than external motivation, they 
also think that external motivation is necessary. On the one hand, this perceived necessity 
seems based on the value of deterring immoral behaviour through social and/or legal 
punishments, but more importantly, external motivation is thought to be necessary at early 
phases of moral motivation development. Taking these understandings together, it seems that 
participants are interested in providing a scaffold for pupils through external motivation and 
teaching in order to help nature take its course (with regards to the development of a moral 
self, at least), without designing a course for said nature to take. They seem to be in favour of 
providing the resources for pupils to make their own selves (hence the emphasis on providing 
learning opportunities through experiences and observations), without making students’ 
selves for them (i.e. imposing a certain set of values and virtues). 
This implies that the seemingly contradictory nature of participants’ beliefs is in 
essence rooted in an understanding of moral psychology that lacks sufficient nuance. 
Furthermore, they seem to be unaware of this. This gap in teachers’ knowledge and the 
resulting conflicting beliefs can be problematic when it comes to engaging in moral 
education/fostering moral development. At best, these seemingly contradictory beliefs can 
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preclude teachers from optimally fostering moral development, at worst, negatively 
influencing moral development by engaging in activities or interactions with pupils that are 
not appropriate to the students’ level – either underestimating or overestimating students’ 
capabilities and/or needs, or entirely disregarding their capabilities and needs and failing to 
take action where necessary. 
The scaffolding teachers seem interested in providing seems to draw from two 
pedagogical methods: experience and observations. Participants have repeatedly emphasised 
that pupils learn morality best through, and that moral education should be designed to 
provide, experiences and observations. Observations can be thought of as a passive kind of 
experience. On the other hand, in the interviews, participants who mentioned experience as a 
learning method also mentioned application (actively carrying out what was learnt in the 
classroom) as a way of learning. This implies that teachers tend towards providing both 
active and passive learning experiences to pupils.  
With regards to experience, participants’ beliefs about how experience works to 
influence the moral self seem in line with Dewey’s (1932) philosophy, although not so 
nuanced. It is thought that experiences, especially active experiences where pupils carry out 
deliberate choices and have the opportunity to observe the consequences of their decisions, 
foster or discourage an orientation to make similar choices in the future. In this regard, 
Narvaez’s (2010a; 2010b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008) proposed four-stage structure for 
fostering expertise in moral skills is likely to aid teachers in their endeavours. The structure 
proposed by Narvaez addresses teachers’ concerns in that the structure does not require a 
certain set of values to be taught; rather it allows a student to act more effectively with 
regards to their values by equipping them with the relevant subset of abilities and skills. 
In terms of observations, while participants place faith in the impact of role 
modelling, it seems that they are not entirely aware of how it works, or its limitations, 
echoing the findings of Sanderse (2014). Participants did not talk about how pupils may learn 
from observations or role modelling but instead talked about how influential various actors’ 
modelling can be. This indicates an awareness of the limits of teachers’ influence. However, 
the fact that a teachers’ influence is limited does not necessarily imply that the role modelling 
they do is pointless, or that there is no point in improving teachers’ skills regarding role 
modelling. In this regard, it is expected that teachers would be able to put Albert Bandura’s 
Theory of Learning by Observation (1986; 1997) to particularly good use. This would allow 
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teachers to understand how exactly learning through observation works, and thus enable them 
to tailor their role modelling to pupils’ level of learning. 
However, providing developmentally appropriate learning experiences, whether 
passive or active, entails an understanding of morally relevant psychological skills, and the 
developmental pattern of these skills. Yet participants seem to lack an understanding of these 
skills. The majority of participants failed to identify the psychological components of moral 
behaviour (in relation to the FCM), instead talking about how moral development could take 
place. No participant was able to identify moral sensitivity as a component of moral 
behaviour – despite in the questionnaires indicating a perception that there is a general lack of 
moral sensitivity in people. Awareness of moral implementation is also not evident unless 
they were discussing why people fail to act morally. When participants did identify any 
component of moral behaviour, they recognised either moral judgement or moral motivation, 
the latter being more frequently recognised than the former. 
With regards to moral judgement, there is a perceived lack of judgements based on 
reasoning. Participants seem to be aware that moral intuitions are the main drivers of moral 
judgements; however, they respect reasoning more highly. This appears to indicate a dislike 
of uncritically going with one’s gut feeling. There is a risk here, regarding the intuition-like 
behaviour of habitualised moral reasoning. In cases where teachers mistake behaviour based 
on highly developed moral reasoning as uncritical intuitive behaviour, they may inadvertently 
encourage the pupil to take a developmentally regressive path. This highlights the necessity 
of understanding the relationship between naïve intuitive judgements with expert rational 
judgements. Given that moral reasoning can influence intuitions, this suggests that 
participants may be interested in fostering moral reasoning development. However, they are 
not clear regarding the developmental phases of moral reasoning either, suggesting that while 
teachers may be interested in fostering moral reasoning, they lack the necessary knowledge 
and skills to provide a scaffold for pupils’ development. Taking this into account, it is likely 
that teachers would be interested in, and could make use of training regarding moral 
reasoning development.  
Moral motivation is most likely to be recognised as a component of moral behaviour, 
implying that teachers are likely to be most sensitive to pupils’ moral motivation. There is 
general agreement among participants that moral reasoning does not provide moral 
motivation, evidencing a recognition of the gappiness problem (Blasi, 1980; Kristjánsson, 
230 
 
2010a). Participants’ emphasis that values and virtues should not be imposed on the pupils 
via moral education implies that they are disinclined to influence the development of 
students' moral selves directly. Instead, they seem in favour of providing a scaffold for 
development. Their attempts to achieve this would be defined at least partly by their 
understanding of the moral self and its elements. 
While some participants’ beliefs regarding moral emotions reflect the academic 
literature on episodic emotions, other participants’ beliefs reflect the literature on emotional 
dispositions. No participant seemed to be aware that there are two kinds of moral emotions. 
Given that teachers are likely to be disinclined to attempt to influence pupils' moral emotions 
directly, their understanding regarding this topic may serve more diagnostic purposes with 
regards to providing learning opportunities through experiences and observations. However, 
the fact that they understand only one side of the moral emotions coin may create problems 
regarding their analysis of pupils’ behaviour and/or needs relevant to furthering moral 
development. 
Participants’ understanding of second order volitions (see Chapter II, Section 2.3 for a 
description of SOVs; in particular, the review of Frankfurt, 1971) seems to be that they are 
rationally set personality goals. They also indicated a positive attitude alongside this 
conception, suggesting that they like the notion of a rationally defined ideal state of 
personhood that an individual desires to achieve and that this rational maintenance of one’s 
character is, in general, a good thing. The emphasis on, and positive attitudes towards, the 
rational aspect of SOVs in teachers’ conceptions, once again suggests that teachers are likely 
to focus on pupils’ moral reasoning development, in this case, to aid students in defining and 
achieving these personality goals. 
It also seems that some participants, especially PCG students, are acquainted with the 
concept of selfhood. One interviewee brought into the discussion terms such as “ideal 
selfhood” from her own studies, and also highlighted several pitfalls regarding SOVs such as 
setting unrealistic goals leading to problematic behaviour. This suggests that, at least in 
relation to SOVs, certain aspects of the PCG programme may also be included in the ITE of 
other disciplines. However, identifying exactly which aspects are likely to be beneficial to all 
teachers requires deeper investigation, which is out of the scope of this study. 
One final issue relevant to participants’ personal practice of moral education that 
needs to be addressed is moral language. Echoing the observations of Sockett and LePage 
231 
 
(2002) and Willemse et al. (2008), participants seemed to lack the language necessary to 
engage in in-depth discussions regarding moral development and moral education. This is 
most clearly exemplified in the confusion regarding the difference between emotions and 
feelings; and the related confusion regarding moral emotions, character traits, and values and 
virtues (see Chapter II, section 2.3 for the explanation of these terms, and Chapter V, Section 
1.7 for an analysis of participants’ confusion relevant to these terms). This may also have 
some bearing on the confusion regarding participants’ understanding of the difference 
between episodic moral emotions, and moral emotional dispositions. Furthermore, during the 
interviews, many participants had trouble presenting their thoughts in an organised manner. 
Participants frequently stopped talking mid-sentence, or stated their ideas in a fragmented 
manner, as can be seen in some of the translated quotations in Chapter V and Appendix B. 
With regards to fostering pupils’ moral development, command of moral language is 
crucial, for this language is the tool with which teachers may realise their efforts (Sockett & 
LePage, 2002; Tappan 1991; Willemse et al., 2008). Considering Carr and Landon’s (1999) 
observation that the Catholic ethos of one of the schools they visited had equipped the 
teachers and pupils with moral language to some degree, engaging with the philosophical, 
psychological, educational, or theological aspects of morality during ITE may serve to equip 
trainee teachers with moral language. This, yet again, highlights the potential of including 
training regarding morality and moral development in ITE. 
Given the understandings obtained from the literature review and results, this section 
focused on how teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs may lend themselves to conducting 
moral education, and how the gaps in these beliefs could be addressed in ITE. The next 
section focuses on teachers’ beliefs relevant to creating a moral ecology conducive to 
fostering moral development in schools. 
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5. Implications Regarding Moral Ecology 
This section discusses how teachers’ beliefs may influence the moral ecology of the 
school and the hidden curriculum. The discussion initially focuses on teachers’ beliefs 
regarding moral ecology and the hidden curriculum and moral education in relation to these 
two concepts. This is followed by a discussion of how culture and the social environment 
influence pupils’ moral development in teachers’ views, and finally, how the variety of 
identified beliefs may affect school moral ecology. 
Teachers’ conceptions of the moral ecology of the school and the hidden curriculum, 
and the influence of these two concepts on pupils’ moral development is particularly 
important as the majority of moral education takes place through the subtle interactions that 
are a part of these two concepts, due to the nature of morality and the nature of school life 
(Frey, 2010; Giroux & Purpel, 1983; Hertzke, 1998; Yüksel, 2005). Participants seem to be 
aware of this issue as they repeatedly emphasised that pupils learn morality primarily through 
observing their environment, and that the influence of these observations is critical regarding 
the development of moral skills and the moral self. Furthermore, while not a unanimous 
position, a considerable number of participants indicated that a consideration for moral 
education should feature more clearly in the hidden curriculum. This suggests that teachers 
are likely to be sensitive to the physical and psychological environment of the school, and 
could attempt to alter them in order to create a climate more conducive to fostering pupils’ 
moral development. 
Taking this together with the nearly unanimous agreement that teachers and their 
behaviour are the central elements of the hidden curriculum in schools, it appears that 
participants recognise a responsibility regarding the examples they set to pupils. This is 
further supported by the quantitative results that indicate that participants believe that 
teachers are and should be role models. Moreover, this was also emphasised during the 
interviews as well. These suggest that participants are likely to be sensitive to how their 
behaviour indirectly affects pupils’ moral development, and that other teachers’ behaviour 
also has an important effect. 
One important element of the hidden curriculum that participants seem unaware of is 
the influence of the physical environment (e.g. the existence of green space or an art studio 
on school grounds) and the temporal structure of the school (e.g. recess and lesson times, 
holiday dates), by way of implying the priorities of the school (Giroux & Purpel, 1983). 
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While in the questionnaires participants generally indicated agreement that these aspects of 
the school may influence moral development, during the interviews only one student, who 
had not been acquainted with the concept of hidden curriculum until I introduced it to her, 
referred to the potential influence of these aspects of the hidden curriculum. Given that the 
physical aspects of the school do not feature prominently in discussions regarding the hidden 
curriculum in ITE programmes in Turkey, it seems to be the case that while the training pre-
service teachers receive influences their educational beliefs, it also educates them out of 
recognising the impact of the school’s physical aspects on the school moral ecology, due to a 
lack of discussion regarding the matter. This may hinder teachers’ attempts to create a school 
environment more conducive to moral development as they may not be aware of all aspects 
of the ecology. 
On the other hand, just as the interactions of life at school have a subtle yet profound 
effect on moral development, participants emphasised that life outside of school also has a 
similar effect. Participants especially emphasised the influence of the family in this respect. 
This implies that teachers understand that multiple moral ecologies in a pupil's life exert 
competing influences on his/her moral development and that teachers’ influence, while most 
decidedly not in vain and certainly valuable, is limited in comparison to the influence of the 
family. 
On the broader scale of culture, participants have indicated that the culture in which 
an individual grows up influences moral emotional dispositions. Given that participants also 
agreed that school psychological climate influences moral development, there seems to be a 
tacit understanding that school culture and psychological climate may affect pupils’ moral 
development on the scale of school, although this influence would be smaller compared to the 
scale of culture in general. 
To this end, participants stated overwhelming agreement with the notion that a loving 
and secure environment is conducive for moral development. Similar views were also voiced 
during the interviews. Based on this, it can be argued that, considering TET (Narvaez, 2008), 
teachers would tend towards creating a psychological climate in school that fosters an 
Engagement Ethics orientation in pupils, emphasising compassion and cooperation. While the 
details of how this might be achieved in the participants’ views are not clear, the means of 
achieving such an aim would be partly dependent on the situation where a teacher works, or 
the trainee may work in the future, i.e. the existing moral ecology of a school. 
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At this point, participants’ politically relevant concerns regarding the role of religion 
in the moral ecology need to be addressed. Given participants’ emphasis on pluralism and 
resentment of imposing values, it seems as if they would be interested in creating a pluralist 
environment where both religious and secular values can be fostered. However, they may be 
reluctant to engage with the religious aspects of the school moral ecology themselves. This 
implies that, while they are highly unlikely to attempt to repress religious perspectives or 
sensitivities in the school, they may not be very likely to engage with them either. 
Just as participants’ concerns regarding religion are partly based on the perception 
that the central aspect of religion is not morality, so they have indicated that the centre of the 
social environment and social pressure is not morality. Yet, the social environment was 
repeatedly stated to have a deep influence on pupils’ moral development and behaviour. It 
seems to be the case that, participants’ understanding is that social alliances – being in others’ 
good favour, whether teachers or peers – are a priority over socially impartial moral 
principles. While being biased towards one’s social alliances over being impartial and caring 
equally for all people may not sound morally commendable, literature on evolutionary moral 
psychology (beyond the scope of this thesis) supports this position – it is the moral nature of 
Homo Sapiens to prioritise friends and family over strangers and rivals. The educational 
relevance of this position draws attention to the socialisation of pupils, and the impact of 
students’ socialisation on their moral development.  
It appears that in teachers’ understanding, pupils’ socialisation with peers and teachers 
would be key to understanding the impact of school moral ecology on students’ moral 
development. Understanding regarding the influence and progress of socialisation is 
somewhat evident in the analysis of participants’ responses in Section 1.9 of Chapter V. 
Participants believe that during the early years, parents are the most important figures, 
followed by teachers in primary years. During adolescence peers gain greater importance and 
teachers lose some of their influence, and during adulthood the general society and peers are 
thought to be the main influences. This belief places particular importance on primary 
teachers, and to a lesser degree on other teachers as well. Considering that the primary 
teacher system in Turkey affords teachers greater opportunities to influence pupils’ moral 
development, it is likely that primary teachers would be especially interested in the affective 
quality of their relationships with the students.  
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Considering other teachers’ roles in students’ socialisation, middle-school (student 
age 10 to 13) and high school (student age 14 to 17) teachers may be more interested in 
monitoring pupils’ relationships with each other, and how the quality of these relationships 
reflects on the school/classroom psychological climate and moral ecology. In terms of the 
influence of external moral motivation, participants implied that social consequences such as 
ostracism and exclusion from play or peer groups, or the threat of it, would influence pupils’ 
moral behaviour. Such social consequences are likely to impact the psychological climate of 
the classroom or the school as well, in return influencing pupils’ moral development. In this 
respect, middle and high school teachers may be more interested in helping pupils manage 
their social relationships. In this process, teachers would also achieve their aim in providing a 
scaffold for students’ moral development, rather than enforcing on them certain behaviours or 
values (which, by enough repetition, can be habitualised and become part of pupils’ moral 
selves). Helping pupils manage their social relationships need not entail imposing a certain 
set of values on them. Indeed, this approach would be more in line with fostering practical 
wisdom (Hursthouse, 2006) in pupils. 
As a result, such an approach could also accommodate the variety of beliefs that 
teachers hold, with regards to the nature of morality, without forcing conflicting or 
complementary values and virtues on pupils. Participants conveyed a wide array of 
descriptions of what morality is, and a similar variety was found regarding their thoughts on 
which academic fields are relevant to understanding morality. This variety indicates that each 
teacher is likely to contribute uniquely to the moral ecology of the school through their 
relevant beliefs and that in turn, the school moral ecology would have a rich diversity of 
beliefs from which pupils can learn. 
However, some participants also problematised this. Several participants indicated 
that each teacher in the school would hold a unique set of values and virtues, or prioritise 
values and virtues in a unique way, and that this would result in a collectively relativistic, dis-
unified approach to moral education in the school context. It was thought that this dis-unified 
multiplicity would make it harder for pupils to learn morality by observing their different 
teachers. This seems somewhat contradictory with participants’ emphasis on pluralism in 
moral education. However, this could also be due to an underlying conception of a learning 
threshold that needs to be passed, in terms of providing sufficient experiences and 
observations to pupils for them to learn. It could be the case that participants think that in a 
relativistic environment where there is a lack of a unified approach to moral education, pupils 
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will not receive sufficient input to truly learn from the range of observations and experiences 
that prioritise different sets of values and virtues. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence from the interviews that participants tend 
towards a particularist or relativist perspective, as opposed to a foundationalist perspective 
comparable to the argument of the MFT (Graham et al., 2013). Especially from a particularist 
perspective, the lack of unity might be problematic. If the assumption is that there is no 
unifying foundation or consequence/end result, the unique approach each teacher takes would 
be problematic as different teachers’ perspectives would share no common ground. 
This disunity in what is emphasised and how the issue of morality is approached 
could be due to a lack of focus on morality and moral education in ITE programmes in 
Turkey. Given that ITE programmes clearly influence pre-service teachers’ educational 
beliefs in a unifying manner, but no such pattern can be found in the data regarding beliefs 
about morality, it is likely that participants’ understanding of morality is not related to any 
professional training, but to world views in general or some other variable. This suggests that 
providing training regarding moral education and moral development could address this 
problem. 
On the other hand, participants’ particularist views may not be as constraining as they 
think. The Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2013) indicates that there are 
foundations of morality in our evolved moral psychology. The issue regarding differing sets 
of values is more related to differing prioritisations of a larger set of values that each person 
holds to a greater or lesser degree, by virtue of being human. This indicates that even in cases 
where priorities differ wildly, they still share a common foundation, and this would be either 
explicitly or implicitly conveyed to the pupils. Furthermore, this applies not only to teachers 
but the entire society and cultural practices at large, alleviating participants’ concerns about 
competing influences on students’ moral psychology to some extent. 
This concludes the discussion of teachers’ beliefs that are relevant to school moral 
ecology and their potential practices in this context. The next section discusses the training 
Turkish teachers receive and participants’ thoughts regarding training and presents 
recommendations regarding improving ITE programmes in Turkey with regards to equipping 
pre-service teachers with the knowledge and skills to foster pupils’ moral development. 
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6. Training Provided in ITE and Recommendations 
According to the quantitative results, participants of this study had received no 
training at all regarding moral psychology – all psychological beliefs reported and discussed 
in this thesis have developed in the absence of relevant training, whether a PCG student or 
other disciplines. During the interviews, it turned out that some participants had been 
acquainted with some concepts relevant to moral psychology, albeit this acquaintance was 
most often not related to their university training, and overall it was superficial. 
By way of reference, however, participants seem to think that the model most relevant 
to moral psychology that they are familiar with is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, as this was 
mentioned by several participants. In each case where Maslow’s hierarchy was mentioned, 
participants indicated that moral behaviour would become a concern only when one reaches 
the highest level of the hierarchy – actualizing oneself. Of all the misconceptions regarding 
moral psychology identified in this thesis, I think this belief is the most alarming. This 
interpretation implies that morality is not applicable unless one has a considerably fulfilling 
life. However, morality is relevant at all levels of the hierarchy, especially with regards to 
how the needs of respective levels are met. The belief that morality is not relevant unless one 
has a fulfilling life could easily translate into absolving wrongdoers (e.g. bullies) from moral 
responsibility if they are themselves victims of some kind, or are suffering in some other 
manner. This could lead to harmful practices regarding fostering pupils’ moral development. 
It also implies that participants do not recognise how pervasive the relevance of morality is in 
all aspects of life. 
On the other hand, this seems to conflict with participants’ recognition of the ubiquity 
of morality, evident from their views regarding the influence of multiple moral ecologies on 
pupils’ moral development. The issue may be more closely related to the lack of moral 
language. As Tappan (1991) indicates, moral language helps one to make sense of moral 
experiences; in the absence of a sufficiently developed moral language, participants may be 
unable to both make moral sense of their experiences and mentally process and convey their 
related observations in a clear and well-articulated manner. The problematic lack of moral 
language among the participants of this study was discussed earlier. Further evidence of a 
lack of moral language can be found in Appendix B (although many quotations included 
there were translated in a clearer way than they were originally articulated) and in the 
transcripts of the interviews. Indeed, one participant was especially nervous about her 
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capability to talk about the issues explored in the interview as she explicitly stated that she 
did not know how to talk about them. 
While teachers’ disciplines do not seem to influence the development of 
psychological or educational beliefs regarding morality, their experiences of engaging with 
moral education points to some important differences with regards to the opportunities 
teachers have regarding conducting moral education. While most teachers indicated that they 
engaged in moral education only when they found the chance to do so, primary teachers 
stated that they conducted moral education “all the time.” This is due to the primary teacher 
system in Turkey. As explained in Chapter V, primary teachers tend to engage much more 
often with a single class whereas specific subject teachers (e.g. history, English) tend to 
engage with a greater number of pupils for much shorter times per week. Primary teachers 
also have form tutor responsibilities for their own class. This gives primary teachers greater 
chance to impact students’ moral development much more deeply. However, the number of 
pupils they can influence is limited. Specific subject teachers, on the other hand, can 
influence a larger number of students but to a lesser degree. 
Most importantly, this shows how teachers’ disciplines influence their socialisation 
with pupils, and by extension, their potential influence on pupils’ moral development. The 
training regarding ME provided in ITE would need to take this into account, and be tailored 
according to how teachers’ disciplines provide the context for their socialisation with pupils. 
Practising teachers were able to explain in some detail how they engage with moral 
education (if they do at all). Activities designed to foster students’ problem-solving 
capabilities and drama were given as examples. While problem-solving capabilities could 
potentially foster moral reasoning and moral judgement development, role-playing (drama) 
has been demonstrated to foster moral sensitivity and moral motivation through empathy 
(Bebeau, 1994). ITE programmes or in-service training can capitalise on teachers’ familiarity 
with these methods in terms of equipping them with pedagogical methods designed to foster 
moral development. 
In opposition to this, interns were unable to reflect the same depth. While this is not 
surprising considering that interns have had much fewer opportunities to engage in moral 
education, many interns complained that they had never had the chance to practise moral 
education, and many of them seemed ambivalent about the prospect of doing it. Some 
participants clearly felt they were not up to delivering moral education; interns especially 
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seemed anxious at the prospect of teaching morality. This, once again, points to how the lack 
of a focus on morality in ITE can work against teachers’ interest and willingness to engage in 
moral education. 
Participants’ thoughts regarding how ITE should be designed in order to equip teachers 
with the abilities and knowledge to foster pupils’ moral development also need to be 
discussed, as this has implications regarding their openness to the kinds of potential training 
they can receive, and by extension, the potential impact of training. 
Participants have indicated the training they have received, or are receiving, is lacking 
in terms of preparing them to engage with moral education, and stated that they would have 
benefitted from such training both as a teacher and as an individual. They have also said that 
all trainee teachers should receive training on moral development regardless of their 
disciplines on the basis that morality is ubiquitous in the school context. In fact, some also 
suggested that non-teaching staff of the school should also receive some training, as they are 
also part of the moral influence pupils are exposed to. While the suggested length of training 
varies from ‘a few seminars’ to ‘distributed throughout secondary and tertiary education,’ 
more often they tended towards long-term and in-depth training, although this may have been 
partly due to – once interviewed – participants understanding that their grasp of the 
philosophical, psychological, and sociological aspects of morality is limited. It was suggested 
that this in-depth training should cover these three aspects of morality. However, very few 
participants were able to elaborate in greater detail about what training on each field should 
entail, presumably due to their lack of knowledge on what is morally relevant. It was re-
emphasised that values should not be imposed on trainee teachers, but that training should 
foster autonomy and critical thinking, in line with their approach to moral education 
discussed in Section 3 of this chapter. In a similar vein, they indicated that the assessment of 
this training should not be based on tests that encourage rote memorization. 
The remainder of the section discusses how ITE programmes may provide training to 
pre-service teachers based on identified misconceptions of morality, dispositions of teachers 
as existing strengths and weaknesses regarding their ability to engage with moral education, 
and participants’ stated preferences regarding the kinds of training they can receive in terms 
of their openness to potential kinds of training. 
Based on the discussed conclusions so far, the initial consideration that needs to be 
taken into account is what kind of training are Turkish pre-service teachers are likely to 
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benefit from, given their concerns and interests. It seems to be the case that, in light of the 
findings of this study, and to the extent that they can be generalised (see Chapter VII for the 
generalisability of findings and the related limitations of the study), Turkish teachers are 
interested in fostering pupils’ moral development by providing them with a scaffold. 
Considering the reviewed literature, several specific suggestions can be made for ITE 
curriculum designers to meet this concern and interest of teachers.17 
Considering participants’ responses, it can be said that Turkish teachers would prefer 
in-depth and long-term training that covers a wide range of morally relevant fields over 
several years. Participants have generally indicated a preference for philosophical, 
sociological, psychological, and other perspectives that would ultimately provide a 
fundamental understanding of the nature of morality, and a deep understanding of how to 
implement a kind of moral education that fosters pupils’ moral autonomy. 
For teachers to be able to meet this aim, the training they receive would need to 
address several seemingly widespread misconceptions regarding moral psychology. 
Collectively, participants’ beliefs tended to be overall in line with academic literature; 
however, at the individual level no participant was especially knowledgeable on moral 
psychology, so it is likely that any and all relevant training they receive will be of value. It is 
envisioned that clarifying teachers’ understanding of skills, and by extension moral skills, and 
the development of moral skills into higher levels of expertise would be particularly 
beneficial. 
In this regard, considering the literature analysed in Chapter II, it could be suggested 
that training on the FCM would be beneficial, as the model provides an overview of the 
psychological skills relevant to moral behaviour. In support of this, literature regarding the 
concept of moral skills, and the developmental pattern in terms of expertise would be useful. 
I would suggest that the four-stage structure proposed by Narvaez (2010b) would provide a 
complementary understanding. Furthermore, this four-stage model would also provide 
teachers with a better understanding regarding how and what kinds of experiences they could 
provide to pupils in order to foster their moral skills. 
                                                          
17 In the suggestions of this section, I have endeavoured to keep to the literature I have reviewed in this thesis, 
and all proposed training and literature is proposed as a starting point – none of the suggestions here should 
be considered an exhaustive list of possibilities. 
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These elements of training could clarify teachers’ misconceptions regarding moral 
skills, and perhaps alter their current negative attitudes towards it as well. Furthermore, if 
teachers receive training regarding how moral skill expertise develops, their incomplete 
conception of skill, which seems to be limited to only the newly developing phase of skills, 
can be addressed. This would also support their efforts in fostering pupils’ moral reasoning 
development. 
With regards to participants’ understanding of moral reasoning development, while 
their understanding does not seem to contradict the psychological literature on the matter, it 
lacks depth. Based on the theory analysis in Chapter II, training on the levels and/or schemas 
of moral reasoning (e.g. Rest et al., 1999; 2000) could address this deficiency. This could be 
achieved through providing training on Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory 
(Kohlberg, 1981; 1984), and the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to the theory (Rest et al., 1999; 
2000). Furthermore, the heteronomous/autonomous orientation cycle proposed by 
Eckersberger & Zimba (1997) could provide further nuance to teachers’ understanding, 
which could help them design their classroom activities and their interactions with pupils 
according to the students’ level. 
However, considering the theories reviewed in Chapter II, disregarding teachers’ 
beliefs and attitudes regarding moral intuitions can be problematic. Providing training on 
moral intuitions, through the SIM (Haidt, 2001) and MFT (Graham et al., 2013), could help 
teachers gain a broader and deeper understanding of moral judgement processes, as well as 
alerting them to how highly developed moral reasoning skills may behave like moral 
intuitions. Furthermore, the proposed links of the SIM (see Figure 1 in Chapter II, or Haidt, 
2001) can highlight to trainee teachers the value of their positive bond with their pupils – that 
their reasoned arguments are not likely to influence pupils’ moral reasoning if they lack  a 
positive bond with the pupil, since reasoned arguments do not lead to moral judgements in 
another person unless the argument taps into their moral intuitions, and the likelihood of 
tapping into another’s intuitions is increased when there is a positive bond between the 
parties having the discussion (Haidt, 2001). 
Data analysis revealed that teachers aim to foster pupils’ moral motivational 
constructs – most importantly pupils’ moral selves. Analysis of reviewed literature would 
suggest that understanding moral judgement, and the moral reasoning process in particular, 
would also help teachers achieve this aim. This is based on data analysis regarding teachers’ 
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dispositions and attitudes towards providing a scaffold for development, and the power of 
second-order volitions (Frankfurt, 1971; Kristjánsson, 2010a) and interests (Dewey, 1932) as 
consciously devised and maintained methods of forming a moral self. In this regard, 
considering both data analysis and reviewed literature, providing training on the 
philosophical literature on the moral self, interests and second-order volitions can help 
teachers acquire the necessary depth in understanding. Considering the literature reviewed in 
this thesis, the literature by Kristjánsson (2010a) and Blasi (1980; 1999) could further 
teachers’ understanding of the moral self, Frankfurt’s (1971) discussion of SOVs, and 
Dewey’s philosophy of the moral self regarding interests and habits (from Hickman & 
Alexander, 1998) could provide at least a starting point for training. 
Training on the moral self can also clarify several other misconceptions identified in 
the data analysis. Most importantly, teachers’ confusion regarding the difference between 
episodic emotions and emotional dispositions, and by extension their confusion regarding 
emotional dispositions, character traits, and values and virtues could be addressed. 
Furthermore, although tangentially relevant, the confusion between moral emotions and 
morally relevant feelings could be clarified. The psychological and philosophical literature 
reviewed in Section 2.3 of Chapter II could provide a starting point for discussions/training 
regarding this matter. 
Most importantly, however, providing such training could equip teachers with the 
moral language they are currently lacking, following from Tappan (1991), and Sockett and 
LePage (2002). I do not think that ITE programmes would need to address the issue of moral 
language separately if the above training were provided – this training itself would, as a side 
effect, equip teachers with the philosophically and psychologically relevant moral language. 
The more training is provided, the more robust teachers’ moral language would become. This 
would apply not only to the training suggested here, but any and all training trainees receive. 
One final problem that could be addressed is the perceived problem of relativism. 
While the psychological and philosophical points suggested above as training would be 
explicitly or implicitly based on virtue ethics, alleviating their concerns of relativism to a 
certain extent, theoretical analysis in Chapter II would indicate that the MFT could be 
especially useful in dispelling this concern. The MFT provides a pluralist, but not a relativist, 
understanding of moral psychology. The philosophical approach inherent in the MFT 
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addresses the limitlessness problem of relativism, while at the same time providing space for 
pluralism. 
On the other hand, there are several dispositions and attitudes that ITE programmes 
may capitalise on and foster. It was argued in Chapter I that pluralism is a sound 
philosophical aim to pursue in moral education. The findings of this study indicate that 
Turkish teachers also value pluralism, and are disposed to foster it. Considering only the 
literature reviewed in Chapter II, the MFT is, I think, particularly conducive to helping 
teachers achieve this aim – both considering their face-to-face interactions with pupils and 
their influence on the school’s moral ecology. The theory sheds light on how teachers, 
students and parents may hold differing values, and understanding this may allow teachers to 
negotiate potentially sensitive situations (whether moral or political) that may occur in 
school, by way of emphasising shared values and concerns. Furthermore, this would also be 
beneficial not only for the liberal teachers represented in this study, but the conservative 
population underrepresented in this study as well – MFT sheds light on conservative morality 
for liberals, and also on liberal morality for conservatives. 
In Section 3 of Chapter II, it was concluded that moral reasoning is the door through 
which teachers can influence pupils’ moral development. This study has discovered that 
Turkish teachers are especially interested in students’ moral reasoning development, and not 
disposed to attempt to influence pupils' moral selves directly. Although an understanding of 
moral reasoning alone would not be sufficient and would need to be supported with other 
aspects of moral psychology, this general disposition could be supported through relevant 
training. 
Another ecologically relevant disposition teachers seem to hold, that is worth 
fostering in my opinion, is their awareness of the ubiquity of morality. Teachers understand 
that there are a number of moral ecologies, inside and outside of the school, that exert 
competing influences on pupils’ moral development. They are aware that their own influence 
is limited but do not seem to be daunted by this aspect. Furthermore, it seems to be the case 
that they would endeavour to create a moral ecology in their school that would foster an 
Engagement Ethics orientation, as described by the TET (Narvaez, 2008). In this regard, the 
value of pursuing this tendency, and the methods and end result of achieving it could be 
fostered by including the TET in the training provided. 
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Related to this, Turkish teachers seem to have a tacit understanding that pupils’ 
socialisation with their peers and teachers has a key role in their moral development in 
school. I believe this is a key understanding that needs to be fostered, however, not having 
dealt with the relevant literature in this thesis in depth (as it was beyond its scope), I will not 
suggest anything in particular. The only piece of literature explored in this thesis that is 
relevant to this conception is Haidt’s (2001) musings on immersion in cultural complexes 
during adolescence. Apart from this, I would suggest literature on the evolutionary 
psychology of morality, or, as participants have suggested, morally relevant aspects of 
sociology. 
Data analysis indicates that teachers are drawn towards the idea of teaching morality 
by providing observations through role modelling, and experiences where pupils can practise 
their moral skills. I would argue that this also is a disposition worth fostering in ITE. The 
literature most relevant to this disposition includes Dewey’s philosophy of experiences, 
habits, and the moral self in relation to these (Dewey, 1932), and Narvaez’s (2010b) four-
stage structure for fostering moral skill expertise with regards to providing experiences; and 
Albert Bandura’s (1986; 1997) Theory of Learning by Observation. 
Finally, with regards to teachers’ and trainee teachers’ dispositions, analysis of data 
suggests that younger trainees are more interested in the nature of morality, while older 
students and practising teachers are more interested in the practicalities of engaging in moral 
education. Taking this into consideration, a broad, year-by-year structure could be suggested 
for ITE institutions, based on theories analysed here, as a potential starting point for 
discussions regarding the revision of ITE curriculum. 
I would suggest that at the earlier phases of training, greater emphasis is placed on 
normative and meta-ethical understandings of morality. This would entail most prominently a 
range of philosophical approaches to morality, including, but not limited to, pragmatism, 
virtue ethics, and rationalism. Pragmatism, especially Dewey’s (1909; 1932; Hickman & 
Alexander, 1998) philosophy of education in general and his philosophy of moral education 
in particular, is expected to be of great interest, given the emphasis participants made 
regarding learning morality from experience. In relation to this, virtue ethics is also expected 
to be of interest, especially concepts such as techne, eudaimonia, natural virtue and full 
virtue, and practical wisdom (see Section 4.2, Chapter I for an overview). 
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It could also be suggested that sociological perspectives of morality are introduced in 
the early phases of training as well, given that most think that social concerns take priority 
over moral concerns. However, considering that the aim of the early phases of training is to 
provide a fundamental understanding of morality, it is suggested that sociological 
explorations at this stage revolve around the notion of the social nature of humans in relation 
to morality, rather than exploring cultural and societal habits relevant to morality, as an 
understanding of the latter is more relevant to practical application of relevant knowledge. 
The early phases of training could also include theological approaches as well, given 
the prominence of religious concerns and their deep connection with morality, at least in the 
Turkish context. Indeed, many teachers in Turkey encounter pupils of differing religiosity, 
and whether liberal or conservative, Turkish teachers will need to attend to students’ (and 
perhaps even parents’) religious concerns as long as they engage with moral education. 
However, this suggestion may be contested based on political orientations. While 
disregarding religious concerns entirely would invariably lead to problems, at least in the 
current conjuncture of Turkey, trainee teachers and lecturers of differing political orientations 
may demand or contest the inclusion of theological aspects of morality as part of the provided 
fundamental understanding of morality. Liberal leaning teachers may consider theological 
considerations as more relevant to the practicalities of engaging with moral education, while 
conservatives may think theological aspects are fundamental to an understanding of morality. 
I suggest each university has its own internal discussion regarding the place of religion in this 
matter. 
It can be suggested that, during the middle phases of training, greater attention is paid 
to psychological aspects relevant to morality. This would entail, most importantly, academic 
literature regarding moral psychology. Theories and models such as the Four Components 
Model for clarifying morally relevant skills and their development as well literature regarding 
moral skill expertise; the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Cognitive Development Theory for 
equipping teachers with an understanding of moral reasoning and its development; the Social 
Intuitionist Model for the unconscious side of the moral judgement processes; and Moral 
Foundations Theory and Triune Ethics Theory for their moral ecological relevance are 
envisioned to be useful in this context. However, this phase of training need not be limited to 
moral psychology alone. Participants have stated interest in cognitive development and 
developmental psychology as well. Depending on how the religious and social aspects of 
morality are addressed in the training programme, these subjects could receive greater focus 
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during mid-training. Furthermore, sociological aspects of morality, in terms of cultural and 
societal practices could also be part of mid-training, considering their relevance regarding the 
practicalities of the social nature of morality. I should note that the necessary clarification of 
misconceptions that I have suggested above, would take place during mid-training. 
In later stages of training, it is suggested that greater attention is paid to the 
educational aspects of morality. Having built a foundational and practical understanding of 
morality based on philosophical, psychological, sociological, and theological approaches to 
morality and moral behaviour, trainees could approach moral education in a much more 
equipped and knowledgeable manner. Thus, in the final stages, pedagogical methods 
regarding how to teach morality, and other potential methods of how to influence the moral 
ecology of the school are likely to be of greater interest to trainees. In this regard, Narvaez’s 
(2010b) four-stage structure of fostering moral expertise could equip teachers with clear 
methods of providing experiences to pupils, while Bandura’s (1986; 1997) Theory of 
Learning by Observation could help teachers to develop an understanding of how to provide 
observations through role modelling. In addition to this, more direct methods of influencing 
the moral ecology of the school could be provided to teachers through a more practical 
application of the understandings gained from their studies of the MFT and TET. This 
approach would also coincide with the greater focus on implicit education commonly found 
in the final year of ITE programmes in Turkey. Furthermore, participants also called for more 
opportunities to practise what they learn. This could be achieved through the placements 
trainee teachers undertake in the final years of ITE programmes. So, the practical focus of the 
later stages of training would also coincide with the current focus of ITE programmes on 
practice. 
The final issue to be considered in this section in broad terms, is the possible 
variations in the training provided. The first criterion in this regard that needs to be accounted 
for is trainees’ disciplines. Based on how teachers’ disciplines dictate their socialisation with 
pupils, and depending on the developmental level of the pupils with whom the teachers will 
be engaging, the training provided to pre-service teachers can be tailored to their specific 
needs. As an example, for primary teachers, an in-depth understanding of the early phases of 
moral reasoning development would be desirable; understanding how important their positive 
bond with pupils influences pupils’ moral development would also be crucial. Beliefs 
regarding innateness are more relevant to teachers who deal with very young pupils as well – 
one question primary teachers may seek an answer for is “what are the innate psychological 
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structures that are organized in advance of experience, and how can the experiences I provide 
for my pupils foster the development/organisation of these innate capacities?” 
For subject matter teachers who engage with a greater number of older pupils for less 
time per week, understanding the social network of their students could be of greater 
importance. Middle phases of moral reasoning development such as the Maintaining Norms 
Schema would also be more relevant, and once again the importance of a positive bond with 
pupils is worth emphasising. For teachers who engage with adolescents more frequently, the 
moral self literature, especially with regards to SOV selection, and interest and habit 
cultivation, is likely to be more useful and beneficial. 
While the above suggestions assume that training provided can be spread over several 
years, with attention devoted to elements of training every week, it excludes practising 
teachers who have expressed interest in in-service training, but may not have the opportunity 
to devote as much time to such training. Policymakers would need to consider such needs of 
practising teachers and make necessary adjustments in the training curriculum. However, this 
may also entail some sacrifices in terms of the depth of the training provided, as it is not clear 
whether episodic sessions of in-service training could adequately equip teachers to engage 
with the complexities and subtleties of implicit moral education. On the other hand, 
practising teachers’ (perhaps tacit) familiarity with the implicit aspects of education may 
alleviate some of the losses incurred by the time limitations imposed on in-service training. In 
this case, in-service training may only need to attend to teachers’ practical knowledge of 
moral psychology and development, and only the most crucial elements of the final stages of 
training suggested above.  
In closure, it should be re-emphasised that training provided should not be geared 
towards solely expanding teachers’ knowledge of moral psychology and moral education. 
The delivery of the training, suggested here in the broadest outline, would focus on the 
practical application of new understandings gained from the training. Hence, the suggestions 
made here should not be taken to mean that the application of the literature reviewed in 
Chapter II should be imparted word for word. The technical language of moral psychology or 
moral philosophy does not need to be included to the maximum possible extent; technical 
vocabulary employed in training would depend on tutors’ style of teaching, and how relevant 
each tutor finds the technical language to the ultimate aim of equipping trainees with better 
intellectual tools and beliefs to carry out moral education. 
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In contrast to this, a concern regarding teachers’ and trainee teachers’ ‘moral 
language’ (Socket & LePage, 2002) also needs to be addressed. The fact that specialist 
philosophical and psychological vocabulary is not essential for teachers’ practice of moral 
education does not mean that a focus on moral language is not warranted. How teachers think 
and talk about morality, the lens through which they understand morality, needs to be 
considered in suggested training. Only, the development of a ‘moral language’ does not need 
to be based on the technical vocabulary of morality. While attending to teachers’ and trainee 
teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011), it is expected that 
moral language would develop alongside  more nuanced beliefs, as the use of a morally more 
nuanced language would be necessary in engaging with these relevant beliefs.  
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7. Summary 
This chapter has discussed the implications of the findings of this study, and how the 
literature reviewed in Chapter II can be effectively employed in order to equip Turkish 
teachers and trainee teachers to foster pupils’ moral development. Most importantly, it was 
discovered that teachers and trainee teachers are dissatisfied with the current state of moral 
education, but that they lack the ability to take matters into their own hands – they are not 
equipped to carry out moral education. Furthermore, teacher training programmes in Turkey, 
as they are currently conducted, do not influence teachers’ moral beliefs and attitudes 
relevant to education. In order to address this issue, their current state of knowledge and 
dispositions were researched, and suggestions regarding how to dispel misconceptions and 
foster valuable dispositions through teacher training programmes were discussed. 
The most critical findings in this regard include teachers’ and trainee teachers’ lack of 
moral language which could help teachers mediate and mentally process their morally 
relevant experiences, and further allow them to engage with moral education. It is clear that, 
overall, teachers and trainee teachers lack sufficient understanding of moral psychology; how 
this problem could be resolved through relevant training was discussed in depth; however, a 
detailed discussion of how to implement these ideas for ITE is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
The most important dispositions that I would suggest ITE programmes foster include 
teachers’ interest in enabling moral development through providing a scaffold, rather than 
dictating a path to moral development. I would suggest that teachers’ interest in fostering 
pluralism is also capitalised on. Participants have expressed an interest and willingness to 
take in-depth training on moral philosophy, psychology, and sociology. In order to 
accommodate this inclination, ITE programmes may consider expanding the curriculum, 
introduce an elective course, or substitute another course with one on morality. However, 
ultimately this decision would be needed to be made by individual Turkish universities, as 
universities have some autonomy regarding their curriculum, and more specific 
circumstances and concerns may influence this decision. 
The body of knowledge created in this study cannot be said to build squarely on 
previous knowledge. However, it adds much greater depth to a barely researched area – 
namely, Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ moral beliefs and attitudes relevant to 
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education, and how teacher training and experience influence the development of these 
beliefs.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter of the thesis, the key findings are summarised. This summary is 
followed by a commentary on the limitations of this study and the generalizability of the 
conclusions. Finally, potential avenues of future research are explored, and the thesis is 
concluded with some final thoughts. 
1. The Main Aim of the Research & Summary of Key Findings 
There are growing rifts in the social fabric of Turkey, institutions no longer work as 
impartially as they could, and this situation has been abused by some people in Turkey – 
leading to corruption in many sectors, including education. While this may provide a bleak 
picture, education can help tackle this problem, and could indeed provide a long-term 
solution to such problems faced by not only Turkey but many countries around the world. 
Moral education, in particular, can help to address such problems. However, previous 
research in Turkey (Temli et al., 2011) and around the globe (Carr & Landon, 1998; 1999; 
LePage et al., 2011) has shown that teachers are not adequately equipped to carry out moral 
education, despite being willing and interested in conducting it. In order to address this 
problem, teacher training programmes need to equip teachers with the necessary intellectual 
tools. But where to start? 
“The most important single factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows. 
Ascertain this and teach him/her accordingly” (Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian, 1978, p. iv). 
There is a significant gap in knowledge regarding Turkish teachers’ beliefs relevant to 
conducting moral education, and how teacher training and experience influence the 
development of these beliefs. In light of this understanding, this thesis has aimed to 
understand, first, what might constitute as relevant knowledge and skills for teachers, 
secondly, what Turkish teachers’ current beliefs and attitudes relevant to moral education are, 
and thirdly, what the role of current ITE programmes in Turkey are in influencing these 
beliefs and attitudes. This thesis specifically focused on the psychological nature of morality, 
and how teachers could positively affect this in schools. 
Moral education takes place mostly implicitly, due to the nature of morality and 
school life. The most central element of this implicit education is teachers’ interactions with 
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pupils. In this respect, an in-depth understanding moral psychology can inform teachers’ 
interactions with pupils, foster the development of students’ moral skills, and help teachers 
create a school environment that is conducive to moral development. Thus, an understanding 
moral moral psychology and the moral ecology of the school is key for teachers regarding 
their engagement with moral education. 
However, teachers or trainee teachers are insufficiently equipped with the relevant 
knowledge or beliefs to deliberately influence students’ moral development or the moral 
atmosphere of the school. Neither teacher training (as currently conducted) nor teaching 
experience seem to have an influence on teachers or trainee teachers’ beliefs relevant to their 
engagement with moral education. This appears to apply even to PCG students, who may 
have been expected to be better informed, or capable of making better guesses, regarding 
moral psychology, due to their greater familiarity with developmental psychology through 
their studies. This is evident from their lack of moral language. These findings echo that of 
Temli et al. (2011) in the Turkish context, and LePage et al. (2011), Carr and Landon (1998; 
1999), and Sockett and LePage (2002) internationally. Yet this is still among the most 
significant findings of this study, as it clearly shows a lack of desirable focus on morality in 
teacher training. 
On the other hand, teachers have expressed an interest and willingness for both 
engaging in moral education, also echoing the findings of Temli et al. (2011) in the Turkish 
context, and LePage et al. (2011), Carr and Landon (1998; 1999), and in receiving training 
relevant to conducting moral education. This finding implies that any attempt to help teachers 
better foster pupils’ moral development is going to be well received. Recommendations have 
been made to policymakers regarding this issue in Chapter VI. 
It was suggested that, in terms of moral psychology, teachers need to understand that 
moral behaviour is a skill that can be developed through education. The aspect of moral 
psychology most relevant to teachers is moral reasoning: by fostering pupils’ moral reasoning 
capabilities, teachers can equip students with the ability to maintain their moral intuitions and 
selves consciously. Expert moral reasoning skills can help one to cultivate moral intuitions 
that would cohere with an understanding of practical wisdom and moral self. Furthermore, it 
can also help pupils cultivate practical wisdom as well. However, for teachers to be able to 
provide the right kind of education for moral reasoning, they also require a broader 
understanding of moral psychology. This includes a) other moral skills (moral sensitivity, 
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moral motivation, and moral implementation), and b) the moral self. In this way, teachers can 
not only foster moral reasoning development but equip pupils with the kinds of moral 
reasoning skills that would allow them to maintain conscious control over the moral aspects 
of their lives and selves. This focus on moral psychology, alongside a focus on moral 
philosophy and aspects of sociology, can also address the identified lack of moral language. 
In terms of teachers’ dispositions regarding how to foster students’ moral 
development, there are three key findings that an understanding of moral psychology could 
support. Firstly, it was discovered that teachers are more interested in providing a scaffold for 
students moral development; teachers are disinclined to impose a set of values and virtues, 
and would rather prefer to help students natural moral development instead of dictating a 
course to said nature to take. Secondly, it also seems that teachers tend towards creating a 
pluralistic school environment that emphasises compassion and cooperation.  
One unexpected and new finding that is highly relevant to any training that may be 
provided to teachers is how influential political orientations seem to be in terms of teachers’ 
dispositions towards moral education. Teachers have repeatedly indicated that they would be 
disinclined to teach morality in a top-down, dogmatic manner, imposing a certain set of 
values and virtues on their pupils. They have also voiced a similar disinclination regarding 
the training they would receive in this manner. This aspect of teachers’ dispositions should be 
considered in cases where training is to be provided to them, as this is the most central aspect 
of the provided training that determines trainees’ openness to receiving training. 
Turkey is facing serious challenges and is going through historic shifts. How these 
challenges are met will define the future of the country both in political terms, and in social 
and moral terms. The steps suggested in this thesis to improve moral education in Turkey are 
envisioned to help the next generation better meet the ethical and social challenges the 
country faces. 
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2. Limitations and Generalizability of Findings 
This study has several limitations. The most important limitation based on design is 
that this study has researched a cross-sectional sample of participants. Based on this sample, 
no pattern regarding the development of beliefs investigated in this study was found. 
However, cross-sectional studies are not as robust as longitudinal studies in determining such 
developmental patterns. While a longitudinal study could have been preferable for the aims of 
this study, it was not feasible for practical reasons detailed in Chapter III. 
Another limitation of this study is related to the observations: observations were 
conducted in order to triangulate participants’ statements in the questionnaires and 
interviews, with a view to ascertain to what degree these statements were reflected in 
classroom practice. However, I now believe that I underestimated the depth and complexity 
of the issue. Had I achieved my original aim of 10 schools, it could have provided sufficient 
variety. My underestimation was in assuming that 2 to 4 hours of observations per school 
would have been enough. I had arrived at this conclusion based on my practice observations 
in the school where I worked. However, I now think that I took for granted my acquaintance 
with the pupils and teachers I had observed in my work place. I now think that in order to 
effectively employ observations in a study like this, the study would need to be driven 
primarily by the observations, and quantitative methods and interviews would only provide a 
supporting role to the observations. 
In relation to this, a more qualitative research design could have been employed at the 
expense of generalizability. This could have been achieved by two central changes to 
methodology: Firstly, the ethnographic observations of teachers’ practice would be employed 
as the primary data gathering tool. The observations would be supported by pre-observation 
questionnaires that involve open ended questions designed to tease out participants’ beliefs 
relevant to moral education in response to a small number of vignettes/short stories depicting 
a moral dilemma, and post-observation interviews informed partly by participants’ observed 
behaviour and questionnaire responses, and partly by theory. However, such an approach 
would constitute a fundamentally different research project, and might be better suited for 
answering research questions of a fundamentally different nature. 
The most significant limitation of this study, however, is the sampling bias inherent in 
the studied population. Data were collected from the students and alumni of a university in 
Izmir, which is the most liberal city in Turkey. The fact that the sample population was 
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selected from an education faculty of high reputation further narrows the population it 
represents. Overall, the findings of this study are representative of mainly liberal teachers and 
trainee teachers in Turkey; conservative views are underrepresented in this study. 
However, the findings can be said to be independent of disciplinary focus. Given the 
lack of statistical difference between PCG students and teachers of other subjects, it can be 
concluded that the findings of this study are generalizable regardless of teachers’ discipline. 
Furthermore, considering that teacher training and experience does not contribute to the 
development of beliefs investigated in this research, the findings regarding moral and 
psychological beliefs could perhaps be generalised beyond teachers to other liberals in 
Turkey. However, in order to ascertain whether this claim is plausible, beliefs of 
professionals unrelated to education would need to be compared with the findings of this 
study. 
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3. Future Directions 
The findings and conclusions of this study point to several new avenues of potential 
research. Most importantly, two comparative studies promise to clarify some of the points in 
this study. First, a comparative study between the beliefs of educators and other professionals 
can shed light on the place of liberalism with regard to the formation and development of 
moral, psychological, and educational beliefs investigated in this research. Secondly, and 
considering the Turkish context, more importantly, a comparative study that investigates the 
beliefs of conservative teachers as well would help to produce a more generalizable picture of 
beliefs and belief development. I think this is of paramount importance, given that the moral 
divide appears to be widening between liberals and conservatives – not just in Turkey but 
across the world, especially in the West – and the two sides have to communicate and work 
together to overcome the challenges in the future. 
Based on the findings of this study, another line of research can focus on what is 
important in teachers’ experience regarding moral issues in schools and how they engage 
with moral education in relation to this. An ethnographic line of inquiry may be better suited 
to such an investigation.  
Another line of potential research is how social and religious concerns overlap and/or 
compete with each other and moral concerns in the Turkish context. Participants repeatedly 
indicated that social and religious concerns can support and contradict moral concerns, but 
are likely to be prioritised over moral concerns. This shows that focusing solely on morality 
with regards to moral education would be insufficient. In a similar vein, researching morality 
in relation to the Turkish culture, which is generally more collectivist than its Western 
neighbours and more individualistic than its Eastern neighbours, is likely to shed light on 
how moral education can be best conducted in Turkey. 
Finally, Carr & Landon (1998) indicate that in Catholic schools in Scotland, the 
religious focus on morality might have provided a moral linguistic platform for pupils and 
teachers to engage in moral education much more effectively. A similar study can be repeated 
in Turkey in order to find out whether and how a religious focus equips pupils with moral 
language in Imam Hatip schools in Turkey. 
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4. Final Word 
As a researcher and a curious human being, I am interested in the moral nature of 
human beings. While at first sight, it may seem as if there are irreconcilable moral differences 
between people that inevitably lead to conflict, I think the conflicts are of a political nature, 
not moral. For this reason, I believe that people who have well-developed moral skills, a 
moral self that drives conduct and conviction, and practical wisdom can overcome the 
challenges they face, whether individually or as a community. 
The Moral Foundations Theory indicates that all people share a common moral 
psychology; people differ in their priorities based on their psychological tendencies and their 
cultural practices. The Triune Ethics Theory shows that individuals who are primed towards a 
self-preservation orientation are likely to be less interested in cooperation and more interested 
in protecting themselves and their own, while people who are primarily inclined towards 
cooperation are more inclined to engage with others positively. In my view, these two 
theories alone point to the fact that conflicts are not necessary, although I think the evidence 
for this can be found all around in our daily lives. 
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APPENDIX A1 – Katılımcı Bilgi Belgesi (Participant Information Sheet - Turkish) 
 
Katılımcı Bilgi Belgesi 
 
Oliver B. Bridge, Doktora Öğrencisi, Eğitim Fakültesi, Oxford Brookes Üniversitesi 
Harcourt Hill Campus, Oxford, OX2 9AT 
Birleşik Krallık 
 
Ahlak Psikolojisinin Öğretmen Eğitiminde Kullanılması: Ahlaki Gelişiminin Desteklemesinde 
Türkiye Örneği 
 
“Ahlak Psikolojisinin Öğretmen Eğitiminde Kullanılması: Ahlaki Gelişiminin Desteklemesinde Türkiye 
Örneği” isimli araştırmaya katılmaya davet edilmektesiniz. Araştırmaya katılıp katılmamaya karar 
vermeden önce araştırmanın neden yapıldığı ve ne içerdiğini anlamanız önemlidir. Lütfen aşağıdaki 
bilgileri okumak için zamanınızı ayırınız. 
 
Bu araştırmanın amacı nedir? 
Araştırmanın temel amacı örtük ahlak eğitiminin uygulanışında öğretmenlerin ahlaki gelişime ve ahlak 
eğitimine dair düşüncelerinin ve öğretmenlik deneyimlerinin nasıl bir etkide bulunduğunu anlamaktır. 
Araştırmanın hedefi birinci ve dördüncü sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencilerinin ve üç yıllık öğretmenlik 
deneyimi olan öğretmenlerin ahlaki gelişim ve ahlak psikolojisine dair görüşlerini anlamaktır. 
 
Neden katılmaya davet ediliyorum? 
Bu araştırmaya birinci sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencisi/dördüncü sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencisi/ öğretmen 
olarak davet edilmektesiniz. 100 birinci sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencisi, 100 öğretmen stajyeri olan 
dördüncü sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencisi ve 100 3 yıllık deneyimi olan öğretmenin bu araştırmaya 
katılması beklenmektedir (toplam 300 katılımcı). 
 
Katılmak zorunda mıyım? 
Katılıp katılmamak sizin kararınızdır. Katılmaya karar verdiğiniz takdirde bu bilgi belgesi sizde 
kalmak üzere verilecektir. Katıldığınız takdirde sağladığınız verilerin ve katılımınızın anonim 
olmasından dolayı geri çekilemeyeceğine dikkat ediniz. Bu çalışmaya katılmanız veya katılmamanızın 
notlarınıza, puanlarınıza, değerlendirilmenize, gelecekteki eğitiminize veya kariyerinize her hangi bir 
etkisi olmayacaktır. 
 
Katılırsam bana neler olacak? 
Aşağıdaki anketi doldurmanın 15 dakikadan daha fazla sürmemesi beklenmektedir. Sorular ahlak 
psikolojisi ve ahlaki gelişime dair düşünce ve görüşlerinizi ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Önemli 
olan şey düşünce ve görüşleriniz olduğu için doğru veya yanlış cevap yoktur. 
 
Anketin ardından gönüllü olan 30 katılımcı ile yarım saatten fazla sürmeyecek bireysel sözlü 
görüşmeler yapılacaktır. Eğer bu sözlü görüşmelere katılmaya istekli iseniz veya ilgi duyuyorsanız 
lütfen size verdiğim iletişim bilgileri aracılığıyla benimle iletişime geçiniz. Sözlü görüşmeler daha sonra 
sizin karar vereceğiniz bir yerde yapılacaktır. Sözlü görüşmeler katılmak isteyen 30’dan fazla gönüllü 
olduğu takdirde katılımcılar rastgele seçilecektir. 
 
Sözlü görüşmelerin ardından gözlemlenmeye gönüllü olan 5 stajyer öğrenci ve 5 öğretmen ile gözlem 
yapılacaktır (toplam 10 katılımcı). Eğer bu gözlemlere katılmaya istekli iseniz veya ilgi duyuyorsanız 
lütfen size verdiğim iletişim bilgileri aracılığıyla benimle iletişime geçiniz. Gözlemlere katılmak isteyen 
10’dan fazla gönüllü olduğu takdirde katılımcılar rastgele seçilecektir. 
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Araştırmaya katılmanın faydaları neler olabilir? 
Bu araştırmaya katılmayanın sağlayabileceği faydalar arasında bu konu ile ilgili bilgimizi 
derinleştirmenin yanı sıra potansiyel olarak mesleki gelişiminize fayda sağlayabilecek konular 
hakkında daha yüksek bir farkındalık kazanmanız bulunmaktadır. Araştırmaya katılmanın her hangi 
bir zarara neden olması beklenmemektedir. 
 
Verdiğim bilgiler gizli kalacak mı? 
Mahremiyetiniz ve gizliliğiniz son derece önemlidir. Bu ankette toplanan bütün veriler kesinlikle 
gizli kalacaktır (yasal sınırlara tabi olarak). Her hangi bir durumda kimliğinizi ortaya çıkarabilecek bir 
bilgi kullanıldığı zaman gizliliğinizi korumak için bir mahlas kullanılacaktır. Oxford Brookes 
Üniversitesi’nin Akademik Dürüstlük kuralları gereğince araştırma sırasında edinilen veriler araştırma 
bittikten sonra on yıl boyunca güvenli bir ortamda elektronik veya basılı şekilde muhafaza edilmek 
zorundadır. 
 
Katılmak istiyorsam ne yapmalıyım? 
Ankete katılmak istiyorsanız yapmanız gereken tek şey doldurduktan sonra anketi size gösterilen 
güvenli kutuya iade etmenizdir. 
 
Araştırmanın bulgularına neler olacak? 
Bu anketin bulguları yapılan literatür taraması ile birleştirilip ortaya çıkan sonuçlar bir doktora tezi 
olarak basılacaktır. Araştırma çalışmalarının Eylül 2015’e kadar devam etmesi beklenmektedir. Eğer 
araştırmanın bulgularını sizde öğrenmek istiyorsanız lütfen size verdiğim iletişim bilgileri aracılığıyla 
benimle iletişime geçiniz. Bana verdiğiniz iletişim bilgileri güvenli bir ortamda saklanacaktır. 
 
Araştırmayı kim organize ediyor ve kim finanse ediyor? 
Bu araştırma Oxford Brookes Üniversite’si tarafından organize edilmektedir ve araştırmayı Oxford 
Brookes Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi doktora öğrencisi olarak yürütmekteyim. 
 
Araştırma kimin onayından geçti? 
Bu araştırma Oxford Brookes Üniversitesi, Üniversite Araştırma Etik Kurulu tarafından onaylanmıştır. 
 
Daha fazla bilgi için iletişim 
Araştırma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak istiyorsanız benimle veya araştırma yöneticisi Prof. 
Graham Butt ile iletişime geçebilirsiniz. Araştırmanın yürütülüşü hakkında her hangi bir endişeniz 
varsa Oxford Brookes Üniversitesi, Üniversite Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (UREC) Başkanı ile 
görüşmeniz gerekmektedir. 
 
Oliver  Barış Bridge:  12004054@brookes.ac.uk 
    (+90) 5301743626 
(+44) 7909668239 
 
Prof. Dr. Graham Butt: gbutt@brookes.ac.uk 
 
UREC:   ethics@brookes.ac.uk 
 
Bilgi belgesini okumaya zamanınızı ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim. 
 
Tarih 
…/…/20… 
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APPENDIX A2 – Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Oliver B. Bridge, Ph.D. Student, School of Education, Oxford Brookes University 
Harcourt Hill Campus, Oxford, OX2 9AT 
United Kingdom 
 
The Application of Moral Psychology in Teacher Training: A Case Study of the Fostering of 
Moral Development in Turkey 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study titled “The Application of Moral Psychology in 
Teacher Training: A Case Study of the Fostering of Moral Development in Turkey.” Before you decide 
whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The main aim of the study is to understand whether there are any differences in the delivery of moral 
education, depending on beliefs about moral development and the education / teaching experience of 
teachers. The research is aimed at discovering the beliefs of 1st and 4th year university students 
studying teaching, and teachers with 3 years of experience regarding moral development and moral 
psychology. 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
 
You have been invited to participate in this study as a 1st year student studying education/4th year 
student studying education and intern/teacher. It is expected that 100 1st year students, 100 4th year 
students, and 100 teachers (a total of 300 participants) to take part in the survey. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given 
this information sheet to keep. If you decide to take part it should be noted that it will not be possible 
to withdraw participation and the data provided, as they will be anonymous. Choosing to take part or 
not to take part in the study will have no impact whatsoever on your marks, grades, assessment, or 
future studies or career. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
The following is a questionnaire that is expected to take no more than 15 minutes. The questions are 
aimed at uncovering your beliefs regarding moral psychology and moral development. As it is your 
beliefs that are important, there are no right or wrong answers. 
 
Following the survey, in depth interviews with 30 volunteers on the same topic will be conducted. If 
you are interested to participate in an interview please express your interest by contacting me through 
the details I have provided you. The interviews will be conducted at a place of your choice other than 
your work place. If there are more than 30 volunteers, participants will be randomly selected. 
 
Following the interview, unstructured non-participant observations will be conducted with 5 teachers 
and 5 interns who volunteer to be observed (10 participants in total). If you are an interested 
teacher/intern and wish to be contacted for observation, please express your interest by contacting 
283 
 
me through the details I have provided you. If there are more than 10 volunteers, participants will be 
randomly selected. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
Possible benefits of taking part in this study are becoming aware of a field of professional 
development, as well as helping us to further our understanding of this topic. There are no anticipated 
costs for taking part in this study. 
 
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
 
Your privacy and anonymity is of utmost importance. All data gathered in this survey shall be kept 
strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). In case any direct reference has to be made to the 
information you provide at any stage of the study, a pseudonym shall be used in order to conceal your 
identity. Data generated in the course of the research must be kept securely in paper or electronic 
form for a period of ten years after the completion of a research project in accordance with the 
Academic Integrity policy of Oxford Brookes University. 
 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
 
If you want to take part in this survey, all you need to do is to simply return a filled questionnaire to the 
secure dropbox provided. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
Results of the present survey will be embedded with the information gathered from literature review, 
and the emerging findings will be published as a Ph.D. dissertation. The study is expected to run until 
2015 September. If you wish to receive the results of the study, please express your interest by 
contacting me through the details I have provided you. I will write your contact details down and keep 
it in a safe location. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
I am conducting this research as a Ph.D. student at the School of Education, Oxford Brookes 
University. The study is being organised by Oxford Brookes University. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
This research has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee (UREC), 
Oxford Brookes University. 
 
Contact for Further Information 
You can contact me or my Director of Studies, Prof. Dr Graham Butt, for further information. If you 
have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you should contact the 
Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Oliver Bridge:   12004054@brookes.ac.uk 
    (+90) 5301743626 
(+44) 7909668239 
Prof. Dr. Graham Butt: gbutt@brookes.ac.uk 
UREC:   ethics@brookes.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you for taking time to read the information sheet. 
Date 
…/…/20… 
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APPENDIX A3 – Öğretmen Anketi (Teacher Questionnaire - Turkish) 
Giriş 
Aşağıdaki sorular ahlak psikolojisi ve ahlak eğitimine dair görüşlerinizi anlamayı hedefliyor. Anket 
dört bölümden oluşuyor: Birinci bölüm ahlak psikolojisi hakkındaki görüşlerinizi, ikinci ve üçüncü 
bölüm ise ahlak eğitimi hakkındaki düşüncelerinizi anlamayı hedefliyor. Son bölümde de özgeçmişiniz 
ile ilgili sorular var. 
1. BÖLÜM 
Lütfen aşağıdaki cümlelerin karşısındaki kutucukları işaretleyerek bu ifadelere ne kadar 
katıldığınızı belirtiniz. (1 = kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 2 = katılmıyorum, 3 = emin değilim, 4 = 
katılıyorum, 5 = kesinlikle katılıyorum) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. İnsanlar her zaman bir olayın ahlaki ağırlığını anlarlar.      
2. İnsanlar bütün durumlarda ahlaki açıdan yapılması en doğru olan şeyin ne 
olduğuna karar verebilirler. 
     
3. İnsanlar nasıl ahlaklı bir davranış biçimi sergileyeceklerine karar verirken doğru 
şeyi yaptıklarından emin olmak için üzerine uzun uzun düşünürler. 
     
4. İnsanlar genellikle nasıl ahlaklı bir davranış biçimi sergileyeceklerine karar 
verirken, duygularına göre hareket ederler. 
     
5. Ahlaki bir karar verirken duygularımız ve düşüncelerimiz kararımızı eşit ölçüde 
etkiler. 
     
6. İnsanlar ahlaki ağırlığı olan bir karar verdiklerinin her zaman farkında olurlar.      
7. İnsanlar bazen yapılacak en doğru şeyin ne olduğunu bilseler bile kötü 
davranışlarda bulunuyorlar. 
     
8. İnsanlar doğru şeyi yapma isteğini, motivasyonunu kendi içlerinde buluyorlar.      
9. Öfke ve sevgi gibi duygular insanları ahlaklı davranmaya iter.      
10. İnsanlar gerçekten iyi insan olmak istedikleri için ahlaklı davranırlar.      
11. Bence yasa ve toplumsal baskı olmasa insanlar hep en çok işlerine yarayan şeyi 
yaparlardı, kötülük olsa bile. 
     
12. Bence yasalar ve toplumsal kurallar insanları doğru davranmaya kendi duyguları 
ve kişilik özelliklerinden daha fazla itiyor. 
     
13. Ahlaki kurallar kültürden kültüre değişir, dünyanın her yerinde aynı değildir.      
14. Ahlakın özü ve temelleri dünyanın her yerinde aynıdır, fakat kurallar ve 
uygulamalar kültürden kültüre değişir. 
     
15. Kültür, insanların ahlaki durumlarda neler hissettiğini etkiler.      
16. Ahlak doğuştan gelen bir şeydir – en azından bazı temel ahlaki kuralları bilerek 
doğuyoruz. 
     
17. Güvenli bir aile ortamında bol sevgi ile yetişen çocuklar daha ahlaklı/iyi 
yetişkinler olmaya daha yatkın oluyorlar. 
     
18. Çocuklar büyüdükçe ve insanlar olgunlaştıkça ahlaka bakış açıları değişir.      
19. Çocuklar neyin doğru neyin yanlış olduğuna karar verirken bulundukları ortamın 
ve anın ötesini düşünebilirler. 
     
20. Çoğu ergenlik çağındaki insanların ve bazı yetişkinlerin neyin iyi neyin kötü      
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olduğuna karar verirken toplumsal düzeni koruma isteği kararlarını yönlendirir. 
21. İnsanların yetişkinlik çağına gelmeden önce ahlakı, ilke ve prensipler olarak 
anlayabilmeleri mümkündür. 
     
22. Beynin işleyişine dair nörolojik araştırmalar ahlaki karar verme sürecini 
aydınlatabilir. 
     
23. Ahlaki kuralları anlamanın tek yolu derin felsefi düşünmedir.      
24. Ahlaki davranış bir beceri olarak düşünülebilir ve bu beceri geliştirilebilir.      
 
2. BÖLÜM 
Aşağıdaki sorular ahlak eğitimi ve ahlakla ilgili gizli müfredata dair görüşlerinizi almayı hedefliyor. 
Lütfen cümlelerin karşısındaki kutucukları işaretleyerek bu ifadelere ne kadar katıldığınızı 
belirtiniz. (1 = kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 2 = katılmıyorum, 3 = katılıyorum, 4 = kesinlikle katılıyorum) 
 1 2 3 4 
25. Okulda ahlakın öğretilmesi önemlidir.     
26. Bir öğretmen olarak öğrencilerime ahlaki değerleri öğretmek sorumluluğumdur.     
27. Öğretmenler öğrencilerine ahlaklı davranış örneğidir.     
28. Öğretmenler öğrencilerine ahlaklı davranış örneği olması gereklidir.     
29. Belirli bir dersin özellikle ahlak eğitimine yoğunlaşması gereklidir.     
30. Ahlak eğitimi bütün müfredata yayılmalıdır.     
31. Ahlak eğitimine yoğunlaşan haftalık ders saati daha fazla olmalıdır.     
32. Öğretmenler öğrencilerinin ahlaki gelişimini nasıl destekleyebileceklerine dair 
eğitim almalılardır. 
    
33. Şu anki eğitim sistemimiz çocuklara ahlakı etkili bir biçimde öğretiyor.     
34. Bina düzeni, ders saatleri gibi zaman düzenleri, yani okulun fiziki ortamı 
çocukların ahlaki gelişimini etkiler. 
    
35. Sınıf oturma düzeni ve kantinde sıraya girmek gibi okul kuralları ve gelenekleri 
çocukların ahlaki gelişimini etkiler. 
    
 
 
Ahlaki Değerleri Öğretmek 1 2 3 4 
36. Öğrencilerimle sıklıkla ahlaki ikilemlerle karşılaşıyorum.     
37. Sıklıkla öğrencilerime ahlaki değerleri öğretme ihtiyacını hissediyorum.     
38. Fırsat doğdukça ahlaki değerleri öğretmeye çalışırım.     
39. Öğrencilere ahlaki değerleri öğretmek için düzenli olarak zaman ayırırım.     
40. Ahlak eğitimi vermek benim yerim değil.     
41. Ahlaki değerlerin öğretilebileceğine inanmıyorum.     
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3. BÖLÜM 
Lütfen aşağıdaki sıralama sorularını kutucuklara numara vererek belirtilen şekilde cevaplayınız. 
42. Aşağıdakilerden hangilerinin ‘gizli müfredatı’ en iyi tanımladığını düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen 
şıkları 1’den (en etkili) 5’e (en etkisiz) sıralayınız. 
Gizli müfredat şöyle tanımlanabilir: 
a. Kasıtsız ve/veya tesadüfen öğrenilen şeyler ve okul ortamında olmanın yan etkileri 
b. Çerçeveler, duyurular, sınıf ve bina dekorasyonları, ders ve teneffüs zamanı ve 
tatiller gibi zaman düzenleri dâhil olmak üzere, okulun fiziksel yapısı 
c. Öğrencilerin öğretmenlerden, yöneticilerden ve diğer okul çalışanlarından aldığı 
örtük mesajlar 
d. Eğitim içerisinde toplumsal sınıf düzenini koruyarak ayrıcalıklı sınıflara fayda sağlayan 
bir sistem 
e. Okul yapısı ve psikolojik ortamı 
43. Çocukların ahlaki değerleri nerede öğrendiğini düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen şıkları 1’den (en etkili) 
4’e (en etkisiz) sıralayınız. 
Çocuklar ahlaki değerleri şurada öğrenir: 
a. Evde 
b. Okulda 
c. Sokakta 
d. Arkadaşlarıyla oynarken 
44. Çocukların ahlaki değerleri kimden öğrendiğini düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen şıkları 1’den (en 
etkili) 6’ya (en etkisiz) sıralayınız. 
Çocuklar ahlaki değerleri şu insanlardan öğrenir: 
a. Anne-babalarından 
b. Öğretmenlerinden 
c. Arkadaşları ile etkileşerek (arkadaşlarından) 
d. Toplumsal ortamı gözlemleyerek (toplumdan) 
e. Medyadan 
f. Kendi başlarına düşünerek 
45. Çocukların ahlaki değerleri nasıl öğrendiğini düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen şıkları 1’den (en etkili) 
4’e (en etkisiz) sıralayınız. 
a. Çocuklar ahlaki değerleri örtülü olarak öğrenirler, “değerler öğretilmez, öğrenilir” 
b. Ceza ve ödüllerle 
c. İyi ve kötü üzerine ders alarak 
d. Arkadaşlarıyla anlaşmazlıklarla – deneyim ile 
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4. BÖLÜM 
Son olarak da sizinle ilgili bazı sorular: Lütfen aşağıdaki şıklı sorulardan bir şıkkı işaretleyiniz veya 
cevabınızı verilen alana yazınız. 
46. Cinsiyetiniz:  E K 
47. Yaşınız:   __________ 
48. Doğum yeriniz:  __________ 
49. Eğitim seviyeniz: 
Üniversite öğrencisi 
Üniversite mezunu 
Yüksek lisans öğrencisi/mezunu 
50. Branşınız nedir? 
______________________________ 
51. Öğretmenlik stajı yaptınız mı, yapıyor musunuz? 
Öğretmenlik stajı yapmadım 
Öğretmenlik stajı yapıyorum 
Öğretmenlik stajı yaptım 
52. Kaç yıllık öğretmenlik deneyiminiz var? 
0-2 
3-5 
6’dan fazla 
53. Öğretmen olarak kalmayı planlıyor musunuz? 
Evet, mesleğime devam etmeyi düşünüyorum 
Hayır, mesleğimi değiştirmek istiyorum 
Emin değilim 
54. Ahlak psikolojisi, ahlaki gelişim, veya ahlak eğitimine dair hiç eğitim aldınız mı? Aldıysanız 
lütfen bu eğitimin hangi konuları kapsadığını ve ne kadar sürdüğünü kısaca açıklayınız. 
 
 
 
 
 
Anketi doldurmaya zamanınızı ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim. Bütün soruları cevapladıktan sonra 
dolu anketi lütfen belirtilen yere bırakınız. 
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APPENDIX A4 – Teacher Questionnaire 
Introduction 
The following questionnaire is aimed at understanding your thoughts and beliefs regarding moral 
psychology and moral education. There are four parts: The first part is aimed at understanding your 
beliefs about moral psychology and the second and third parts are aimed at understanding your 
thoughts about moral education. Finally the last part asks questions about your background. Please 
follow the provided guidelines when answering the questions. 
PART 1 
Please tick the relevant boxes to indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = not sure, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. People always understand the moral significance of a situation.      
2. People can decide on what the morally best thing to do is in all situations.      
3. Generally, when people are deciding on a moral course of action, they think 
about it at length to make sure they make the right decision. 
     
4. Generally, when people are deciding on a moral course of action, they act on 
their feelings. 
     
5. Our moral decisions are equally effected by our thoughts and emotions.      
6. People are always aware whether the decisions they make are have a moral 
salience. 
     
7. Sometimes, even when people know what the best thing to do is, they still do 
bad things. 
     
8. People find the motivation to do the right thing within themselves.      
9. Emotions such as love and anger drive people to act morally.      
10. People act morally because they really want to be good people.      
11. Without laws and societal pressure, people would always do what suits them 
best – even if it is bad. 
     
12. Laws and societal pressure drive people to act morally more than their own 
emotions and character. 
     
13. Moral rules change from culture to culture; they are not same around the world.      
14. I think that the core foundations of morality are the same throughout the world 
but rules and applications differ from country to country. 
     
15. Our culture affects what we feel in situations with moral weight      
16. Morality is innate – we are born knowing at least some basic moral rules.      
17. Children raised in a safe home with lots of love are more likely to grow up to be 
moral/ good people. 
     
18. As children grow and people mature their approach to morality changes.      
19. When children are deciding on what is right or wrong, they can think beyond 
their immediate surroundings. 
     
20. I think that a desire to maintain the order of society drives most adolescents’ and      
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some adults’ decisions regarding what is right or wrong. 
21. It is not possible for people to conceive of morality in terms of ideals and 
principle before adulthood. 
     
22. Research on brain functions and neurology can shed light on the moral decision 
making process. 
     
23. The only way of understanding moral rules is through philosophical 
contemplation. 
     
24. Moral behaviour can be conceived as a skill, and this skill can be further 
developed. 
     
 
PART 2 
The questions below are aimed at understanding your thoughts about moral education and 
hidden curriculum. Please tick the relevant boxes to indicate whether you agree or disagree with 
the following statements. (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree) 
 1 2 3 4 
25. It is important to teach morality in school.     
26. As a teacher it is my responsibility to teach moral values to my students.     
27. Teachers are models of moral behaviour for students.     
28. Teachers should be models of moral behaviour for students.     
29. There should be a specific subject focusing on moral education.     
30. Moral education should be taught across the curriculum.     
31. There should be more weekly lessons in school focusing on morality.     
32. Teachers should be educated regarding how to foster their student’ moral 
development. 
    
33. Our current education system teaches morality effectively.     
34. The physical environment of the school, including building structure and time 
frames such as class and recess times affect students’ moral development. 
    
35. School rules such as classroom seating arrangements and getting in line at the 
canteen affect students’ moral development. 
    
 
Teaching Moral Values 1 2 3 4 
36. I frequently come across moral dilemmas with students.      
37. I frequently feel the need to teach morality to my students.     
38. I try to teach moral values when the opportunity rises.     
39. I regularly spend time on teaching values to students.     
40. It is not my place to teach morality.     
41. I do not think that moral values can be taught.     
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PART 3 
Please answer the ranking questions below by giving relevant numbers to the boxes. 
42. Which of the options below do you think defines ‘hidden curriculum’ the best? Please rank the 
following options from 1 (most influential) to 5 (least influential). 
Hidden curriculum can be defined as, 
a. the unintended and/or accidental learning outcomes and side effects of schooling 
b. the physical structure of the school, including announcement posters and the 
decoration of rooms and buildings, and time frames such as class and recess times 
and holidays 
c. the implicit messages conveyed to students by teachers, staff and administration 
d. a system within education that benefits the ruling elite by maintaining present class 
structures in the society 
e. school culture and psychological climate 
43. Where do you think children learn moral values? Please rank the following options from 1 
(most influential) to 4 (least influential). 
Children learn moral values 
a. At home 
b. At school 
c. In the street 
d. While playing with friends 
44. From whom do you think children learn moral values? Please rank the following options from 1 
(most influential) to 6 (least influential). 
Children learn moral values; 
a. From their parents 
b. From their teachers 
c. By interacting with their peers 
d. By observing their social environment 
e. From the media 
f. By thinking about them, on their own 
45. How do you think children learn moral values? Please rank the following options from 1 (most 
influential) to 4 (least influential). 
 
a. Children learn moral values implicitly, values are caught, not taught 
b. Punishments and rewards 
c. Lecturing on morality/ right and wrong 
d. Conflicts with their equals (peers) – with experience 
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PART 4 
And finally some questions about you. Please select one answer or write down your answer for 
the following questions: 
46. What is your gender?   M  F 
 
47. How old are you?   __________ 
 
48. Where were you born?  __________ 
 
49. What is your education level? 
Undergraduate 
Graduate 
Postgraduate 
 
50. What do you teach?  
______________________________ 
51. Have you done, or are you doing your teaching internship? 
I have not done a teaching internship 
I am in the process of doing my teaching internship 
I have finished a teaching internship 
 
52. How many years of teaching experience do you have? 
 
0-2 
3-5 
6 or more 
 
53. Do you plan on staying as a teacher? 
Yes, I intend to stay as a teacher 
No, I want to change my career 
I’m not sure 
54. Have you ever received any formal education regarding moral psychology, moral development, 
and/or moral education? If yes, please briefly describe the course or topic, and for long it 
lasted. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire. Once you have finished answering 
the question please return the filled questionnaire to the dropbox. 
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APPENDIX A5 – Mülakata Katılım Onay Formu (Interview Participation Informed Consent 
Form) 
ONAY FORMU 
 
 
Ahlak Psikolojisinin Öğretmen Eğitiminde Kullanılması: Ahlaki Gelişiminin 
Desteklemesinde Türkiye Örneği 
 
Oliver B. Bridge, Doktora Öğrencisi, Eğitim Fakültesi, 
Oxford Brookes Üniversitesi 
b_oliver_b@hotmail.com 
 
 
 Kutucukları işaretleyiniz 
 
Yukarıdaki katılımcı bilgi belgesini okuyup anladım ve sorular sormaya fırsatım 
oldu. 
 
  
 
Katılımımın gönüllü olduğunu ve her hangi bir zamanda neden vermeden 
çekilebileceğimi anlıyorum. 
 
 
Yukarıda adı geçen araştırmaya katılmayı istiyorum.   
 
 
Bu çalışmaya sağladığım veriler (kimliğim gizlendikten sonra) bir uzman veri 
merkezinde saklanabilir ve gelecekteki çalışmalar için kullanılabilir. 
 
 Kutucuğu 
İşaretleyiniz 
 
     Evet              Hayır 
   
Mülakatın sesli kaydının alınmasına onay veriyorum.   
Kimliği gizlenmiş alıntıların yayımlarda kullanılmasına onay veriyorum    
Araştırmanın ileriki safhalarına katılımın gönüllü olduğunu anlıyorum ve 
araştırmanın gözlem safhasına katılabilme ihtimali için benimle iletişime 
geçilmesine onay veriyorum. 
  
   
 
 
Katılımcının Adı     Tarih    İmza 
 
 
 
 
Araştırmacının Adı    Tarih    İmza 
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APPENDIX A6 – Interview Participation Informed Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM 
 
The Application of Moral Psychology in Teacher Training: A Case Study of the 
Fostering of Moral Development in Turkey 
 
Oliver B. Bridge, Ph.D. Student, School of Education, 
Oxford Brookes University 
b_oliver_b@hotmail.com 
 
 
 Please initial box 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
  
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving reason. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
 
I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it has been 
anonymised) in a specialist data centre and may be used for future research. 
 
 
 Please tick box 
 
     Yes              No 
I agree to the interview being audio recorded    
I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications  
 
  
I understand that further participation in the study is optional, and I would like to 
be contacted to discuss the possibility of participating in observations. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Contact e-mail address for observations (optional)     
 
 
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher    Date    Signature 
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APPENDIX A7 – Mülakat Soruları (Interview Schedule – Turkish) 
SORULAR 
 
İlk bölümde özgeçmiş soruları bulunmaktadır, ardından 3 tane giriş sorusu bulunmaktadır. 3. 
bölümde ahlak psikolojisi ve ahlaki gelişime dair sorular bulunmaktadır. 4. bölümde ahlak eğitimi ve 
gizli müfredat/örtük program ile ilgili sorular bulunmaktadır. Son olarak da 5. bölümde sizin 
deneyimleriniz ile ilgili sorular bulunmaktadır. 
 
1. Özgeçmiş soruları: 
1.1. Adınız:  
1.2. Yaşınız:  
1.3. Doğum yerininiz (nerelisiniz?):  
1.4. Eğitim seviyeniz:  
1.5. Branşınız:  
1.6. Kaç yıllık öğretmenlik deneyiminiz var:   
1.7. Öğretmenlik sizin için ne kadar önemli, bu işi seviyor musunuz, meslek değiştirmeyi düşünüyor 
musunuz?  
 
 
2. Giriş soruları: 
2.1. Daha önce ahlak psikolojisine dair hiç eğitim aldınız mı? Aldınızsa, bu eğitimi nerede aldınız, ne kadar 
sürdü ve hangi konuları kapsadı? Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, James Rest, Jonathan Haidt, 
Elliot Turiel gibi yazarları daha önce hiç duydunuz mu? 
 
 
2.2. Kısaca, sizce ahlak nedir, insanlar neden ahlaklı/iyi davranırlar? 
 
 
2.3. Ahlakı ve iyi davranışı anlamak için sizce hangi akademik alanları incelemeliyiz? (Örn: Felsefe, 
psikoloji, din, kültür, politika, sosyoloji, nöroloji, evrim, diğer hayvanlar…) 
 
 
3. Ahlak Psikolojisi ve Ahlaki Gelişim 
3.1. Sizce ahlaki/iyi davranış ortaya nasıl çıkar? Ahlaki davranışın ortaya çıkması için gereken psikolojik 
veya bilişsel öğeler neler olabilir?  
 
 
3.2. Sizce insanlar belirli bir durumda yapılabilecek en iyi bir davranışın ne olduğuna karar verirken daha 
sıklıkla mantıkları üzerinden mi (bilinçli bir şekilde düşünerek) hareket ederler, yoksa 
duyguları/sezgileri üzerinden mi (neredeyse hiç düşünmeden, otomatik, içgüdüsel olarak)? 
 
 
3.3. Sizce insanlar belirli bir durumda yapılabilecek en iyi şeyin ne olduğunu bildikleri her zaman bunu 
yaparlar mı? Yapmıyorlarsa düşünceyi/bilgiyi neden davranışa dökmezler veya dökemezler? 
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3.4. Sizce iyi davranışın motivasyonu nereden gelir? İç motivasyon olarak: mantık ve düşünce, duygular ve 
sezgiler, kişilik özellikleri ve karakter; veya dış motivasyon olarak yasalar ve toplumsal baskı. Bunların 
dışında, teknik taktik sebeplerle (ceza almamak için yasaya uymak, daha fazla ticaret yapabilmek için 
itibarınızı korumak, yükseltmek) ahlaklı davranmak sizce ne kadar yaygındır? 
 
 
3.5. Sizce ahlaki duygular neler olabilir (örn: suçluluk duygusu)? Bu ahlaki duygular davranışlarımızı nasıl 
etkiler? 
 
 
3.6. Sizce insanların kişilik özellikleri ve duyguları arasındaki bağ ne/nasıl olabilir? İnsanların “(şöyle) bir 
insan olmak istiyorum” gibi özellikleri onların iyi davranmasına ne ölçüde etkide bulunabilir? 
 
 
3.7. Sizce bebeklikten yetişkinliğe kadar ahlaki gelişim duygu, düşünce, davranış bazında, nasıl 
gerçekleşir? Ahlaki gelişimde ailenin, öğretmenin (üst-ast ilişkisi), arkadaşlığın (eşit ilişkileri) ve genel 
toplumun (3. kişiler ve medya) etkisi nedir, ne ölçüde olur? 
 
 
3.8. Ahlaki davranışı bir beceri olarak düşünebilir miyiz? Bu beceri sizce nasıl geliştirilebilir?  
 
 
4. Ahlak Eğitimi ve Gizli Müfredat/Örtük Program 
4.1. Ahlakın okulda öğretilmesi önemli midir sizce? Sizce ahlak eğitimi programı nasıl olmalıdır? 
 
 
4.2. Sizce çocuklar ahlaki değerleri ve iyi davranmayı/iyilik yapmayı nasıl öğrenirler? 
 
 
4.3. Bugünkü müfredattaki ahlak eğitimi hakkındaki görüşleriniz nelerdir? 
 
 
4.4. Ahlak eğitiminin gizli müfredattaki yeri nedir, ahlak eğitimi gizli müfredatta nasıl gerçekleşir? 
 
 
4.5. Yükseköğretimde gerçekleştirilen öğretmen eğitiminin, ilköğretim ve lise düzeyindeki gizli müfredata 
nasıl bir etkisi vardır sizce? İlköğretim ve lisede ahlak eğitiminin geliştirilmesi için sizce öğretmen 
eğitiminde neler yapılabilir? 
 
 
5. Sizin deneyimleriniz 
5.1. Ders içerisinde ahlaki değerleri öğretmeye genellikle ne kadar zaman ayırırsınız? Bunu yaparken 
belirli bir sistemden, metottan yararlanır mısınız? 
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5.2. Ahlak eğitimine dair paylaşmak isteyeceğiniz bir deneyiminiz var mı? Bu deneyim okul içerisinde veya 
dışarısında ve her hangi bir eğitim düzeyinde olabilir (anaokulundan bugüne kadar – öğrenirken veya 
öğretirken). 
 
 
5.3. Bir öğretmen olarak, üniversite eğitiminiz sırasında ahlak eğitimi ve ahlaki gelişime dair bir ders 
almak ister miydiniz? Alsaydınız bunun size nasıl bir faydası olacağını düşünüyorsunuz? Böyle bir 
dersten öğrenmek isteyebileceğiniz belirli bir konu var mı? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Soruları cevaplamaya zamanınızı ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim. 
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APPENDIX A8 – Interview Schedule 
Introduction 
 
The first part of the interview consists of background questions; this is followed by 3 introductory 
questions. The third part of the interview includes questions related to moral psychology and moral 
development. Questions related to moral education and implicit education can be found in the 
fourth part of the interview. Finally, in the fifth part, questions related to your own experiences are 
found. 
1. Background Questions 
1.1. Name:  
1.2. Age:  
1.3. Birth place (Where are you from?):  
1.4. Education level:  
1.5. Discipline:  
1.6. Years of teaching experience:   
1.7. How important is teaching for you? Do you enjoy teaching? Do you plan on changing your career? 
 
 
2. Introduction Questions: 
2.1. Have you ever received any education on moral psychology? If so, what did it cover and for how long 
did it last? Are you familiar with these authors: Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, James Rest, 
Jonathan Haidt, Elliot Turiel 
 
 
2.2. Briefly, what do you think morality is? Why do people behave morally? 
 
 
2.3. What academic fields do you think we should study in order to understand morality and moral 
behaviour? (E.g. philosophy, psychology, religion, culture, politics, sociology, neurology, evolution, 
other animals...) 
 
 
3. Moral Psychology and Moral Development 
3.1. How do you think moral/good behaviour emerges? What might be the necessary psychological or 
cognitive components for moral behaviour to emerge? 
 
 
3.2. When deciding what they best thing to do might be in a certain situation, do you think people more 
often behave based on their reasoning (consciously thinking), or based on their emotions/intuitions 
(nearly without a thought, automatically, instinctively)? 
 
 
3.3. Do you think people always do the best possible thing when they know what it is? If not, why do you 
think they cannot or will not translate this thought/knowledge into action? 
 
298 
 
3.4. Where do you think the motivation for moral behaviour comes from? As internal motivation: logic 
and reasoning, emotions and intuitions, personality trait and character; or as external motivation 
laws and societal pressure. Apart from these, how prominent do you think moral behaviour for 
technical/tactical reasons (such as obeying the law to avoid punishment or protecting your 
reputation to be able to do better business)? 
 
 
3.5. What do you think might be moral emotions (e.g. guilt)? How do these moral behaviours affect our 
behaviour? 
 
 
3.6. What do you think might be the relationship between personality traits and emotions? How much 
can their desires to be “this kind of a person” affect their moral behaviour? 
 
 
3.7. How do you think moral development takes place from infancy to adulthood considering emotions, 
reasoning and behaviour? What do you think is the influence of the family, teacher (hierarchical 
relationships), peers (equals), and the general society (3rd persons and the media) on moral 
development? 
 
 
3.8. Can we think of moral behaviour as a skill? How do you think this skill can be fostered? 
 
 
4. Moral Education and Implicit Education 
4.1. Do you think it is important to teach morality in school? How should the moral education program 
be? 
 
 
4.2. How do you think children learn moral values and good behaviour? 
 
 
4.3. What do you think about our current moral education system? 
 
 
4.4. What is the place of moral education in the hidden curriculum? How does moral education take 
place in the hidden curriculum? 
 
 
4.5. How do you think higher education teacher training affects primary and secondary education hidden 
curriculum? What do you think can be done in teacher training to improve moral education in 
primary and secondary education? 
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5. Your Experiences 
 
5.1. How much time do you devote to teaching moral values in the classroom? Do you use a specific 
system of method when you teach morality? 
 
 
5.2. Do you have an experience that you would like to share regarding moral education? This can be in or 
out of the school, at any education level (from kindergarten to today – either teaching or learning). 
 
 
5.3. As a teacher, would you have liked to take a course on moral development and moral psychology in 
teacher training? If you had, how do you think it would have been beneficial for you? Is there 
anything specific that you’d like to learn from such a course? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for answering my questions. 
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APPENDIX A9 – Gözlem Katılım Onay Formu (Observation Participation Informed 
Consent Form) 
ONAY FORMU 
 
 
Ahlak Psikolojisinin Öğretmen Eğitiminde Kullanılması: Ahlaki Gelişiminin 
Desteklemesinde Türkiye Örneği 
 
Oliver B. Bridge, Doktora Öğrencisi, Eğitim Fakültesi, 
Oxford Brookes Üniversitesi 
b_oliver_b@hotmail.com 
 
 
 Kutucukları işaretleyiniz 
 
Yukarıdaki katılımcı bilgi belgesini okuyup anladım ve sorular sormaya fırsatım 
oldu. 
 
  
 
Katılımımın gönüllü olduğunu ve her hangi bir zamanda neden vermeden 
çekilebileceğimi anlıyorum. 
 
 
Ders verirken gözlemlenilmeyi kabul ediyorum.   
 
 
Bu çalışmaya sağladığım veriler (kimliğim gizlendikten sonra) bir uzman veri 
merkezinde saklanabilir ve gelecekteki çalışmalar için kullanılabilir. 
 
 Kutucuğu 
İşaretleyiniz 
 
     Evet              Hayır 
   
Kimliği gizlenmiş alıntıların yayımlarda kullanılmasına onay veriyorum    
   
 
 
 
Katılımcının Adı     Tarih    İmza 
 
 
 
 
Araştırmacının Adı    Tarih    İmza 
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APPENDIX A10 - Observation Participation Informed Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
The Application of Moral Psychology in Teacher Training: A Case Study of the 
Fostering of Moral Development in Turkey 
 
Oliver B. Bridge, Ph.D. Student, School of Education, 
Oxford Brookes University 
b_oliver_b@hotmail.com 
 
 
 Please initial box 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
  
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving reason. 
 
 
I agree to be observed while teaching as a part of the above 
study. 
 
 
  
 
I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it has been 
anonymised) in a specialist data centre and may be used for future research. 
 
 
 Please tick box 
 
     Yes              No 
I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher    Date    Signature 
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APPENDIX A11 – Classroom Observation Schedule: 
 
Description of Event: behaviour, feedback, pause, etc. 
 
Notes 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
1.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
School Rule? 
 
 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
2.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
School Rule? 
 
 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
3.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
School Rule? 
 
 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
4.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
School Rule? 
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Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
5.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
 
School Rule? 
 
 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
6.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
 
School Rule? 
 
 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
7.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
 
School Rule? 
 
 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
8.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
School Rule? 
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Physical Items 
Item: 
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Content: 
 
 
Reference/Use: 
 
 
 
Item: 
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Content: 
 
 
Reference/Use: 
 
 
 
Item: 
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Content: 
 
 
Reference/Use: 
 
 
 
Item: 
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Content: 
 
 
Reference/Use: 
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APPENDIX A12 - School Grounds Observation Schedule 
 
Description of event: behaviour, feedback, place, other 
 
Notes 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
1.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
School Rule? 
 
 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
2.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
School Rule? 
 
 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
3.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
School Rule? 
 
 
Care:  Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity: 
Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action: 
 
4.  
Initiator/interaction: 
 
 
Mode: 
 
 
Duration: 
 
 
School Rule? 
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Physical Objects 
Item:  
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Frequency of use: 
 
 
Description: 
 
 
 
Item:  
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Frequency of use: 
 
 
Description: 
 
 
 
Item:  
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Frequency of use: 
 
 
Description: 
 
 
 
 
Item:  
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Frequency of use: 
 
 
Description: 
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Item:  
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Frequency of use: 
 
 
Description: 
 
 
 
Item:  
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Frequency of use: 
 
 
Description: 
 
 
 
 
Item:  
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Frequency of use: 
 
 
Description: 
 
 
 
 
Item:  
 
Place: 
 
Size: 
 
Frequency of use: 
 
 
Description: 
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APPENDIX B 
Interview Data Analysis Tables 
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APPENDIX B1: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 1, Question 2 
Part 1 – Question 2: Briefly, what do you think morality is? Why do people behave 
morally? 
Theme Description Example Statements 
Social harmony 
and 
consideration of 
others, 
collectivist 
Descriptions related to the 
social nature of morality 
have been included in this 
theme. 
• “People must behave morally for social order” 
• “People behave morally to be in harmony with 
their society” 
• “Avoiding ostracism, being accepted by others, 
social pressure...” 
Personal, 
individualist 
This theme is in direct 
opposition to the first, and 
includes descriptions 
related to the internally 
motivated and personal 
nature of morality. 
• “For personal peace of mind” 
• “It has to be internal, I don’t think it can be done 
through external forces” 
• “What a person thinks and wants to do is related 
more to morality than external factors” 
Both 
individualist 
and collectivist 
Responses included into 
this theme include 
descriptions that state that 
the nature of morality is 
both personal and social. 
• “Trying to be a good person is morality - that 
effort should be about being beneficial to oneself, 
to those around one, and the world.” 
• “the balance has to be between living according to 
others and according to yourself.” 
• “Morality is both individual and social” 
Rules This theme includes 
responses that define 
morality as a set of rules. 
• “A set of unwritten rules, from the beginning of 
humanity, that make human relationships better” 
• “Rules that organize societies” 
• “A set of unwritten laws for having healthy social 
relationships and communication.” 
 
Virtues and 
character traits 
Only one participant 
included virtues and 
character traits in her 
description of morality. 
• “Virtuous, honest respectful individuals” 
Values This theme includes 
descriptions of morality 
that focus on its 
relationship with values 
and valuations. 
• “People behave morally for things they deem 
right” 
• “Morality covers values.” 
• “...people value different things, and value derives 
from what is important to the individual, or 
because everyone in a society values that same 
thing.” 
 
Developmental This theme includes 
descriptions that focus on 
the developmental aspects 
of moral behaviour. 
• “A well raised person is moral” 
• “Something inside people but could be 
developed” 
Universality This theme includes 
responses that indicate 
that at least some aspects 
of morality are universal. 
• “Goodness can change from person to person and 
locally, but there must be/are universal rules as 
well” 
• “There are differences between cultures in 
morality, but there is also universal morality. 
Universal morality is the consequence of the 
common points of all different cultural 
moralities.” 
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Particularity This theme is in direct 
opposition with the 
above, in that descriptions 
included in this theme 
define morality as 
something that is not 
universal. 
• “Behaviours [...] change from person to person 
and from community to community.” 
• “Morality can change from culture to culture.” 
• “Morality changes from person to person.” 
 
Behaviour This theme includes 
definitions of morality 
focusing on the 
behavioural aspects of it. 
• “It is related to the good and bad things people 
do” 
• “Being good is about sharing, helping others, not 
talking behind people’s backs, not being 
selfish...” 
• “The ability to stop oneself, self-control” 
 
Intentions This theme includes the 
emphasis participants 
made regarding the 
intentionality of a 
behaviour in terms of 
whether the behaviour is 
moral or not. 
• “Intentions are important” 
• “... if a person does something good for others 
without intending it, it is not moral” 
 
Sexuality This theme includes 
responses emphasizing 
sexual morality. 
• “Morality is not only about sexuality or boy-girl 
relationships” 
• “Sometimes when a girl acts on her feelings it is 
deemed to be immoral by society.” 
 
Other This theme includes 
responses that do not fit 
to any of the other 
categories. 
• “Morality is not what people think it is.” 
• “People create/make morality” 
• “[Morality] is related to our superego; the way we 
shape ourselves according to our superego [...].” 
• “The person in front of me might be used to being 
lied to or lying, but the fact that his/her perception 
of morality is shaped like this should not 
influence my understanding of morality.” 
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APPENDIX B2: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 2, Question 1 
Part 2 – Question 1: How do you think moral behaviour emerges? What might be the 
necessary psychological or cognitive components for moral behaviour to emerge? 
Category Theme Description Example Statements 
Components 
of the FCM 
Judgement This theme includes 
responses that focus on 
moral judgement. Only one 
response was categorized in 
this category. 
• [Moral behaviour emerges] 
“When we need to make a 
choice between right and wrong” 
 
Motivation This theme includes 
responses that focus on the 
motivational aspects of 
moral behaviour. Only one 
response referred to the 
motivation to act morally. 
• “Religion provides the 
motivation to act morally. But 
this motivation is a selfish one of 
seeking paradise after death 
and/or avoiding divine 
punishment.” 
 
Emotion This theme could be 
considered as a further 
subcategory of Motivation. 
However, while the 
motivational aspects of 
emotions are alluded to, the 
emphasis on specific 
emotions, rather than their 
motivational aspects, 
requires a separate category 
for emotions. 
• “Empathy is behavioural 
morality, in my understanding.” 
 
Moral 
development 
Reactions This theme includes 
responses that emphasize 
the reactions role models 
give to children in response 
to events and situations 
during moral development. 
• “Arrangements and reactions in 
response to events and situations 
are important.” 
• “Reactions and attitudes in 
response to events” 
• “Reactions to events” 
 
Learning This theme includes 
responses that focus on 
morality as something that is 
learnt. 
• “Moral behaviour is learnt. 
During childhood it is learnt 
through observation, it sinks in 
during adolescence.” 
Developmental This theme includes 
responses that focus on 
moral development. This 
was the most common kind 
of response that participants 
gave to this question. Some 
participants gave in depth 
explanations of moral 
development. 
 
• “Morality emerges early in 
childhood with the family.” 
• “During ages 0-6 with the 
family, and with pre-school 
education” 
• “Morality appears after a certain 
phase of cognitive development 
is reached.” 
• “According to a study [children] 
think that their lies are true 
before they reach a certain level 
of cognitive development, so 
before they can understand 
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honesty, they must reach the 
relevant age” 
 
Environmental This theme includes 
responses that focus on the 
environment in which a 
child’s moral development 
takes place. This was the 
second most common kind 
of response to this question. 
 
• “Personal history, experiences, 
and familial and environmental 
factors are important.” 
• “Social pressure and family are 
the most important things.” 
• “Pressure from society and 
family, related to where you 
grow up... People born on the 
Western and Eastern sides of 
Turkey tend to be different from 
each other given the differences 
in family structure and 
worldview.” 
 
Other This category includes responses that could not 
be categorized in any of the other main themes 
or categories. 
 
• [It is] “Related to meeting the 
needs of oneself in balance with 
the needs of others” 
• “It is innate” 
• “It changes from person to 
person” 
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APPENDIX B3: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 2, Question 2 
Part 2 – Question 2: “When deciding what the best thing to do might be in a certain 
situation, do you think people more often behave based on their reasoning (consciously 
thinking), or based on their emotions/intuitions (nearly without a thought, 
automatically, instinctively)?” 
Theme Description Example Statements 
Predominantly 
Emotional/ 
Intuitive 
This theme includes 
responses that emphasize 
the role of emotions 
and/or intuitions. While 
there is a clear difference 
between moral emotions 
and moral intuitions, in 
this question they were 
treated as if they were 
same in order to focus on 
the visceral and automatic 
nature of intuitive moral 
judgements. 
• “People make decisions mostly emotionally, 
instinctively” 
• “People initially reason, but eventually act on their 
intuitions” 
• “More than 80% of human behaviour is based on 
emotions.” 
• “I’d say 60% of the time emotions lead moral 
judgement. But this is for me, I can’t say for 
others.” 
• “...we make intuitive decisions because we usually 
cannot reason things out; because of either 
laziness, not being able to reason, or for lack of 
time” 
• “I think ... for women it would be 70-80% 
intuitive.” (female participant) 
Balanced 
influence 
This theme includes 
responses that indicate 
that the influence of 
moral reasoning and 
intuitions has a closer 
balance. 
• “By establishing a balance between our reasoning 
and emotions...” 
• “The entirety of morality cannot be conceived in 
emotional terms, but it might cover both aspects.” 
• “...although it seems to me like it is reasoning, I 
think emotions play an important role; they are not 
independent.” 
• “This changes from person to person, but it should 
be equal. I try to make decisions based on my 
reasoning but if [one does not] emotionally accept 
[the reasoned judgement] one can’t be content.” 
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APPENDIX B4: Themes and Categories Emerging from Part 2, Question 3 
Part 2 – Question 3: Do you think people always do the best possible thing when they 
know what it is? If not, why do you think they cannot or will not do what they think or 
know to be the right thing to do in a situation? 
Category Theme Description Example Statements 
Related to 
the FCM 
Component 
3 
Religion This theme includes statements 
that are related to the moral 
motivational power participants 
have attributed to religion. While 
some participants indicated that 
religion can motivate people to do 
what they think is right, others 
have indicated that religious 
beliefs can inhibit people from 
acting. This category includes 
16.2% of all relevant statements. 
• “Religion is used to elevate 
morality to a higher level” 
• “It could inhibit people from 
doing the right thing” 
• “...my friends with more 
religious emotions are morally 
better than others.” 
• “I think it is related to the love 
or fear of God” 
 
Personal 
Interest 
This theme includes statements 
that are related to competing 
interests; in this case all 
statements refer to personal 
interest. All statements included 
here indicated that personal 
interest prevents people from 
acting on what they think or know 
to be the right thing to do in a 
situation. This theme includes 
24.3% of all statements. 
• “People do bad things because 
they don’t care about others, 
they are concerned with their 
own interest” 
• “People can’t disregard their 
personal gains.” 
• “People are born with the ego 
to help their survival, but the 
society might force one to 
protect one’s interests more.” 
 
Indifference This theme includes statements 
that indicated that people fail to 
act on what they know to be the 
best thing to do in a situation due 
to indifference. This theme 
includes 2.7% of all statements. 
• “... as in ‘the snake that doesn’t 
touch me can live a thousand 
years for all I care’” 
 
Related to 
the FCM 
Component 
4 
Social 
Pressure 
This theme includes codes that 
indicated that people fail to do 
what they know to be the right 
thing due to fear or anxiety of 
suffering negative social 
repercussions or ostracism. This 
theme includes 24.3% of all 
statements. 
 
• “For fear that getting involved 
might receive condemnation” 
• “They can’t, because in some 
situations environmental factors 
are also important” 
• “They don’t always do what 
they know, because sometimes 
what the majority wants can 
prevent our personal wishes” 
• “To be sure it is the right time 
and place” 
• “...for fear of losing people.” 
• “people would do whatever 
they want if nobody was 
watching –” 
 
Emotional 
Barriers 
This theme includes statements 
that identified only the preventive 
• “No they cannot. Negative 
thoughts like fear, anxiety 
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motivation of emotions, leading 
to a failure in moral behaviour 
despite individuals’ knowledge of 
the best thing to do. This theme 
includes 5.4% of all statements. 
 
might create obstacles.” 
• “People do bad things because 
their emotions override their 
will to do good” 
 
Other Uncategorized This category includes statements 
that pointed to a psychological 
failing, but could not be 
categorized in any other way. 
This category includes 10.8% of 
all statements. 
 
• “No they don’t. In some cases 
conscious values can be 
forgotten” 
• “Individuals’ habits and 
character” 
• “There are unseen obstacles in 
life.” 
• “Some psychological obstacles 
might prevent [people from 
doing the right thing]” 
 
Unrelated to 
the FCM 
This category includes statements 
that were not related to the Four 
Components Model. These 
include a focus on empathy, and 
gossip. This category includes 
10.8% of all statements. 
 
• “To understand why people 
don’t do the right thing when 
they know it, we need to 
understand them, be like them, 
and understand how they got to 
be the way they are.” 
• “People would not want to be 
treated the way they treat others 
if they were the receivers of 
that kind of treatment. To 
understand, one must put 
themselves in the shoes of 
others.” 
• “No people don’t always do 
what they think is right. Instead 
they gossip about the wrong 
doing. Taking action against 
wrongdoing is a rare thing.” 
 
No Gappiness 
Problem 
This category includes codes that 
indicate that people always do 
what they know to be the best 
thing to do. Only two teachers 
indicated this in the written 
interviews, using the exact same 
words. 5.4% of codes are 
included in this subcategory. 
• “People always do the best they 
know” 
• “People always do the best they 
know” 
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Appendix B5: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 2, Question 4 
Part 2 – Question 4: “Where do you think the motivation for moral behaviour comes 
from? As internal motivation: logic and reasoning, emotions and intuitions, personality 
traits and character; or as external motivation laws and social pressure. Apart from 
these, how prominent do you think moral behaviour for technical/tactical reasons (such 
as obeying the law to avoid punishment or protecting your reputation to be able to do 
better business)?” 
Category Theme Description Example Statements 
External 
Motivation 
Technical/ 
tactical reasons 
Statements related 
to this theme 
referred to 
motivation to act 
morally based on 
technical/ tactical 
reasons. 
• “technical/tactical reasons such as avoiding 
punishments are the main drivers of moral 
motivation” 
• “[Technical/tactical reasons] should be more 
prominent, but they aren’t today” 
• “It’s like fooling oneself and others to get to 
the good of afterlife  - if it exists” 
Consequences Statements related 
to this theme 
referred to the 
motivation 
consequences of 
certain behaviour 
provide for moral 
action. 
• “In Turkey fear of punishments is a strong 
motivator.” 
• “For laws to be effective motivators, 
punishments have to be deterrent enough.” 
(legal consequences) 
• “People act morally because they are afraid 
of social pressure, if they don’t they are 
ostracized.” (social consequences) 
• “Other people’s reactions are more important 
deterrents [than laws].” (social consequences) 
• “The feeling of being accepted and approved 
of is an important motivator.” (social 
consequences) 
 
The necessity 
of external 
motivation 
Statements placed 
in this theme were 
related to how 
participants 
perceived that 
external 
motivation is 
necessary for 
moral behaviour. 
• “...if external motivation wasn’t so efficient, 
the notion of state would not have developed. 
This is the reason states exist. Because people 
violate each other. Everyone wants to see an 
authority above themselves. The necessity for 
an authority has led to the creation of states.” 
• “Internal motivation plays a small role, 
external motivation such as rewards, like 
congratulating children, are necessary, at 
least before the character settles.” 
 
Internal 
Motivation 
Development 
and character 
Statements placed 
in this theme were 
related to the 
development of a 
kind of character 
that provides 
internal 
motivation. 
• “Internal motivation is important. But of 
course, the external motivation during the 
development of internal motivation is very 
important.” 
• “The person might be able to develop his/her 
own internal motivation once their character 
has settled.” 
• “Character provides moral motivation, but 
only after a certain stage.” 
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 Reasoning vs. 
emotions 
Statements related 
to this theme 
referred to the 
motivating power 
of moral reasoning 
or moral emotions. 
• “...I can’t make a distinction between 
emotions and personality. Emotions must 
direct personality. Reasoning is a bit further 
away” 
• “Reasoning and logic are more important 
[motivators], followed by emotions.” 
Value of 
internal 
motivation 
Statements 
relevant to this 
theme emphasize 
the value of 
internal 
motivation. 
• “Moral behaviour due to external reasons is 
more common, but internal motivation is 
more important.” 
• “People should act morally because they 
want to.” 
Mixed 
Influence 
Statements placed in this category 
pointed to the variety of potential 
causes of motivation to act morally 
and to the ambiguity related to the 
roots of moral motivation. 
• “Internal and external motivation are equally 
important.” 
• “Changes from person to person. People can 
behave morally for all kinds of reasons.” 
• “Behaving morally can be instinctive as well 
as concerning personal interest.” 
 
Other Statements placed in this category 
either do not fit the other themes or 
categories, or they are ambiguous. 
• “[Moral motivation] comes from the family.” 
• “Everybody acts morally for 
technical/tactical reasons... no, not everybody 
is that bad.” 
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Appendix B6: Second Order Volitions – Part 2, Question 6, Focus 2 
Part 2 – Question 6: “What do you think might be the relationship between character 
traits and emotions? How much can one’s desire to be “this kind of a person” affect 
their moral behaviour?” 
Theme Description Example Statements 
Roots of 
Second Oder 
Volitions 
Statements categorized in 
this theme focused on how 
second order volitions are 
created, or alternatively 
what lies at the root of 
second order volitions.  
 
• “I think if an individual is trying to be a good person 
s/he would be using only their reasoning. If someone 
is putting aside their emotions and is aiming to 
achieve that ideal personhood s/he is using his/her 
reasoning and that person should put their reasoning 
before their emotions.” 
• “I think it’s like indirect learning. If your mother 
praises the neighbour’s kid ‘look how hard he 
studies, look how smart he is’ you inevitably find 
yourself lacking and think ‘if I want to be loved by 
mum I need to work hard, I want to be hard-
working.’” 
 
Second 
Order 
Volitions as 
Goal 
Orientation 
Several participants seemed 
to construe second order 
volitions, or “the kind of 
person one wants to be” as 
goals to be achieved. 
Statements categorized in 
this theme focused on 
participants’ beliefs 
relevant to this idea. 
• “If someone is putting aside their emotions and is 
aiming to achieve that ideal personhood s/he is using 
his/her reasoning...” 
• “[The kind of person one want to be] must have an 
effect [on moral behaviour]. [A person who acts 
according to such desires] will have behaved towards 
a goal.” 
Failures 
Related to 
Second 
Order 
Volitions 
Several participants 
focused on how second 
order volitions fail, or what 
happens when they fail. 
The only unifying theme of 
this category is that each 
statement placed here 
emphasized one kind or 
another failure related to 
second order volitions. 
• “People cannot change their personalities overnight 
even if they want to.” 
• “Usually when people can’t be what they want to be 
they become aggressive and blame others for their 
failure.” 
• “Well, the ideal self must not conflict with the real 
self.” 
• “Before a certain phase of cognitive development is 
reached where children can decide for themselves 
people learn morality by conforming to the 
environment and family. After this it is hard to detach 
from that influence. If this was not the case you 
might have been able to decide based on the kind of 
personality you wanted to be.” 
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Appendix B7: Effects on Moral Behaviour – Part 2, Question 6, Focus 3 
Part 2 – Question 6: “What do you think might be the relationship between character traits 
and emotions? How much can one’s desire to be “this kind of a person” affect their moral 
behaviour?” 
Theme Description Example Codes 
Second Order 
Volitions 
Statements placed in this 
theme focused on the effect 
second order volitions have on 
moral behaviour. Four out of 
the seven statements relevant 
to this focus are placed here. 
• “[The kind of person one wants to be has] a 
direct effect [on moral behaviour].” 
• “The characteristics people want to be/have 
affect good behaviour to a large extent.” 
• “A person who succeeds in becoming the person 
they want to be is a moral and proper person.” 
• [The kind of person one wants to be has] quite a 
bit [of an effect on moral behaviour]. 
 
Character 
Traits 
Statements placed in this 
theme focused on the effect 
character traits have on moral 
behaviour. Three out of the 
seven statements relevant to 
this focus were placed here. 
• “The kind of person someone wants to be... 
would influence their behaviour, though not as 
much as their character traits.” 
• “Character traits can be effective. They affect 
moral behaviour.” 
• “Character traits have an effect.” 
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APPENDIX B8: School is not the most important place for moral education – Part 
3, Question 1, Theme 1 
Part 3 – Question 1: Do you think it is important to teach morality in school? How 
should the moral education program be? 
Theme Description Example Statements 
Family is 
more 
important 
Statements placed in this 
theme focused on the 
importance of the family in 
terms of moral education, and 
the role the school plays in 
relation to the family. 
• “The school is a factor but the most important factor 
is the family.” 
• “I think the school can only have a supporting role to 
the family.” 
• “The school helps alongside the family.” 
• “Families should be given this kind of awareness 
[relevant to moral education].” 
ME is not 
entirely 
possible 
Statements placed in this 
theme indicated that moral 
education is either not entirely 
possible, or that ME in 
schools cannot do justice to 
what is actually aims to 
achieve. 
• “Teachers can be good models but I don’t think 
morality can be completely taught.” 
• “It could be in the homeroom hour, but something 
like morality is caught rather than taught, in and out 
of the school, and since life couldn’t be a lesson these 
things would be learnt implicitly.” 
• “I’m not sure how it can be taught.” 
• “Concerns like earning bread would trump concerns 
about moral education.” 
 
ME 
beyond 
the school 
Statements placed in this 
theme indicated that moral 
education either should not be 
confined to the school or that 
it continues beyond the 
school. 
• Moral learning is lifelong. 
• Moral education should not be confined to school; 
those who don’t go to school should also get moral 
education. 
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APPENDIX B9: How ME should be conducted – Part 3, Question 1, Theme 2 
Part 3 – Question 1: Do you think it is important to teach morality in school? How 
should the moral education program be? 
Theme Description Example Statements 
Lesson Based 
ME 
Statements placed in this 
theme focused on the 
practice of ME in terms of 
lessons. All participants who 
indicated how moral 
education should be 
practiced as lessons were 
teachers. 
• “It is definitely important. A yearly plan must be 
made regarding moral education. It should be 
conducted step by step like a lesson.” 
• “It is important. [It should be conducted when the 
teacher] finds the time during lessons.” 
 
ME vs. 
Religious 
Education 
(RE) 
Statements placed in this 
theme refer to the ME 
provided in RE. Two 
students and one intern 
addressed this issue here. 
 
• “Moral education should be separate from 
religious education, so that it can have an 
influence on people from different religious 
background or no religious interest.” 
• “There should be a moral education course 
separate from religious education, but that should 
not mean religious education should be removed.” 
• “What are you trying to achieve with religious 
education?” [Rhetorical question] 
 
Application/ 
Experience 
Based ME 
Two teachers explicitly 
emphasized that ME should 
be based on application and 
experience. However, they 
did not specify a certain 
format for how moral 
education should be 
conducted. 
• “It should take place in education through 
application/exemplification.” 
• “It is important. Its application should be based 
on experiencing.” 
 
Implicit ME Two interns emphasized that 
ME should be practised 
implicitly in schools. 
• “It should be implicit and it should penetrate the 
entire educational process.” 
• “Moral education should be implicit, and spread 
across the curriculum.” 
 
Pedagogical 
Practices 
One student and one intern 
focused on which 
pedagogical methods should 
be used in ME. 
• “Morality as a skill develops through trial and 
error. But in school moral behaviour can be 
fostered with reinforcements: awards and 
punishments. But no, using only well placed 
rewards would be better.” 
• “Moral education should be given starting from 
primary school. But it should not be based on rote 
memorization, like the Religious Culture and 
Ethics course.” 
 
Regarding 
Teachers 
Four students focused on the 
role of the teacher in ME. 
While three students focused 
on the teacher in terms of 
being a role model, one 
student indicated that 
teachers are not well 
• “Along with the moral education teacher other 
teachers should also know how to do moral 
education and be role models. But in the lack of a 
tight focus moral education cannot work very 
well.” 
• “Moral education should start with the teacher’s 
behaviour.” 
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equipped to conduct moral 
education. 
• “Morality is usually learnt from the behaviour of 
teachers, parents...” 
• “If the teachers had the necessary and relevant 
knowledge they could do better moral education.” 
 
ME as 
Imposition 
One interesting theme to 
emerge was this one, from 
the responses of three 
interns. They all indicated 
that moral education should 
not have an oppressive 
nature. 
• “Moral education should be voluntary, not 
mandatory.” 
• “Moral education should be conducted not as 
handing down from an authority like the teacher 
or a cleric.” 
• “[ME] is important, but to a certain degree: it 
should not take away my freedom, I should be 
able to act like myself, not in some other direction 
– though there should be some direction in the 
education.” 
 
Unspecified Some participants indicated 
that moral education was 
important, but they did not 
specify a certain method of 
conducting ME. Statements 
from one student and three 
teachers have been included 
here. 
• “Yes, [it is important]. It should take place in the 
programme heavily.” 
• “It is important.” 
• “The school is already a moral programme 
[/institution].” 
• It should not be as a course. 
 
Other Some statements could not 
be placed in any of the above 
categories. These include one 
intern’s focus on fostering 
students’ self-esteem, and 
one 1st year student’s thought 
regarding the nature of moral 
education. 
• “If you build the child’s self-esteem and make 
them feel unique and valuable s/he would be more 
considerate, respectful, and overall more moral.”  
• “Morality should stop being seen as something 
religious or communal, and be taken for what it 
actually is.” 
• “If a kind of training that would improve people’s 
empathetic abilities was given and human 
psychology was well taught, there would no 
longer be any problems regarding morality.”  
• “Moral education should make people do the right 
thing beyond technical/tactical reasons.” 
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APPENDIX B10: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 3, Question 3 
Part 3 – Question 3: “What do you think about our current moral education system?” 
Theme Description Example Statements 
ME Format Statements relevant 
to this theme focused 
on the format of 
moral education. 5 
teachers and 1 intern 
focused on the 
format of ME, and 
this theme holds the 
highest frequency of 
statements in this 
question. 
• “It requires more support. A separate course and education 
programme should be planned.” 
• “Awful. The general education system is bad on all levels.” 
• “It should be more intense; more importance should be 
given to experience and application.” 
• “I find it lacking in terms of application.” 
• “Moral education is not sufficient and it is not conducted in 
the right way.” 
• “Topics related to morality are taught in the religion and 
philosophy courses, but it is not enough.” 
 
Regarding 
RE and ME 
Content 
Statements placed in 
this theme focus on 
how ME is 
conducted in RE and 
other contexts, and 
the content of ME in 
different contexts. 
Three students and 
one intern explicitly 
focused on this 
matter. 
• “There should be no religious education because the way it 
is practiced now excludes people of different religious 
backgrounds.” 
• “Sometimes it is expected of the child to blindly follow 
rules... Parents and teachers decide in the child’s stead – 
you will go to this school, we will learn this in class today – 
all without the child’s participation in decision making. As 
a result the child ends up unable to advocate his/her own 
thoughts. So, the child just keeps on taking what being 
provided rather than being creative or resourceful.” 
• “There is no moral education. There is no education that 
addresses Kohlberg’s theory. We used to take the religion 
course in middle school but the moral education given there 
is made up of whatever the individual teacher teaches and it 
changes from teacher to teacher and school to school.” 
 
Regarding 
Teachers 
One teacher and two 
interns stated their 
beliefs regarding 
teachers engaged in 
moral education. 
• “It is taught only in religious education, maybe by the 
wrong people.” 
• “As far as I can see unskilled teachers are being trained... I 
don’t think I’ll be a very good model so I don’t want 
morality to be taught... If the system was a bit better more 
skilled teachers could be trained. But very unskilled 
teachers are being trained. If I was a parent I wouldn’t want 
teachers to teach anything about morality to my children.” 
• “There is so much wrong with it I don’t know where to 
start... First of all teachers should receive moral education.” 
 
Teachers’ 
Initiative 
Two students and 
one intern indicated 
that moral education 
is completely up to 
the efforts of 
individual teachers, 
implying that there is 
no consistent or 
unified practice of 
moral education. 
• “Bad ... There is not enough emphasis on moral education; 
it is up to individual teachers.” 
• “There is no moral education ... We used to take the 
religion course in middle school but the moral education 
given there is made up of whatever the individual teacher 
teaches and it changes from teacher to teacher and school to 
school.” 
• “Awful ... It is up to individual teachers to conduct moral 
education, and idealist teachers who will do quality moral 
education are very rare.” 
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Unspecified Two interns and two 
teachers stated 
negative attitudes 
towards the current 
system of moral 
education; however, 
they did not specify 
the cause of their 
negative attitudes. 
• “I find it lacking.” 
• “It’s insufficient.” 
• “Moral education exists only in name, it is not practiced. If 
it was we would have been able to see its effects, but there 
are none.” 
• “I don’t know much, but I don’t think it’s good.” 
Unclear The responses of two 
teachers and one 
student do not make 
it clear whether they 
have a negative or 
positive attitude 
towards the current 
moral education 
system. These 
participants 
described what they 
thought was the 
current moral 
education system. 
• “I know moral education to be conducted in the RCE and 
philosophy courses.” 
• “Programmes conducted in the homeroom/guidance course, 
as well as personal development courses.” 
• “I might have learnt something from high school 
philosophy...” 
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APPENDIX B11: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 3, Question 4 
Part 3 – Question 4: “What is the place of moral education in the hidden curriculum? How 
does moral education take place in the hidden curriculum?” 
Theme Description Example Statements 
Teachers’ 
Behaviour 
The collection of 
statements that 
yield this theme 
focused on how 
teachers’ behaviour 
has an important 
implicit influence 
concerning 
students’ moral 
education. One 
teacher, two interns 
and a student 
focused on this. 
• [Moral education takes place in the hidden curriculum as 
teachers] “caution students at every area, during recess, 
during class.” 
• “It happens through taking role models. Or when the 
teacher warns a student who’s done something wrong or 
rewards when a student does something right. This 
provides a model... Not just in the classroom but in the 
yard as well, and teachers’ relationships with each other as 
well in some way... everyone in the school environment 
would contribute to moral education.” 
• “The teacher has to be a model. If there is petty 
competition between teachers, students pick up on it 
straight away, and they learn more from teachers’ 
behaviour than what they say in class.” 
• “Students pay attention to teachers all the time. If the 
teachers treat each other badly, the kids pick up on that.” 
 
Social 
Environment 
Statements placed 
in this theme 
focused more on 
whose behaviour 
forms the hidden 
curriculum than 
what kind of 
behaviours form it. 
Three teachers and 
one intern focused 
on this aspect. 
• [It is] “The moral education taking place in the hidden 
curriculum between the teachers and the administrators.” 
• “It is between teachers and administrators”  
• “Hidden curriculum = school interaction”  
• “Students learn morality completely implicitly. I think 
morality is learnt better through what the teacher does 
outside the classroom than what s/he says in class. And not 
just the teachers, everyone in the school is part of moral 
education, the guy at the canteen, the cleaners, friends, 
administrators... They have more influence.”  
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APPENDIX B12: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 3, Question 5 
Part 3 – Question 5: “How do you think higher education teacher training affects 
primary and secondary education hidden curriculum? What do you think can be done in 
teacher training to improve moral education in primary and secondary education?” 
Theme Description Example Statements 
Improving 
Teacher 
Training 
The majority of 
participants 
focused on how 
teacher training 
could be 
improved 
considering 
implicit education 
at primary and 
secondary levels. 
55.5% of 
statements have 
been placed in 
this theme. 
• “There should be a greater focus on moral psychology in 
teacher training.” 
• “One would have greater knowledge. Seminars should be 
arranged.” 
• “It should be conducted throughout the teaching service by 
the right educationists.”  
• [It should be improved] “throughout teacher training by 
experienced teachers.” 
• “Formation programmes and in-service education can be 
considered.” 
• “The development of a person must be thoroughly known. 
Developmental psychology must be learnt, student 
psychology must be learnt; teaching techniques and 
methodologies must also be learnt. The training we get 
supposedly teaches us this, but it is shallow, and we don’t 
have the means to practice any of this kind of training we get. 
I’m not sure if every graduate of an education faculty is 
moral either. I don’t think the assessment of this training can 
be tests, the idea is ridiculous.” 
 
The Benefit 
and 
Influence 
of Teacher 
Training 
Most of the rest 
of the statements 
have been placed 
here (27.7%). 
Statements placed 
in this theme 
focused on how 
wide the effects 
of teacher 
training is, or can 
be, concerning 
moral education 
and the wider 
society. 
• “During training it remains at the level of knowledge. It is 
useful in terms understanding the concept of ‘morality.’” 
• “It is very beneficial and effective. There should be greater 
focus on it.” 
• “Such an education should be definitely given. Now that I 
think about it, considering the four years of my education, I 
have never received this kind of training. Would it be useful 
if I had? Definitely. I would have been able to solve my own 
problems more easily had I had this kind of an education. I’ve 
had to grapple with some tough issues on my own without 
any help after moving to this city for university. This kind of 
training would have helped me to resolve my own issues with 
greater confidence, and in return, I could better help my 
students resolve their issues. They would learn confidence as 
well.”  
• “Despite being in an education faculty I don’t think very 
highly of teachers. Most of them don’t raise even their own 
children very well. And then what can a single teacher do in a 
class of forty students other than to be a role model anyway? 
... But if teachers received this kind of an education every 
segment of the society would be better off. If a kind of 
training that would improve people’s empathetic abilities was 
given and human psychology was well taught, there would no 
longer be any problems regarding morality.” 
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APPENDIX B13: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 4, Question 1 
Part 4 – Question 1: “How much time do you devote to teaching moral values in the 
classroom? Do you use a specific system of method when you teach morality?” 
Theme Description Example Statements 
Time 
Focus 
The statements 
placed in this theme 
focused on how 
much time 
participants spend 
on teaching values. 
This theme includes 
35% of all 
statements. 
• “I devote a part of my lesson every day. I use ‘I Solve 
Problems’ and drama methods. I also use book sets.” (Teacher) 
• “When it is appropriate, when it is suitable, and in the 
homeroom hour.” (Teacher) 
• “Apart from conducting it as lessons, I focus on it at every 
social crisis in class.” (Teacher) 
• “I do it in the teaching and education process in general.” 
(Teacher) 
• “I don’t devote much time, only when I find the time.” 
(Teacher) 
• “Morality is a general concept; I implement it throughout the 
teaching and educating process.” (Teacher) 
Method 
Focus 
The statements 
placed in this theme 
elaborate on the 
methods employed 
in teaching values. 
This theme includes 
35% of all 
statements. 
• “I devote a part of my lesson every day. I use ‘I Solve 
Problems’ and drama methods. I also use book sets.” (Teacher) 
• “I prefer the teaching through experience method.” (Teacher) 
• “By relating it to topics covered in class or to current events, or 
through a situation happening in the class.” (Teacher) 
• “I prefer rewarding rather than punishing, but I try to use 
Kohlberg’s moral development stages and teaching  methods” 
(Teacher) 
• “I worked with some 12-year-olds; they tend to be more self-
centred. I try to get students to think for themselves by asking 
them questions instead of outright saying this is right and this is 
wrong. I focus on fostering the respect students have other 
individuals’ right, but I don’t interfere unless someone is in 
danger of being harmed.” (Intern) 
• “Usually in games. I worked for the Turkish Education 
Volunteers Charity for a while. The kids would fight when 
playing, ‘you took my spot’ ‘you pushed me’ sort of thing. I 
don’t know how, but spontaneously with something of the 
moment, using the right kind of language I would try to get the 
children to empathize with each other, ‘OK, now I want you 
two to change places’ or ‘how would you feel in you were in 
your friend’s place?’ ‘You’d be angry if your friend did the 
same to you, right?’ And the kids would understand then.” 
(Intern) 
 
Other Statements placed 
in this theme did 
not focus either on 
the time spent on 
teaching values, nor 
on the methods 
used. Interns’ and 
students’ responses 
were more related 
to this theme. 29% 
• “Yes, I do.” (Teacher) 
• “I can’t really think of a concrete example right now, but 
unconsciously I would have tried to give something to the 
students with the way I talk and behave.” (Intern) 
• “I haven’t had much of an interaction with students. Actually 
there were a few times when I tried to take control of the class 
to challenge myself. But these... as I said, this information isn’t 
enough for teachers. Should I try to teach a lesson in my field 
or... I haven’t had much time for these.” (Intern) 
• “No I don’t use any specific methods.” (Intern) 
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of statements were 
placed in this 
category. 
• “Respect is very important for me, like being listened to when 
I’m speaking. There is no meaning in what I do if the student 
isn’t listening to me. I should get a response, and I should not 
be interrupted.” (Student) 
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APPENDIX B14: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 4, Question 3 
Part 4 – Question 3: “As a teacher, would you have liked to take a course on moral 
development and moral psychology in teacher training? If you had, how do you think it 
would have been beneficial for you? Is there anything specific that you’d like to learn from 
such a course?” 
Theme Description Example Statements 
Reasons 
for 
receiving 
training 
One teacher, two 
interns, and one 
student focused on 
why this training 
should be provided. 
• “Yes I would like to. I would have better learnt the stages of 
how to explain and implement such a large and abstract 
topic” (teacher) 
• “Of course I would like to have a course like this. I think the 
training I received is not enough. I would have liked to learn 
more.” (intern) 
• “To understand what morality is. When you asked me what I 
thought morality is, I didn’t know what to say. I don’t know 
whether morality is my values or the society’s values.” 
(intern) 
• “If we understand ... historical development, philosophical 
development, and sociological development of foundations – 
if we understand these, we can understand that morality is 
something different than what the society, state or world 
order says it is.” (student) 
 
Format of 
the 
training 
Three interns and two 
students focused on 
how this training 
should be provided 
and assessed. 
• “I would like it, but not as a course/lecture18... It should not 
be evaluated like a test, but it should be more like sharing.” 
(intern) 
• “Yes, at least a few lectures. But this training should not be 
about rote memorization, it should be more about 
discussion.” (intern) 
• “It should not be about how I view morality, but about how I 
can teach and change morality.” (intern) 
•  “A course means directing people. I would like to discuss 
what people think morality is rather than how to be moral. 
Not like ‘universal morality is this or that.’” (student) 
• “Yes, but it can’t be covered in a single lecture. It would be 
ridiculous to confine a topic that affects a person’s whole life 
to a single lecture. I think it should be distributed across 
secondary and tertiary education...” (student) 
 
Content of 
the 
training 
One teacher, two 
interns, and two 
students focused on 
what they would like 
to learn from this kind 
of training, and what 
the contents of this 
training should cover. 
• “Yes I would like to. I’d have liked to learn about moral 
development theories.” (teacher) 
•  “Yes, because even though I can’t make proper sentences 
about this topic, I like this stuff. I would like to learn the 
theories. I would like to read psychological, sociological, 
and philosophical papers.” (intern) 
• “Philosophy, like I said in the beginning, but also other 
relevant things as well. These include religion, technological 
developments, psychological theories... Giving the largest 
share to philosophy, all these should be studied.” (intern) 
                                                          
18 The participant used the word “ders” which can mean either a single lecture, or a term long course. Due to 
the ambiguity, both translations have been included. 
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• “I’d like to learn something about the hidden curriculum...” 
(student) 
• “... we should first understand how morality has progressed 
historically... How morality has progressed from the ancient 
era to the modern era. We should understand the human 
brain’s cognitive process ... After this philosophy and 
sociology should enter the scene. This time we should 
investigate the philosophical perspectives on morality. Like 
pragmatism. We should study philosophical schools of 
thought. It should be in the frame of historical development 
once again, so we can have a sense of the historical pattern, a 
foundation. And we should understand what shapes 
societies’ understanding of morality.” (student) 
 
Receivers 
of 
training 
One teacher, intern 
and student 
emphasized that 
teachers should not be 
the only ones to 
receive this training, 
but that at least 
everyone involved in 
the education process 
should receive this 
training. 
• “I would have liked to take this during university. I think it 
should be in all departments.” (teacher) 
• “Every teacher and, indeed, everyone working in a school 
should get this training.” (intern) 
• “Yes I would’ve liked it. It’s necessary in any case. 
Everybody needs it, from the construction engineer to the 
teacher.” (Student) 
 
“I just 
want it.” 
Five teachers and one 
student simply stated 
that they would have 
liked to receive this 
kind of training. 
• “I would have liked”  
• “Yes I would have liked to. I believe it would be beneficial.” 
• “Could do.” 
• “Yes I would have liked it.” 
• “Yes I would have liked to.” 
• “Yes, but I can’t say anything specific.”  
 
 
 
 
